

The Qur'anic  
Theology  
Philosophy  
and  
Spirituality

Abdul Hafeez Fazli



**THE QUR'ANIC THEOLOGY**

**PHILOSOPHY**

**AND**

**SPIRITUALITY**

**Dr. Abdul Hafeez Fâzli**

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## PREFACE

Allah's Word is *al-Ḥaqq*. (Al-Qur'an, 6:73, 2:42 etc.) *Al-Ḥaqq* means 'the standard of truth'. Whenever Allah reveals *al-Ḥaqq*, it comes to humankind as the certain truth. (*ibid*, 32:2-3; 34:6 etc.) And *al-bâtil* (falsehood, untruth), *ad-dalâl* (error) or *ẓann* (conjecture or opinion) have no reality of their own. *Al-bâtil* is but the attempted rejection of *al-Ḥaqq*. To say anything in violation to *al-Ḥaqq* is without justification and wrongful (*bi ghayr 'l ḥaqq*). (*ibid*,02:61; 03:21 etc.)

To prefer suspicions, conjectures or opinions in the face of *al-Ḥaqq* is to follow *ẓann*. Whatever the Qur'an upholds is truth (*ḥaqq*), whatever it disapproves is untruth (*bâtil*). To express views without reference to it is to express opinion or conjecture and 'Assuredly conjecture can by no means take the place of truth.' (*ibid*,10:36)

*Ad-dalâl* (error) is nothing except deviation from truth. (*ibid*,10:32) It results in the generation of erroneous ideas, and ideological systems. It is the outcome of giving equal importance as *al-Ḥaqq* to manmade ideas and ideologies, human experiments, opinions, suggestions, insights, imaginations, visions (*ro'yâ*), unveiling (*kashf*), direct witnessing (*shahûd*) and traditions (*riwayât*) and confounding them to *al-Ḥaqq* (the Word of Allah). But it is the Way of Allah that "He wipes out the falsehood and establishes the truth with His Words." (08:7-8)

Allah commands the believers "not to utter aught concerning Allah save the truth" (4:171). For saying anything about Allah, not supported by the Qur'an, is *iftirâ* (concoction). (3:94) To mould truth according to one's desires is *fisq* (transgression) and it is the *fasiqoon* to whom Allah misleads.

*Al-Ḥaqq* is the epithet used for Allah's Word revealed to His messengers (peace be upon them). Allah is the Descender of *al-Ḥaqq*. (cf. *ibid.*, 5:83, 84; 11:120 etc.) Qur'an verifies that the People of the Book have tampered *al-Ḥaqq* revealed in the past (cf. *ibid.*, 4:46; 5:13,41 etc.) and that Allah has taken on Him to protect the Qur'an against any such attempt, (cf. *ibid.*, 15:9) so virtually epithet *al-Ḥaqq* (*the truth*) rightfully applies to the Qur'an alone and the status of *authority* lies with it only.

Articles in this book present a humble attempt on the part of the author to examine certain terms, ideas, problems, presuppositions, opinions, suggestions, insights, imaginations, visions, unveiling and

religious experience (*ro'yâ* and *kashf o shuhood*) and traditions relating Muslim theology, philosophy and spirituality on the authority of the Qurân and their reconstruction in accordance with Qur'anic teachings. It is true that anyone's understanding or interpretation of the Qurân is not binding for others yet this is the only way with minimum scope for disagreement. At least the Muslims have no disagreement as to the text of the Qurân. If someone disagrees with author's view on some problem based on a certain interpretation of the Qurân, let him present a better interpretation for the readers and scholars to judge. The authority that an interpretation of a verse can be better than the other lies in Surah al-Furqân where Allah Almighty says: "*And no question do they bring to thee but We reveal to thee the truth and the best explanation (thereof).*" (*al-Qur'an*, 25:33)

Philosophy and Science are modern human endeavor to understand reality. We shall term them modernity. There seems to be a growing trend which takes Islam and modernity as the two opposing viewpoints having nothing in common, and disagreeing at the core. Should we reject all human experiment as untruth and profane or some viable understanding between the two is possible! The present work is a modest attempt to address this issue too.

Friends of Allah lead people from darkness towards light. If it gives you light, it is all because of the light granted to the author by his worthy mentor Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli (1940- ), the co-author of *Tafseer-e Fâzli*.

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## INTRODUCTION

Philosophical system and scientific world view by which one gets impressed assumes the status of a rational version of truth for him. If one already believes in a revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance. Ptolemy's model of the world which consisted of nine heavens with the earth in the center presented the scientific worldview of Ibn-e-Sina's times. (Circa 980–1037 A.D.) Qur'anic model of the universe consists of seven heavens and is irreconcilable with Ptolemaic model.<sup>1</sup> Remaining true to the Qur'an, Ibn-e-Sina could not accept Ptolemaic model. But he did not prove his worth in locating flaws in Aristotelian metaphysics, logic, concept of 'will' and 'perfection' etc. He also could not locate flaws in Ptolemaic model of the universe. This marred Ibn-e-Sina's whole metaphysics with inconsistency and self-contradiction and he had to surrender his belief in the creation of the universe in favour of eternal emanation, belief in Allah's Knowledge of particulars in favour of His eternal knowledge of everything, belief in human freedom in favour of determinism, bodily resurrection in favour of spiritual resurrection, belief in miracles in favour of absoluteness of causation and so on. Aristotelian concept of perfection as immutability was also not in line with the Qur'an.

Ideas thrive upon terms and travel in history through them. If they are false they go on coloring the understanding and interpretation of other ideas. At times it takes centuries for someone to identify them and straighten them. Let us take acceptance of Aristotle's concept of 'volition' by Ibn-e-Sina as an instance. Aristotle (384 B.C.–322B.C.) defines 'volition' as a capacity to attain something which one lacks or a capacity to remove deficiency which one suffers. So he argues: "Volition implies change, and change implies imperfection. Since god is conceived to be an absolutely perfect being, the attribute of 'volition' cannot be ascribed to him." Aristotle conceived perfection as immutability. Ibn-e-Sina, deeply impressed by Aristotle's philosophy as he was, accepted the notions of 'volition' and 'perfection' from him. The Qur'an very clearly states 'volition' as a Divine attribute and a sign of His Majesty. Qur'anic God is not inactive and immutable: *Every day He is at work. (al-Qur'an, 55:29)* It also states Allah's Knowledge and Volition as two different attributes.

Finding that 'volition' cannot be denied for Qur'anic God, Ibn-e-Sina makes an indirect move and says that since Allah lacks in nothing nor is there any deficiency in Him, so in Him 'Volition' is the same as 'Knowledge'. Again following Aristotle he said that essential nature of God is 'Thought' and thought is expressed in knowledge so there is no contradiction in identifying 'volition' with 'knowledge' in God. Since there is nothing outside God to have knowledge of it, therefore, God's knowledge consists of His eternal Self-Knowledge. Ibn-e Sina could not have denied Volition for God had he not accepted definition of 'will' from Aristotle.

It took around fourteen centuries after Aristotle when al-Ghazali (1058–1111) reconstructed the notion of 'Allah's Volition' as a capacity to freely choose one, out of two absolutely identical possibilities without any principle of particularization and showed that the concept of 'volition' was absolutely compatible with the perfection of Qur'anic God and a sign of His Dignity and Majesty. He also pointed out other inconsistencies in Ibn-e-Sina's philosophy which arose as implication of accepting Aristotle's concept of 'cause' and other ideas.<sup>2</sup>

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Ptolmaic cosmological system prevailed for sixteen centuries as scientific worldview before it was replaced by Newtonian scientific worldview. Newtonian cosmology and naturalism prevailed for two hundred years before it was replaced by Einstein's cosmology based on his theory of relativity and naturalism arising with it. If the scientific cosmologies in the past have been changing, the present one is likely to be replaced even in a lesser period. To meet the challenges posed by Newtonian cosmology and naturalism for Islam, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan formulates the tenets of a theology of modernity (*jadeed ilm-ul-kalam*) and presents it in his address to the Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam in Lahore in 1884 to respond to the threats of modernity. Conceiving the universe as 'Work of God' and conceiving the Qur'an as 'Word of God' it declares that in case of conflict between the two "Work of God overrides the Word of God." is the principle to be followed. Science being the scientific study of the universe, this amounts to a clear admission that that interpretation of the Qur'an will be preferred which is compatible with the Newtonian cosmology and the Newtonian naturalism.

Sir Seyed Ahmed passes away in 1998. Only seven years after his passing away Newtonian theory and naturalism is replaced by Einstein's theory of relativity and naturalism arising in its wake. "Newtonian universe was an infinite space existing in an absolute time. Albert Einstein in his Theory of Relativity suggested that time wasn't separate from space but connected to it. Time and space are combined to form *space-time*, and everyone measures his or her own experience in it differently. Einsteinian naturalism sees the fabric of space as four-dimensional. In it *time* is not absolute, it is relative to the experiencing subject. The basic elements of space-time are *events* as compared to Newtonian naturalism which believes in static and steady state universe with *things* as its elements... Now Iqbal comes forward with a new interpretation of 'the Word of God' in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* in line with Einsteinian Naturalism and other modern sciences."<sup>3</sup> In this connection Iqbal makes use of a tradition (*hadith*) which identifies Allah with time. This tradition is narrated in five different versions by Hazrat Abu Huraira (May Allah be pleased with him.) Two versions clearly deny Allah's identification with *time*. The other two versions clearly assert this identity. One version is liable to be interpreted both ways. Iqbal picks that version of this tradition which is clearly incompatible with Qur'anic teachings.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of critical examination of a theory is never to under-estimate the effort of the theorist who has given it. Ibn Sina, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal and even Dr. Israr Ahmed deserve our gratitude for their perceiving the significance of defining the nature of relationship of religion with the sciences and philosophy of a period and for their intellectual efforts in this concern. But for the development of knowledge it is necessary that we critically but respectfully examine the merits and the demerits of their work and play our part to take the knowledge ahead.

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"*La tasubu addahr, fa innallaha howa addahr.*" (Do not vilify time for Allah is time.) is considered to be a saying of the Prophet (pbuh). It contradicts with the Qur'an, therefore cannot be a saying of the Prophet. Nowhere in the Qur'an Allah identifies Himself with Time (*ad-dahr*). The word *ad-dahr* (the time) occurs only at two places in the Qur'an. In *surah al-Jâthiya* the disbelievers are reported to be saying: "There is naught but [only] our life of the world; we die and we live, and naught destroyeth us save time [al-dahr]; when they

*have no knowledge whatsoever of (all) that; they do but guess.”* (45:24) The disbelievers deny afterlife and requital and attribute what occur to them to *al-Dahr* as if *al-Dahr* (time) was but over and above everything like a superior fate. In *surah al-Dahr* the Qur'an says: *“Hath there come upon man (ever) any period of time [al-Dahr] in which he was a thing unremembered!”* (76:1) There is no sense in drawing the identification of *al-Dahr* with Allah or taking it as the Good-Name of Allah on the basis of these verses. It can be said on the authority of the Qur'an that the Prophet (pbuh) could never have identified *al-Dahr* with God. But Iqbal, an eminent Muslim philosopher of the sub-continent, conceives 'time' as an essential element of God's Being<sup>5</sup> and offers the above mentioned tradition as a proof.<sup>6</sup> 'Iqbal's philosophy of ego' is grounded in this identification. On the authority of the Qur'an we can say that the alleged tradition can never be a saying of the Prophet. The Qur'an does not endorse the view that 'Allah is time'. Since Iqbal is an eminent philosopher, the idea introduced by him may travel in history for long until it is finally checked and refuted.<sup>7</sup>

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Let us take another example of the acceptance of un-Qur'anic ideas to see how they affect the understanding and interpretation of other religious ideas. We unintentionally accept un-Qur'anic terms or ideas from other systems believing that they are our own and for centuries they keep us entangled in inconsistencies and confusion. Look at this formulation!

“Allah's Knowledge is eternal.

His eternal knowledge of everything includes foreknowledge of free actions of human beings yet to be born till the Last Day.

And that His Knowledge is infallible.”

Don't we consider it to be very much an Islamic belief! Muslims usually believe this doctrine of omniscience to be in accordance with the Qur'an, which it never is. It is absolutely against the teachings of the Qur'an. The readers will be surprized to know that the above is a restatement, in simple words, of the doctrine of omniscience formulated by Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.), reformulated by Luis de Molina (1535-1600 A.D.) and others and is known in history as the Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience. St. Anselm's (1033-1109) observation that God's Knowledge is infallible is also

part of this doctrine. The Ash'arite and the Maturidite<sup>8</sup> too believed God's Knowledge of everything to be essentially eternal.<sup>9</sup> Both of the above formulations (Muslim and Christian) interpret omniscience in an absolute manner which makes them incoherent with the concept of human freedom. The fact is that absolutist approach about Divine Knowledge of human actions has no basis in the Qur'an. The Muslims as well as Christians both had it from Greeks.

There is no attributive name referring to God's omniscience in Christianity. However Christians believe God to be Omniscient. The above mentioned formulation is a human attempt by Saint Thomas Aquinas to understand God's Omniscience. Our view is that man, with his created and finite capabilities, cannot correctly formulate the idea of God or any of His Attributes except on the basis of knowledge revealed by God Himself; and that too, within the limited scope of human abilities and understanding. The Muslims have Allah's Book intact in form and content. This contains Allah's Attributive Name *Al-'Aleem* (Omniscient) in it. It is astonishing that yet the Muslims accepted absolutist approach about God's Knowledge. Such views involved the Muslims into following inconsistency:

If Allah eternally knows all things, He must know the things yet to happen. And if He knows things yet to happen, He must eternally know the actions of human beings yet to come about. And if He foreknows human actions yet to come about, how can a man go against Allah's foreknowledge regarding a particular action. If man cannot go against Allah's foreknowledge of that action, his actions are pre-determined. If man's actions are pre-determined, how can he be a free agent!

If it is not possible that a human being takes a course other than what is eternally known by God, then he is not a free agent. Such view makes God an eternal Script Writer Who eternally knows what is going to happen or what is going to be performed by a character in any episode in this everlasting drama.

Such problems with respect to human freedom have also been identified in the contexts of Divine Omnipotence, the Appointed Term (*ajl-e mussamma*), Pre-Ordained Sustenance, Pleasure of God and Will of God (*Allah ki Raza aur Mashiyat*), and with regard to Libertarian and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an. On these problems the Muslims became divided into Libertarians and Predestinarians. The Mu'tazilites were libertarian whereas the



Ash'arites were predestinarian. The widely agreed approach used by the libertarians is to argue that though everything is known to God eternally and his Knowledge no doubt is infallible, God's Knowledge is descriptive but not determinative or causative; so human beings do what they do, freely. But it is illogical. If from the creation of the universe till the end of the world you cannot conceive a single person who can take a course other than what is eternally known by God, then what is determining the whole course of history other than God's eternal knowledge! The real thing is that when you take an un-Qur'anic notion (*i.e.*, a mistaken notion) about God or His attributes, you cannot avoid facing inconsistencies.<sup>10</sup>

Without indulging in an unnecessary discussion, let us reconstruct the doctrine of omniscience in the perspective of Qur'anic teachings.

The Qur'an categorizes human beings into three categories. Some human beings are sent in the world in such purity of nature that doing anything unholy is not conceivable of them. This purity of nature is not like a compulsion imposed on them. They are free moral agents. The function of the dictating self (*nafs-i-ammara*) in them is to blink dimly to point out that something, whether a precept or action or knowledge, is against their pristine purity, so unholy. They always stand upright against the dictates of desiring-self. The Qur'an says: "*God took a pledge from the prophets, saying, 'If, after I have bestowed Scripture and wisdom upon you, a messenger comes confirming what you have been given, you must believe in him and support him. Do you affirm this and affect My pledge as binding on you?' They said, 'We do.' He said, 'Then bear witness and I too will bear witness.'"* (03:81)<sup>11</sup> This holy verse clearly shows that (i) Allah had chosen prophets (pbuh) from among the progeny of Adam (pbuh) prior to the beginning of human life in this earthly world and the above mentioned pledge was taken from them in that non-physical state of their existence as Allah had taken pledge from the whole progeny of Adam by asking them: "Am I not your Lord!" and they had said "Yes! Of course, You are." (ii) That the holy prophets were destined to be born as holy. This is true of all prophets but the cases of Hazrat Ibrahim, his sons (Hazrat Ishâq and Hazrat Yaqûb), Hazrat Yahya, Hazrat Isâ and Hazrat Muhammad (Peace be upon all of them.) can be particularly mentioned in this respect for their status as righteous ones was declared before they were born.<sup>12</sup> Such persons are sent as a role model. Arguing with his people Hazrat Ibrahim

(pbuh) says: *“How can you argue with me about God when He has guided me!”* Allah says: *“We gave him Isaac and Jacob, each of whom We guided as We had guided Noah before, and among his descendants were David, Solomon, Job, Joseph, Moses, and Aaron—in this Way We reward those who do good. Zacharia, John, Jesus, and Elijah, and Lot. We favoured each one of them over other people; and also some of their forefathers, their offspring, and their brothers: We chose them and guided them on a straight path. Such is God’s guidance, with which He guides whichever of His servants He will. ... Those are the ones to whom We gave the Scripture, wisdom, and prophethood.”* (Al-Qur’an, 6: 80-88)<sup>13</sup> In Surah Yâseen Allah says to Hazrat Muhammad (pbuh): *“Yâ Sîn. By the Wise Qur’an; you [Muhammad—pbuh] are truly one of the messengers, sent on a straight path,”* (36:1-4)<sup>14</sup> All the messengers are sent on the Straight Path. (*Ṣiraṭ Mustaqeem*). To follow in the footprints of the Messenger is to be on the straight path. Allah foreknows that they will always lead a holy life. They are made to pass through such trying situations and turbulations which are unthinkable of ordinary human beings. They are Messenger of Allah’s revealed truth as well as role model in their own person of what they preach. They are seen by Allah for how they fulfil their duty as Allah’s prophet or a messenger and over a slight oversight they are severely seized by Allah. This shows that they are free moral agents. The case of Hazrat Yunas deserves to be mentioned here. Hazrat Yunas (pbuh) fulfilled his duty as Messenger in a best manner. However, when the People of Hazrat Yunas bluntly refused to believe in him, having clearly seen that Allah’s torment was but to fall on them, without waiting for Allah’s Command Hazrat Yunus (pbuh) left the people. Allah did not like this hurrying on the part of Hazrat Yunus (pbuh). He was seized by Allah and detained in the belly of a whale who had swallowed him. Allah says in the Qur’an that *“Wait patiently [Prophet] for your Lord’s judgement: do not be like the man in the whale who called out in distress: if his Lord’s grace had not reached him, he would have been left, abandoned and blameworthy, on the barren shore, but his Lord chose him and made him one of the Righteous.”* (Surah al-Qalm, 68:48)<sup>15</sup> In Surah Aṣ-Ṣafât Allah says: *Had he not been among those who glorify Allah, he would have stayed there in its belly till the Day when all will be resurrected.* (Surah as-Ṣafât, 37:139-148) Why! Because hurry in abandoning the deniers of truth prior to the coming of Allah’s Command showed his disdain for deniers of truth and Allah does not

like that anyone, even a prophet, shows disdain for his servants. Allah likes that one hates evil, He does not like that one hates the evil-doers. This act of Hazrat Yunus was just a foresight. Defiance or disobedience of Allah's Command or committing a sin by a Prophet (pbuh) is unthinkable. Hazrat Yunus' prayer, when he begged his Lord for forgiveness on his oversight from the darkneses of the belly of fish, was accepted. Hazrat Yunus' omission became a blessing for his People. Because of his not being present at the time of torment, his people were saved of the torment and this opened the gate of repentance for the servants for all times to come. Is it not enough to prove that notwithstanding Allah's chosen ones, the prophets and the messengers are free moral agents and they are passed through extremely difficult trials? Hazrat Noah's son was drowned in the deluge which was sent by Allah as torment on his people. Hazrat Noah (pbuh) beseeched his Lord saying that Allah had promised to save his household. Allah said that being unrighteous in actions his son did not belong to his household. Hazrat Noah (pbuh) again entreated for his son. Allah Almighty advised Hazrat Noah (pbuh) not to follow the way of the ignorant ones by insisting on his son's redemption. (11:45-46) It was not a defiance or disobedience of Allah's injunction, yet Allah did not like that Hazrat Noah (pbuh) talks about his son's redemption again. In a prolonged and very severe state of illness when most people had left him, Hazrat Ayub (pbuh) had shown great perseverance. Yet when it came on his tongue that *"O Lord! the satan has touched me with torture."* (21:83-84) Allah Almighty immediately relieved him from illness, but feeling guilty Hazrat Ayub thought that with the belief in Allah's All-Knowingness, the words of complaint should not have come on his tongue, he proclaimed that he will give punishment to his soul on this act. Allah forgave him, accepted his sincerity, and honoured him with blessings. Hazrat Musa (pbuh) while giving help to an Israelite with whom a Phiraunite was quarreling, the Phiraunite got killed. But it was not an intentional act. Hazrat Musa (pbuh) entreated for forgiveness of Allah, and Allah Almighty blessed him with forgiveness. Hazrat Dawood (pbuh) was busy in Allah's remembrance when two persons entered his place tresspassing the boundry wall. They presented their issue and sought his help. Hazrat Dawood (pbuh) immediately gave his verdict and the issue was resolved. But Hazrat Dawood (pbuh) entreated for forgiveness of Allah on his oversight for

not making provision for the seekers of help in urgent matters after the Court time was over. Allah Almighty had directed Hazrat Adam (pbuh) and his wife for not coming near a tree. Allah Almighty had also warned them to beware of Satan for the Satan was their arch enemy. But the fault of taking Satan as his wellwisher (whom Allah had declared Adam's professed enemy) misled Hazrat Adam but Allah forgave him and purified him before sending on the earth. These instances are sufficient to show that the Prophets and the Messengers are free moral agents; they are blessed with such purity when they are born that defiance and disobedience of Allah's Command is not conceivable of them. However, being human beings, foresight is possible and the foresight of a prophet opens a new door of blessing and salvation for the believers. Everyone is accountable before his Lord to the extent of capacity given to him and Allah has not made persons alike in this respect. It is already in Allah's Knowledge that the prophets and the messengers will always take a line of action compatible with His Pleasure.

It is pertinent to mention that according to the teachings of the Qur'an not a single person comes in the world in such state that it is already determined in God's Knowledge that he or she is bound to leave the world as a disbeliever. Even Iblis or Phiraun or Abu Lahb was not condemned by birth to leave the world as a sinner. Allah does not do injustice to His servants.

According to the Qur'anic concept of human life, man has not been sent to the earth as a punishment, but with the purpose to see whether divine bestowment is being utilized in his life according to Divine Guidance.<sup>16</sup> Man is to be rewarded for the line of action he takes. Utilization of provisions granted by Allah determines the line of action (*rukh*). It is not the action that is important it is the line of action that makes an action righteous or wrongful.<sup>17</sup> Resurrection and Requital are among the basic articles of Muslim Faith. This very present worldly life (*dâr al-'amal* دارالعمل) is going to change into afterlife (*dâr al-jazâ'* — دارالجزا). People other than those of the category mentioned above come in the world with both courses open to them. Allah has taken on Him to send Guidance and to enlighten the truth. All kinds of abilities (*taufiq*) given to them is best known to the Granter of Abilities. The kinds of test they are passed through are also best known to Him. *(Sometimes what befalls upon the believers is that He might know the believers, and that He may know the*

*hypocrites; cf. 3:165-166.*) To some, because of their persistence in righteousness, Allah makes to enter the category of His sincere servants, the devout (*al-Mukhlashin*) whom Satan cannot mislead. Now it gets determined in Allah's Knowledge that they will always choose a right line of action. Similarly, to some, because of their persistence in wrong-doing Allah lets to go astray and they fall in a category where the door of guidance is closed on them.<sup>18</sup> Now it gets determined in Allah's Knowledge that such people will not choose other than a wrong line of action.

Abu Lahb's condemnation was not determined in God's Knowledge prior to Abu Lahb and his wife's being born and included in the category of wrongdoers by having persistently followed wrong-doing. The verses of *surah* 111 simply state Abu Lahb's inability and undeservingness regarding Divine Guidance. It is quite in accordance with the laws of Divine Guidance that when a person or a people pass a certain limit in the enmity of the prophet and in disobedience of Allah's injunctions by their own free will, they are declared to be transgressors (*fâsiqûn*), who have closed the door of Guidance on them. Allah never guides such a people. Allah leaves them to advance in their transgression. These verses, containing Abu Lahb and his wife's condemnation, certified they're being transgressors. It is absolutely wrong to state these verses to contain pre-destined condemnation of Abu Lahb or of his wife on their pre-destined sins. It does not present a case of incoherence of Allah's Knowledge and Human Freedom, for none of the human beings Allah ever create is determined as sinner in His Knowledge from all eternity or prior to his birth. The same is the case with Iblîs. It was not impossible for God to create a world without Iblîs as 'the enemy of mankind' had Iblîs not demonstrated arrogance. However, a world without Iblîs as 'enemy of mankind' would have been a different world than the present one. It was never determined in Allah's Knowledge from eternity that Iblîs will necessarily demonstrate disobedience and arrogance, for Allah says: *He (Iblîs) disobeyed, and demonstrated arrogance and became a disbeliever. (02:34) And Allah is never unjust to His servants. (03:182, 08:51, 22:10, etc.)*

One of the sources of mistaken views about Omniscience is based on un-Qur'anic notion of Preserved Tablet (*lohim mahfûz*) prevalent in Muslims. Muslims believe that *lohim mahfûz* contains the record of everything that has happened and everything that will ever happen. As

given in the Qur'an the Preserved Tablet (*lohim mahfûz*) is a Book with the Lord which contains (i) the knowledge of former generations with reference to their destiny, (ii) the knowledge of what is in the heavens and the earth, and (iii) Mother of the Book (*Umm al-Kitâb*, i.e., Divine Laws regulating human destiny). This Qur'anic notion of *lohim mahfûz* is neither inconsistent with the view of the freedom of will for man nor with any other component of Islamic Faith. The Book which contains the knowledge of only former generations must not contain the knowledge of the generations yet-to-come with respect to their destiny i.e., which of them would be condemned or blessed.<sup>19</sup>

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The Qur'an is the fundamental religious document and basic source of Islamic faith. Sufism is a phenomenon which organized itself into a discipline in the early centuries of Islam. A great majority of Muslims have always believed it quite coherent with the spirit of their faith. But the question is: Where does lay its origin in the Qur'an! Muslim scholars have been searching for the answer since centuries. They have tried to explain the origin of Islamic spirituality in terms of words like '*saf*', '*sûf*', '*suffa*', '*wujûd*', '*Ihsân*', '*ḥubb*', '*tazkia*' etc. but could not explain its origin and its development into a discipline on Qur'anic grounds. First time in fourteen hundred years long history of Muslim Culture *Tafseer-e-Fâzli* (an exegesis of the Qur'an, 7 vols, 1982-1998) traces the origin of this discipline in the Qur'anic word '*Shâhid*'. According to the *TF* the epithet used by the Qur'an for what is commonly called 'sufi mentor' is '*shahid*' (witness), '*Tariqat-i-Shahidîn*' (The Way of *Shahidîn*) is the right epithet to be used for sufism, which is a discipline for granting purification (*tazkia*) and then its verification (*taşdîq*). The Prophet (pbuh) was sent as *Shâhid*. Those who believed in him were the *mash-hûd*. *Shâhid* recites the Word of God and presents his auspicious life as model. He is the teacher of the Book and Wisdom. State attained after acting upon the teachings is knowledge. So knowledge is post-experience. Allah grants wisdom to whom He likes. To whom Allah granted wisdom (*hikmat*) he, verily is granted abundant good. This abundant good is granted by the Prophet to whom Allah Wills. The Prophet (pbuh) grants purification (*tazkia*) to his followers and verifies as *shahid* to whom he pleases. Those among his followers whom the Prophet purified and then verified became *shahid*. Who are commonly called *sûfis* are the chain of *shahidîn*, the certified ones,

and *Tariqat-e-shahidîn* (commonly called sufism) is the discipline for granting purification (*tazkia*) and then its verification (*taşđiq*).<sup>20</sup>

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Let us take another example. Qur'anic ontology consists of three ultimate principles: i) Allah—the Creator and the Command-Giver, ii) The creation (*khalq*), iii) The command (*amr*). According to Qur'anic ontology Allah alone is beyond all determinations; and whatever else either falls to the category of 'creation' or to the category of 'command' and none of these two is eternal. Neither 'the creation' nor 'the command' partakes in the being of God in any way nor are they similar to Him. Hence the saying: "Allah created Adam on His own Image." is un-Qur'anic. Regarding the category of command it has been said that "You have been given but a very small knowledge of it." (17:85) so human knowledge about 'command' will ever remain little.

Aristotelian ontology sees anything either as eternal or as generated one. 'Pure form' and 'pure matter', lying parallel to each other, are both eternal. Generated things are composed of form and matter; hence in some sense they partake in their respective ultimate categories. Aristotelian philosophy divides everything into 'essence' and 'attribute' or 'subject' and 'predicate' considering them real in their own right. There is no such concept in the Qur'an. When any problem of Muslim metaphysics will be formulated in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics, it is sure to produce confusion and bound to mislead. The problem of the relationship of Allah's Essence and Attributes and of the 'Eternity vs Createdness of the Qur'an' are two out of many problems which are arisen from formulating problems of Muslim theology in un-Qur'anic Aristotelian notions. Had the Muslim's kept in view that the Qur'an avoids using the word '*siffa*' (attributes) for Allah, rather it describes the Being of God as a Person (*Allazi*) and ascribes Him Comely Names, they could have saved from entangling into useless discussions. And had the Muslims kept in mind the difference between Qur'anic ontology and Aristotelian ontology they could have saved from entangling into the problem of the eternity vs. createdness of the Qur'an. Most problems of Muslim theology, philosophy, and mysticism have emerged from accepting un-Qur'anic notions and by formulating problems into them.

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If we use the word 'Islam' for the religion revealed by Allah in its final form on the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and approved by Him as a way of life for mankind, and if we use the word 'modernity' for all kinds of manmade knowledge (philosophy, and sciences—social as well as natural), it can be said that Islam and modernity are opposed to each other. Islam is a way of life which recommends fulfilment of desires within Allah's prescribed limits whereas modernity legislates for the maximum fulfilment of desires. Islam legislates to keep fulfilment of desires subservient to Allah's prescribed limits whereas modern societies legislate to keep their laws subservient to the free fulfilment of desires. One's free pursuit of desire does not harm the similar freedom of any other is the only limit before it. Thus Islam and manmade knowledge (sciences and philosophy) differ in their basic assumptions. Apparently no viable understanding between the two seems possible. Should the Muslims then reject all human experiments in various fields as unholy! As for the aspect of utilizing the outcome of manmade knowledge is concerned, Islam does not leave us to wander in darkness. The Qur'an opens the way of *bida't* (Innovation).<sup>21</sup> No innovation in respect of prohibitions is allowed. Not everyone is qualified for carrying out this job. The sound in knowledge (*ar-rasikhûn fil-ilm*) are the ones who are best qualified for working out an appropriate relationship between Islam and manmade knowledge in line with the Divine decree: *la talbisul Haqqa bil batili ...* (Mix not falsehood with truth!) (02:42) It is Qur'anic principle of innovation (*bida't*) which provides basis to *ijtihad*. It is this principle which is meant to keep the revelation appropriately applicable in all circumstances and in all times to come. Unluckily because of the shortsightedness of some religious scholars '*bida't*' has acquired a highly undesirable connotation since centuries. It is high time that the principle of *innovation* is revived as basis of *ijtihad* and a framework is formulated for relating science and philosophy with religious knowledge.

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There is a difference between 'Allah's Pleasure' (*raza*) and 'Allah's Will' (*mashiat*). Much confusion in Muslim Thought and especially in problems relating Divine Omnipotence and human freedom has arisen because of not keeping in view the difference between these two concepts. Divine revelation has always been the

source of knowing Allah's Pleasure and the prophets, the messengers, have always been presenting the model of Allah's Pleasure in their lives. So the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure is always clearly stated, declared, determined and foreknown. For the Muslims the Holy Qur'an is the source of knowing Allah's Pleasure as for the teachings, precept and the principles are concerned. The illustrious life of the Prophet (pbuh) and the followers whom he certified present an authentic model of this knowledge. In contrast to this, Allah's Will relates to His Absolute Power over the consequences. Man is free in his intention; he is free in choosing a line of action for the utilization of his abilities. This is what comprises a person's performance. The last step in action is the consequences. Consequences are subservient to Allah's Will. Allah's Absolute Power over the consequences is His Will (*mashiyat*). Allah's Will is not known, or foreknown (except to him whom He please). It is not declared. It may not be determined in Allah's Knowledge even as stated in al-Qur'an (3:165-166) above. What Allah wills is always with His Absolute Knowledge. The believers are responsible for acting upon their knowledge of Allah's Pleasure and they are bound to accept the consequences as coming from Allah's Will. Accepting the consequences as Allah's Will (*mashiyat*) is part of faith.

Sometimes we read statements like "Even a leaf does not fall without Allah's Decree." and consider it quite in accordance with Islamic teachings, which it never is. The meaning of the Qur'anic verse in this regard is as follows: "*Even a leaf would not fall, but Allah knows it.*" (*Al-Qur'an, 6:59*) There is essential difference between 'knowing something' and 'issuing a decree for it'. Similarly, the belief that "Even a particle does not move without Allah's Decree. (*Lâ tataharraku zarratun illâ bi-idhn Allah*)" is also absolutely contrary to the Qur'anic teachings. This saying destroys all distinction between the righteous and the evil actions. Allah encompasses everything in His Knowledge as well as Power but does not decree for what is declared by Him as wrong.<sup>22</sup>

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Another example which shows how negligent the Muslims are from the Qur'an relates to their ignorance about the number of verses of the Qur'an. It is considered that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6666. Let the readers note that it is absolutely incorrect that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6666. According to our

research the Qur'anic Text consists of 6238 verses. Some compilations of the Qur'an divide the text of the Qur'an into 6236 verses. Anjman-e-Himayat-e-Islam Lahore in the Qur'an published by it in the year 1935 divides the Qur'anic Text into 6236 Verses. (Government of Pakistan *vide* Act No. LIV of 1973 dated 30-7-1973 has adopted this copy as the 'Standard Copy' of the Qur'an.) However it is clear that total number of verses of the Qur'an could never be 6666.<sup>23</sup> Arguments of the Committee which recommended the acceptance of Anjman-e-Himayat-e-Islam's published Qur'an as the 'Standard Copy' are not available to the author, so no comments can be given on the decision taken by the Committee constituted by the Government of Pakistan for the above purpose. Author's arguments in favour of his claim are available in the article included in this book.

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The above are some examples of the un-Qur'anic concepts which have become part of Muslims' belief system. The articles in this book present a modest attempt of the author to reconstruct some concepts relating Muslim theology, philosophy, and spirituality in accordance with his understanding of the Qur'an. There is no big claim as to their absoluteness. These are the answers found by the author for his own existential questions and it is to share his enlightenment and peace of heart with the readers that this book is being published.



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## FOREWORD

I have known Dr. Abdul Hafeez for the last about 40 years. He was my post-graduate student in 1970s in the subject of Philosophy at the Punjab University, Lahore. After M.A. he joined the teaching faculty of the Department of Philosophy at the same University and became my colleague. During all the years ever since his studentship, I never lost contact with him and have been continued to watch his scholastic career with loving interest. His special field of research has been Muslim Thought and Culture and Qur'an Studies. He has written a number of articles in this area which has been published in journals of international repute. They have been widely appreciated and acclaimed by learned readers all over the world. As a writer he is extremely painstaking and meticulous. He tries his best not to accept half-baked, popular truth and would not remain content with the secondary source material in so far as the building blocks of his own research inquiries are concerned. Instead, he would always have recourse to the original in every respect in order to draw various implications therefrom.

The book of Dr. Abdul Hafeez under review is the collection of different articles written and already published by him in various journals. For their presentation now in one Volume they have, of course, been thoroughly reviewed, revised and enlarged. To me the contents of the book belong to the tradition of reconstruction of Islamic thought. In view of the Qur'anic thesis of the discontinuation of the chain of Prophets (pbuh) this tradition has necessarily been kept alive ever since after the times of the Prophet (Peace be upon him.) by the *'ulmâ* of the Muslim *Ummah*. Most of them have taken the revivalism of Islamic thought against the context of the occasional newly-emerging socio-cultural conditions of the society and its thought-fashions, but sometimes it has comprised simply a call 'back to the Qur'an'. In our recent past, to the former class of thinkers belong, for instance, Sir Seyyid Ahmad Khan and Allama Muhammad Iqbal; the attempt of Dr. Hafeez belongs to the latter class. In various chapters of this book, the author has referred to a number of – what he regards – accretions to Islamic thought, during the passage of time, which have been unwarily registered by non-Islamic views, particularly some views of the Greek thinkers. He has very forcefully

tried to bring out and assert the pristine truth of the Qur'anic teachings in all these respects. Anyway, in all humility, he does not insist on his views being the 'last word' in various discussions. If someone disagrees with another's view on some problem based on a certain interpretation of the Qur'an, he says, "Let him present a better interpretation for the readers and scholars to judge."

I strongly recommend the reading of the Book for all seekers of the Qur'anic truth.

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# **THE QUR'AN STUDIES**



## IS 'AL-ḤAQQ' ONE OF AL-ASMĀ' AL-ḤUSNĀ!\*

*Abstract: It has been believed by Muslims since long, that 'al-ḥaqq' is one of al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā. References from books of history of Muslim civilization, authorities from Muslim religious scholars, writings of the orientalists, and articles published in encyclopaedias support the fact that the idea that al-ḥaqq is one of al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā was long ago established as doctrine in Muslim culture. However, it is one of the essentials of Muslim faith that al-Qur'an is a Book which is revealed by Allah. They further believe that the Qur'an is authoritative, it is perspicuous and internally self-consistent. Muslim's believe that the Qur'an is historically intact and this is because Allah has taken on Him to save it from any kind of tampering for all times to come. It is unanimously agreed among Muslims that whatever belief, view, concept, principle, doctrine, or teaching is contrary to what is stated in the Qur'an, is necessarily false. So the Qur'an is believed by the Muslims to be the final standard for determining the truth or validity of a doctrine. The author has placed his deliberations, formulated in the light of the Qur'an, on the status of 'al-ḥaqq' as food for thought before the worthy readers. The word 'al-ḥaqq' occurs 227 times in the Qur'an in different forms. The writer has placed almost all these instances as evidence to show that the Qur'an uses the epithet 'al-ḥaqq' to refer to the Qur'an including Word of Allah revealed in the past.*

It is commonly believed in by Muslims from centuries, that 'al-ḥaqq' is one of al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā (the Beautiful-Names of Allah). Evidence from books of Prophetic tradition (*aḥādīth*), of history of Muslim civilization, authorities from Muslim religious scholars, writings of the orientalists, and articles published in encyclopaedias can be produced in support of this fact. Some of these references are mentioned below:

Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali (450/1058–505/1111), a very renowned philosopher, theologian and sufi scholar of the medieval centuries in his book *al-Maqsad 'l asna fi sharah al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā* attempts to highlight the meanings and ethico-religious implications of 'Good-Names' for a Muslim. He also dilates upon the problem of containing 'Good-Names' within the figure ninety-nine as they are

traditionally counted. '*Al-ḥaqq*' is included at no. 52 in the list of ninety-nine *al-Asmâ' al-Husna* approved by him.<sup>1</sup>

Some schools of Sufism has chosen '*al-ḥaqq*' as their preferred name for Allah. The doctrine of the unity/oneness of being (*waḥdat al-wajûd*) is an important evidence to be quoted here. The belief that '*al-ḥaqq*' is one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* is one of the two fundamental presuppositions of this doctrine propounded by a renowned Sufi Scholar Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 638/1240).<sup>2</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a renowned contemporary Muslim scholar and representative of the *waḥdat al-wajûd* school of thought asserts '*al-ḥaqq*' to be one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*.<sup>3</sup>

Gerhard Böwering in his article "God and His Attributes" p. 321 vol. 2, and Alexander, D. Knysh in his article "Sufism and the Qur'an" at p. 154 vol. 5 of the Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an support this fact.<sup>4</sup>

Various publishers of the Qur'an in Pakistan include a list of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* in the beginning of the Holy Qur'an, and '*al-ḥaqq*' is very much included in the list at no. 52. (These lists sometimes contain hundred and one Names.)<sup>5</sup>

Qâzi Muhammad Suleman Salman Mansoor-puri, Mawlana Abu al A'la Moududi, and Ghulam Ahmed Perviz, three renowned Muslim religious scholars of the subcontinent acknowledge '*al-ḥaqq*' as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husna* in lists given by them. References and other details will be given at their proper place.

Redhouse examining the writings of Meninski, Hottinger (*Historia Orientalis*), Herklot, Muhamed Rabadan, E. T. Rogers, and Vratisslas on *al-Asmâ' al-Husna* and comparing them with the Qur'an, gives a list of the 'Most Comely Names' simple as well as compound, that he meets with. This list consists of 552 such Names. Redhouse shows which of these are verbally and which are inferentially Qur'anic, indicating the passages of the Qur'an where they occur; he also indicates the list or lists from which they are taken. Redhouse finds *al-ḥaqq* counted by all the above writers as Good-Name of Allah. Along with mentioning verses of the Qur'ân where it occurs, he also mentions references from Hottinger, Herklot, Rabadan, and Roger to establish that *al-ḥaqq* has long been considered as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* among the Muslims. (p. 23)<sup>6</sup>



The above references have been placed to show that the idea that *al-ḥaqq* is one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husna* was long ago established as doctrine in Muslim culture. Now it is quite obvious that this understanding of *al-ḥaqq* must have coloured the translation and interpretation of many verses of the Qur'an. However, it is one of the essentials of Muslim faith that al-Qur'an is a Book which is revealed by Allah. They further believe that the Qur'an is authoritative, it is perspicuous and internally self-consistent. Muslims believe that the Qur'an is historically intact and this is because Allah has taken on Him to save it from any kind of tampering for all times to come. It is unanimously agreed among Muslims that whatever belief, view, concept, principle or teaching is contrary to what is stated in the Qur'an, is necessarily false. Even if the import of a tradition included in any compilation proves to be incongruent with the Qur'an, it is believed that it absolutely cannot be a saying of the Prophet (pbuh) irrespective of the fact that who is reported to be its narrator. So the Qur'an is believed by the Muslims to be the final standard for determining the truth or validity of a doctrine. The purpose of this study is to place the deliberations of the author on the status of '*al-ḥaqq*' formulated in the light of the Qur'an, for readers as food for thought.

'*Al-ḥaqq*' relates to the root (*hâ qâf qâf*). The following derivatives of this root occur in the Qur'an:

*ḥaqq* (occurs twelve times<sup>7</sup>) meaning, just, right; to occur or fall rightly or justly; to be justly due; coming true of the Words, Promises, Warnings or Glad-tidings of Allah *etc.*

*ḥaqqat* (five times<sup>8</sup>): justified;

*yaḥiqqu* (once<sup>9</sup>): the word to be fulfilled,

*ḥuqqat* (twice<sup>10</sup>): be made fit;

*yuhiqqu* (four times<sup>11</sup>): to cause the truth come true or become manifest;

*astahaqqa* (once<sup>12</sup>): to deserve; to merit;

*astahaqqa* (once<sup>13</sup>): be ascertained;

*al-ḥaqq* (227 times<sup>14</sup>).

*ḥaqqan* (17 times<sup>15</sup>): duty incumbent on someone to fulfil; certainty (of promise of Allah); certainly or in truth; a promise which is binding on Allah to bring about; coming true of a dream;

*ḥaqqâhû* (3 times<sup>16</sup>): the due;

*ahaqqu* (10 times<sup>17</sup>): to have a better right; to be more deserving; to be truer than, to be more worthy than (e.g., testimony, or party);  
*haqîqun* (once<sup>18</sup>): to be bound;  
*al hâqa* (3 times<sup>19</sup>): The reality; the sure event; the undeniable truth;

Since our main concern in this article is with examining the authority for considering *al-ḥaqq* as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ*, let us find out and study different forms in which '*al-ḥaqq*' occurs in the Qur'an.

***al-ḥaqq occurring in Simple Form for Word of the Lord (i.e., for what Allah has narrated, revealed or promised.)***

- (i) Allah's Word is the truth (*Qaulo hul ḥaqq*). cf. 06:73
- (ii) What Allah has revealed is the truth. (cf. 02: 42, 91)
- (iii) *al-ḥaqq* (the truth) is from your Lord. (cf. 02:147, 03:60)
- (iv) *al-ḥaqq* (the truth) is from the Lord. cf. 22:54.
- (v) Say: *Al-Ḥaqq* is from the Lord of you all. Then whosoever will, let him believe, and whosoever will, let him disbelieve. cf. 18:29.
- (vi) What Allah descends unto His Messenger is *al-ḥaqq* (the truth). cf. 5:83, 84, 11:120, 13:01, 19, 21:55.
- (vii) The disbelievers denied the truth when it came unto them; cf. 06:05, 66; 08:31-32, 21:24,
- (viii) Allah's Injunctions are *al-ḥaqq* (the truth): cf. 02:149, 33:53,
- (ix) *Al-ḥaqq* will be the measure of weighing on the Day of Judgement, cf. 07:08.
- (x) The Prophet of Allah is the best knower of the truth in any matter, those who prefer their own understanding actually dispute with the Prophet on the truth, cf. 08:06.
- (xi) Only Allah leads to the truth. cf. 10:35.
- (xii) The truth (i.e., Scripture, Guidance) comes from the Lord, 10: 76-77, 94, 108, 11:17, 28:48, 57:16;
- (xiii) The truth comes from the Lord and only disbelievers, the enemy of God and of believers, deny it. cf. 60:01

- (xiv) What Allah has promised concerning Day of Judgment and Requital or anything else is the truth. cf. 11:45, 14:22, 18:21, 28:13, 30:60, 31:33, 35:05, 40:25, 77, 42:18, 46:17.
- (xv) To be on the right; rightful. 24:49
- (xvi) When the verses of the Qur'an are recited unto the people of the Book they say: We believe; it is the truth (*al-ḥaqq*) from our Lord. cf. 28:52-53;
- (xvii) Those who disbelieve say of the truth when it reaches them that it is naught else than mere magic. cf. 34:43, 46:07;
- (xviii) Word of the Lord (*al-ḥaqq*) revealed in the past testifies the Word of the Lord (*al-ḥaqq*) revealed in the present, and Word of the Lord revealed in the present witnesses the Word of the Lord revealed in the past. 02:41, 89, 91; 03:03; 06:05; 35:31; 37:37.
- (xix) The truthful narration of a similitude by Allah in the Qur'an, cf. 02:26. *Al-ḥaqq* in the sense of truth of an event; 12:51,

### ***Al-ḥaqq contained in Phrases***

- i. *al-ḥaqqā lilla hi*: The truth (*al-ḥaqq*) belongs to Allah; only Allah's Word is the truth.<sup>20</sup>
- ii. *howa l-ḥaqqu min-Rabbika*: The Qur'an is the truth from your Lord.

*The revelation of the Scripture whereof there is no doubt is from the Lord of the Worlds. Or say they: He hath invented it? Nay, but it is the truth from thy Lord, that thou mayst warn a folk to whom no warner came before thee, that haply they may walk aright. 32:02-3.*

*... What is revealed unto thee from thy Lord is the truth (howAl-Haqqu), ... 34:06, As for that which We inspire in thee of the Scripture, it is the truth (howAl-Haqqu) 35:31, ... That which is revealed unto Muhammad – and it is the truth from their Lord (howAl-Haqqu min-Rabbihim) ... 47:02, al-ḥaqqā min-Rabbihim: 47:03.*

- iii. *wallahu yaqûl al-ḥaqq*: What Allah says is the truth. (cf. 33:34),  
 ... What was it that your Lord said! They say: the truth (*al-ḥaqq*). (cf. 34:23).  
*wal-ḥaqqa Aqûl*: The truth is what Allah speak. (cf. 38:84)  
*annahu l-ḥaqq*: It (*i.e.*, the Qur'an ) is the truth.  
*(We shall show them Our portents on the horizons and within themselves until it will be manifest unto them that it is the truth. Doth not thy Lord suffice, since He is Witness over all things! 41:53.)*
- iv. *al-ḥaqq wa Rasûl al-Mubîn*, there came unto them the truth [Qur'an ] and a messenger making plain. And now that the truth has come unto them they say: This is mere magic, ... And they say: if only this Qur'an had been revealed to some great man of the two towns! 43:29-31.
- v. *yahdi ilal-ḥaqq*, Qur'an guides to truth and a right road, 46:30.
- vi. *qawl al-ḥaqq*, true description, 19:34; Jesus was son of Mary. Allah has given true description in the Qur'an regarding him (a.s.) in which the people dispute.
- vii. *da'watu l ḥaqq*, *al-ḥaqq* in the sense of real, justified:  
 With all justification He deserves to be invoked; to Him is due all true invocation; (*da'watu l ḥaqq*), cf. 13:14,  
 Allah narrates real stories concerning past generations, cf. 18:13.
- viii. *Al-wa'd l-ḥaqq*, the Day of Judgment, Requital and other eschatological events that Allah has promised.<sup>21</sup>
- ix. *al-ḥaqqil mubîn*, Qur'an as manifest, clear and plain truth; *Therefore put thy trust in Allah, for thou (standest) on plain truth ... 27:76-79.*
- x. *ḥaqq l yaqîn*: Certain truth. Reward of what man does in this life is a certain truth. cf. 56:95.
- xi. *ḥaqq l yaqîn*: The Qur,ân is a certain truth. cf. 69:51
- xii. *al-yawm l ḥaqq*: Day of Judgment, cf. 78:39.

- xiii. *wa-tawaṣu bil-ḥaqq*: Exhort one another to truth, cf. 103:03.
- xiv. *Dîn al-ḥaqq*, Islam is the true faith, the religion of truth. cf. 09:29, 33.<sup>22</sup>
- xv. *ro'ya bil ḥaqq*: true vision, cf. 48:27.
- xvi. *al-mulku yoma'izen Al-Ḥaqqu li al-Rahmân: The Sovereignty on that day will be the true (Sovereignty) belonging to the Beneficent One, and it will be a hard day for disbelievers, 25:26.*

***al-ḥaqq (truth or reality) as opposite to al-bâtil (falsehood);***

- i. *al-ḥaqq* as opposite to *al-bâtil*, 02:42, 109, 144, 146, 213; 07:118, 18:56, 40:78;
- ii. to confound falsehood with the truth to conceal *al-ḥaqq*: cf. 03:71;
- iii. Similitude of *al-ḥaqq* and *al-bâtil*: Allah coins the similitude of *al-ḥaqq* and *al-bâtil*. *Al-ḥaqq* is comparable to rain water that Allah sends down from above, then the valleys flow with water each according to its measure, and *al-bâtil* is comparable to the swelling foam that the flood water bears on it; another similitude for the same is of metals which are molten in fire for the purpose of making ornaments or tools, and a foam rises on it. The rising foam is but like *al-bâtil*. Its (*i.e.*, foam's) coming over the surface is proof of its passing away. *Al-ḥaqq* is to remain on the earth for it benefits the mankind; *al-bâtil* is to pass away like foam that scum on the bank. cf. 13:17.
- iv. Allah cast the truth against falsehood so that it breaks its head and lo! it vanishes. cf. 17:81, 21:18
- v. Allah wipes out the falsehood and establishes the truth with His Words. cf. 42:24; When *al-ḥaqq* is practically established at some point, it becomes so manifest that it cannot be denied; it completely nullifies falsehood; the guilty, the hypocrites dislike it, cf. 08:08, 09:48, 10:82, 23:70.
- vi. The truth has come; and falsehood neither produce nor reproduce. Neither was there any falsehood at the

beginning of creation nor has it any scope to show it at the end. cf. 34:49. (This means that 'evil' has no permanent place in reality.)

- vii. *bâṭil* is only the opinion of those who disbelieve. cf. 38:27;
- viii. The disbelieving people ever tried to refute *Al-Ḥaqq* with false argument, but they failed, then Allah seized them. cf. 40:05;
- ix. And on the Day when those who disbelieve are exposed to the Fire (they will be asked): Is not this real! They will say: Yea, by our Lord ... cf. 46:34.

***al-ḥaqq as opposite to aḍ-ḍalâl (error)***

*After the truth what is there saving error!* 10:32.

(This further proves that 'evil' is nothing but deviation from the truth.)

***al-ḥaqq as opposite to ḡann (false suspicion, conjecture)***

- vi. *Al-ḥaqq* as opposite to *ḡann*, cf. 03:154, 45:32,
- vii. There is none among those, whom the disbelievers conjecture as partner to Allah that leads to the truth. cf. 10:35;
- viii. Assuredly conjecture can by no means take the place of truth. cf. 10:36; 53:28.

***bil-ḥaqq: accuracy, balance, purpose, truth etc.***

- i. To narrate something with accuracy or recite a tale with a purpose to enlighten the right way *etc.*, cf. 05:27, 28:03; In absolute balance, accuracy, and purpose, cf. (02:71); in course of justice, cf. (17:33).
- ii. What Allah tells is the truth; cf. 06:57.
- iii. Allah recites His portents unto His Prophet with truth, cf. 02:252, 03:108, 45:06, ...
- iv. Allah has created the heavens and the earth in truth, cf. 06:73; 10:05, 14:19, 15:85, 16:03, 29:44, 30:08, 39:05, 44:39, 46:03, 64:03.<sup>23</sup>
- v. With the truth, *e.g.*, Allah has sent the Prophet Muhammad with the truth, cf. 02:119; 04:170,

- vi. He (pbuh) brought the truth and confirmed those sent before him, cf. 37:37;
- vii. *Allah hath revealed the Scripture with the truth. Lo! those who find (a cause of) disagreement in the Scripture are in open schism.* 02:176
- viii. Allah hath revealed the Scripture on His Prophet with the truth: cf. 02:213; 03:03; 05:48; 06:114, 39:02, 41, so that the Prophet may judge between mankind. cf. 04:105; 05:48;
- ix. The holy Spirit (*Gabriel*) has revealed the Qur'an with truth on the Prophet from the Lord, cf. 16:102;
- x. *Allah it is Who hath revealed the Scripture with truth, ...* 42:17;
- xi. Allah descends the angels with truth, cf. 15:08,
- xii. What good-tidings, warning, or chastisement the angels bring is with truth, cf. 15:55, 64;
- xiii. It is forbidden to take life of a person save *in course of justice*, cf. 17:33; 25:68;
- xiv. The Prophet (pbuh.) is true, cf. 03:86;
- xv. Allah has sent His Prophet with truth as bearer of glad tidings and as warner, cf. 35:24;
- xvi. Coming true of Allah's Word concerning this world or concerning the Hereafter, cf. 06:30, 23:41, 38:64;
- xvii. To do something in accordance with Allah's Pleasure, cf. 06:151, 08:05,
- xviii. Verily what the messengers of Allah did bring is the truth, cf. 07:43, 53;
- xix. Allah decides with truth, cf. 07:89, 21:112, 34:26,
- xx. On the Day of Judgment, they will be judged in accordance with the truth, cf. 39:69, 75, 40:20;
- xxi. The prophets judge in disputes in accordance with the truth. cf. 38:22,26;
- xxii. To speak concerning Allah nothing but the truth, cf. 07: 105,
- xxiii. What is in accordance with the guidance of Allah is truth, and those who guide with the truth, establish justice therewith, cf. 07:159, 181;

- xxiv. The covenant of the Scripture taken by the Children of Israel not to speak aught concerning Allah save the truth, cf. 07: 169;
- xxv. *With the truth has Allah caused the Qur'an to be sent down, and with the truth has it come down*, 17:105;
- xxvi. Stories narrated by Allah concerning past generations are truth. cf. 18:13;
- xxvii. With Allah is the Record which speaks with truth, cf. 23:62;
- xxviii. The Prophet of Allah brings to the people the truth, cf. 23:70;
- xxix. Hazrat Musâ brought truth from Allah to the People of Pharaoh, cf. 40:25;
- xxx. Allah has brought them the truth, cf. 23:90, 43:78;
- xxxi. In response to an objection of the disbelievers concerning the gradual revelation of the Qur'an rather than descending it all at once, Allah says that they will not bring you any objection but we will give you the truth about it and a better explanation. cf. 25:32-33;
- xxxii. Who denied truth when it came unto him did great wrong. cf. 29:68, 50:05;
- xxxiii. Only those will be allowed intercession before Allah who bear witness to the truth while they know it, cf. 43:86;
- xxxiv. *This Our Book [Record of human actions] pronounceth against you with truth ...* 45:29;
- xxxv. Agony of death comes (to the wrong-doer) with truth, cf. 50:19;
- xxxvi. The Day when they will hear the (Awful) Cry in truth, cf. 50:42.

**ḥaqq: True, most certainly true; purpose, claim, interest; the truth, due share, the right;**

- i. Resurrection and Reward are most certainly true, cf. 10:53, 55, 18:21.
- ii. In the sense of purpose, claim, interest. cf. 11:79.
- iii. Allah's Command for the commencement of the Day of Judgment is truth, 51:23;



- iv. And in the wealth of the God-fearing the beggar and the outcast had *due share*, 51:19;
- v. Those who ascribe partners to Allah, they esteem not Allah as He *has the right to be esteemed*, 39:67.

***bi ghayr l ḥaqq / ghayr l ḥaqq:***

- i. In violation to the Word of God; without justification; wrongful, cf. 02:61; 03:21, 112, 181, 04:155; 05:77; 06:93, 07:33, 146, 10:23, 22:40, 28:39, 40:75, 41:15, 42:42, 46:20;
- ii. Injunction for not to utter aught concerning Allah save the truth. cf. (04: 171).

***Verses misinterpreted to signify 'al-ḥaqq' as one of al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ***

- I. *Mawla humu al-ḥaqq*: Their Master in truth; their Rightful Master; ... *Then are they restored unto Allah, their Rightful Master (Mawla humu 'l ḥaqq)* 06:62.<sup>24</sup> For further reference see: 10:30.
- II. *Rabbukumu 'l-ḥaqq*: 10:32, Your Rightful Lord; your Rightful Nourisher, ... Such then is Allah, your Rightful Lord ... cf. 10:32.
- III. *al-wilâyatuhu li'llâhi al-ḥaqq*: The true Protection is from Allah. He is the True Protector.  
In this case the true protection is from Allah.<sup>25</sup> He is Best for reward, and Best for consequence. cf. 18:44.
- IV. *Mâlik al-ḥaqq*: The True King; the Rightful King.  
*Then exalted be Allah, the True King! And hasten not (O Muhammad) with the Qur'an ere its revelation hath been perfected unto thee, and say: My Lord! Increase me in knowledge. (20:114) Now Allah be exalted, the True King! There is no God save Him, the Lord of the throne of Grace. (23:116)*
- V. *Howa 'l- ḥaqq*, He is the Real Lord; He is the True God; That is because Allah, He is the Real Lord.<sup>26</sup> Lo! He quickens the dead, and He is Able to do all things. (22:6) That is because Allah, He is the True God<sup>27</sup> and that whereon they call instead of Him, it is the False, and because Allah, He is the High, the Great. (22:62) That (is

so) because Allah, He is the True God,<sup>28</sup> and that which they invoke beside Him is the False, and because Allah, He is the Sublime, the Great. Cf. (31:30)

VI. *al-ḥaqq al-Mubîn*: The True Manifester;

On that day Allah will pay them their just due, and they will know that Allah is the True Manifester. (24:25)<sup>29</sup>

## ANALYSIS

- From verses of section 1 and 7 it is absolutely clear that Word of Allah, the Revelations, the Scriptures descended to the Messengers (a.s.) entertain the status of being 'the truth' (*al-ḥaqq*). There is no compulsion in believing it. Only the disbelievers always deny *al-ḥaqq*.

Whatever *al-ḥaqq* comprises *i.e.*, Guidance, Allah's Injunctions, Promises concerning Day of Judgment and Requital, narrations, descriptions and similitudes, accounts of eschatological events, or whatever else, they are *ḥaqq* and part of *al-ḥaqq*.

*Al-ḥaqq* revealed in the past testifies the *al-ḥaqq* revealed in the present, and *al-ḥaqq* revealed in the present witnesses *al-ḥaqq* revealed in the past.<sup>30</sup>

*Al-ḥaqq* will be the measure of weighing on the Day of Judgement for the purpose of Requital.

- From the verses of section 2 it is clear that what Allah say/speak is *al-ḥaqq* (the truth) and only His Word is *al-ḥaqq*. The Qur'an is His last revelation and is for all mankind. Therefore, it is *al-ḥaqq* (the truth) from the Lord in the present. It is such a truth which is manifest, clear and plain. Verses of this section further corroborate the fact that whatever the Qur'an (*al-ḥaqq*) certifies as *Dîn* or as guidance or narrates about the Day of Judgement or about anything whatever is a certain truth. It is a certain truth that man will have no freedom of action on that Day and Sovereignty will exclusively belong to Allah.
- Verses of sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 vindicate the fact that the Qur'an comprises *al-ḥaqq* (the certain truth) and whatever is its opposite is *al-bâṭil* (falsehood). *Al-ḥaqq* is Allah's revealed truth and *al-bâṭil* is the opinion of those who disbelieve. Allah forbids to mix *al-bâṭil* with *al-ḥaqq* for it is always to conceal

truth. *Al-ḥaqq* is to remain on the earth for it benefits the mankind, *al-bâtil* is to vanish for it is only temporal, ephemeral and very short-lived.

The Qur'an refutes those who say that *al-ḥaqq* and *al-bâtil* both are struggling against each other from the beginning of the creation. Allah's Word is *al-ḥaqq* (the truth). Whenever He communicates *al-ḥaqq*, it comes to mankind as the certain truth. And *al-bâtil* (false ideas), *ad-dalâl* (error) or *zann* (false suspicion, conjecture or opinion) have no reality of their own. *Al-bâtil* (false ideologies) is but the attempted falsification of *al-ḥaqq*. To prefer false suspicions, conjectures or opinions in the face of *al-ḥaqq* is to follow *zann*. *Ad-dalâl* (Error) is nothing but the deviation from the truth. *Ad-dalâl* (error), as deviation from truth, is the outcome of bringing about ideas or ideologies opposite to *al-ḥaqq*. It is the outcome of giving equal importance (as *al-ḥaqq*) to manmade ideas and ideologies, experiments, opinions, suggestions, insights, imaginations, visions and unveiling (*ro'yâ* and *kashf*) and confounding them to *al-ḥaqq* (the Word of Allah). But it is the Way of Allah that He wipes out *the falsehood* and establishes *the truth* with His Words.

Allah has forbidden uttering anything concerning Allah save in accordance with *al-ḥaqq*. From the verses of section 8 it is clear beyond any doubt that whatever is asserted in violation to *al-ḥaqq* is without justification and is wrongful. So whatever is uttered about Allah on the base of conjecture, speculation, imagination, vision, unveiling or whatever which is not in accordance with *al-ḥaqq* is but false, wrongful and unjustified. The Qur'an calls it *iftira* (concoction). Allah commands the believers 'not to utter aught concerning Allah save the truth' (4:171) for saying anything about Allah, not supported by the Qur'an, is *iftirâ* (concoction). (3:94) To mould *al-ḥaqq* according to one's desires is *fisq* (transgression). (5: 3, 47; 6:121)

- From verses of Section 9 subsections I, II, III, IV it is beyond any doubt clear that Allah is the Master, the Nourisher, the Protector, the King. These are either His Attributive Names or derivable from these. But *al-ḥaqq* here comes as adjective qualifying these nouns.
- In verses preceding 24:25 mentioned in section 9 (V) Allah says that those who falsely accuse chaste women are cursed in this world as well as the Hereafter. On that Day Allah will

give their own tongues, hands and feet the ability to talk and these will bear witness against them concerning their evil deeds. (cf. 24:23-24) We have already seen that *al-ḥaqq* (the Revelation) will be the measure of weighing on the Day of Judgement for the purpose of Requit. (cf. 07:08) Now Allah says that on that Day Allah will pay them what they really deserve according to *the truth* He has revealed, and they will come to know that Allah is the true Manifester of the piety of the virtuous whom they caused humiliation and disgrace by making malicious and false statements and also that He is the true Manifester of *al-ḥaqq* by giving the evil-doers their just due. (cf. 24:25)

- In verses of Section 9 (V) '*Howa*' (He is the Lord) refers to the Being of God and *al-ḥaqq* qualifies its meaning that Only Allah is the Lord/Allah Alone is the Lord. Let us examine this compound word (*Howa 'l- ḥaqq* ) in its context:
  - a) Allah is the Creator of everything. In verse 22:05 Allah Almighty invites those who do not believe in Resurrection to reflect, placing the different stages of the creation of man (first from clay, and then from drop of seed, then as clot of blood, then as lump of flesh, then its stay in the womb and then birth if Allah so Wills) as food for thought. Then Allah places before them the different stages through which man is made to pass after his birth, his growth, may be reaching his prime, his death either at an early age or at very old age, the most abject time of life. Then Allah invites their attention to different states of earth: it is barren, then Allah sends down water on it and it becomes alive and put forth every kind of lovely growth. Stating all this the verse concludes: "*That is because Allah, He Alone is the Lord (Huwa Al-Ḥaqqu). Lo! He quickens the dead, and He is Able to do all things.*" (cf. 22:6)<sup>31</sup>
  - b) In verse preceding 22:62 attention has been drawn to a daily observable sign of Allah's Power. It is Allah Who makes the night to pass into the day and makes the day to pass into the night. He Hears and Sees. Drawing the conclusion from this and preceding verses the Qur'an states that: "*This is all because of Allah. Only He is the Lord [Howa 'l-ḥaqq]. Those who worship other than Him,*

*what they worship is al-bâtil (falseness) because Allah is the High, the Great.*" (cf. 22:62)<sup>32</sup> To worship Allah Alone in accordance with the way of the righteous is right and justified. It is always to seek the Pleasure of Allah. What is done contrary to this is to worship falseness (*al-bâtil*). 'Qur'an is the manifest, clear and plain truth.'

- c) Verse no. 31:30 is comprised of almost the same words as verse no. 22:62 above. Again in the preceding verses 31:28, 29 drawing attention to the phenomena of man's creation, it has been stated that your creation and raising (from the dead) for Allah is only as the creation and raising of a single sole (*i.e.*, resurrection is not something that is going to humble Allah's Power.) Allah is Hearer and Seer of everything. Then drawing attention towards the phenomena of passing into each other of the night and the day, and then to the phenomena of the sun and the moon subdued to do their work by Allah's Power, Allah states that Allah knows what you do. Now Allah says: "*This is all because of Allah. Only He is the Lord (Howa 'l-ḥaqq). Those who worship other than Him, what they worship is al-bâtil (falseness) because Allah is the High, the Great.*" All the above mentioned phenomena is working so because of Allah. Allah is the Only Lord (*howa 'l-ḥaqq*). And not to worship Him is but falsehood. *That is also because Allah is the Sublime, the Great.* (cf. 31:30)

Stating and inviting attention to different examples from the phenomena of nature which prove Allah's Uniqueness as Creator, case for Allah's Power for Resurrection has been presented in the above verses. The same theme recurs in verses 22:06, 62 and 31:30 that all the uniformity, regularity and precision of the phenomena is because of Allah, the only Being Worthy of being called God (*howa 'l-ḥaqq*), and He has the Power to do all things *i.e.*, to raise them after they are dead.

Pickthall translates this verse as follows: "That is because Allah, He is the truth and because He quickenth the dead, and because He is Able to do all things." Now what sense

does it make, what meaning does it convey to say Allah “the truth” in the context given above!

Further, how can it be justified in the face of all those verses stated in the Qur'an classified above in sections 1 to 9 all of which, in one way or the other, quite unambiguously state that ‘Word of the Lord is *the truth*’, or ‘what Allah say or speak is *the truth*’, or ‘what Allah reveals to His Messengers is *the truth*’, specially the following verses in which the same compound word *howa 'l-ḥaqq* refers to the Qur'an:

- i) *The revelation of the Scripture whereof there is no doubt is from the Lord of the Worlds. Or say they: He hath invented it! Nay, but it is the truth from thy Lord (howa 'l-ḥaqq min Rabbi ka), that thou mayst warn a folk to whom no warner came before thee, that haply they may walk aright. 32:02-3.*<sup>33</sup>

*What is revealed unto thee from thy Lord is the truth (howa 'l-ḥaqq), ... 34:06, As for that which We inspire in thee of the Scripture, it is the truth (howa 'l-ḥaqq) ...35:31, ... that which is revealed unto Muhammad – and it is the truth from their Lord (howa 'l-ḥaqqo min-Rabbiḥim) ... 47:02, ذَلِكَ بَأْسٌ That is because those who disbelieve follow falsehood (al-baṭil) and because who believe follow the truth from their Lord (al-ḥaqqo min-Rabbiḥim). Thus Allah cointh their similitude for mankind. 47:03.*

Since ‘Word of the Lord is the truth’ therefore Allah is the One Whose Word is *the truth* (*al-ḥaqq*); since ‘what Allah reveals is the truth’ therefore Allah is the One Who is the Descender of *the truth*; ‘Allah is the One Who wipes out the falsehood and establishes *the truth* with His Words.’ Hence Allah is the Establisher of *the truth*. Similarly Allah is the Manifester of *the truth*. Pickthall, Muhammad Asad or anyone for that matter cannot translate verses 22:06, 22:62 and 31:30 ascribing the attribute of being *al-ḥaqq* to Allah without negating and contradicting the content of the Qur'an at least at 224 places other than those mentioned above where the epithet ‘*al-ḥaqq*’ occurs in the Qur'an.

*Al-Ḥaqq* is the attribute of the Word of Allah revealed to His messengers (pbut) and since Qur'an verifies that the people of the Book has tampered Allah's Word revealed prior to the Qur'an and it

also certifies that Allah has taken on Him to protect the Qur'an against any such attempt, therefore, epithet *al-ḥaqq* (*the truth*) can only be attributed to the Qur'an. To ascribe *al-ḥaqq* as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* to Allah is to identify *al-ḥaqq* with the Descender of *al-ḥaqq*, and the revelation with the Revealer, and the Word with the Speaker which is a clear inconsistency. Whereas Allah certifies the Qur'an to be a consistent Book *par excellence* when He says: *Praise be to Allah Who hath revealed the Scripture unto His slave, and hath not placed therein any crookedness.* (al-Qur'an, 18:01) Also, *Allah has revealed the fairest of statements, a Scripture consistent [Aḥsan'l-Hadīth Kitāb]...*, (Qur'an, 39:23); *(It is) the Qur'an in Arabic, containing no crookedness [i.e., inconsistency]...* (Al-Qur'an; 39:28)

*Al-ḥaqq* means 'the standard of truth'. Whatever the Qur'an verifies is truth (*ḥaqq*), whatever it disapproves is untruth. Wherever the Qur'an is silent, to express one's views is to express opinion or conjecture and 'Assuredly conjecture can by no means take the place of truth.' Deviation from what Qur'an states is but *error*. To oppose the Qur'an is but *bāṭil*. 'To say anything in violation to the Qur'an is without justification and wrongful (*bi ghayr 'l Ḥaqq*).' Allah commands the believers 'not to utter aught concerning Allah save the truth, (*i.e.*, what is in accordance with the Qur'an.)

The Qur'an states: *la-hul Asmâ' al-Husnâ* (His are the Most Beautiful Names.) 17:110, 20:08, 59:24. But the Qur'an does not determine their number. These are the Attributive Names of Allah. In the books narrating traditions in the name of the Prophet (pbuh) it has been stated that *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* of Allah are 99 in number (without including the Personal Name *i.e.*, Allah). Some traditions state only this fact but do not give any detail of what these *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* are! There are some traditions which contain detailed lists of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*. This latter group of traditions has been narrated in three ways known as *ṭurûq*. Traditions reporting *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* in these *ṭurûq* being reported by different lines of narrators, greatly differ from each other at various places. Even the tradition narrated in each one of these *ṭurûq* when further narrated may have slight difference. Qâzi Muhammad Sulemân Salman Mansoor-puri gives a chart of seven such lists of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* reported in these three *ṭurûq*. According to this chart, 158 Names in total have been attributed to Allah as *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*. Some of them are alleged to be given in the Qur'an and some have been drawn as

inference. This number is much greater than the number 99. Qâzi Mansoor-puri concludes that critically examining the above mentioned three lines (*turûq*) of reporters and *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* reported in these traditions makes it evident that a complete list of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* was never given by the Prophet (pbuh). It were the scholars who drew these *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* from the Qur'an according to their knowledge and understanding. Mawlana Abu al A'la Moududi, and Ghulam Ahmed Perviz also hold the same view.<sup>34</sup>

Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali prefers to follow the tradition which counts 'Good Names' as ninety-nine, but he also observes that *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* are not these 99 alone which he has expounded in his treatise.<sup>35</sup>

Comparing various lists mentioned earlier Redhouse observes that taking *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* to be ninety-nine, as is prevalent among Muslims, implies a selection. Redhouse thinks that each list of ninety-nine of them is a selection, varying according to the religious fancy or preference of some eminent man, who compiled it.<sup>36</sup>

All these references show that no finality can be claimed for any list given in the traditions referred to above.

- According to the writer's knowledge *Tafseer-e-Fâzli* is the only exegesis of the Qur'an in the history of Muslim civilization which considers that *al-Haqq* is an epithet to be referred to the Qur'an and is not one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*.<sup>37</sup>
- [When all the above lines of tradition (*turûq*) include *al-Haqq* in the list of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* how can we ignore them all! To give answer to this query another tradition reported from a companion of the Prophet, Hazrat Abu Hurrayra, and included in the renowned books of Prophetic tradition is examined in another article "Is God Time!"]

**Conclusion:** The word '*al-Haqq*' occurs 227 times in the Qur'an. The writer has placed almost all these instances as evidence to show that the Qur'an uses the epithet '*al-Haqq*' to refer to the Qur'an itself. To use this epithet as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* is but to identify the Descender of '*al-Haqq*' with what He has descended, taking the Revealer for Revelation, taking the Establisher of truth for *the truth*. The interpretation which inserts contradiction in the Qur'an is a false interpretation for Allah has declared this Book as Best of all Narrations.<sup>38</sup> The belief that '*al-haqq*' is one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*



has very far-reaching implications for Islamic culture. But to work out the implications of this belief is beyond the scope of this article.



## THE QUR'ANIC ONTOLOGY AND STATUS OF AL-ḤAQQ'

*Abstract:* Writer's article entitled: "Is al-ḥaqq' one of al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ!" was published in *Bazyaft*, Volume 9, (July–December, 2006). Critical appraisal on writer's article, entitled: "From Philosophy To Exegesis And Back" by Mr. Qaisar Shehzad, a scholar of the International Islamic University Islamabad was published in *Bazyaft*, Volume 14 (January–June, 2009). Present study examines the points raised by the worthy critic. Worthy critic's scholarly attitude and drawing writer's attention to certain points for their further elaboration is worth appreciation. Present study begins with a summary of writer's arguments presented in the original article to support his thesis that "The word 'al-ḥaqq' occurs 227 times in the Qur'an in different forms. Examination of all these 227 instances reveals that the Qur'an uses the epithet 'al-ḥaqq' (the truth) to refer to the Qur'an including scriptures revealed in the past." It has been felt that the worthy critic needs to be made clear on Qur'anic ontology. Writer's main focus in present article relates to the elaboration of this aspect besides furnishing replies to his objections. Qur'anic Ontology consists of three ultimate principles/entities: Allah, the Originator; and the origination. The origination further consists of two categories: Creation and Command. Allah is 'The Originator of whatever there is. 'Khalq' (Creation) and 'Amr' (Command) are the 'orders of being' originated by Him with His Will. Everything other than God belongs to either of the two categories. This study argues that Qur'an belongs to the category of Allah's Command and if the epithet 'al-ḥaqq' is used as Name for Allah as well as for the 'Word of Allah' it will violate the categorial distinction and amount to disregarding Allah's Command "Verily to Him belongs the Creation and the Command." (7:54) It is clear that the Qur'an/Word of God is not God; so it should either belong to the category of 'Creation' or to the category of 'Command'. The status of authority lies with the Qur'an. Interpretation of a verse which disregards muḥkmât (obligatory verses) makes that verse incongruent with other parts of the Qur'an; and consistency of the Qur'an is essential part of Muslim Faith. Writer concludes his submissions with the following remarks: People are of three types: (a) Those who benefit from the knowledge of 'the Teacher of the Book and Wisdom' and from the people who are certified subsequently, they reach the correct conclusion. (b) The deniers are the deniers. (c) Those who

*incorporate their own likes and dislikes into the teachings of the Qur'an, never reach correct conclusion.*

**Thesis presented in writer's article:**

In the article "Is 'al-ḥaqq' one of al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ!" published in *Bazyaft* vol. 9 of 2006 the writer has presented the following thesis:

1. It is one of the essentials of Muslim faith that al-Qur'an is a Book which is revealed by Allah. That the Qur'an is authoritative,<sup>1</sup> it is easy to understand<sup>2</sup> and internally self-consistent.<sup>3</sup> That the Qur'an is historically intact for Allah has taken on Him to save it from any kind of tampering for all times to come.<sup>4</sup>
2. The Qur'an is *Qawl* (i.e., teaching, guidance, precept, advice, reminder, remembrance etc.)<sup>5</sup> As far as its status is concerned, it is *al-ḥaqq* (i.e., 'the standard of truth'). Since it is Advice (*Ziker*) for whole mankind,<sup>6</sup> whatever belief, view, concept, principle, tradition, practice, doctrine, teaching, vision, imagination, interpretation of unveiling or religious experience (*ro'yâ* and *kashf o shuhood*), ideology, opinion, tradition, suggestion or insight is contrary to what is stated in the Qur'an, is necessarily false.<sup>7</sup>
3. That *al-ḥaqq* which is considered by Muslims from centuries to be one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husna*, according to the authority of the Qur'an actually refers to the Qur'an itself. And to consider this epithet as one of Allah's Names is against the teachings of the Qur'an.
4. (i) The word 'al-ḥaqq' occurs 227 times in the Qur'an in different forms.<sup>8</sup> The writer has placed almost all these 227 instances (directly or indirectly) as evidence in his article to show that the Qur'an uses the epithet 'al-ḥaqq' (the truth) to refer to the Qur'an including scriptures revealed in the past.<sup>9</sup> The references include verses that very clearly state that the Qur'an is al-ḥaqq (the standard of truth) which has been revealed by Allah. For example:

*"If thou were in doubt as to what We have revealed unto thee, then ask those who have been reading the Book from before thee: the Truth [al-ḥaqq] hath indeed come to thee from your Lord: so be in no wise of those in doubt." (10:94)*

*"(This is) the revelation of the Book in which there is no doubt; from the Lord of the Worlds... Or do they say, "He has forged it"? Nay, it is the Truth from thy Lord,..." (32:02-3)*

*"What has been revealed to Muhammad (pbuh) is al-ḥaqq (the truth) from their Lord..." (47:02)*

*"What Allah says is the truth." (33:04)*

(ii) These also include verses which state that Allah is The Revealer of the Qur'an (*al-ḥaqq*). One of the epithet used in the Qur'an for itself is *az-Ziker*. The Qur'an states:

*"We have, without doubt, sent down the Message; and We will assuredly guard it (from corruption)." (15:09) See also: "It is We Who have sent down the Qur'an to thee by stages." (76:23)*

*"It is God Who has sent down the Book in Truth, and the Balance (by which to weigh conduct). And what will make thee realize that perhaps the Hour is close at hand?" (042.018); "Only those wish to hasten it who believe not in it: those who believe hold it in awe, and know that it is the Truth..."(042.017)*

(iii) These references also include verses which contain '*al-ḥaqq*' used as epithet for the Qur'an occurring in simple form and verses which contain '*al-ḥaqq*' used as epithet for the Qur'an occurring in compound form for example verse 32:3 which contains *howAl-Ḥaqqu min-rabbika*, or verse 47:02 which contain *howal-ḥaqqu min-rabbihim* and similar verses.

(iv) These references also include mention of such verses which are liable to be misinterpreted to signify *al-ḥaqq* as one of *al-asmâ' al-Husnâ*. For example:

*Mawla humu al-ḥaqq*: Their Master in truth; their Rightful Master; "...There will every soul perceive the deeds it sent before: they will be brought back to God, their rightful Lord (*Maulahu mul Haq*), and their invented falsehoods will leave them in the lurch." (10:30) For further reference see: 06:62.<sup>10</sup>

*Rabbukumu 'l-ḥaqq*: 10:32, Your Rightful Lord; your Rightful Nourisher, "... Such is God, your real Cherisher and Sustainer: apart from truth, what (remains) but error? How then are ye turned away?" 10:32.

*Al-wilâyatu li'llâhi al-ḥaqq*: The true Protection is from Allah. He is the True Protector.

*"In this case the true protection is from Allah. He is Best for reward, and Best for consequence." cf. 18:44.<sup>11</sup>*

*Mâlik al-ḥaqq: The True King; the Rightful King:*

*"Then exalted be Allah, the True King! And hasten not (O Muhammad) with the Qur'an ere its revelation hath been perfected unto thee, and say: My Lord! Increase me in knowledge." (20:114).<sup>12</sup> "Did ye then think that We had created you in jest, and that ye would not be brought back to Us (for account)?" (23:115). "Now Allah be exalted, the True King! There is no God save Him, the Lord of the throne of Grace." (23:116)<sup>13</sup>*

*Howa'l- ḥaqq, He is the Real Lord; He is the True God: "That is because Allah, He is the Real Lord.<sup>14</sup> Lo! He quickens the dead, and He is Able to do all things." (22:6); "That is because Allah, He is the True God<sup>15</sup> and that whereon they call instead of Him, it is the False, and because Allah, He is the High, the Great." (22:62) "That (is so) because Allah, He is the True God,<sup>16</sup> and that which they invoke beside Him is the False, and because Allah, He is the Sublime, the Great." Cf. (31:30)*

*Al-ḥaqq al-Mubîn: He Who makes the truth manifest:*

*"On that day Allah will pay them their just due, and they will know that Allah is the true Manifester." (24:25)*

5. (i) The article in question also includes reference to the verses where '*al-ḥaqq*' does not occur as *epithet/name* for the Qur'an but refer to the status of its message, content, import, or injunctions of the Qur'an. For example: "*Al-ḥaqq will be the measure of weighing on the Day of Judgement*", cf. 07:08. Also many more.
- (ii) In this capacity the study includes mention of the verses where *al-ḥaqq* or any of its derivatives refers to the quality of being true of the narratives stated in the Qur'an ;
- (iii) In its capacity not as name it also occurs to state that Allah's creation is real, Allah's command is real, the world is real, the Hereafter is real, the Day of Judgement is real, requital is real, heaven is real, hell is real; that promises, threats etc. and eschatological events stated by Allah are reality. It means that the above are no illusion. For example: "*Allah created the heavens and the earth for a true purpose, to reward each soul according to its deeds; and they will not be wronged.*" (45:22) and also 06:73; 10:05, 14:19, 15:85, 16:03, 29:44, 30:08, 39:05, 44:39, 46:03,

64:03. But nowhere in the Qur'an '*al-ḥaqq*' occurs as *EPITHET* for the world, the universe, the Hereafter, whether in the sense of 'the truth' or 'the reality' (as it occurs as epithet for the Qur'an).

6. "*Al-ḥaqq* means 'the standard of truth'. Whatever the Qur'an verifies is truth (*ḥaqq*), whatever it disapproves is untruth (*al-bāṭil*). Wherever the Qur'an is silent, to express one's views is to express opinion or conjecture (*ẓann*) and 'Assuredly conjecture can by no means take the place of truth.' Deviation from what Qur'an states is *error (aḍ-ḍalāl)*. To oppose the Qur'an is *bāṭil*. 'To say anything in violation to the Qur'an is without justification and wrongful (*bi ghayr 'l ḥaqq*).' Allah commands the believers 'not to utter anything concerning Allah save what is in accordance with the Qur'an for it is *iftra* (concoction). To mould truth according to one's desires is *fiṣq* (transgression) and it is the transgressors whom Allah misleads. For example: 02:42, 109, 144, 146, 213; 07:118, 18:56, 40:78; and 10:32; and 10:36; 53:28, at 13:17 and 17:81 etc.
7. Citing almost all the references in the study in question placing his deliberations as food for thought before the learned scholars and readers the writer has drawn their attention towards the fact that nowhere in the Qur'an the word '*al-ḥaqq*' occurs as Good Name of Allah. Therefore to use this epithet as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* is but to identify the Descender of '*al-ḥaqq*' with what He has descended, taking the Revealer for Revelation, taking the Establisher of truth for *the truth*. And this implies inconsistency. And any interpretation that implies inconsistency in the Qur'an is a false interpretation for Allah has declared this Book as Best of all Narrations.<sup>17</sup> It is obvious that an incorrect interpretation cannot escape colouring the interpretation of other verses of the Qur'an and beliefs.

It is pleasing that the writer's research work "*Is al-ḥaqq one of al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*" has attracted the attention of scholars and at least one of them, Mr. Qaisar Shehzad, has taken great pains in critically examining the thesis presented in writer's article and evidence placed in its support. His seriousness and sincerity is worth appreciating. Worthy critic agrees that "the Word of Allah entertains the status of *the truth*." He also says: "We don't think that anyone else will dispute either.", but what he does not agree with is that '*al-ḥaqq* is not one of

*al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ* and argues that “there is no contradiction in applying *al-ḥaqq* [both] to Divine Being and His Word.” Let us examine the objections raised by worthy critic and the evidence and arguments offered in his favour.

### **Objections and Comments**

- I. (i) **Objection:** No contradiction/inconsistency occurs in applying the epithet *al-ḥaqq* to Allah in a sense different than it is applied as epithet to the Word of Allah.<sup>18</sup>

**Comments:** Having admitted that the Qur'an is *the standard of truth (al-ḥaqq)*, the worthy critic cites no *authority* from the Qur'an to justify his contention. The Qur'an renders saying anything about Allah without *authority* as *iftirâ*—concoction or forging lies against Allah. (cf., 3:94, 6:93-4)

- (ii) **Objection:** That this word does have many meanings; the Qur'an applies '*al-ḥaqq*' to accuracy, balance, and purpose etc. If there is no contradiction in applying *al-ḥaqq* to these and to Word of Allah simultaneously why there must be contradiction in applying it to Allah?<sup>19</sup>

**Comments:** The Qur'an applies '*al-ḥaqq*' as epithet to the Qur'an alone. However, it contains verses where '*al-ḥaqq*' does not occur as epithet for the Qur'an but refer to the status of its message, content, import, or injunctions; or refers to the truth of the Qur'anic narratives, or to state that Allah's creation is real, Allah's command is real, the world is real, it is no illusion, the Hereafter is real, the Day of Judgment is real, requital is real, heaven is real, hell is real; that promises, threats etc. and eschatological events stated by Allah are reality. We have placed authorities in its favour at number 5 above. There is no contradiction/inconsistency in using it in this way. But to apply '*al-ḥaqq*' as epithet to Allah or anything else (world etc.) for which Allah has revealed no authority amounts to going against truth.

- (iii) **Objection:** Differing with the writer's interpretation of the compound word *al-Ḥaqq al-mubîn* in verse 24:25 of the Qur'an in which word '*al-ḥaqq*' occurs twice, worthy critic claims: “verse 24:25 alone is enough to show that the Qur'an does refer *al-ḥaqq* to Allah.” He further claims that: “...24:25 is the clearest and



indubitable proof that '*al-ḥaqq*' is one of the most beautiful Names of Allah."<sup>20</sup>

**Comments:** The objections raised by the worthy critic so far were general in character. Now he comes out with a specific objection. His contention is that in verse "On that day Allah will pay them their just due, and they will know that Allah is the True Manifester." (24:25) *al-ḥaqq* refers to Allah as Good Name and not as a qualifier to the meaning of *Al-mubeen* (the Manifester). In order to support his contention worthy critic offers the following proofs: (a) Drawing attention to polemic between Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites (the early Muslim theologians) on a theological problem where according to the worthy critic they were drawing opposite conclusions from one and the same Qur'anic verse, he gives a general observation as to the exegesis and textual interpretation of the Qur'an that "There are multiple possibilities of scriptural exegesis, indeed of textual interpretation in general." (b) Reference to the rule of Grammar: According to the established and non-disputed rule of Arabic language the qualified (*mawsūf*) comes before the qualifier (*wasf /sifah*). (c) Worthy critic points out to verses 22:6 and 22:62 to support his stand point that 'two nouns occurring together [as in 24:25] refer to two names.' (d) Refers to verse 09:117 and 59:10 in which epithets Ar-Rauf and Ar-Rahîm occur as Good-Names of Allah and the same set of epithets occurs at 09:128 for the Prophet (pbuh).<sup>21</sup>

After this preliminary analysis let us turn towards the examination of proofs.

- (a) Reference to polemic between Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites on any matter carries no authority. If anything is stated on the authority of the Qur'an, it definitely has weight. In case of many theological problems the writer has seen that both the above schools formulated questions in un-Qur'anic notions and entered into useless unending controversies.
- (b) (i) Philologists have shown that languages evolve first and rules of grammar and lexicon are extracted afterward. Exception to the rules is also an admitted fact of language. Moreover, philologists and grammarians differ concerning rules and lexicon of a language at various points. Yet

existence of rules is necessary for the standardization of a language.

(ii) The Qur'an is in Clear Arabic Language but it is the Word/Speech not of a human being, but of Allah. Allah is The Originator of Everything including human languages and including human ability to evolve languages.

(iii) Rules of Arabic language as identified by philologists are only initially necessary for understanding of the Qur'anic text but no manmade science can be held as absolute standard for determining the meaning of Allah's Word. The Qur'an being *al-haqq* (the standard of truth) itself guides towards its rules and lexicon as will be stated latter. If a rule/meaning is testified by the Qur'an it is correct, if it does not it is to be rectified accordingly.

- (c) The text of verses 22:62 and 31:10 are exactly alike and read as follows: *ذَلِكَ بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الْحَقُّ وَأَنَّ مَا يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ ۖ هُوَ الْبَاطِلُ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الْعَلِيُّ الْكَبِيرُ* That is because Allah, He is the True God (*H-wal Haqqo*)<sup>22</sup> and that whereon they call instead of Him, it is the False (*Ho-wal Batilo*), and because Allah, He is the High, the Great (*al-Ali ul Kabîr*). Worthy critic argues: That 'two nouns occurring together [in 24:25 i.e., *al-Haqq al-Mubîn* must] refer to two names' as *al-Ali al-Kabîr* do. The worthy critic must explain: (i) Are these two sets of words/nouns identical! (ii) Are '*al-Ali ul Kabîr*' (two Good Names) both or any one of them used anywhere in the Qur'an to refer to the Qur'an as *al-haqq* allegedly do in *al-haqq al-mubîn*! The argument is irrelevant and out of place. There are many other sets of nouns that occur as Good Names at various places in the Qur'an. The same criticism applies there.
- (d) Verse 22:65 more clearly elaborates the Dignity of Allah with respect to the epithets *Rauf* and *Rahîm* (Kind and Merciful) under discussion. The verse says: *See you not that Allah has subjected to your service whatever is in the earth, and the ship that sails in the sea by His Command. And He it is Who withholds the sky from falling on the earth except by His permission. Verily, Allah is Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful [Rauf and Rahîm] to mankind.* And verse 09:128 very clearly elaborates the dignity of the Prophet (pbuh) with

respect to these epithets. It says: "*Verily, there has come to you a Messenger of Allah (pbuh) from amongst yourselves, one who grieves at your hardship. Ardently desirous of your welfare, he is tender and merciful [Rauf and Rahîm] to those who believe.*" (9:128) So we will discuss this point with reference to verses 22:65 and 09:128. The former states that Allah is Full of Kindness and Mercy **for the whole human kind**. Whereas the later verse states that the Prophet (pbuh) is full of kindness and mercy **for the believers**. The same set of epithets is applied both to Allah and to the Prophet (pbuh) but the sense in which they are to be used respectively is unambiguously qualified by the Qur'an. So in what lays the contradiction! Is verse 24:25 or any other verse for that matter likewise warrants and qualifies the conditions for the use of the epithet '*al-ḥaqq*' for Allah as well as the Qurân!

- II. We have stated in the paper under discussion that in verses preceding 24:25 "Allah says that those who falsely accuse chaste women are cursed in this world as well as the Hereafter. On that Day Allah will give their own tongues, hands and feet the ability to talk and these will bear witness against them concerning their evil deeds." (cf. 24:23-24) We have already seen that *al-hâqq* will be the measure of weighing on the Day of Judgement for the purpose of Requital. (cf. 07:08) Now Allah says that on that Day Allah will pay them what they really deserve in accordance with *the truth*, and they will come to know that Allah is the true Manifester (*al-Ḥaqq al-Mubeen*) of the piety of the virtuous women whom they caused humiliation and disgrace by making malicious and false statements and also that He is the true Manifester of *al-hâqq* by giving the evil-doers their just due. (cf. 24:25) Let us see some more instances. In the context of holy war of Badar Almighty says: "*And when Allah promised you one of the two bands, you wished the one that would have no danger and Allah wished to justify the Truth by His Words and to cut off the roots of the disbelievers.*"(08:07) Similarly at 10:81-82 where Hazrat Mûsâ (pbuh) puts his staff on the earth and says that what you have brought is magic and Allah will reduce it to naught just now. It is here that Allah says: "*And Allah vindicates the truth by His Words, howsoever much the guilty detest that.*"

### ***Qur'anic Ontology vs un-Qur'anic Ontology***

Let us identify the real problem. According to the writer the real problem lies in the un-Qur'anic Ontology at the back of mind of those who see no contradiction in applying *al-ḥaqq* both to Divine Being and to His Word. According to Qur'anic ontology 'God (Allah), *Khalq* (Creation) and *Amr* (Command) are the ultimate categories of being. Whatever *there is*, belongs to either of these three categories. Allah is The Originator of everything, and *Khalq* (Creation) and *Amr* (Command) are the 'orders of being' originated by Him. Thus Qu'anic ontology divides the whole origination in to two categories: 'Creation' and 'Command' as Allah says: "Verily your Lord is Allah who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and then He established himself on the throne. He causes night and day with each other so one succeeds the other the sun and moon and the stars are subject to his command. Behold his is the creation and his is the command. Giver of blessings is Allah, Lord of the worlds." (al-Qur'an, 7:54)<sup>23</sup> According to the Qur'anic ontology the Qur'an belongs to the category of Command (*amr*).<sup>24</sup> The polemic between Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites on the problem of 'the createdness / eternity of the Qur'an' arose because of accepting un-Qur'anic ontology on the part of the former school and overstepping the bounds of this ontology by identifying *Kalâm al-Allah* with the Divine Attribute of Speech and in this way identifying *Kalâm al-Allah* with Allah by the latter school. Since it would make everything stated in the Qur'an to be eternal and determined from ever, in their attempt to find the way out the Ash'arites had to coin terms like *kalam-i nafsi* (latent speech) and *kalam-i lafzi* (expressed speech). The Qur'an is the standard of truth; going against it can never lead to the right direction. The same is the case with *wahdat al-wujud*. The very nomenclature is un-Qur'anic. Had Allah been *Wujud* what difficulty was there in revealing this word or any of the derivatives of *w-j-d* in the Qur'an! It could not exist without disregarding absoluteness of ontological categories and making them relative to each other, and this they do by declaring *al-ḥaqq* as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*. They translated '*al-ḥaqq*' in the sense of True/Truth or Real/Reality and said: Allah is 'Absolute Truth' or 'Absolute Reality' and the universe is 'relative truth'/'relative reality' whereas according to the Qur'anic ontology the created order of being is *Reality* and Allah is the Originator of *Reality*; similarly the Qur'an is *the truth* and Allah is The Descender

of the truth.<sup>25</sup> Using 'al-Ḥaqq' as epithet for Allah and for the 'Word of Allah' in identical or overlapping sense mars categorial distinction and amounts to disregarding Allah's Command *أَلَا لَهُ الْخَلْقُ وَالْأَمْرُ*; and using 'al-Ḥaqq' in different senses for Allah and for 'Word of Allah' has no authority on its back.

### **Consensus Is No Argument**

III. Worthy critic understands that at philosophical level consensus is no argument yet he says that on non-philosophical level at least 1400 years of Scriptural interpretation must carry some weight. The fact is that neither philosophy nor tradition carries any weight vis-à-vis *al-ḥaqq*. There are many verses a certain interpretation of which is believed by most of the exegetes and believers from centuries and yet that interpretation is not correct. We shall very briefly refer to just one such verse.

#### **Interpretation of Verse No. 24:26 of Surah An-Nûr**

Verse no. 24:26 occurs just after verse 24:25 the context of which we have discussed at (e) above. This verse reads as follows: *Al-Khabîthâtu Lilkhabîthîna Wa Al-Khabîthûna Lilkhabîthâti Wa Aṭ-Ṭayyibâtu Lilṭayyibîna Wa Aṭ-Ṭayyibûna Lilṭayyibâti 'Ulâ'ika Mubarra'ûna Mimmâ Yaqûlûna Lahum Maghfiratun Wa Rizqun Karîmun*. In most of the translations and exegeses of the Qur'an the above verse is translated in the manner M.A.S. Abdel Haleem does it:

*"Corrupt women are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; good women are for good men and good men are for good women. The good are innocent of what has been said against them; they will have forgiveness and a generous provision."* (24:26)<sup>26</sup>

Now consider the following:

*God has given examples of disbelievers: the wives of Noah and Lot who married two of Our righteous servants but betrayed them. Their husbands could not help them against God: it was said, 'Both of you enter the Fire with the others.'* God has also given examples of believers: Pharaoh's wife, who said, 'Lord, build me a house near You in the Garden. Save me from Pharaoh and his actions; save me from the evildoers; and Mary, daughter of Imran. She guarded her chastity, so We breathed into her from Our spirit. She

*accepted the truth of her Lord's words and Scriptures: she was truly devout. (al-Qur'an, 66:10-11)<sup>27</sup>*

These verses certify that wives of Hazrat Noah and Hazrat Lût (pbut) – the two pure men of Allah were impure; and the wife of Firaun – a transgressor– was a pure woman. Is the translation of verse 24:26 not inconsistent with verse 66:10-11 and many other verses whereas Allah declares the Qur'an to be *a Book consistent par excellence (Ahsan al-hadith Kitab ... 39:23; Also see 39:28, and 18:01* which say the Qur'an contains no inconsistency, or any kind of defect. If any *tafseer* translates verse 24:25 or 24:26<sup>28</sup> or any other verse in such a way which secures the consistency of the Qur'an, should we defend the deficient interpretation by referring to 1400 years tradition of its translation! Shall it carry any weight!

Let the writer conclude his submissions with the following remarks: People are of three types. Those who benefit from the knowledge of the Teacher of the Book and Wisdom<sup>29</sup> and from the people who were certified subsequently, reach the correct conclusion. The deniers are the deniers. And those who incorporate their own likes and dislikes into the teachings of the above mentioned, can never reach correct conclusion.

## THE QUR'AN: CREATION OR COMMAND!\*

*Abstract: Problems which became controversial between Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites in the early centuries of Muslim history included among them the problem of the nature of relationship between Divine Essence and Attributes. The problem was that whether Divine Attributes are real in their own right and superadded to the Being of God or the Essence and Attributes of God are identical. Ash'arites held the first whereas the Mu'tazilites the second view. The problem of the createdness/ eternity of the Qur'an arose out of this problem as an implication. Ash'arites' held that the Qur'an was uncreated and eternal whereas the Mu'tazilites held it to be created and contingent. This study examines the views of both theological schools in the perspective of the Qur'anic teachings and finds that the problem is based on the acceptance of an un-Qur'anic ontology by both schools. The solutions offered by both schools too were inappropriate on the same count. The study reconstructs the problem in Qur'anic diction as the following: Whether the Qur'an belongs to the category of Creation or to the category of Command! and argues that the Qur'an belongs to the category of Command.*

### **Islam vs Disbelief as Dîn**

Islam is a *dîn*(way of life); it is a *din* which Allah Almighty has pleased to approve for His servants. From Hazrat Adam (pbuh) till the last Prophet (pbuh) Islam was the *dîn* which was revealed to any of the prophets. It was a complete *dîn* whenever it was revealed for any people; on Hazrat Muhammad (pbuh) it has been perfected.<sup>1</sup> *Kufer* (disbelief) is a *dîn*(way of life) too.<sup>2</sup> *Kufer* denotes all manmade *dins*—the ways of life structured by human likes and dislikes, desires, imaginations etc. To define Islam as a complete code of life as compared to *kufer* is a style which is not endorsed by Allah in the Qur'an.<sup>3</sup> Holy Qur'an, which Allah has declared to be 'the standard of truth' (*al-Haqq*), is the sole authority in *dîn-i-Islam*.<sup>4</sup> (People differ as to their level of its understanding.<sup>5</sup>) Then why do Muslims differ in their understanding even on core issues! If the reference for the understanding of *dîn* does not remain to be the same, dissension is bound to occur. Majority opinion (*jamhûr-e ummat*) is never endorsed by the Qur'an as standard for the correctness of a view. The Qur'an alone entertains the status of being the standard of truth as *qawl i.e.*, as teaching, precept, principle etc.<sup>6</sup> Who's statement is more true than

Allah's! [No one's is.] (4:87) Accordance with the Holy Qur'an is the standard for the correctness of any individual or collective opinion. Plurality of religions is a fact acknowledged by the Qur'an.<sup>7</sup> 'No coercion is permitted in matters of *dīn*(religion)' is the principle enunciated by the Qur'an.<sup>8</sup> The same injunction binds the Muslims to tolerate difference of understanding within Islam as a religious obligation. If Allah's injunction as to the none-coercion in matters of religion is kept in mind, no attempt will be made to impose one's understanding on others—one will live according to one's own religion or understanding of religion—such that equal right for the same will be accepted for others. But our history does not substantiate that we acted upon above mentioned Allah's Injunction. After the division of Muslims into Sunni and Shi'a factions, the theological sects which arose among Sunni's in the early centuries are known as *Mu'tazilites* and *Ash'arites*. One of the problems upon which they held controversial views related to the problem of createdness /uncreatedness of the Qur'an. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> century of *Hijrah*(9<sup>th</sup> century A.D.) when the then Abbasside Caliph embraced *Mu'tazilites'* creed and forced the religious scholars for the acceptance of the same under state authority, the coercion and oppression employed by him is still cause of embarrassment for Muslims. This study examines the problem of createdness /uncreatedness of the Qur'an to show that neither the views of *Mu'tazilites* nor of the *Ash'arites* were in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an.

### ***Createdness vs Uncreatedness of the Qur'an***

#### ***Mu'tazilites vs Ash'arites***

The *Mu'tazilites* believed that the Holy Qur'an was 'created' and 'contingent'. Some believed that the Holy Qur'an was initially created on the Preserved Tablet (*loḥim-mahfūz*) in non-verbal form which after its revelation took the form in which it is recited; some of them believed that it was created during its revelation. They argued that the belief in an uncreated and eternal Qur'an was opposed to the belief in the Oneness of God. They did not deny the Qur'an to be the 'Word of Allah', however they denied its uncreatedness and eternity.<sup>9</sup> *Ash'arites* believed the Qur'an to be 'Word of Allah' too. (9:06) They argued that the 'Word of Allah' could not be created and contingent. Referring to verse 54 of *surah al-A'râf* which says "... all creation and command belong to Him."<sup>10</sup> 'Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari argued that



'Creation' and 'Command' are two different categories. From verse 25 of surah ar-Rûm which says that: "...Among His signs, too, is the fact that the heavens and the earth stand firm by His command."<sup>11</sup> he argues that Allah's Word belongs to the category of His Command (*amr*), and His Creation (*khalq*) stands firm by His Command. The Qur'an is Allah's Word, so it belongs to the category of 'Command'. He further argues that it is necessary that the 'Command' precedes 'Creation'; for if some other 'Command' is perceived to precede the 'Command', it will again be a 'Command'; and infinite regress makes everything unintelligible.

### ***Distinction between Un-articulated Speech and Articulated Speech***

Al-Ash'ari further argues: That as inherent in Allah's Attribute of Kalam, Allah's Word (*Kalam Ullah*) was with God from ever as Unarticulated Speech (*Kalam-i Nafsi*). So the Qur'an is uncreated and eternal (*qadim*) in its essence. At the beginning of the creation this was placed on the Preserved Tablet as 'Pre-existent Qur'an' where it remained till its revelation in articulated form.<sup>12</sup>

It is said that Muslims traditionally believed in the uncreated-ness of the Qur'an.<sup>13</sup> The question is what is the authority behind this assertion? The terms 'common Muslims' and 'traditional religious scholars' are vague terms with no definite denotation. The only belief which the common Muslims and traditional scholars could entertain was 'that the Holy Qur'an is the Word of Allah, revealed on the holy heart of the Prophet (pbuh) in around twenty three years.' How could a belief about the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur'an arise among Muslims traditionally! As mentioned by Wolfson following three things are presented as proof for coming into being of the belief in a pre-existent heavenly Qur'an among Muslims, and about its being placed in some Hidden Book, or in *Lohim Mehfüz* or in *Ummul Kitâb*.<sup>14</sup> (i) It has been said in the Qur'an that it is the dignified Qur'an in *Lohim Mehfüz*.<sup>15</sup> (ii) This is Arabic Qur'an in the *Ummul Kitâb*.<sup>16</sup> (iii) This is the dignified Qur'an in a Hidden Book.<sup>17</sup> Notwithstanding these and other verses relating Qur'an's being the Word of Allah and its being revealed by Hazrat Jibrael on the holy heart of the Prophet (pbuh), how could a belief about placing of an uncreated or a created Qur'an on the Preserved Tablet from which the verses were being revealed bit by bit arise among Muslims in early

centuries without alien un-Islamic influence! While the Qur'an bars the Muslims from asking unnecessary questions, was it possible for them to enter into polemics about a pre-existent created or uncreated Qur'an without un-Islamic inspiration!<sup>18</sup> A belief about a pre-existent Turah already existed among Jews; most probably the belief in a Pre-existent Qur'an entered in Muslim Thought from there.<sup>19</sup> In Christian ontology there was no concept of a category other than the categories of 'created/contingent' and 'uncreated/eternal'. During polemics with Christians, Muslim's accepted these terms. Terms are never neutral. Ideas on which they thrive invariably ride on their back. Mixing 'untruth' in 'truth' cannot bring about anything except misperception.<sup>20</sup> When the *Mu'tazilites* presented the theory of the createdness of the Qur'an, its being disliked by Muslims was but natural because of its being opposed to the Qur'anic teachings. Traditional religious scholars, especially Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal and his group, expressed strong resentment over it. Had these scholars formulated their stand point in Qur'anic terms and based their argument on the authority of the Qur'an, they would have rendered a great service to the Muslim Thought. But they too entangled into un-Qur'anic philosophical notions of createdness vs. uncreatedness and contingency vs. eternity of the Qur'an, and in response to the *Mu'tazilites'* view that the Qur'an was created they argued that it was uncreated and eternal. Thus they went to the other extreme. Usually it is assumed that the *Ash'arites* took a midway between the extremes; at least in this matter it is not correct. The *Ash'arites* too, failed to perceive the harmful implications of accepting un-Qur'anic notions. Using the terms of 'unarticulated speech' (*kalam-i nafsi*) for the ideas in mind before their being verbalized, and 'articulated speech' (*kalam-i lafzi*) after they are verbalized, al-Ash'ari argued that the Qur'an before its revelation was with God as 'unarticulated speech' and on its revelation it took the form of 'articulated speech'. So it is uncreated and eternal in its essence. The origin of *kalam-i nafsi* and *kalam-i lafzi*—terms used by *Ash'arites*—does not lie in the Qur'an. Their origin lies in Philo's philosophy which in turn can be traced back to the intradeical interpretation of Platonic Ideas. According to this interpretation, 'the ideas of Plato's World of Ideas' actually are the eternal ideas of God's Mind. While creating the universe, God first created these eternal ideas apart from Him in an intelligible form, and then created this intelligible world in physical form.<sup>21</sup>

The ideas of *the Mu'tazilites* and *the Ash'arites* both did not correspond to the Qur'anic teachings. The *Ash'arites'* view does not correspond to the Qur'an because, besides un-Qur'anic notions of *kalam-i nafsi* and *kalam-i lafzi*, in it the concepts of 'Preserved Tablet' and of 'God's Knowledge' are incongruent with other Qur'anic concepts like moral freedom and accountability, principles of guidance and misguidance, and of *Umm al-Kitab* etc. For example according to the Holy Qur'an nobody ever comes in this world in such a state that it was determined for him in Allah's Knowledge, from the beginning of the universe or before he is born, that he will leave this world as a condemned sinner.<sup>22</sup> This observation is also true of those persons concerning whom the Qur'an confirms that they left the world as sinners. For instance Phiraun, Hâmân, Sâmri, and especially Abu Lahab and his wife. Keeping in view the teachings of the Qur'an it is never possible that the verses relating their condemnation could have been written on Preserved Tablet from eternity. To believe in a pre-existent uncreated Qur'an and its being placed on the Preserved Tablet or to believe in a pre-existent Qur'an created on the Preserved Tablet at the beginning of the universe will imply that leaving the world as sinners of the above mentioned persons (and others like them) was determined from eternity or from the beginning of the universe. This belief gives birth to such moral determinism which is absolutely opposed to Islamic beliefs of moral freedom and accountability. If the above mentioned premises are admitted, escape from this conclusion is impossible. Such view makes God an eternal Script Writer in whose knowledge the role and destiny of a character appearing in any episode in world-drama is eternally and infallibly determined. In the presence of belief in the accountability of man before Allah on the Day of Judgement as a core principle of Islamic teachings such view cannot be accepted. Denying the belief in an uncreated or created pre-existent Qur'an, when the libertarians (*Mu'tazilites*) argued that the Qur'an was created at its revelation, they had to face the objection of holding 'the Word of Allah' as created. This view was also incorrect.

Let us examine these views in the light of the Qur'an.

1. It is Allah Who brings everything into being. The Qur'an divides whatever there is other than Allah, into two categories—the creation (*khalq*), and the command (*amr*).<sup>23</sup> It is Allah Who has

- created everything and with His Command (*amr*) it is active in its orbit with reference to its purpose of creation.<sup>24</sup>
2. Heavens and the earth and whatever is between them, including the phenomena of death and life, all belong to the category of creation (*khalq*).<sup>25</sup>
  3. Allah has not created anything without purpose.<sup>26</sup> Purpose therefore is necessary to be determined prior to the creation of anything.
  4. Anything Allah Wills to create, it is His Command (*Amr*) which makes it active in its well-defined orbit.<sup>27</sup>
  5. Though command (*amr*) is determined prior to anything's creation, yet it is issued or descended or blown into when the thing in question becomes capable of receiving it. The command is descended at present.<sup>28</sup>
  6. The Qur'an belongs to the category of command (*amr*) rather than the category of creation (*khalq*) as has been said: "*Dhâlika 'Amru Allâhi 'Anzâlahu 'Ilaykum Wa Man Yattaqi Allâha Yukaffir 'Anhu Sayyi'âtihi Wa Yu'zim Lahu 'Ajrâan*" This [the Qur'an] is Allah's Command (*Amr*) which He has revealed towards you. (al-Qur'an, 65:05)
  7. The Qur'an is the source of knowing *shari'a* and *shari'a* too is Allah's *Amr*.<sup>29</sup>
  8. The characteristic of Allah's *Amr* is that it is always sent down or issued, or blown into and not created.<sup>30</sup>

### **Critical Examination**

1. In principle it was wrong to discuss that whether the Qur'an is created or uncreated. What could be rightfully asked on this matter was that whether the Qur'an belongs to the category of creation or to the category of command and its answer was that "It is command (*amr*)." Abu al Hasan al-Ash'ari correctly identified the Qur'an as command (*amr*) but holding that the Qur'an as 'Word of God' was identical with His Attribute of Speech, and since the Attribute of Speech was uncreated and eternal so it was also uncreated and eternal, made an unlawful move. It was equivalent to asserting the incarnation of the Divine Attribute of Speech. This will make the Qur'an co-eternal with God.

2. *Asha'rite* distinction between unarticulate speech and articulated speech also amounted to holding 'the Word of God' identical with God.<sup>31</sup> Whereas the Qur'an is Allah's Word which He has descended on His Prophet (pbuh) and Allah is the Descender of this Word; the Descender and the descended can't both be identical.
3. Allah is Able to speak to any of His servants or creatures anytime He likes.<sup>32</sup> The Qur'an calls itself and scriptures revealed earlier as 'Word of Allah' (*Kalam Allah*).<sup>33</sup> To speak is Allah's Attribute as to create is His Attribute. The earth, the heavens and whatever between them are proof of Allah's Attributes of Creation and others. Similarly the Holy Qur'an is proof of Allah's Attributes of Speech, Command etc. This is also true of Scriptures revealed in the past and as well as Allah's speaking with His servants and creatures.

It is not the case that Allah created whatever He liked once for all. He creates at present whatever He likes.<sup>34</sup> Similarly it is not the case that Allah has spoken whatever He liked, once for all, and then placing His Word/Speech on the Preserved Tablet He retired to let it descended gradually. Allah is Able to speak with any of His servants or creatures any times He likes.<sup>35</sup>

#### ***The Qur'anic Principle for the Interpretation of the Mutashabihât (Allegorical Verses)***

4. Verses of the Qur'an are of two types: The *muḥkimât* (obligatory verses) and the *mutashabihât* (allegorical verses). *Muḥkimât* are the verses which are in the form of Allah's Injunctions. Whereas *mutashabihât* are the verses, by hearing and reading which, there comes some obligation on the hearer or the reader. *Muḥkimât* are the foundation of the Book (*Ummul Kitab*). Congruence with these is the criterion in all matters relating the interpretation of the Book. Whatever conclusion is drawn from the *mutashabihât* is necessary to be corroborated by *muḥkimât*. Those whose hearts are diseased, does not admit of any criterion in this respect. While interpreting the *mutashabihât* (allegorical verses) they don't base their interpretation on *muḥkimât* (obligatory verses); they interpret them as they like. Allah alone knows the interpretation of allegorical verses; the sound in knowledge (*ar-rasikhûna fil-ilm*)

say: We believe in them. These are from our Lord because the trustworthy Messenger (pbuh) has said so and he (pbuh) is the absolute standard with reference to being on the straight path.<sup>36</sup> The perverse people seek to arrive at the meaning of *mutashabihât* arbitrarily. Qur'an calls it *ibtigha al-fitna* (to create trouble). The Qur'an considers *al-fitna* worse than killing.<sup>37</sup>

### **Preserved Tablet**

5. As Allah's Command (*Amr*) the Holy Qur'an has the status of 'Judgement or Authority' (*Hukm*) and is in Arabic language.<sup>38</sup> It is on the Preserved Tablet as *ummulkitab*.<sup>39</sup> Thus *ummulkitab* is the seclusion (*khalwat*) of the Qur'an and the Qur'an is the manifest form (*jalwat*) of *ummulkitab*. It has also been said in the Qur'an that the *muḥkimât*' are the foundation of the Book.<sup>40</sup> This very *ummulkitab* is the criterion on the basis of which Allah obliterates anything He likes or confirms if He likes.<sup>41</sup> Thus, the *ummulkitab*, it can be argued, are the principles which Allah Almighty in His Absolute Wisdom had determined for the guidance or misguidance of mankind— individuals as well as nations—before the revelation of the Scriptures. Only Allah has the knowledge of these principles, and with His Authority these are implemented.<sup>42</sup> It can be argued that *muḥkimât*' verses are the expression of these principles into Divine injunctions in the Qur'an at the time of its revelation. Identification of *muḥkimât*' and the *ummulkitab* implies that the *muḥkimât* as principles of guidance and misguidance had been there before the revelation of scriptures from the beginning of the universe. These are the *ummulkitab*. But no such assertion can be made concerning the *mutashabihât*. Verses concerning Phiraun, Hâmân, Sâmrî, abu-Lahb and his wife are not *muḥkimât*. With due respect and reverence of the Qur'an it can be argued that these verses did not exist prior to their revelation from the beginning of the universe.
6. In Surah *al-Waqi'a* of the Qur'an it has been said: This indeed is a noble Qur'an; in a Book kept hidden. Which none toucheth save the purified ones. (56:77-79) It is further corroborated by the verse which says: We have sent down this Advice, and it is We Who will keep it intact. (Cf. 15:09) This shows that Allah has taken upon Him to save it in every way.

7. Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz tries to identify Preserved Tablet with the Hidden Book (*kitab-immaknoon*), and both of them with the revealed Qur'an<sup>43</sup> but to our understanding this is not correct. *Lohim Mehfooz* (Preserved Tablet) and the Holy Qur'an are distinguishable from each other. According to the Qur'an *Lohim Mehfooz* is a book which contains: (i) Knowledge of the generations of the past. (20:51-52) (ii) In it is recorded whatever there is in the heavens and the earth. (20:70) (iii) It contains *ummulkitab*—the principles of guidance and misguidance determined by Allah prior to the revelation of scriptures from the beginning of the universe. (3:7; 13:39; 43:1-4)

## Conclusion

The problem of the createdness vs. eternity of the Qur'an in the history of Muslim theology arose because of accepting un-Qur'anic philosophical terms. These terms were based upon un-Qur'anic ontology. According to Qur'anic ontology the universe is not eternal, and whatever Allah has brought into being either belongs to the category of creation (*khalq*) or to the category of command (*amr*). If anything does not belong to the category of *khalq*, it will necessarily belong to the category of *amr* and vice versa. So the appropriate terms for discussion on the status of the Qur'an were not 'created vs. uncreated'; rather they were 'creation (*khalq*) vs. command (*amr*).' So the stand points of *Mu'tazilite* and the *Ash'arite* both were un-Qur'anic. The Holy Qur'an is *Amr* and consists of obligatory verses (*muhkamât*) and allegorical verses (*mutashabihât*). Similarly the discussion about the Qur'an that whether it is *contingent* or *eternal* was also un-Qur'anic and out of place. The way Allah is Able to add to His creation anytime He pleases, He is also Able to speak to any of His servants or creatures at any time to descend His Command.

Allah is beyond all determinations in His Being as well as Attributes because He is Absolutely Matchless, Unique. He is 'Bringer into Being of Everything'. As from the undeterminable nature of His Attribute of Creation, it does not follow that His creation too is beyond determinations, similarly from the undeterminable nature of His Attribute of Speech or Command it does not follow that His revealed Word or Command was also beyond

determinations. Allah is Absolutely Unique in His Matchlessness and is Beyond all Determinations.<sup>44</sup>

The terms *Hâdith*(contingent) and *Qadîm*(eternal) in the above discussion also need to be examined. Everything which has beginning in time is *hâdith*. Whereas '*qadîm*' is equivalent in meaning to the term 'eternal' and '*qidm*' denotes 'eternity'. A being whose beginning and end with reference to time is inconceivable is *Qadîm*.<sup>45</sup> In Christian theology the concept of '*qidam*' (eternity) has been considered in two senses: i) Everlastingness—infinity of time with reference to past and future; ii) Timelessness—transcendence from time *i.e.*, past present and future.<sup>46</sup> An everlasting being will be a temporal being though without beginning and end. Transcendence from time has its own implications. Eternity (*Qidam*) is a term which the Christians accepted from Greeks and included into the Divine Attributes from where it entered in Muslim thought.<sup>47</sup> The *Mu'tazilites* and the *Asha'rites* accepted these terms, like many others, from Greeks through Christians and introduced the word '*qidam*' as attribute of Qur'anic God. *Qadîm* occurs thrice in the Qur'an but nowhere has it occurred as Good Name or to mention Allah's Attribute. For example, Hazrat Yusuf's brother leaves for Hazrat Yaqûb (pbuh) from Egypt taking with him Hazrat Yusuf's shirt. Hazrat Yaqûb says: I am feeling the fragrance of Yûsaf if you do not say that I am dotard. Those of his progeny who heard Hazrat Yaqûb, said: "*By God! You are still lost in that old illusion of yours!*" (12:95) The disbelievers when do not come towards affirming faith they say about the Qur'an: "*This is an ancient fabrication.*" (46:12) Allah has placed stages for the Moon, it decreases and increases. It is said: "*We have determined phases for the moon until finally it becomes like an old date-stalk.*" (36:39) Wherever the word *Qadîm* has been used in the Qur'an it has been used in the sense of 'old', or 'ancient'; nowhere it has been used in any sense of the word 'eternal' or 'uncreated'. Then how the theologians' use of this word for God and His Attributes can be justified! What can come about from it except confusion and dissension! The Holy Qur'an states: "*Yet still there are some who, with no knowledge or guidance or any book of enlightenment, argue about God.*" (22:8) The Qur'an bars the believers to talk about God without authority and calls it concoction (*iftirâ*). While talking about God we must keep in mind that our



assertion must be based on authority from the Qur'an. The Qur'an says: *"The Most Excellent Names belong to God: use them to call on Him, and keep away from those who abuse them– they will be requited for what they do."*(07:180)



## NUMBER OF VERSES OF THE QUR'AN (INDEX AND ARGUMENT)\*

*Abstract: It is considered that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6666. Let the readers note that it is absolutely incorrect that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6666. According to our research the Qur'anic Text consists of 6238 verses. Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam Lahore, in the Qur'an published by it in the year 1935 accepts the division of the Qur'anic Text into 6236 verses. (Government of Pakistan vide Act No. LIV of 1973 dated 30-7-1973 has adopted this copy as the 'Standard Copy' of the Qur'an.) Arguments of the Committee which recommended the acceptance of Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam's published Qur'an as the 'Standard Copy' are not available to the author, so no comments can be given on the decision taken by the concerned Committee. However it becomes clear that total number of verses of the Qur'an could never be 6666. It would be important that someone tries to trace how this misconception entered into Muslim thought.*

### Index of Surahs and Verses

Sr.	Name	Verses	Sr.	Name	Verses
1.	Al-Fâtiḥa	7	12.	Yûsuf	111
2.	Al-Baqara	286	13.	Ar-Ra'd	43
3.	Āl-e Imrân	200	14.	Ibrahîm	52
4.	AnNisâ'	177	15.	Al-Ḥijir	99
<b>Total Verses of Manzil I</b>			16.	An-Nahl	128
<b>670</b>			<b>Total Verses of Manzil III</b>		
5.	Al-Mâidah	120	<b>665</b>		
6.	Al-Anâm	166	17.	Al-Asrâ	111
7.	Al-A'râf	206	18.	Al-Kahf	110
8.	Al-Anfâl	75	19.	Maryam	98
9.	At-Tauba	129	20.	Ṭâ Hâ	135
<b>Total Verses of Manzil II</b>			21.	Al-Anbiya'	112
<b>696</b>			22.	Al-Ḥajj	78
10.	Yûnus	109	23.	Al-Muminûn	118
11.	Hûd	123	24.	An-Nûr	64

25.	Al-Furqân	77	52.	Aṭ-Ṭûr	49
<b>Total Verses of Manzil IV 903</b>			53.	An-Najm	62
			54.	Al-Qamar	55
26.	Ash-Shu'râ	227	55.	Ar-Rahmân	78
27.	An-Naml	93	56.	Al-Wâqî'ah	96
28.	Al-Qaṣaṣ	88	57.	Al-Ḥadîd	29
29.	Al-Ankabût	69	58.	Al-Mujâdilah	22
30.	Ar-Rûm	60	59.	Al-Ḥashr	24
31.	Luqmân	34	60.	Mumtaḥinah	13
32.	As-Sajdah	30	61.	Aṣ-Ṣaff	14
33.	Al-Aḥzâb	73	62.	Al-Jumu'ah	11
34.	Saba'	54	63.	Al-Munâfiqûn	11
35.	Fâṭir	45	64.	At-Taghâbun	18
36.	Yâ Sîn	83	65.	Aṭ-Ṭalâq	12
<b>Total Verses of Manzil V 856</b>			66.	At-Taḥrîm	12
			67.	Al-Mulk	30
37.	Aṣ-Ṣâfât	182	68.	Al-Qalam	52
38.	Ṣâd	88	69.	Al-Ḥâqqah	52
39.	Az-Zumar	75	70.	Al-M'arij	44
40.	Ghâfir (Momin)	85	71.	Nûh	28
41.	Fuṣṣilat (Hâ Mîm as-Sajda)	54	72.	Al-Jinn	28
			73.	Al-Muzzammil	20
42.	As-Shurâ	53	74.	Al-Muddaththir	56
43.	Az-Zukhruf	89	75.	Al-Qiyâmah	40
44.	Ad-Dukhân	59	76.	Al-Insân (Ad-Dahr)	31
45.	Al-Jathiyah	37	77.	Al-Mursalât	50
46.	Al-Aḥqâf	35	78.	An-Naba'	40
47.	Muḥammad	38	79.	An-Nâzi'ât	46
48.	Al-Fataḥ	29	80.	'Abasa	42
49.	Al-Ḥujurât	18	81.	At-Takwîr	29
<b>Total Verses of Manzil VI 842</b>			82.	Al-Infiṭâr	19
			83.	Al-Muṭaffifin	36
50.	Qâf	45	84.	Al-Inshiqâq	25
51.	Aḍh-Dhâriyât	60			

85.	Al-Burûj	22	101.	Al-Qâriah	11
86.	Aṭ-Ṭâriq	17	102.	At-Takâthur	8
87.	Al-A'âlâ	19	103.	Al- 'Aşr	3
88.	Al-Ghâshiyah	26	104.	Al-Hamazah	9
89.	Al-Fajr	30	105.	Al-Fîl	5
90.	Al-Balad	20	106.	Quraysh	4
91.	Ash-Shams	15	107.	Al-Mâ'ûn	7
92.	Al-Layl	21	108.	Al-Kauthar	3
93.	Aḍ-Ḍuḥâ	11	109.	Al-Kâfirûn	6
94.	Alam Nashrah	8	110.	An-Naşr	3
95.	At-Tîn	8	111.	Al-Masad (Lahb)	5
96.	Al-'Alaq	19	112.	Al-Ikhlâş	4
97.	Al-Qadr	5	113.	Al-Falaq	5
98.	Al-Bayyinah	8	114.	An-Nâs	6
99.	Az-Zalzalah	8	<b>Total Verses of Manzil VII 1606</b>		
100.	Al-'Ādiyât	11			
<b>Total Verses of the Qurân= 6238</b>					

According to our research the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6238 whereas in the Qur'an published in 1935 by Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam, Lahore and declared as 'Standard Copy' by the Government of Pakistan *vide* Act No. LIV of 1973 dated 30-7-1973, these are given as 6236.

According to our research the total number of verses of Surah An-Nisâ' of the Qur'an is 177 whereas it is 176 according to the 'Standard Copy' referred to above. According to our research verse no. 173 of Surah An-Nisâ' starts from "*Fa'ammâ Al-Ladhîna 'Āmanū Wa 'Amilū Aş-Şâlihâti*" and ends at "*Fayu adhdhibuhum 'Adhâbâan 'Alîmâan.*" And from *Wa Lâ Yajidûna* starts the next verse no. 174 which ends at *Walîyâan Wa Lâ Naşîrâan*. But the 'Standard Copy' of the Qur'an counts this whole text as one verse.

Similarly according to our research the total number of verses of Surah Al-An'âm of the Qur'an is 166 whereas it is 165 according to

the 'Standard Copy'. According to our research verse no. 73 of Surah Al-An'âm consists of the following text: "*Wa Huwa Al-Ladhî Khalaqa As-Samâwâti Wa Al-'Arḍa Bil-Ĥaqqi Wa Yawma Yaqūlu Kun Fayakūnu*"; and from "*Qawluhu Al-Ĥaqqu*" starts the verse no. 74 which ends at "*Wa Huwa Al-Ĥakîmu Al-Khabîr.*" But the 'Standard Copy' counts this whole text as one verse. The following evidence is offered to help readers reach the right conclusion.

- The phrase "*Adhâbâan 'Alîmâan*" occurs 14 times in the Qur'an. Wherever the statement concludes at "*Adhâbâan 'Alîmâan*", the verse ends. At 12 places including verse no. 173 of surah An-Nisâ', the verses end at "*Adhâbâan 'Alîmâan*".<sup>1</sup> This fact is accepted and observed in many copies of the Qur'an published by different companies at different times but the 'Standard Copy' does not observe it and counts the above mentioned text of An-Nisâ' as one verse.

Similarly the phrase "*Kun Fayakūnu*" occurs 8 times in the Qur'an. All the Qur'an publishing companies accept and observe that all the seven places other than 06:73 the verses end at "*Kun Fayakūnu*". There is absolutely no justification for denying the same to the verse 06:73. This is the evidence from within the Qur'anic text.

- Following copies of the Qur'an published by different companies with translations of scholarly persons highly esteemed by different sects agree with the author at above points:

(1) Copies of the Qur'an published by Taj Company before its coming under the control of Administrator appointed by the Lahore High Court, which also include the following: i) Translation into Persian by Shah Wali Allah, ii) Translation into English by Marmaduke Pickthall and in Urdu by Mawlana Fateh Muhammad, Model No. 358/5; (2) Translation into Urdu by Hazrat Ahmad Raza Khan (Model 22-F). (3) Tafseer-e Rifâi published by Deeni Kutab Khana; (4) Copy of the Qur'an containing Urdu translation by Shaikhul Hind Maulana Mahmud ul Hasan and *tafseer* by Shaikhul Islam Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, published by Anjuman-e Asha'ate Qur'an-e

Azeem. (5) Tafseer Ziaul Qur'an by Hazrat Pîr Mhammad Karam Shah al-Azheri.

- Even Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam does not claim any finality or originality in declaring that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6236. Professor Zafar Iqbal of Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam in the foreword simply says that they "have followed Kufi way of counting the verses instead of non-Kufi way and in preparing their copy they have followed the copy of the Qur'an published by the [then] Government of Egypt."<sup>2</sup>
- Allah states in the Qur'an at 15:87 that He has revealed seven oft-repeated verses<sup>3</sup> and all agree that the verses referred to here are the verses of surah Al-Fâtiḥa. Hence all agree that Surah Al-Fâtiḥa consists of seven verses. But they disagree as to whether the formula "*Bismi Al-Lahi Ar-Raḥmân i Ar-Raḥîm.*" is included in Al-Fâtiḥa as the first verse, or the surah has seven verses other than "*Bismi Al-Lahi...*" We agree with those who do not consider "*Bismi Al-Lahi...*" as a verse of Al-Fâtiḥa. In the light of Allah's Injunction at 15:87 we consider surah Al-Fâtiḥa consisting of seven verses without "*Bismi Al-Lahi...*" In accordance with the auspicious way taught by the Prophet (pbuh) we believe that "*Bismi Al-Lahi Ar-Raḥmâni Ar-Raḥîmi*" is written and recited before all the surahs of the Qur'an except surah At-Tauba, but not as part of any surah. "*Bismi Al-Lahi Ar-Raḥmâni Ar-Raḥîmi*" occurs in the text of surah An-Naml (27) as part of verse 30 and only there it is included in the Qur'an. The editor/s of the 'Standard Copy' count "*Bismi Al-Lahi...*" as verse no. 1 of *surah* Al-Fâtiḥa to make it consist of seven verses but they do not include "*Bismi Al-Lahi...*" as part of the surah, in other 112 surahs. There is no uniformity, consistency or justification in their decision.
- As Qur'an says at 74:30-31 that Allah has appointed nineteen angels as wardens of Hell Fire. Allah says that He has made number 19 a stumbling block for those who disbelieve. Mentioning of this number in the Qur'an may lend certainty to the people who were given scripture in the past and it increases the faith of the believers.<sup>4</sup> In this perspective it has been found that number 19 has a very special significance in the Qur'anic system. For example, the formula "*Bismi Al-Lahi...*" which is

recited before we recite the Holy Qur'an, consists of 19 letters. It consists of four words: *Ism* (اسم-Name), Allah, *Ar-Rahmân*, *Ar-Rahîm*. Total number of each one of these words occurring in the Qur'an is a multiple of number 19.<sup>5</sup> Special significance of this number in the Qur'anic system renders much justification to the view that the total number of verses of the Qur'an must be a multiple of number 19. The figure 6238 as total number of the verses of the Qur'an is a multiple of number 19.

There is another very important point to be discussed in this respect. The Verse 24 of Surah Yûsuf starts as follows: “*Wa Laqad Hammat Bihi Wa Hamma Bihâ Lawlâ 'An Ra'á Burhâna Rabbihi.*” She (the wife of Egyptian Minister) verily desired him (Yûsuf a.s.). And verily he (Yûsuf a.s.) would have desired her had he not observed the *Burhân* of his Lord. Muslims agree that it is utmost necessary to observe a stop (وقف) while reciting the Qur'an so that the two statements, both part of the Qur'an but one stating something about the righteous or righteousness and the other about the vile or evil, may not intermingle. But it is very strange and irreverent that Muslims have continuously been ignoring to place a قف (stop) after “*Wa Laqad Hammat Bihi*”. The editor/s of the ‘Standard Copy’ do not even recognize the anomaly which arises from it. They only discuss whether there should be a وقف (stop) of ج (optional stop) after “*Wa Hamma Bihâ*” or not.<sup>6</sup> We believe that the placement of a وقف (stop) of ج (optional stop) after “*Wa Hamma Bihâ*” is quite inappropriate but it is most required that a *waqaf* (قف-stop) or *waqaf mutliq* (ط-necessary stop) be placed between “*Wa Laqad Hammat Bihi*” and “*Wa Hamma Bihâ Lawlâ 'An Ra'á Burhâna Rabbihi*”.

The readers may please note that since Government of Pakistan has declared the copy of the Qur'an published by Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam as ‘Standard Copy’ therefore the publishers must follow the format approved by the Government.



# **SPIRITUALITY**



## THE WAY OF SHAHIDĪN: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A QUR'ANIC THEOLOGY OF SUFISM IN TAFSEER-E- FÂZLĪ

*Abstract:* Hazrat Fazal Shah (Allah's mercy be upon him), known as Ba-Ba Ji Noor Walay, is initiator of Fâzli Qâdirî branch in already existing Qâdiriyya Order in Muslim gnosticism. He was born at Jallendhar, East Punjab, India. After the partition of Indo-Pak subcontinent in 1947 the saint migrated to Pakistan ultimately settling at Lahore. He passed away in 1978. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli (1940– ) at present his successor and first mentor of Fâzli Qâdrî Order is also settled at Lahore. It was the way of Hazrat Fazal Shah that he would give a narration (biyân) of one rakû' (a small section) of the Holy Qur'an daily at pre-dawn. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli, his most obedient disciple and would-be successor was assigned the duty of taking notes and presenting the import in his own writing before the mentor any time in the day to get his verification. The narration of the Qur'an completed in the life time of Hazrat Fazal Shah and was verified by him in his 'will' before his demise. This ultimately published by the name of Tafseer-e-Fâzli (TF). The commentary is not based on any traditions etc. Authority for whatever has been said in it is given from the Qur'an. The obligation on the reader has been written under the caption of 'Paroration' after every verse. The work is original with respect to its diction and approach. It consists of seven volumes and is originally in Urdu, published from 1982 to 1998. First three volumes have been translated into English and published, the 4<sup>th</sup> one is in the Press, while work on the 5<sup>th</sup> volume is in progress. The study examines how the TF constructs of a Qur'anic theology of Sufism focusing on the interpretation of the Qur'anic term Shâhid. According to the TF the epithet used by the Qur'an for what is commonly called 'sufi mentor' is 'shahid' (witness, the devout) and 'The Tariqat-e-Shahidîn (The Way of Shahidîn) is the right epithet to be used for 'taṣawwaf /sufism'. Shâhid recites the Word of God and presents his auspicious life as model. He is the teacher of the Book and Wisdom. He grants purification (tazkia) to the follower/s and verifies it as shahid. Therefore, Tariqat-e-Shahidîn (commonly called sufism) is the discipline for granting purification (tazkia) and then its verification (taṣdîq). The article is an attempt to locate the origin of Islamic spirituality in the Qur'an. The Qur'an is the

*fundamental religious document and basic source of Islamic faith. Sufism is a phenomenon which organized itself into a discipline in the early centuries of Islam. A great majority of Muslims have always believed it quite coherent with the spirit of their faith. But the question is: "Where does lie its origin in the Qur'an!" Muslim scholars have been searching for the answer of this question since centuries. They have tried to explain it in terms of words like 'saf', 'suf', 'suffa', 'wujud', 'ihsân', 'ḥubb', 'tazkia' but could not explain its origin and its development into a discipline on Qur'anic grounds. First time in the history of Muslim culture Tafseer-e-Fâzli traces the origin of this discipline in the Qur'anic term 'Shâhid' (the certified witness) and explains its development into a discipline. The most important thing about this article is that it explains everything without reference to anything other than the Qur'an.*

According to *Tafseer-e-Fâzli (TF)*, the Qur'an is *qawl*<sup>1</sup> (قول teaching, guidance, precept) and has the status of *the standard of truth* in this respect.<sup>2</sup> To talk with reference to the Qur'an is to talk on the basis of *authority*. The writer must admit that there could never flourish in Muslim culture in general, and in *sufism* in particular a strong tradition to talk on the basis of *authority*. When anyone talks on some matter without reference to *authority*, it is no better than mere conjecture. Conjecture can add to anyone's knowledge or contribute to his betterment to the least. One's conjecture is in no way better than the other one's. Conjecture does not spare anyone from '*the truth*'.<sup>3</sup> As being '*the truth*' (*Al-Haqq*) only the Word of Allah has the status of '*authority*'.<sup>4</sup> The Qur'an is *precept (qawl)*.<sup>5</sup> So far as the word, the concept, the idea, the principle, teaching or the precept, interpretation of an unveiling (*kashf*) or vision (*shuhud*), is concerned, whatever '*the truth*' certifies is truth, whatever conforms to '*the truth*' is truth.<sup>6</sup> Then there comes the stage of action ('*amal*'). '*Amal* is complementary to *qawl*.<sup>7</sup> The knowledge that Allah has given to the believers to talk on a matter is 'to say only that which they themselves act upon', if otherwise, Allah hates it most.<sup>8</sup> If one expresses his knowledge on some matter, in accordance with Allah's injunction, he will share the benefit with others he has got from acting on it. These are the conditions to be fulfilled if one talks with reference to *authority*. If one believes that the Qur'an, being *al-haqq*, is the standard of truth, controversies in religion arise when he talks without its reference, for knowledge is the capacity to distinguish truth from untruth.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the purpose before a knowledgeable person while

writing or giving judgment on anything should be to enlighten truth on that very matter.<sup>10</sup> The study examines how the *TF* constructs of a Qur'anic theology of sufism focusing on the interpretation of the Qur'anic term *Shâhid*.<sup>11</sup>

### ***The Way of Shahidîn***

The *TF* sees the origin and organization of Islamic spirituality in the concept of *shahid*. According to *TF*, the Holy Qur'an calls the Prophet (pbuh) *shahid* (the witness, the devout).<sup>12</sup> All the prophets (pbuh) were *shahid*.<sup>13</sup> The followers of the prophets (pbut) are *mash-hûd* (the witnessed). Allah Himself sent the prophets (pbut) as *shahidîn*. There can be *shâhidîn* who are not prophets. The *shahidîn* other than the prophets are raised from within *the mash-hûdîn*. Allah loves both. He vows the honor of both *shahid* and *mash-hûd*.<sup>14</sup> Allah has taught the believers to pray for togetherness with the *shahidîn*.<sup>15</sup> In Islam, the chain of holy people has its origin in those immediate followers of the Prophet (pbuh) whom he (pbuh) purified and then verified. This chain will continue to the dooms day. It is these holy men who are mistakenly called *sufies*. The way of gnosis in Islam is actually the way of *shahidîn* (the verified witnesses, the devout).

It is the glory of the Prophet (pbuh) as *shahid* that he is giver of glad-tidings as well as a warner.<sup>16</sup> He gives glad-tidings to those who believe in him (pbuh) that for them is blessing and warns the disbelievers of bad end. All the messengers (pbut) were *shahid*<sup>17</sup> i.e., giver of glad-tidings as well as warners.<sup>18</sup> *Shâhid* recites the Word of God and presents his auspicious life as model. Allah has sent His Prophet (pbuh) as the teacher of the Book and Wisdom. To grant purification to the followers is also the proud privilege of *shahid*. Allah Almighty says: *Allah verily has shown grace to the believers by sending unto them a messenger of their own who reciteth unto them His revelations, and causeth unto them to grow [purifies them],<sup>19</sup> and teacheth unto them the scripture and wisdom; although before (he came to them) they were in flagrant error.* (al-Qur'an, 3:164)<sup>20</sup> According to the *TF* this privilege was granted by the Prophet (pbuh) to 'the chosen ones', the devout, from among his followers and this will last till the day of resurrection. For example, Allah chose Tâlut (Saul-a.s.) above others and granted him abundance in knowledge and physical endurance;<sup>21</sup> Allah chose Maryam (a.s.), purified her, and exalted her above the women of the whole world making a model for

them;<sup>22</sup> Allah also chose Âdam and Nûh and *Âl-e-Ibrâhîm* and *Âl-Imrân* above all people. (*Âl* are the people whose condition is similar to that of their leader.)<sup>23</sup> In every age, Allah Almighty chose some men to bring people from darkness to light. "Allah Almighty chooses certain men/women so that through them people find the way to attain His Pleasure. It is comforting to accept him who is chosen by Allah Almighty. When one believes in Allah Almighty through the one chosen by Him, one is granted guidance."<sup>24</sup> The Qur'an classifies the early Muslims into three categories: those on the right hand (*aṣḥâb-ul-yamîn*); those on the left hand (*aṣḥâb-ush-shimâl*); the foremost in the race (*as-sâbiqoon-al-awwaloon*—السابقون الأولون). The Qur'an says that Allah is Well-Pleased with 'the first and foremost of the fugitives from Makkah (*the muhâjirîn*) and those who welcomed and helped them in Madîna (*the anṣâr*) and they are well-pleased with Him. The Qur'an also states that the same is true for those who followed them in sincerity.<sup>25</sup> *Al-'Ashra-tul-Mubashira* were the ten chosen ones among these whom the Prophet certified as the dwellers of paradise while they were alive.<sup>26</sup> The *TF* holds that the greatest of all the favours of Allah Almighty to mankind is that He presented His chosen servants as model for them. The purpose being that people should believe in Him through the chosen servants and follow them so that they are relieved of fear and grief.<sup>27</sup> Hence, according to the *TF*, *Tariqat-e-shâhidîn* (commonly called *sufism*) is the discipline for granting purification (*tazkia*) and then its verification (*taṣdîq*). But what is the significance of purification! The *TF* holds: Purification (*tazkia*) and success in both the worlds (*falah*) are essential for each other. He attained *falâh* who kept his self pure.<sup>28</sup> Indeed he attained *falâh* (success) who was granted purification.<sup>29</sup> Allah promises *falâh* for *muminûn*—the faithful.<sup>30</sup> The *shahid* certainly imbibes in him these qualities par excellence. According to the *TF*, following in the footsteps of their *shahid* at all these stations the faithful attain purification and thus *falah*.<sup>31</sup> If it was necessary in the life time of the Prophet (pbuh) that the *shahid* grants purification how can it be attained without *shahid* in any other time! Allah Almighty has sent His Prophet (pbuh) as lamp that gives light.<sup>32</sup> Lamps will go on lit by the light-giving beacon. *Shâhid* is pure/righteous. According to the *TF*, two authorities confirm his purity: i) His precepts are straight.<sup>33</sup> The Qur'an (*al-Haqq*) as 'standard of righteous precept' verifies his position. ii) In practice he always follows in the footsteps

of his mentor.<sup>34</sup> Allah is the protecting friend of those who believe. *Shahidîn* are the friends of Allah. *He bringeth them [His friends] out of darkness into light.*<sup>35</sup> It is the glory of the friends of Allah to be free of fear and grief.<sup>36</sup> He who befriends any friend of Allah, befriends Allah. He is directed towards light and becomes free from fear and grief.

According to *TF*, *shahidîn* are beloved servants of Allah. Allah Almighty has stated in the Qur'an: Allah loves the beneficent (*mohsinîn*). (al-Qur'an, 2:195) Allah loves those who turn unto Him in repentance (*tawwâbîn*). (ibid., 2:222) Allah loves those who keep themselves pure (*motatahhirîn*) (ibid., 2:222). Allah loves those who fear Him (*muttaqîn*). (ibid., 3:76) Allah loves the steadfast (*şâbirîn*). (ibid., 3:146) Allah loves those who place their trust in Him (*mutawakkilîn*) (ibid., 3:159). Similarly, the purifiers, the just dealers, and those who for the cause of Allah fight in ranks as if they were a solid structure are beloved of Allah. (ibid., 9:108, 60:8, 61:4). Those who have inculcated vices in them are also mentioned in the Qur'an. For example, Allah does not love the transgressors (*zalimîn*). (ibid., 3:140) Similarly, Allah does not love the corrupters (*mufsidîn*), the prodigals (*musrefîn*), the aggressors (*m'utadîn*), the treacherous (*khâinîn*), the proud (*mustakbirîn*) and the like. (ibid., 5:64, 6:141, 7:55, 8:58, 16:23) One who develops in him the attributes of any of the beloveds of Allah, comes near him and becomes dear to Allah. The attributes of a beloved of Allah cannot come except by following him with love. And after all it is the beloved of Allah who is to certify that one is following him. Only one of the beloved servants of Allah at present is to be followed but all others are to be respected.<sup>37</sup> Those who claim nearness with any of the beloveds of Allah without following him, their claim is devoid of evidence. The claim not supported by evidence does not prove to be true. The Prophet (pbuh) is the absolute standard of servitude (*'abdiyat*) to Allah.<sup>38</sup> Allah certifies the Prophet (pbuh) as *'abdohû* or *'abdihî* (His servant).<sup>39</sup> He (pbuh) enjoys the highest place in servitude to Allah. None of the attributes of the beloveds of Allah is to be found in any one equal to the Prophet (pbuh). Allah Almighty Himself has granted these good qualities to His beloved servant (pbuh), the followers are granted these qualities from the beloved servant of Allah at present. The Prophet (pbuh) is the most beloved servant of Allah and the lamp that gives light. Those who are lit from this lamp are also light-giving

lamps and beloveds of Allah. How beautifully the *TF* narrates the saying of Hazrat Fazal Shah:

Beloveds of Allah (*shahidîn*) are one embodiment, for their purpose is one and the same and that is to bring people out of darkness towards light.<sup>40</sup>

### ***Taşawaf as 'Kashf'-o-Shahood (Unveiling and Direct Witnessing)***

Some consider *taşawaf as 'kashf'-o-shahood* (unveiling and direct witnessing). The *TF* does not consent to it. It is not true of the way of *shahidîn*. According to *TF*, *kashf-o-shahood*, or *karamat* (making miracles) if granted by Almighty, is appreciable but it never is the objective of those who love the beloved of Allah. The worthy authors of *TF* believe that anyone's *kashf-o-shahood* bears no authority, and *karamat* is the outcome of profuse repetition of a 'word', be it meaningless. To make miraculous things is never evidence of one's piety.<sup>41</sup> Who can be the better knower of what is needed to bring people out of darkness towards light except the Al-Mighty! Allah by Himself grants to His beloved whatever knowledge is needed to him.<sup>42</sup> Those who seek ranks by their own choice, make themselves fall in trouble.<sup>43</sup>

### ***Shri'ah, Ṭariqah, Ḥaqiqah and Ma'rifah***

*Shri'ah* (the law), *ṭariqah* (the practice/the way), *ḥaqiqah* (realism) and *ma'rifah* (gnosis) are four grades of believing. *Shari'a* is Allah's *amr* (command) which is to be followed. *Shari'a* in essence is a way, a royal road on which Allah has set us and has commanded to follow. He who follows it as he likes, does not follow Allah's *amr*, he only follows his own likes and dislikes.<sup>44</sup> Such a person may develop high expertise in rituals, but never reaches the core. According to the *TF* to act upon *shari'a* following in the footsteps of *shahid* is *Ṭariqat*.<sup>45</sup> The cadre of *ḥaqiqat* is related to knowledge. *Ilm* (knowledge) is always post-experience. It is granted after '*amal* (acting upon *shari'a*).<sup>46</sup> It is only after following in the footsteps of the beloved of Allah that the faith in the unseen (*imân-bil-ghaib*)<sup>47</sup> is converted into the witnessed faith (*imân-bish-shahâdat*).<sup>48</sup> He who keeps on following his *shahid* at all the three grades is granted *m'arifah* (the level par excellence of what the Qur'an calls *irfân-i-ḥaqiq*).<sup>49</sup> He is granted togetherness with *shahidîn*.<sup>50</sup> He is included among those whom Allah has blessed with His favour *i.e.*, among the



truthful ones, the martyrs and the righteous. Al-Qur'an says: *Who so obeyeth Allah and the messenger, they are with those unto whom Allah hath shown favour, of the prophets [an-nabiyîn] and the saints [as-şiddiqîn] and the martyrs [as-shuhadâ] and the righteous [as-şâlihîn]. The best of company are they!* (al-Qur'an, 4:69) The Qur'an states four ultimate categories of those whom Allah has blessed with His favour and they are: *nabiyîn* (the prophets-pbut), *şiddiqîn* (truthful ones), *shuhadâ* (martyrs), *şâlihîn* (the righteous). All other epithets used in the Qur'an for those whom Allah has blessed with His favour will come under these heads, for example, messengers (*rasool*), *olul-azam*, *shahidîn*, *mukhlaşîn*, the *abrâr*, the *muttaqîn*, the *moħsinîn* etc. Thus according to the *TF*, to consider messengership (*risâlat*) a higher category than prophet-hood (*nabuwat*)<sup>51</sup> or to consider *olulazm* as a category independent from *an-nabiyîn*,<sup>52</sup> is not correct in the light of this verse. All prophets (*nabiyyin*) are also messengers (*rasool*) by virtue of their being *nabi* but it is not true otherwise. *TF* supports the primacy of prophet-hood over the messengership.

Word of Allah affirms that those whom Allah has blessed with His favour (*in'am-yafta*) will remain in the world till the last day and that there is no better company than to be with them. Only whoso is with them here, will be with them in the hereafter, for the same present is going to convert into the future (*i.e.*, Hereafter). (al-Qur'an, 2:25, 82, 110, 130). The *TF* expounds these grades of believing in the following manner: *Shri'at* is similar to milk, *ṭariqah* is like curd, *ḥaqiqat* is like butter and *m'arifat* is akin to butter oil. If there is no milk, none of these could be made nor can anyone make. Butter-oil is ultimately the essence of milk. The *TF* also explains it in another way: The reality of *shri'ah* is step / journey (*qadam*), *ṭariqah* is footprints (*naqsh-e-qadam*), *ḥaqîqah* is the knowledge derived from it and is one and eternal (*qadîm*). *Shri'at* is the beginning of journey (*ibtidâ-i-qadam*) and *ma'rifa* is the ultimate end of journey (*intihâ-i-qadam*).<sup>53</sup>

### **Seyyed Hossein Nasr**

To rightly appreciate the value of the thought and approach of *TF* about what is called *sufism* let us compare it with the thought and approach of a contemporary scholar who is also one of the chief representatives of a school of *sufism*. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933), an eminent scholar, and presently professor of Islamic Studies at the George Washington University in America wrote a book in 1966

entitled *Ideals and Realities of Islam (IR)* to help the world understand Islam. In this book he also gives his views about *sufism*. Two instances from this book will be presented here.

*Ideals and Realities* proclaims an analogy of a circle to explain the relationship between *shri'at*, *Ṭariqat* and *ḥaqiqat*. In this analogy the circumference of a circle depicts *shri'at*. *Shri'at* is for all believers and all the believers are on the circumference. The radii of this circle symbolize the *ṭuruq* (plural of *ṭariqat*—the way). *Ṭariqat* is that radius which connects each and every point on the circumference to the center which is *ḥaqiqat* (Reality). Because of cultural and psychological differences of the people *ṭariqat* is apparently found in various shades but it does not differ in essence. *IR* states that there are as many as ways of *ṭariqat* as the number of the children of Adam. By affirming faith in Allah one comes on the circumference (*i.e.*, the *shri'at*) from where one can travel on the path (*i.e.*, the *ṭariqat*) towards the center of the circle (*i.e.*, *Ḥaqiqat*) which is God. *Ḥaqiqat* is the source of *shri'at* and *ṭariqat*. God has created *shri'at* and *ṭariqat* separately from each other. These both have a different relation with *Ḥaqiqat* [*i.e.*, God]. Observing *shri'at* alone is necessary as well as enough to achieve salvation but there are such persons who do not stop short of reaching *Ḥaqiqat*.<sup>54</sup>

Examining from the point of view of *TF* all aspects of this analogy are contrary to Qur'anic teachings. The center of this circle is *Ḥaqiqat* (The Truth or God or Reality as *IR* calls it.) But the Qur'an never uses the word '*Ḥaqiqat*' for Allah. The word '*Ḥaqiqat*' is a derivative of the root *ḤâQâfQâf*. The following derivatives of this root occur in the Qur'an:

*Ḥaq* (occur twelve times) meaning just, right; to occur or fall rightly or justly; to be justly due; coming true of the Words, Promises, Warnings or Glad-tidings of Allah *etc.*

*Ḥaqqat* (five times): justified;

*yahiqqo* (once); fulfilling of the word;

*Huqqat* (twice): be made fit;

*yuhiqq* (four times): to cause the truth come true or become manifest; *astahaqqa* (once): to deserve; to merit;

*astahaqqaa* (once): be ascertained;

*ḥaqqān* (17 times): duty incumbent on someone to fulfill; certainty (of promise of Allah); certainly or in truth; a promise which is binding on Allah to bring about; coming true of a dream;

*ḥaqqāhō* (3 times): the due;

*aḥaqqo* (10 times): to have a better right; to be more deserving; to be truer than, to be more worthy than (e.g., testimony, or party);

*ḥaqîq* (once): to be bound;

*al-Ḥâqqah* (3 times): The Day of Judgment as reality, the sure event, the undeniable truth;

*Al-Ḥaqq* (227 times). The Word of the Lord; (02:26), the truth or reality as opposed to *al-bâtil* (falsehood); 02:42, as opposite to *Ad-dalâl* (error); (10:32), or as opposite to *ẓann* (conjecture) etc. (03:154)<sup>55</sup>

There is no scope for calling God *Ḥaqiqat* (Reality) while talking in the light of the Qur'an. It cannot be derived from the derivative *al-ḥâqqah* even which occurs only three times in the Qur'an in the first three consecutive verses of surah *al-Ḥâqqah*. Pikhthal translates these verses as follows:

The Reality! What is the Reality? Ah, what will convey thee what the reality is! (al-Qur'an, 69:1-3)

Abdullah Yousaf Ali translates the same verses in this way:

The Sure Reality! What is the Sure Reality? And what will make thee realize what the Sure Reality is?

But the translation of verses 13 to 37 of the same surah by Pikhthal as well as Abdullah Yousaf Ali leave no doubt that in all the first three verses the reality, the sure event, the undeniable truth referred to is nothing except the Day of Judgment when everyone will be required for his doings during worldly life. (al-Qur'an, 69:1-3, & 13-37)<sup>56</sup>

The analogy of a circle to depict the Person of Allah, too, is un-Qur'anic. The Qur'an never uses this analogy, nor does it befit to His Glory. The writer has stated above that *shari'at* denotes 'teachings' or precept, *tariqat* comprises practice and *ḥaqiqat* denotes a stage of spiritual knowledge. Whoso follows in the footsteps of his mentor in all these three places he is blessed with *m'arifat*. *M'arifat* is a favour (*in'am*) as approval of his piety. He becomes a sage, a saint, a gnostic. *IR* does not mention *ma'rifat* except as a passing reference and that too without authority. After identifying Allah as *Ḥaqiqat* how could there remain any further stage!<sup>57</sup> If Allah is Reality then what is the status of the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them

which He has claimed to have created with truth! (Cf. *ibid*, 45:22) It would not be anything other than appearance, a half-reality or a relative reality!<sup>58</sup> But the universe as manifestation of Absolute Reality could not be less than being eternal or everlasting which is contrary to the Qur'anic teachings. Allah has created the heavens and the earth in truth... (al-Qur'an, 06:73, 10:05, 45:22 and many more.) If the word '*ḥaqīqat*' is to be used in the sense of 'reality' in Qur'anic perspective, it can be used for 'the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them'. They are 'reality' and Allah is the Creator of reality. It is commonly believed in by Muslims from centuries, that '*al-ḥaqq*' is one of *al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ* (the Beautiful-Names of Allah). However, the *wahdat al-wajûd* school of sufism, (of which Seyyed Hossein Nasr is a present day representative<sup>59</sup>), has chosen '*al-ḥaqq*' as their preferred name for Allah which they use for translating God into The Reality or The Truth. The belief that '*al-ḥaqq*' is one of *al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ*<sup>60</sup> and to identify Allah with this as His preferred name is one of the two fundamental presuppositions of the doctrine of *wahdat al-wajûd*<sup>61</sup> propounded by a renowned sufi scholar Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 638/1240).<sup>62</sup> The *TF* doesn't believe *al-ḥaqq* as one of *al-Asmâ-ul-Husnâ*. Hence identification of Allah with *al-ḥaqq*, referring Him as 'The Truth' or 'The Reality' and drawing implications thereof, *TF* does not accept. According to *TF* the status of being *al-ḥaqq* (*the truth*) only befits to the Word of Allah in the light of the Qur'an.<sup>63</sup>

*Al-Ḥaqq* means 'the standard of truth'. Whatever the Qur'an verifies is truth (*ḥaqq*), whatever it disapproves is untruth. Wherever the Qur'an is silent, to express one's views is to express opinion or conjecture and *baṭil* (*false*) is *the opinion of those who disbelieve*. (cf. 38:27) '*Assuredly conjecture (الظَّنُّ - aẓ-ẓanna) can by no means take the place of truth.*' (cf. 10:36, 53:28) Deviation from what Qur'an states is but error (*azzalâl*) "*Famâdhâ Ba'da Al-Ḥaqqi 'Illâ Aḍ-Ḍalâlu.*" (10:32) To give views opposite to the Qur'an is but *al-bâtil*. (cf. 17:81, 21:18) '*To say anything in violation to the Qur'an is without justification, and wrongful (bi ghair il ḥaqq – cf. 02:61, 03:21).*' Allah commands the believers '*not to utter aught concerning Allah save the truth, (i.e., what is in accordance with the Qur'an. cf. 04:171)*'<sup>64</sup>

The *TF* upholds that the Qur'an is authoritative, it is perspicuous and internally self-consistent and *TF* gives no reference from anything other than the Qur'an. The *TF* holds *al-ḥaqq* (*i.e., the Qur'an*) to be

the final standard for determining the truth or validity of a doctrine, belief, view, concept, principle or teaching, unveiling, intuition, imagination, religious experience or whatever. The views about sufism, wahdat al-wajud, or the way of shahidîn expressed in *TF* arise in the same perspective.

*TF*, as we have already seen, do not see *shri'at* and *trîqat* to be separately created by Allah for common people and for the chosen one's respectively. It holds that *al-ḥaqq* (the Qur'an) is the source of knowing *shri'at*.<sup>65</sup> The way to act upon its teachings—the straight path (*trîq-i-mustqîm* i.e., the *trîqat*)—is also shown by this Book.<sup>66</sup> For *trîq-i-mustqîm* to be as many in number as the children of Adam is but contrary to the Qur'anic teachings. What this means is that there is no need to follow him *who is turning towards Allah*, that whatever way one likes to act upon *shri'at* is *trîq-i-mustqîm*. But this is absolutely contrary to Divine injunctions. (...*And follow in the footsteps of the one who is turning towards Allah*—cf. *TF*, vol. 5,31:15, p. 253) Islam has from ever been the Dîn—the way of life approved by Allah for His servants.<sup>67</sup> All the *shahidîn*—*the beloved servants of Allah*—presented Islam to their people. It was perfect guidance for every people. Since it was revealed on the last of the prophets (pbuh) for all humanity and for all the ages, it now comprises of a guidance which is absolutely perfect (*akmal*). *Shri'at* now comprises of the teachings of this Dîn and the essence of *shri'at* is a royal road. (Cf. *TF*, vol. 6,45:18) *Al-ḥaqq* uses the analogy of the straight path (*sirât-i-mustqîm*) for the way traversed on this royal road by those whom-Allah-has-blessed.<sup>68</sup> To follow in the footsteps of the one among the blessed ones is *sirât-i-mustqîm* or the *trîq-i-mustqîm'* or *trîqat*. It is the shortest and the surest way to destiny i.e., *falâh*. Allah witnesses Hazrat Muhammad (pbuh) to be on the straight path. (al-Qur'an, 36:3-4) Whom he (pbuh) witnesses as his follower is also on the straight path. Whosoever follows this devout (*shahid*) and is subsequently witnessed by him is also on the straight path, and so on. Hazrat Muhammad (pbuh) is *shahid* (witness). Allah Himself has witnessed it.<sup>69</sup> (33:45) All others among his followers are raised as *shahid* from those who are *mash-hood* (85:3) i.e., either directly witnessed by the Prophet (pbuh) or indirectly verified by one whom he (pbuh) verified. Straight path (*sirât-i-mustqîm*) is the shortest distance between two points and to follow a witnessed guide is the safest and guaranteed way to reach the destiny. The circumference has

neither beginning nor it takes anywhere. The analogy of a *circle* is used in the Qur'an either in the sense of 'befalling of a bad fortune' or 'evil turn of fortune'.<sup>70</sup> Nowhere it has been used to depict *shari'at* or its relationship with *ṭrîqat* and *ḥaqiqat*.

*IR* asserts in the name of Hazrat Ali (a.s.) that

"...with the *basmalah* begins the *surah al-Fatihah* and therefore the whole of the Qur'an ..., [and] all the Qur'an is contained in the *surah al-Fatihah*, all of the *surah al-Fatihah* is contained in the *basmalah*, and all of the *basmalah* in the letter *ba'* (ب) with which it begins, all of the letter *ba'* in the diacritical mark under ب and I am that diacritical mark."<sup>71</sup>

No doubt, Hazrat Ali (a.s.) is among the chiefs of *shahidîn* and *shahidîn* have ever been admitting this fact and ever shall they admit it. But what has been said in the above analogy, can it be substantiated on the authority of the Qur'an! Never! It does not befit the glory of Hazrat Ali (a.s.) that he would claim anything which could not be substantiated on the authority of *al-Haqq*. A diacritical point under *ba'* is a 'point'. A 'point' is always dimensionless as well as directionless. Hazrat Ali (a.s.) always followed the footsteps of the Prophet (pbuh) and submitted to him (pbuh). How could he (a.s.) be dimensionless or directionless! The *TF* nowhere supports such mystifying and mythologizing the personality of any beloved servant of Allah in the name of esoteric knowledge. Hazrat Ali (may peace be upon him) is at a very very high rank among the beloved servants of Allah and a leader of the gnostics till the Last Day. Hazrat Ali acted upon the teachings of the Qur'an throughout his life following in the footsteps of the Prophet (pbuh) taking him as ultimate role model.<sup>72</sup>

*IR* further asserts:

"...the beautiful symbolism indicated in this saying refers to Ali's 'supreme identity' as the perfect saint who is inwardly in union with God."<sup>73</sup>

The *TF* nowhere uses words like 'union with God'. It holds that the concept of anyone's 'union with God', inward or outward, is contrary to Qur'anic teachings. According to *TF m'aiyyat* – one's nearness or togetherness with Allah is the right concept. For instance the Qur'an says that Allah is 'with' those who show perseverance (*sâbirîn*), those who fear Allah (*muttaqîn*), and those who do good (*moḥsinîn*).<sup>74</sup> During migration in their way from Makkah to Madina,

when they were hiding themselves in the cave and the enemy came very near to them and the worthy companion Hazrat Abu Bakar Siddique feared lest the disbelievers harm the Prophet (pbuh), he (pbuh) said to his worthy companion: "Don't be afraid, We are in togetherness with Allah." ("لَا تَخْزَنَنَّ إِنَّ اللَّهَ مَعَنَا")<sup>75</sup> Hazrat Ali, a perfect saint, certainly was in supreme togetherness with Allah in seclusion as well as in public but not in union with God.

Most of what has been presented and is going to be so in the name of *sufism* is but mysticism (*bâtiniyat* or *sirriyat*). It has nothing to do with Islam. The *Way of Shahidîn* is absolutely different from it.

It can be asked why one cannot purify oneself without a *shahid!* If someone says that one has purified oneself it would only be a claim. Who would witness this assertion! Allah enjoins:...follow him who turns towards Me. (al-Qur'an, 31:15)<sup>76</sup> According to *TF*: One who talks of doing his own purification, one who does not identify anyone better in knowledge than himself, how could he act upon Allah's injunction stated in verse 31:15! What was the problem of Iblîs! Were it not the case that to acknowledge Âdam (pbuh) better than him was difficult for Iblîs! (cf. al-Qur'an, 7:12) Had Iblîs acted upon Allah's Injunction to prostrate before Âdam (a.s.), he would have come out of the orbit of his own likes and dislikes. Allah Almighty at Surah 31 (Luqmân) verses 14-15 enjoins man to be grateful to Allah and to his parents. If his parents ask him to attribute associates with Allah he is enjoined not to submit to them. However, he is to serve them even then. It is in this context that Allah enjoins: ...and follow the path of him who turns towards Me... To identify that beloved servant of Allah who is turning towards Allah, and following in his footsteps, is what is called *trîqat*. To allege to act upon *shri'at* without following in the footsteps of the beloved of Allah at present time is to follow one's own likes and dislikes.<sup>77</sup>

### ***Bifurcation of the Personality of Shâhid into various Facets***

***Dr. Israr Ahmed***

The question is that in presence of the Qur'anic saying "Allah purifies whom He likes."<sup>78</sup> why should one search, identify and acknowledge a *shahid!* According to the *TF*, it is Allah Almighty Who has granted His Most Beloved Servant (pbuh) the authority to purify the believers. Allah purifies him whom the Prophet (pbuh)

purifies. According to *TF* Allah Almighty says to His Prophet (pbuh) to ask the believers to follow him (pbuh) if they aspire Allah's love, and to tell them if they do so Allah will include them in those whom He loves.<sup>79</sup> The claim to follow the Prophet (pbuh) can only be substantiated if one follows the *shahid* at present. Al-Qur'an says: *And know that the messenger of Allah is among you...(49:7)* According to the *TF* the Prophet (pbuh) is among the believers in the shape of *shahidîn* (3:53, 5:83) and *mukhlashin* (the sincere servants of Allah—15:40).<sup>80</sup> According to the *TF*: Whosoever follows Allah's beloved at present, Allah likes him and to whom Allah likes to purify, the beloved of Allah grants purification and verifies him.<sup>81</sup> If one classifies the person of the Prophet (pbuh) into various facets of authority, asserting his messenger-ship only one among these aspects and maintaining that he (pbuh) is to be followed only in this respect; and even in this respect(if one maintains), he (pbuh) is to be followed in matters pertaining to religion alone, and not in matters pertaining to mundane world, how he could submit to the Prophet (pbuh) or follow him (pbuh) even if he happened to be in the life time of the Prophet (pbuh)! The *TF* believes in the indivisibility of the personality of *shahid*; that he (pbuh) is *shahid* and *shahid* alone. Father, wife, son, relative or non-relative whoever believes in him as *shahid* and follows him belongs to him (pbuh) and whoso does not follow him (pbuh) does not belong to him (pbuh). This is true of all *shahidîn*.<sup>82</sup> *TF* holds messengership as a whole time affair covering the whole life. A messenger (pbuh) is first and foremost a messenger and then anything else. The reason for bifurcating the personality of the prophet into facets and holding messengership just a facet by such people seems to be that they are stitched with their likes and dislikes and on the face of Allah's injunctions mentioned above that if anybody aspires for Allah's love, he should follow the messenger, and that he who will obey the messenger, Allah will include him among the ones whom He has blessed, such people find no scope for giving preference to their own likes and dislikes. Making *risalat* just a facet of the personality of prophet they have tried to procure ample space for entering their likes and dislikes into the teaching of the Qur'an.

### ***Tradition Concerning Date Palms***

Those who hold being messenger only one facet of the life of the prophet, maintain that there are two types of matters—*umûr-i-Dunya*



(matters pertaining to mundane world) and *umûr-i-Dîn* (matters pertaining to religion)—and maintain that believers are bound to follow the Prophet (pbuh) in *umûr-i-Dîn* alone. They base their contention on a tradition which says: That some growers of date-palm presented themselves before the Prophet (pbuh) and said that before the Prophet (pbuh) had migrated to *Madîna*, they used to get pollen-grain from the flowers of male date-palm and would rub it manually over the flower of a female date-palm. This, they would call ‘marriage of date-palms’. The tradition further narrates: But when it came to the knowledge of the Prophet (pbuh) they thought that the Prophet (pbuh) did not like it so they abandoned the age old practice. But the yield next year was very small. Here the tradition adds: The Prophet (pbuh) asserted that they were better-knowing concerning their *umûr-i-Dunya*.<sup>83</sup> According to *TF* it is absolutely contrary to the teachings of the Qur’an to believe that anyone can be more knowledgeable than the Prophet (pbuh) in any sort of affair/s. Let us examine this alleged tradition in the light of *Tafsîr-e-Fâzli*.

This tradition divides *umûr* (affairs) into *umûr-i-Dunya* and *umûr-i-Dîn*. There is no basis in the Qur’an for such distinction in the nature of affairs (*umûr*). *Umûr* (singular *amr*) in the diction of the Qur’an are either *m’aruf* or they are *munkar*.<sup>84</sup> The Prophet (pbuh) always commanded the former and asked to hold back from the latter. The Qur’an forbids the believers to force the Prophet (pbuh) to comply with their wishes, and warns them had the Prophet (pbuh) accepted their opinions in most of the affairs (*amr*) they would surely be in trouble. (cf. al-Qur’an, 49:07)<sup>85</sup> The righteous do not even imagine to intentionally disobeying the mentor (*shahid*), however, if such thing happens unintentionally, they do not delay in making repentance and seeking guidance.<sup>86</sup> Whosoever submits to the advice of his *shahid*, succeeds, and whosoever does not submit to him, the *shahid* would not fail to accommodate him so that the relation is not broken. However, one who follows his likes and dislikes necessarily falls in trouble and it is then that he may turn towards acting upon the advice of the *shahid* if Allah so Wills. Al-Qur’an asserts the absolute following of the Prophet (pbuh). The significance of following the Prophet (pbuh) can be measured from the fact that who so follows the Prophet (pbuh), Allah Almighty includes him/her among those whom He loves.<sup>87</sup> And who so submits to the Prophet (pbuh), is included among those whom He has blessed.<sup>88</sup>

Let us see where does the word '*umoor*' occur in the Qur'an and in what sense:

The word '*umoor*' occurs in the Qur'an as the following: ...All cases [*umoor*] go back to Allah (for judgment).<sup>89</sup> Then how could they be divided into *U Moor-i-dunya* and *umoor-i-Din*! Hazrat Luqmân (pbuh) advised his son to establish prayer, enjoin kindness and forbid inequity, persevere on whatever befalls him. These, Hazrat Luqman said, were of the steadfast heart of things (*min azmil-umûr*). (cf. al-Qur'an, 31:17) Which of these they would declare as *umoor-i-dunya* and which of these as *umoor-i-Dîn*! The constructions '*tasîrul umûr*' (of the steadfast heart of things) (ibid, 42:43) and '*âqibatul umûr*' (sequel of all things) (ibid, 31:22) have also been used in the Qur'an. But none of these uses of the word '*amr*' (or *umûr*) meaning affair/s or case/s warrants bifurcation of the affairs into *umûr-i-Dunya* and *umûr-i-Dîn*.<sup>90</sup>

The Qur'an mentions that Allah has made everything in pairs: night & day, death & life, darkness & light, believer (*Muslim*) and non-believer (*Mujram*), knowledgeable (*Âlim*) & ignorant (*Jâhil*), seer & blind, male & female etc. Nowhere in the Qur'an Allah pairs '*dunya*' with '*Dîn*'. *Al-haqq* (the Qur'an) invariably pairs '*dunya*' (world) with '*âkhirah*' (Hereafter) for example: ...*Our Lord! Give unto us in the world that which is good and in the Hereafter that which is good...*(al-Qur'an, 2:201) The word '*Dîn*' (the way of life) wherever it occurs in the Qur'an it refers either to *Dîn al-Islam* or *Dîn al-kufr*. (109:6) It proves that the above tradition is contrary to the Qur'anic teachings and cannot be a saying of the Prophet (pbuh).

### ***Sufism as Ihsân-i-Islâm***

Some people have tried to trace the origin of *tasawwaf* from another tradition commonly known as *Hadith-i-Jibrâel*.<sup>91</sup> On the basis of this *tradition* they assert that there are three levels of believing: *Islâm*, *Imân* & *Ihsân*. To make a declaration of faith is *Islâm* and to confirm it in heart is *Imân*. *Ihsân* is the highest state and it is to always act with the conviction that I am seeing Allah, and if not this level of conviction then to act with the conviction that Allah definitely sees me. The exponents of this view maintain that *sufi* is at the highest stage of believing (*i.e.*, at *Ihsân*).<sup>92</sup>

*TF* does not support this view. According to this tradition *Imân* (faith) is the second stage of believing. Al-Qur'an states nine qualities

of a *mo'min*. These are in fact nine stations (*muqâmât*) of being a *mo'min* which are as follows: *taubah* (penitence), *ibâdat* (worship), *hamd* (praise of Allah), *ṣaom* (fasting), *rukû'* (bowing before Allah), *sijdah* (prostration), *amr-bil-m'arûf* (bidding good), *nahi-anil-munkar* (forbidding evil) and *hifâzat li-hudud-Allah* (observing the limits prescribed by Allah Almighty). (al-Qur'an, 9:112) If *Ihsân* is the higher stage of *Imân*, the exponents of this view must mention with authority the stations denoted by *Ihsân* but not covered by *Imân*. According to the Qur'an, *Ihsân* means kindness, doing of good, adding convenience to anyone's life and *mohsinîn* are the people who add convenience to the life of the people keeping Allah's Pleasure their objective.<sup>93</sup> Is it stated anywhere in the Qur'an that you should act with the conviction that you are seeing Allah? Does the *mo'min* not act with the conviction that Allah sees him on the face of the verse that 'Allah is Seer of what you do.'! (Cf. 2:96, 110) According to *TF* only he who maintains his togetherness with Allah in seclusion remains pure in seclusion (*khalwat*) and he who keeps his togetherness with the Prophet (pbuh) when in public remains pure in public (*jalwat*); and a *mo'min* remains pure in seclusion and in public. Even if Allah says that "... and over every lord of knowledge there is one more knowing." (12:76) the fact is that to acknowledge someone better in knowledge than them is the real problem of those who present their conjectures under the label of knowledge. It is easy to go on guessing, every now and then, about oneself, and self-certifying that one is at the place of *Ihsân* or at the place of *Imân*! To follow anyone is not possible until one acknowledges the beloved servant of Allah better in knowledge, and self-centered people would never acknowledge anyone better than them. One who does not hesitate from asserting himself better knowledgeable than the Prophet (pbuh)—in what he alleges the matters of mundane world (*umoor-i-dunya*), and asserts that the Prophet (pbuh) is a human being (*basher*) like him, how could he acknowledge anyone better than him!

According to the *TF* if the prophet himself says that he (pbuh) is a human being (*basher*) like them it is absolutely correct, for only *basher* can be a role model to be followed by the *basher*. (Angel could be a role model only for the angel.<sup>94</sup> Even the angel could not offer a model through his words and deed for *basher*.)<sup>95</sup> But if anyone other asserts that the Prophet (pbuh) was like him/them it would be absolutely wrong for how can the mercy-of-all-humamity (*rahma-*

*tullil-âlamîn*) be like us. Is it not same thing the non-believers would say concerning the Prophet (pbuh)!<sup>96</sup> Whoever moulds himself according to the standard, becomes a standard when he is verified.

There are people who believe that one can purify himself.<sup>97</sup> If one could purify himself why did the prophet Ibrâhîm pray to Allah for sending a messenger who will grant purification to the people! Similarly, while stating the purpose of sending the Prophet (pbuh) why did Allah mention that he purifies the believers!<sup>98</sup> Some people think that the Prophet (pbuh) has shown how to perform prayers (mandatory and discretionary), fasting, conducting remembrance of Allah (*ziker*) and other religious rituals and the same was his (pbuh) way to grant purification. Everything is preserved in the Qur'an and in the books of tradition. One should act upon these teachings to become pious. The *TF* does not recognize that anywhere in the Qur'an it is commanded to Muslims that they purify themselves on their own. What the books contain is only words. One cannot get from books except the information, principles, teachings or the precept. Should the 'book' be raised to the status of *teacher (muallim)* what need was there for Allah to send the prophets (pbut)! What difficulty could the Arabs face in understanding the Arabic Qur'an! One who claims to have taken the 'book' for *teacher (shahid)*, follow none but himself. If the 'book' could act for a *teacher (shahid)* then none else except the Qur'an was needed. It is the dignity of the Prophet (pbuh) that he (pbuh) is *teacher (muallim)*. (Al-Qur'an, 2:151; 3:164.) Commentary on verse 02:151 including in *TF* reads: "Those who are to be reformed must always have a perfect model before them... It is the Order of Allah alone which is worthy of obedience and it is His beloved who is worthy of being a model, an ideal. One who is purified by the beloved of Allah Almighty, is practically initiated into guidance." Commentary on verse 3:164 reads: "He (pbuh) read unto the people the verses revealed to him by Allah Almighty and honored them by purifying them, because success comes after purification. He taught them the Divine Book and wisdom, imparted them the knowledge of Divine injunctions and the way to benefit from them.... His (pbuh) lovers continue to educate people in His verses as well as wisdom and purify the believers to enable them to benefit from the bounties of Allah Almighty. Our own suggestions lead us astray."<sup>99</sup>

One who passes away as righteous he/she attains Allah's Pleasure for ever. Allah enlivens him/her with a pure life. Allah causes such a

person to live a blessed life as reward of their illustrious deeds.(16:97) Though state of such blessed life and nature of its activity is not comprehensible for common people, Allah may make any of His servants experience it. State of such life can only be felt if Allah so Wills but not articulated. Having granted a blessed life after passing away, *shahid* attains Allah's Pleasure for ever. In this new phase of life his cadre is changed. Now he is active with Allah's granted knowledge and authority according to his spiritual cadre. People who come to his mausoleum with love and reverence benefit from his blessings. But not everyone is capable of seeking guidance from him through direct contact. So one needs a *shâhid* at present to seek guidance and to follow him as role model in his life. Though sanctioning of purity is approved by such authorities blessed with eternal pure life but to grant purity and especially its certification (*taşdîq*) is the privilege of *shahid* at present. Visiting the mausoleum of the prophets, the truthful ones, the martyrs, and the righteous ones benefits the respectful visitor, but to grant purification is no more their privilege. Hazrat Fazal Shah states this fact in a very beautiful manner when he says: Purification is granted in the present, and it is granted by him who has the honour of being *shahid* at present.<sup>100</sup>

One should keep in touch with *shahid*. When the greatness of the *shahid* dawns upon one, one's *qawl* (belief, idea, statement, precept, ritual) is rectified. When one gets in love with *shahid*, his '*amal* (practice) gets reformed and becomes righteous. Now the knowledge is granted. Knowledge is always post experience. Who follows in the footsteps of the mentor (*shahid*) at all the three stages he is included among the *mukhlaşîn* (*the sincere, the devout*). *Al-ḥaqq* certifies that Satan cannot mislead a *mukhlis*.<sup>101</sup> Those who disprove *shahid* or whose action does not confirm their claim of submission to *shahid*, they are not proved true.<sup>102</sup> If a person comes to *shahid* in a position that he/she has already freed himself (or herself) from contradictions, confusions and doubts and the soil is ready to accept the seed of righteousness, it is sown. If the soil is not ready and the seed of righteousness is sown, the person becomes abnormal, his personality is defaced, and it is not something wise. A Qur'anic parable would help understand this position: The heart of man is like a niche in which is placed the lamp. The lamp is encased in a glassy globe. The globe is so clean that it glitters like a star. Imagine how much illumination the globe can add to the light of the lamp when it is

lighted, and how beautifully will it distribute this light! The lamp in the heart of man is filled with blessed oil, the *reason*. Heart is the seat of reason.<sup>103</sup> This blessed oil is pure like the oil extracted from the fruit of an olive tree which is neither in the east nor in the west but in the center of the garden where the sun shines over it the whole day. The oil of such a tree is so pure that it is just to be lighted up as soon as spark approaches it. Now imagine when this lamp is lighted up, how luminous would it be! Light upon light! The role of reason is to free man from contradictions. The reason, when pure, has the greatest capacity to catch light from the light of guidance of Allah by which the heavens and the earth are lit and are luminous. But when man follows his desires, the reason loses its purity.<sup>104</sup> The heavens and the earth are filled with the light of Allah's guidance. If there is a heart, whose oil has not lost its purity and whose globe has not lost its shine, Allah guides him to the way of His light, to the way of His gnosis. *Shâhid* is that light-giving lamp. (33:46) When the heart of Mo'min gets lighted up it becomes light upon light. Allah is the Knower of everything, He knows with absolute Knowledge whom to bless with this favour. Allah sets parables for the guidance of mankind.<sup>105</sup>

Some people understand that *Awaisia* is a chain of *shahidîn* (*silsila*) where one does not need a mentor (*shahid*) for granting purification or for verification. They make the process of granting purification a sort of mystery.<sup>106</sup> The *TF* does not agree with this view. *Awaisia* is not a chain of *shahidîn*, rather it is a way of imparting knowledge.<sup>107</sup> It is the glory of *shahid* that he can impart knowledge to a sincere seeker living physically at a distance from him.

### ***Wahdat al-Wujûd***

*Wahdat-al-wujûd* may also need to be discussed in the context of *the Way of Shahidîn*. The view that Allah is *wujûd-e-mutliq* (Absolute Existence) and whatever else is His manifestation, is known in the history of Muslim thought as *Wahdat al-wujûd* or the principle of the unity/oneness of all-being. It is also known as the principle of the unity/oneness of all-Existence.<sup>108</sup> One of its fundamental presuppositions (*i.e.*, Allah is *al-Haqq*) has already been discussed above. The second fundamental presupposition is going to be discussed here. The *TF* upholds that the doctrine of *wahdat al wujûd* is not compatible with Qur'anic teachings, therefore contrary to truth.<sup>109</sup> Let us examine this view.

'*Wujûd*' is a word of Arabic origin. It is a derivative of the root *wao-jîm-dâl*. Were Allah *Wujûd-i-Mutliq* in His Essence, what difficulty was there to mention it in the Qur'an which is in Arabic. But Allah has not liked to use this word or any other derivative of the same root to mention His Being. Could anyone else know Allah's Being better than Him! Chittick observes that "Ibn-al-'Arabi is not a philosopher" but a sage, a visionary, and '*wahdat al wujûd* is one of the many dimensions of his overall vision of reality which Ibn al-Arabi wants to convey to his reader.'" "One of Ibn al-Arabi's themes is that reason or intellect ('*aql*) is inadequate as a source of knowledge of God, the world, and the self. His own teachings are based primarily upon 'unveiling' (*kashf*), 'direct witnessing' (*shahûd*), 'contemplation' (*mushâhida*), and 'tasting' (*dhawq*), all of which transcend the limitations of intellect."<sup>110</sup> It is clear from the above quotation from Chittick that Ibn al-'Arabi's own 'vision' is the standard-of-truth to him. The same is true of his school.<sup>111</sup> *Al-haqq* (The Qur'an) testifies that Allah is Incomparably Unique and Matchless. To consider one's own vision or speculation regarding Allah to be truth whereas Allah has not accorded any validity to it, is a grievous wrong. (al-Qur'an, 07:21) Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi criticized this view saying that *wahdata al wujûd* is only a stage in mystic journey and asserted that when Allah, by His Grace, elevated him from this stage only then he realized that it was not the final stage and the concept of God based on this level of experience was not the right concept. Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi asserted that Allah is the Creator and the universe is His creation. Creation in no way partake the being of Allah either as His manifestation or adumbration (*tajalli*) or what not. 'Creation' is reality but the Creator absolutely transcends it, He even transcends it with respect to any analogical reference. Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi termed his view as *wahdat ash-shahûd* (transcendental unity of all manifestation).<sup>112</sup> If Ibn 'Arabi has presented his *wahdata al-wujûd* on the base of his vision/mystic experience, Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi was no better than him in this respect. None of them talked with reference to *authority i.e.*, the Holy Qur'an. According to the *TF* talking with reference to authority 'the oneness of all *shahidîn*' (*wahdat-e-shahidîn*) is the right view, for the way of *shahidîn* (the certified witnesses, the devout) has ever been to bring people from darkness to light and to purify them and to verify him whom they grant purification.<sup>113</sup>





**OMNISCIENCE AND HUMAN  
FREEDOM**



## THE QUR'ANIC VIEW OF OMNISCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM\*

*Abstract.* It has been commonly understood that Divine knowledge, even though eternal and inclusive of foreknowledge of free human actions, does not restrict human freedom. However, the philosophers and theologians both in Muslim as well as in Jewish and Christian traditions have pointed out that apparently the doctrine of Omniscience of God does not cohere with the doctrine of free will of man. On this problem the Muslims became divided into Libertarians and Predestinarians. The Mu'tazilites were libertarian whereas the Ash'arites were predestinarian. The present study is an attempt to examine different formulations of the problem as well as solutions offered by Muslim theologians. It has been observed that Muslims' approach to interpret Omniscience in an absolutist manner makes it incoherent with the concept of human freedom. The fact is that such approach has no basis in the Qur'an. The Muslims and Christians both have accepted it from Greeks. This study is an attempt to reconstruct the doctrine of Omniscience in the perspective of Qur'anic teachings. The correct formulation of the concept of Omniscience must include an indeterminate aspect concerning free choice of a human action.

The problems discussed in the history of Muslim theology and philosophy are generally of three types. Some of them are purely religious, some are purely philosophical, some are problems of religion treated in terms of philosophy. The writer firmly believes that not only the problems of purely philosophical nature, but also at least some of the problems of purely religious nature have their origin either in Plato or in Aristotle. Many of these problems even could not have arisen, had the Muslims not accepted Greek philosophers' views passed on to them through Christianity or through Judaism.<sup>1</sup> The problem of the compatibility of Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom is no exception. The basic assumptions underlying traditional Christian approach to the understanding of the concept of Omniscience were not reconcilable with Qur'anic concept of Omniscience. These were even not reconcilable with Biblical concept of God. The Christians and through them the Muslims accepted these assumptions unnoticed and it created problems with reference to its compatibility with human freedom. An attempt has been made in this

article to uncover these assumptions and reconstruct the concept of Omniscience in Qur'anic perspective.

Islam, Christianity and Judaism, in the present world, are the religions that claim their origin in revelation. They claim many attributes for God. They all share their belief in the Omniscience of God as well as man's free will. It has been pointed out by philosophers and theologians in Muslim as well as in Jewish and Christian traditions that apparently the doctrine of Omniscience of God does not cohere with the doctrine of man's free will. They have made attempts to formulate the problem as well as to give solution. This study examines the problem as well as solutions offered with reference to Muslim tradition only.

The problem of determinism or predestination in Islam has been identified both by the Orientalists as well as the Muslims. However, it mostly has been identified with reference to Divine Power or Omnipotence rather than Divine Knowledge or Omniscience. To cite few examples, W. Montgomery Watt, in his *Freewill and Predestination in Early Islam*, nowhere touches the problem of human free will with reference to its compatibility with Divine Omniscience. In this book he does not even identify the problem from this point of view. In his *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, he identifies the problem but does not make it a subject of any elaborate analysis or discussion.<sup>2</sup> The writings of Harry Austryn Wolfson (1887-1974)<sup>3</sup> on the problems of Muslim theology reflect vastness of his learning. Wolfson have good command on different languages including Arabic and basis his research on original sources. He, in his *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, mostly discusses the problem of Freedom and Predestination with reference to Divine Power. He cites in great detail the views of the Muslim theologians and their formulations of the theories of acquisition. He, however, does not miss to identify aspects of the problem of predestination other than those based on the concept of Divine Power. He states these problems in the form of antinomies. Among these he also very clearly identifies the problems that arise for human free will from different interpretations of the concept of omniscience, however, it fails to attract his philosophical acumen which he demonstrates in the analysis of other problems. He states this problem very briefly. He neither formulates it into an antinomy nor does he give any elaborate discussion or analysis. He neither traces the history nor finds views of

other orientalist Martin Schreiner, Ignacz Goldziher, R. Nicholson etc. to cite on this problem.<sup>4</sup> Franz Rosenthal, in his *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, discusses different definitions of knowledge including views of Muslim theologians about God's Knowledge. Dilating upon the implications of the view that takes God's Knowledge to be eternal he, no doubt, identifies the problem of the incompatibility of omniscience with human freedom but just gives cursory comments in few lines. He makes no detailed analysis or discussion nor does he develop the problem any further.<sup>5</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), who is an eminent Muslim thinker of the modern era discusses the concept of omniscience only with reference to its implications for Freedom of God and develops his own philosophical concept of omniscience.<sup>6</sup> He does not discuss the bearings of any concept of omniscience for actions of human free will. Syed Abul A'la Moududi (1903-1979)<sup>7</sup> identifies the problems that arise for human free will with reference to its compatibility with Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Eternal Will but observes that the Qur'an does not discuss these problems in their metaphysical aspect because of man's inability to understand them.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Abdul Khaliq,<sup>9</sup> in his *Problems of Muslim Theology* while discussing the problem of Determinism and Human Freedom, mostly concentrates on the implications of the concept of Divine All-Powerfulness on free human actions and does not address the problem that arises for human free will from any interpretation of the concept of omniscience.<sup>10</sup> The same is the case with Professor M. Saeed Sheikh (d. 2003).<sup>11</sup> His ultimate focus in his article, "Freedom and Fatalism in Islam",<sup>12</sup> is to examine and explain the following three Arabic terms: '*Qadar*', '*Taqdir*', and '*Hâdith*'. This essay is primarily an analysis of some of the statements of the renowned Western scholars with regard to freedom and fatalism in Islam. However, he nowhere finds an occasion even to identify the problem under discussion. Dr. Hanifi Ozcan is an exception. Ozcan, in his article "The Relationship between God's Knowledge and Human Freedom: A New Approach to the Problem" discusses the problem in great detail, though the scope of his research is limited. He studies the problem only in context of the statement that "Knowledge (*'ilm*) depends upon the known (*ma'lûm*)."<sup>13</sup>

These examples have been quoted to show that the problem under discussion has received little attention from theologians and research

scholars both from Muslims as well as Orientalists. However, it does not show that the problem is in any way less important. Rather the opposite is the case. It is hoped that analysis made in this article would help remove much confusion from the intellectual circles on Islamic position on this problem. The approach in the analysis of this problem is in accordance with standard Islamist move that asserts the absolute primacy and sufficiency of the Qur'an. The writer believes that the Qur'an is authoritative, it is perspicuous and internally self-consistent, and wishes to show that such position on the Qur'an is the only way to resolve the difficulties that the classical Kalam tradition and philosophical theology had with the problem of free will and predestination. Holy Qur'an supports this position. It is stated in the Qur'an *that the Qur'an is the truth (al-Haqq) from your Lord.* (2:147; 3:60; 18:29; etc.) '*The truth*' means the standard of truth. What *the truth* certifies is truth. If anything is contrary to what is taught in the Qur'an, is untruth (*bâtil*) and cannot help but produce confusion and incoherence with other concepts. The objective of the article is to show that Muslims absolutist interpretation of the Divine attribute of Omniscience<sup>14</sup> was un-Qur'anic, therefore incorrect, and it is suggested instead that a logical approach would be commendable. Had the Muslims not fallen into the pitfall of viewing Omniscience this way and also had not accepted some other attributes as Divine under the influence of Greeks and Christians, they would have been saved from being led to predestinarianism. Their very perspective to talk on Divine knowledge would have been different. In this article an attempt has been made to reconstruct the Omniscience and other related religious concepts in accordance with Qur'anic teachings.

According to the Qur'anic concept of human life, man has not been sent to the earth as a punishment, but with the purpose to see whether divine bestowment is being utilized in his life according to Divine Guidance.<sup>15</sup> Utilization of provisions granted by Allah determines the line of action (*rukh*). Man is to be rewarded for the direction he takes. The Qur'an lays ultimate stress to join faith with righteous deed;<sup>16</sup> but it is not the action that is important, it is the direction (which one takes) that makes an action righteous or wrongdoing. A claim not certified by the accordant actions does not prove to be true, is the principle enunciated in the Qur'anic teachings.<sup>17</sup> Resurrection and man's accountability before God is among the basic articles of Muslim Faith.<sup>18</sup> The concept of afterlife as presented in the

Qur'an is based on the idea that this very present (*Dâr al-'Amal* دار العمل) is going to change into *future i.e., afterlife* (*Dâr al-Jazâ'* — دار الجزا).<sup>19</sup> All these teachings presuppose freedom of will, on the part of man, to choose the right or a wrong course; and one can well imagine the life of the people and the texture of the society which was brought into being by these teachings. However, the orientalists are generally inclined towards the opinion that the original teachings of Islam were predestinarian in nature and it was under some external influence that the libertarian views could enter into Islam. Wolfson, for example, states that (1) predestinarian views comprise the original teaching of Islam and (2) that libertarian views could enter into Islam under the influence of Christianity.<sup>20</sup> In order to support his first contention, he categorizes the statements occurring in the Qur'an about the Power of God into three markedly distinct kinds: statements about God's Power over what happens in the world; statements about God's Power over what happens to human beings; and the statements about God's Power over the actions performed by human beings. With regard to statements falling under first two categories Wolfson mentions such general statements as the following: *His is the Sovereignty of the heavens and the earth; He quickeneth and He giveth death; and He is able to do all things.* (al-Qur'an, 57:2-3; and also cf. 6:2, 11:8). As regards God's Power over human actions, Wolfson says that there are contradictory statements: (i) there are some statements which affirm absolute predestination as for instance 10:100; 7:29-30; 6:125; 2:6; 63:11; (ii) whereas there are some verses which affirm complete freedom, for example 18:28; 20:84; 6:106; 2:24; 40:37.<sup>21</sup> In order to support his second contention, Wolfson refers to three kinds of material: (a) he quotes some traditions in the name of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace and blessing of Allah be upon him) and then compares these traditions with certain similar rabbinic traditions to show that "in rabbinic lore a distinction is made between 'what happens to man' and 'what man does'; and while the former is predestined, the latter is left to man's free choice whereas no such distinction is made in the Muslim traditions; human action is as predestined as the events of human life;"<sup>22</sup> (b) a statement of the doctrine of predestination by Jahm b. Safwân (d. 746); (c) narration of a fictitious disputation between a Christian and a Muslim by John of Damascus. (d. ca. 748).<sup>23</sup>

As to the question of why 'early Muslims' [?]<sup>24</sup> preferred to choose predestinarian passages in the Qur'an instead of the libertarian ones, Wolfson sees its origin in two things: (i) in the fact that Power (which includes God's Power over human action) is stated as the chief Attribute of the Qur'anic God. As a proof to this, he says that a contrast has so often been made in the Qur'an between the Powerfulness of God of Islam and the powerlessness of the false pre-Islamic gods that the Muslims were naturally led to give preference to the predestinarian passages than the libertarian passages of the Qur'an and were led to take the predestinarian passages as establishing the standard of true belief.<sup>25</sup> But it is absolutely wrong to say that Power is stated as the chief Attribute of the Qur'anic God. The Qur'an nowhere supports it. The Qur'an states many attributive Names of Allah, e.g., Powerful, Hearer, Knower, Seer, Wise, Beneficent, Merciful, Loving Friend, Protector, and so on; and it says: *Allah! There is no God save Him. His are the most beautiful Names (20:8); He is Allah, the Creator, the Shaper out of naught, the Fashioner. His are the Most Beautiful Names. All that is in the heavens and the earth glorifieth Him, and He is the Mighty, the Wise (59:24)*. (For further references, see 7:180; 17:110). Wolfson quotes Schreiner, Goldziher and Watt's views on the same question who agree with Wolfson as to his contention that the Qur'an contains contradictory statements (or that its teachings are predestinarian in nature) but differ with him as to the alleged reason for the preference given by 'early Muslims' to the predestinarian passages over the libertarian ones.<sup>26</sup> Dr. Abdul Khaliq too thinks that the generality of the 'early Muslims' was convinced that God determined and controlled the department of human activity as He determined and controlled the destinies of the objects of the universe. In order to substantiate his contention he mentions "not a leaf could move without His decree" as a belief of the 'early Muslims'.<sup>27</sup>

According to our view it is misleading to divide the verses or passages of the Qur'an into 'predestinarian' and 'libertarian' ones. No consistent book would allow such a categorization of its text into irreconcilable contradictories. The case of the Qur'an is even stronger. It claims to be a Book, it claims to be Word of Allah, and it claims to be consistent and intact. *This (i.e., the Qur'an) is the Scripture whereof there is no doubt. (2:2)* Allah certifies the Qur'an to be a consistent book *par excellence* when He says: *Praise be to Allah Who*



hath revealed the Scripture unto His slave, and hath not placed therein any crookedness. (al-Qur'an, 18:01) Also: Allah has revealed the fairest of statements, a Scripture consistent [Ahsan-al-Hadith Kitâb] (Qur'an, 39:23); (It is) the Qur'an in Arabic, containing no crookedness [i.e., inconsistency]... (Al-Qur'an, 39:28) Similarly the phrase 'early Muslims', as used above by Dr. Abdul Khaliq, is quite vague. The Qur'an classifies the early Muslims into three categories: those on the right hand (*Aṣḥâb-ul-Yameen*); those on the left hand (*Aṣḥâb-ush-Shimâl*); and the foremost in the race (*as-Sâbiqûn-al-Awwalûn* — السابقون الاولون). (al-Qur'an, cf. 56:7-10, 09:100) There are three possible behaviours in all times: Those who are righteousness-oriented. They are on the right hand. Then are those who follow their desires. People on the left hand are desire-oriented. Then come those who love the *Shâhid* (the Prophet). 'First and foremost in the race' and 'those who sincerely followed them' (cf. 09:100)<sup>28</sup> are *Shâhid-oriented*. The 'foremost in the race' are those for whom there is perfectly good sense in referring to them as an authority. There is absolutely no sense in using the term 'early Muslims' undifferentiatedly and reffering the generality of the Muslims as authority.<sup>29</sup> The 'foremost in the race' very clearly knew what these three categories of men are going to get will be only as "reward of what they will do." (Al-Qur'an, cf. 56:24, also cf. Chapter 56) The 'early Muslim' could never believe in any statement of the type "not a leaf could move without Allah's decree" or 'even a particle does not move without Allah's decree' (*Lâ tataharraku zarratun illâ bi-idhni Allah*).<sup>30</sup> Any such statement is absolutely contrary to the Qur'anic teachings. It destroys all distinction between the righteous and the evil actions. The Qur'anic teaching in this regard is that 'even a leaf would not fall, but He (Allah) knows it.' (Al-Qur'an, 6:59) There is essential difference between the two statements. As to what were the original teachings of Islam in this regard, they will be made clear as we proceed.<sup>31</sup> However, it can be said at this juncture that predestinarianism had never been the teachings of Islam. There was never any confusion in the companions of the Prophet who have been called 'the foremost in the race' and 'those who followed them with sincerity'. These companions of the Prophet (pbuh) believed in freedom of will and man's accountability before God, and emphatically denied the idea of compulsion (*jabr*).<sup>32</sup> How could they believe in any statement of Allah's sovereignty or Omniscience that

amounted to compulsionism in face of the following teachings of the Qur'an: *Whoso doth an ill-deed, he will be repaid the like thereof, while whoso doth right, whether male or female, and is a believer, all such will enter the Garden, where they will be nourished without stint.* (40:40); and also cf. 2:281; 3:25; 16:11.<sup>33</sup> As an example the case of 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar, who died in 73/692, is worth mentioning. He believed that "God's knowing what actions a human being chooses, is only a result of the realization of the human's choice there."<sup>34</sup> The unspecified and vague use of the term 'early Muslim' has been misleading and a cause of great confusion. It is the third category whose opinion is to be accepted as the standard at all times. The Qur'an calls them 'sound in instruction' or 'firm in knowledge'. (cf. 3:7; 4:162) The certified one's (*shahidîn*), those whom the Prophet (pbuh) declared the dwellers of Paradise while they were still alive — *al-'Ashra-tul-Mubashira* العشرة المبشرة — (and then those whom these people certified subsequently) are the highest in rank among them.<sup>35</sup> Without any doubt they were the predecessor 'foremost in the race' (*as-Sâbiqûn-al-Awwalûn*) in Muslim community. Wolfson says that the term *al-Salaf* (the predecessors) in Muslim tradition is used for the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and for those who came after the companions. Wolfson identifies *al-Salaf* with 'early Muslims' and calls them 'the followers of early Islam' or 'orthodox Muslims'. What these *al-Salaf* agreed upon is taken to constitute that which may be called the good old-time religion of Islam.<sup>36</sup> Using this word in an undifferentiated manner is not correct on another count. The Qur'an says: .... *We raise by grades whom We will – and over every lord of knowledge [dhi-ilm] there is one more knowing.*<sup>37</sup> (Al-Qur'an, 12:76). Not each one of the *al-Salaf* could be equally knowledgeable. To believe them equally knowledgeable would be against experience, reason, and teachings of the Qur'an. Last but not the least, use of the word *al-Salaf* to refer to 'the foremost in the race' (*as-Sabiqoon-al-Awwalûn* السابِقون الّاولون) does not have its roots in the Qur'an.

The sense of freedom and then accountability before God was the most emphatic and forceful idea which would drive the life of these faithful Muslims, and they would believe in Allah's Power over all things in the sense that no one could save oneself from Allah if one would disobey Allah. The orthodox were the people who preferred revelation over hair splitting in the name of rational thinking but the

reason behind this attitude was their concept of knowledge that 'knowledge is post-experience', *i.e.* knowledge comes only after one puts into practice ('*amal*) Allah's injunctions, without this it would be to speak on the base of 'precept' (*qawl*) alone, which practice Allah hates most.<sup>38</sup> The all-pervading Will of God (*mashiyat*), Infinite Power and Omniscience on the one hand, and freedom of the human will and action, on the other, are equally stressed in the Qur'an. No orthodox who believed in requital in the Heaven or Hell can ever be supposed to hold predestinarian or fatalistic views. The *foremost in the race* were neither *Qadrites* nor *Jabrites*.

The Qur'an is a Scripture, which is absolutely intact as to its text<sup>39</sup> and is absolutely free from any inconsistency *viz a viz.* its content.<sup>40</sup> Wolfson is mistaken when he says that with regard to God's Power over human actions it contains contradictory statements. What appeared to Wolfson as contradictory statements was the outcome of a particular interpretation which to us is a defective interpretation. Actually they are not contradictory statements, and are reconcilable through a particular interpretation that we are going to propose. For instance, Wolfson mentions: *A party hath He [Allah] led aright, while error hath just hold over (another) party, for lo! they choose the devils for protecting friends instead of Allah and deem that they are rightly guided. (7:30); And whomsoever it is Allah's Will to guide, He expandeth his bosom unto the Surrender, and whomsoever it is His Will to send astray, He maketh his bosom close and narrow... Thus Allah layeth ignominy upon those who [choose to] believe not [kafaru], (6:125)* as verses which affirm absolute predestination, but parts of the verses underscored above falsify Wolfson's claim. As for the following verses, *As for the disbelievers [i.e., those who have chosen to disbelieve], whether thou warn them or thou warn them not it is all one for them; they believe not (02:06)*, and the verse, *It is not for any soul to believe save by the permission of Allah.... (10:100)* are concerned, it is not understandable how these affirm absolute predestination. One who denies the truth (*al-Haqq*) and chooses to side with untruth (*bâtil*) becomes firm in disbelief. And one who persists in opposing the bearer of truth does not come to the Faith whether you warn him, or you warn him not. Similarly, one who worships his desires goes astray. (cf. 45:23) One who hears only what appeals to his desires, one who observes only what appeals to his desires, is unable to see the truth. One, who spends what God has

given him entirely for the satisfaction of his desires, worships his desires. He is a person who does not see purposefulness in life. Such a person is least bothered about knowing what is the best model to spend a purposeful life? He does not follow the Prophet. Allah does not Please to permit such a person to come to believe. Allah sets a seal on their hearts and on their hearing and a cover on their eyes. (al-Qur'an, cf. 02:07) Allah only permits those to come to believe who have firm faith in the purposefulness of life, who use their reason and choose the Prophet as a role model and obey him (pbuh) in line with Allah's decree: "*In the life of the Prophet (pbuh) there is a perfect role model for you.*" (*laqad kana lakum fi rasoolillah uswatun hasana*; cf. 33:21). As far as the traditions are concerned, the fundamental and final touchstone of declaring any tradition a saying of the Prophet of Islam, is the Qur'an. No saying of the Prophet (pbuh) can ever contradict or be inconsistent, even to the slightest degree, to the articles of Faith enunciated in the Qur'an.<sup>41</sup>

The question then is how the controversy regarding the freedom and determinism could arise in Islam? The conscious emergence of the controversy with all the desperate implications was officially occasioned during the Ummayyad rule in Islam (661-750 A.D.) and it clearly was based on their political interests.<sup>42</sup> On the brutal murder of Hazrat Hussein and other members of his family (61 H /680 A.D.), Umayyads had to face the curse and condemnation from all over the Muslim world. They were in dire need of some sort of a doctrine that could work as defence for them. None could initiate and promote this controversy if it did not suit them. Predestinarianism only suited Umayyads. They alone could be the ultimate beneficiary of this doctrine.

After these preliminary remarks let us see the difference between the Predestinarians and Libertarians. In Muslims, Ash'arites were predestinarian as against the Mu'tazilites<sup>43</sup> who were libertarian. According to the predestinarians, "there is no distinction between the actions that occur in the world including the actions which occur to man, and the actions which are performed by man."<sup>44</sup> According to the libertarians, "there is a distinction between actions that occur in the world (including actions which occur to man) — and actions performed by man. The former actions admitted by all but two of the libertarians<sup>45</sup> to be directly created by Allah; the latter actions are taken by them to be performed by man's free will."<sup>46</sup> Their assertion

of free will, made the libertarian confront two difficulties: First, how would he explain those verses in the Qur'an which directly or indirectly ascribe Allah's control over human action? Second, how would he reconcile the description of Allah in the Qur'an as All-Knowing with libertarian's conception of man's free will?<sup>47</sup> The predestinarians formulated arguments to prove the views of the libertarians to be self-inconsistent. The antinomies, which arose from these difficulties, have been presented by Wolfson under five headings which include: (i) The antinomy of free will and Allah's Foreknowledge; (ii) The antinomy of free will and the predestinarian verses in the Qur'an; (iii) The antinomy of free will and the appointed term (*ajal mussammâ*); (iv) The antinomy of free will and Allah's Power; and (v) The antinomy of free will and preordained sustenance.<sup>48</sup> We shall examine the antinomy of free will and Allah's Fore-Knowledge in this article. We shall examine this dilemma neither on behalf of the libertarians (*i.e.*, *the Mu'tazilites*) nor on behalf of any other of the Muslim theologians, but from the point of view of the original teachings of Islam. Predestinarian views had never been coherent with the original teachings of Islam as prescribed in the Qur'an. In order to substantiate this assertion it was but necessary to reconstruct the Qur'anic concepts of 'Omniscience, 'Freedom of will', 'Will of Allah and Pleasure of Allah', 'Divine Decree', 'Concept of the Categories of Men', 'Ontological Status of the Verses of the Qur'an', 'Preserved Tablet', 'Mother of the Book', 'Human Life' and 'Life Hereafter'. Significance of the understanding of the concept of God's knowledge on human level is central for deciding whether there can be some degree of freedom for human action or whether rigid predestination is to prevail. If God were to know what human beings were going to do and if God's Knowledge (*i.e.*, Omniscience) were to mean the knowledge of everything particular and universal, if it was eternal and immutable, man's fate was of necessity determined in all its details.<sup>49</sup>

Before we examine the dilemma and the solutions offered by the libertarians, let us study different positions taken by scholars who accepted the view of Omniscience as 'knowledge of everything particular and universal' and as 'eternal knowledge being the characteristic of God'. The following views were presented by the theologians:

(i) God's knowledge is eternal and as such incompatible with human freedom. (ii) God's knowledge is not eternal *i.e.*, it is originated (*ḥadith*) or it takes place simultaneously with or after the occurrence of the object of knowledge and as such does not hinder human freedom; therefore, it is compatible with human freedom. (iii) God's knowledge is eternal but not incompatible with human freedom.<sup>50</sup>

First of these is presented by *fatalists* (*Jabriyyah*). Such conception of God's 'eternal knowledge' leads either to "necessity" or to impossibility of free choice. It denies human freedom. The second view makes God's knowledge 'originated' (*ḥādith*) which is incompatible with the conception of God as Creator. It implies that God creates and then has knowledge of what He created. The third view belongs to Hisham b. al-Hakam (d. 199/814) and Abû al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 436/1040). "According to them, God knows the essence and nature of things (*i.e.*, *universals*) eternally, but knowing particulars become possible only when they occur.... So God's knowledge depends upon the occurrence of the known." This view identifies two aspects in God's Knowledge: 'knowledge of *universals* which is eternal; and, *indeterminate* knowledge which depends upon the occurrence of the particular.' This view, apparently a midway between two extremes, was not accepted by those who thought that being eternal was the only characteristic of God's Knowledge.<sup>51</sup> The Ash'arite and the Maturidite held 'being eternal' as essential character of God's knowledge and observed that it never hindered human beings freedom of will and choice. They held that "God's foreknowing of actions of human beings is on account of their coming into existence through human being's choice. On the contrary, the occurring of those actions is not due to God's foreknowing them."<sup>52</sup> Hasan al-Basri (21/642-110/728), making a distinction between *descriptive* and *determinative* functions of God's eternal knowledge asserts that God's knowledge is *descriptive*, but not *determinative*. This means that God knows what a human being will do depending on his own choice."<sup>53</sup> They argued that just as God's Knowledge of His Own actions was not a hindrance in His own freedom so as it was not a hindrance to man's free choice. This argument does not validly apply to human situation. Until one is not free to do otherwise of what God foreknows, he is not a *free agent* in reality; and given God's Knowledge as eternal (therefore immutable and infallible), it is not

possible for anyone to do otherwise of what God foreknows. Dr. Hanifi Ozcan commenting on this argument observes “even if it is thought that God’s knowledge about His Own actions will not be an obstacle to His Choice, ... it cannot be said that His foreknowledge concerning human actions will not prevent the human choice. In the case of God’s knowledge and choice, both “knower” and “preferrer” is God Himself; His knowledge and choice are eternal. But both the choices and actions of human beings are created, and it is necessary for them to occur in the way they are known by God eternally.” He further observes that “it does not seem correct to suggest that God’s foreknowing the actions of human beings is not a reason for their occurrence... Without accepting “change” in eternal knowledge, it is necessary for the human being to choose in the way which is suitable to what is known eternally....”<sup>54</sup> Jalâl al-Dîn Dawwânî (d. 908/1502) holds that God’s knowledge precedes the objects of His knowledge for God is the ultimate cause of all existents; He knows them due to being the cause of them.<sup>55</sup> [God is not cause but the Causer of causes — *Musabbib al-asbâb* مسبب الاسباب]<sup>56</sup> Dawwânî’s view of Divine Knowledge, if extended to include free human choice, would render God as Causer of human moral actions then it would not be possible to hold man responsible for these actions. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Umar (d.73/692), on the other hand, believed that “God’s knowing what action a human being chooses is only a result of the realization of the human’s choice there.”<sup>57</sup> Interpreting this view Dr. Hanifi Ozcan observes that “this means that God knows the doing of an action or the not doing of it in the way that is appropriate to the choice of man at that time.”<sup>58</sup> The knowledge of God cannot be contrary to human choice. Ibn Rushd (520/1126-595/1198) feels that if it is held that “God’s knowledge depends on the known at the present”, it will lead to the conclusion that God is not able to know the existents before they come into being; and if it is thought that “God’s knowledge depends on the known in eternity” it will lead to the idea of eternity of the universe, at least, in the form of thought (*i.e.*, in the form of a project). As far as first part of Ibn Rushd’s view is concerned, Dr. Hanifi Ozcan’s observation that “this means that God knows of the doing of an action or the not doing of it in the way which is appropriate to the choice of man at that time.” is the right interpretation and carries more weight than of Ibn Rushd. As far as the second part of Ibn Rushd’s comments is concerned, Dr. Hanifi

Ozcan perceives that if one tries to attribute freedom to human beings “by saying that this eternal knowledge, which is in the state of a project, is a neutral knowledge, that is, it does not necessitate any object to exist and does not prevent some body acting in accordance with his or her choice, then it will not yet be a complete freedom, for it is not possible to act contrary to the frame of this project because the content of eternal knowledge will not change.”

Dr. Hanifi further observes that “if one ascribes freedom to man in the frame of eternal knowledge he can not completely inhibit change in the eternal knowledge.” Dr. Hanifi Ozcan is right to say that on the view of God’s eternal knowledge “it is almost impossible to explain the relationship between God’s knowledge and man’s actions in the way that attribute to the human beings an unconditional freedom....”<sup>59</sup> What Hanifi Ozcan fails to understand is that ‘*being eternal*’ as the characteristic of God’s Knowledge (of the universe and specifically of human moral action) is a false concept. It has no basis in the Qur’an. We shall study Qur’anic teachings and develop the right concept of God’s Knowledge in this respect when we analyse the dilemma but it can safely be pointed out at this place that ‘eternity’, ‘infinity’ and ‘immutability’ which have been formulated as Divine attributes by Christian theologians are not Divine Attributes according to Qur’anic teachings. There is no Good Name of God in the Qur’an which exactly corresponds to the epithet ‘eternity’.<sup>60</sup> Let us now examine the dilemma of human free will and Allah’s foreknowledge presented by predestinarians to refute the view of libertarians.

### ***The Antinomy of Free Will and Allah’s Foreknowledge***

The antinomy involved in this case is that:

If Allah knows all things, He must know the things yet to happen. And if He knows things yet to happen, He must know the actions of human beings yet to come about. And if He foreknows human actions, how can a man go against Allah’s foreknowledge regarding a particular action. If man cannot go against Allah’s foreknowledge of that action, his actions are pre-determined. If man’s actions are pre-determined, how can he be a free agent?<sup>61</sup>

When the libertarians began to speculate on the bearing that Allah’s foreknowledge may possibly have upon man’s free action, they came up with two views: (a) One view restricted Allah’s



foreknowledge to five kinds of things which are mentioned in the Qur'an (cf. 31:34), thus denying it of all other things, or at least of human actions. (b) Some libertarians, instead of denying Allah's foreknowledge of human actions, denied only its causative function.<sup>62</sup> In order to examine the dilemma and the solutions offered by the libertarians, let us study the verses 57:3; 63:11; 31:34 as mentioned above and also some other verses to formulate the Qur'anic concept of Allah's Omniscience.

1. *His is the Sovereignty of the heavens and the earth. He quickeneth and He giveth death; and He is Able to do all things. He is the First and the Last, and the Outward and the Inward; and He is the Knower of all things. (57:2-3)*

*Lo! Allah! With Him is knowledge of the Hour. He sendeth down the rain, and knoweth that which is in the wombs. No soul knoweth what it will earn tomorrow, and no soul knoweth in what land it will die. Lo! Allah is Knower [Alîm], Aware [Khabîr]. (31:34)*

*And with Him are the keys of the invisible. None but He knoweth them. And He knoweth what is in the land and the sea. Not a leaf falleth but He knoweth it, not a grain amid the darkness of the earth, not of wet or dry, but (it is noted) in a clear Record. (6:59)*

2. *Allah knows what every soul earns of righteousness or of evil: cf. 2:197; 3:166; 6:60; 13:42; 48:30....Allah is Aware of what ye do. (63:11)*

3. *No one will enter the Garden until Allah has not known him whether he strives hard and whether he is a steadfast believer: cf. 3:141; Allah is Knower (Alîm) and Aware (Başeer).*

*Sometimes what befalls upon the believers is that He might know the believers, and that He may know the hypocrites; cf. 3:165-166.*

*Allah knows him who makes mischief from him who sets aright: cf. 2:220.*

### **Conclusion**

- (1) From the verses of section 1 and especially from the verse: *And there falls not a leaf but He knows it .... (6:59)*, it is clear that Allah's Knowledge encompasses everything. Nothing, however insignificant or small, escapes His Knowledge.
- (2) So far as free human action is concerned, it is clear from the verses of section 2 that there are always two lines of action open

for man: a right line of action (*i.e.*, the way of the righteous), and a wrong line of action (the way of the evil-doers). It is the privilege of man to choose which line of action to adopt for the utilization of provisions and abilities granted to him. It is further clear from these verses that Allah knows whatever a soul earns of the righteousness or of evil.

- (3) Since Allah is the Knower of everything and their natures, beyond any doubt He knows the consequences, which are to follow in case man chooses the 'right line of action' and in case man chooses the 'wrong line of action'. All range of possibilities and the consequences, even if they are infinite and innumerable from human point of view, are absolutely known to Allah at any point of time. It is in this sense that Allah knows the future of a possible human action. However, the choice certainly belongs to man, the moral agent. Allah does not interfere in what is exclusively man's privilege but up to an extent for respite is not unlimited.
- (4) A human action that is yet to happen, is always related to the course man adopts. Such human action can only be known to Allah if the line of action he is to adopt is preordained by Him. With reference to this fact the Qur'an categorizes men into three groups:<sup>63</sup>
- (i) Those who are yet to be differentiated by Allah as righteous or the wrongdoer. From the verses quoted at section 3 above it is clear that it is contrary to the privilege of free choice given to man that Allah should know which course such a man is to adopt in acts yet to happen. As a testimony the event of the Children of Israel from 5:20-26 of the Qur'an can be quoted when Hazrat Musâ said to his people:
- (a) that they should enter the Holy Land and turn not their backs;
- (b) that if they acted upon it, Allah had preordained the Holy Land for them;
- (c) that if they turned their backs Allah had ordained that they would be losers.

Now they were free to act according to what the prophet Hazrat Musâ (a.s.) had asked them. They would surely have conquered the Holy Land for Allah had ordained it for them if they submitted to Hazrat Musâ (a.s.). What they were going to

choose was in no way determined. For if it would have been determined in Allah's Knowledge that they were not going to submit to what Allah had asked them to do, it had never been possible for them to go against Allah's Knowledge. It was, beyond any doubt, in all respects within the power of these people to act upon what had been asked to them by the prophet (a.s.) for: *Allah imposes not upon any soul a duty beyond its capacity.* (al-Qur'an, 2:286) Moreover: *Your Lord is never unjust to His servants.* 3:182; 8:51; 22:10; also cf., 41:49; 50:29) They did not choose to submit to Hazrat Musâ (a.s.). They chose to be losers and Allah forbade the Holy Land for them for forty years.

(ii) Those whom Allah has declared as 'the righteous'. Allah knows that the sincere ones (*mukhlaṣîn*) will always freely exercise their choice in favour of what is the right line of action: *He [the devil] said: My Lord, because Thou has sent me astray, I verily shall adorn the path of error for them in the earth, and shall mislead them every one, save such of them as are thy perfectly devoted slaves [mukhlaṣîn]* 15:39-40. Whatever be the possibilities of performing an act, it is known to Allah that a *mukhlaṣ* will never deviate from what is the right course except for oversight which Allah has promised to pardon. Allah protects him. Sincere ones (*mukhlaṣîn*) are of two types: Those who are sent as such and those who are raised from the common folk. The first are prophets and messengers and some righteous ones<sup>64</sup> while the others are what the Qur'an calls the truthful ones, the martyrs, and the righteous.<sup>65</sup> All *shahidîn* are *mukhlaṣîn* but not all *mukhlaṣîn* are *shahidîn*.

(iii)(a) Those who because of their persistence in 'evil-doing', 'transgression', 'hypocrisy', or 'disbelief' have caused themselves to enter the category of *zâlimûn*, *fâsiqûn*, *munâfiqûn* or *kâfirûn* regarding whom Allah says: *For the disbelievers [those who have chosen to disbelieve], whether thou warn them or thou warn not, it is all one for them; Allah hath sealed their hearing and their hearts and on their eyes there is a covering.* (al-Qur'an, 2:6-7) Allah knows that such a person will never exercise his freedom in favour of a right line of action.<sup>66</sup>

(b) A time may come on such people when respite given to them comes to an end and Allah seizes them. After their seizure they think they are freely doing things which they don't. For example when the prophet Hazrat Musâ (pbuh) took the Children of Israel with him, Pharaoh and his people chased them with the intention to torture them, force them surrender and take them back. They thought they were doing things on their own but Allah says that He drove them out of their gardens and springs and caused the pursuers draw near the sea and caused them to drown.<sup>67</sup>

(5) It is usually thought that in the Qur'an, while omniscience is ascribed to Allah explicitly in such statements as "*He knows all things*" (57:03) and "*He is fully cognizant of what you do*" (63:11), Allah's Prescience is mentioned only with reference to five things at 31:34 (mentioned above), and of these five things none is a human action.<sup>68</sup> It must be noted that there is no word in the Qur'an that can be rendered into 'prescience' of Allah Almighty as distinguished from omniscience. The concept of prescience or foreknowledge is included in the concept of Omniscience.

Hence, the first solution offered by the Libertarians is wrong. The dilemma is based on un-Qur'anic concept of Allah's Omniscience and of Human Freedom. It falsely attributes eternal knowledge to Allah that includes knowledge of future free human actions. It also commits a fallacy by not differentiating among the categories of men as stated in the Qur'an.

### ***Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an and their bearing on the problem under discussion***

It is another antinomy formulated by Muslim predestinarians to prove that to assert freedom for man entangles one into contradictions with respect to some other doctrines of faith. Though it is formulated in the perspective of the controversy among Muslims about the createdness and uncreatedness of the Qur'an, yet it has a definite bearing on the problem under discussion, this is why giving a brief account of the dilemma has been considered appropriate.<sup>69</sup>

The Qur'an contains the condemnation of two sinners, Abu Lahb (whose name is explicitly mentioned) and his wife (mentioned only with reference to her husband) at 111:1-5:

“With the belief in a pre-existent Qur’an, even in a pre-existent created Qur’an, it means that these sinners were condemned long before they were born, with the inevitable implication that they were predestined to be sinners. And if the libertarian refuses to believe the sin of these sinners and the condemnation in this regard to be predestined, he is bound to abandon his belief in the pre-existent Qur’an and even pre-existent created Qur’an, and is obliged to believe that the Qur’an was created at the time of its descent. And this confronts the libertarian to face the antinomy of considering the “Word of Allah” (*i.e.*, the Qur’an) as created?”<sup>70</sup>

Examining the dilemma in the light of the teachings of the Qur’an it is found that the dilemma divides whatever there is, into two categories, *i.e.*, created and uncreated, and presupposes that ‘what is uncreated is eternal.’ Of course the Qur’an divides everything into two ontological categories, but the above mentioned categorization is false. Everything, which Allah has brought into being, is either Creation (*Khalq*), or it is Command (*‘Amr*).<sup>71</sup> To draw the conclusion that ‘what is not created/creation’ is eternal, is wrong for it may belong to the category of Command. The writer draws the conclusion that the Qur’an belongs to the category of Command. The dilemma is based on a false concept of the Preserved Tablet (*al-lawh im-mahfûz*). This concept is false because it is contrary to the Qur’anic concept of such a Book, as well as it contradicts basic components of Islamic Faith. The Preserved Tablet as given in the Qur’an is a Book with the Lord which contains (i) the knowledge of former generations with reference to their destiny, (ii) the knowledge of what is in the heavens and the earth, and (iii) Mother of the Book (*Umm al-Kitâb*, *i.e.* Divine Laws regulating human destiny). This view of the Preserved Tablet is neither inconsistent with freedom of will for man nor with any other component of Islamic Faith. The Book which contains the knowledge of only former generations must not contain the knowledge of the generations yet-to-come. Thus, the Qur’an does not certify that the Preserved Tablet contains the knowledge of the generations yet-to-come with reference to their destiny (*i.e.*, which generations will be condemned or blessed),<sup>72</sup> and it is against the basic teachings of Islamic Faith that it should contain such knowledge. So this Book could never contain the condemnation of Abu Lahb or the knowledge of any sin on his part prior to Abu Lahb’s being born and having

committed it. From what is mentioned above it is inferred that this Book could not contain any kind of knowledge from the creation of the universe or prior to it, which bars human freedom. There is no concept in the Qur'an of anything pre-existent and co-eternal with God may it be Preserved Tablet or anything else for that matter. It is to be admitted then that such a Book was brought into being simultaneously with the world.

Mother of the Book (*Umm al-Kitâb*), which is the foundation of the Qur'an, refers to the Divine Laws which Allah in His Omniscience and Absolute Wisdom prescribed for man prior to the revelation of the Books, from the time best known to Allah Almighty; and according to which He decides the destiny of a person or a people.<sup>73</sup> Preserved Tablet could never contain the condemnation of Abu Lahb or the knowledge of any sin on his part prior to Abu Lahb's being born and having committed it.

Thus, Abu Lahb's and his wife's condemnation was not determined in God's Knowledge prior to Abu Lahb and his wife's being born; it was also not determined in God's Knowledge prior to their being born that they will persistently follow a wrong line of action and will be included in the category of wrongdoers. The verses of *Surah* 111 simply state Abu Lahb's inability and undeservedness regarding Divine Guidance. These verses did never exist on the Preserved Tablet prior to their being born and included in this category. It is quite in accordance with the laws of Divine Guidance that when a person or a people pass a certain limit in the enmity of the prophet and in the disobedience of Allah's injunctions, they are declared to be transgressors (*fâsiqûn*), who have closed the door of Guidance on them. Allah never guides such a people. Allah leaves them to advance in their transgression because of their persistence in ungratefulness.<sup>74</sup> Abu Lahb preferred to be a staunch enemy of the Prophet, with his wife a partner to him, hence transgressors by their own free choice. It is after Abu Lahb and his wife's having proved themselves transgressors in the superlative degree (*fâsiq*) that the judgment contained in these verses was passed by Allah and the same was revealed to the Prophet (pbuh). These verses, containing Abu Lahb and his wife's condemnation, certified they're being transgressors. It is absolutely wrong to state these verses to contain pre-destined condemnation of Abu Lahb or of his wife on their pre-destined sins. The dilemma does not present a case of incoherence of

Allah's Knowledge and Human Freedom, for none of the human beings Allah ever create is determined as sinner in His Knowledge from all eternity prior to his birth.

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Let us cast a brief look at Christian philosophers' views on the problem at hand. The Christian philosophers have identified three main problems concerning the coherence of this Divine Attribute. First problem relates to the compatibility of Divine Omniscience with Immutability.<sup>75</sup> The second problem relates to the compatibility of Divine Omniscience with human freedom. The third problem concerns the compatibility of Divine Omniscience with Eternity.<sup>76</sup> In the history of Christian thought, St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) formulates the first and the second problem,<sup>77</sup> whereas the third problem is formulated by Boethius (c.480-524).<sup>78</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, 14, 13, 3 states the second problem in two versions. First version argues that if man is supposed to be free, God cannot be considered to be Omniscient. The second version argues that if God is supposed to be Omniscient, man cannot be proved to be free. Hence, Omniscience and human freedom are incompatible.<sup>79</sup> Saint Aquinas analyses the difficulties involved in these problems and tries to solve them. In this attempt he also formulates his doctrine of Omniscience which is known as traditional doctrine of Omniscience. It gives a propositional view of omniscience. According to this doctrine omniscience means that God justifiably believes all true propositions. St. Anselm (1033-1109) has already given this traditional Christian doctrine a deep philosophical tinge when he said that 'God is essentially omniscient' *i.e.*, He simply could not be mistaken about anything, He has infallible knowledge. Luis de Molina, Spanish Jesuit, one of the most accomplished and learned figures in the sixteenth-century revivalist movement (1535-1600)<sup>80</sup> reformulates Thomistic doctrine.<sup>81</sup> According to Aquinas a future free action is known by God by virtue of His decree, for it cannot come into existence unless God decrees its existence. Molina considers this doctrine a subversion of human free will and tries to find a means within the framework of traditional Christian doctrine of Omniscience whereby God knows a future free act before and independent of Divine decree. Richard Swinburne argues that there is essential incompatibility between God's Omniscience and free will, if

the traditional Christian doctrine of Omniscience is accepted. According to Swinburne this incompatibility has two aspects:

- (i) That there is an incompatibility between God's Omniscience and human free will, and
- (ii) That there is an incompatibility between God's Omniscience and His Own free will.<sup>82</sup>

Swinburne does not suggest the outright rejection of this doctrine but recommends a better formulation. He recommends a limited doctrine of Omniscience in place of a doctrine that asserts God's foreknowledge of free human actions in absolute sense. He argues that God is Omniscient in the weakened sense, and this of course has resulted from His Own choice. Swinburne feels that Bible, or at any rate the Old Testament, implicitly approves this view. The God thus postulated brings about all things which exist (or permits them to exist) and in so doing knows what He brings about and knows what that will lead to, so long as He has brought about things which physically necessitate certain effects. Yet to maintain His freedom, He limits His knowledge of His own future choice.<sup>83</sup>

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We have seen that Muslim and Christian theologians/philosophers' formulation of the problem does not essentially differ from each other. Their understanding of Divine Omniscience does not essentially differ from each other too. Traditional approaches in Muslim as well as Christian theologians have been almost the same. Analysis of the solutions offered by the Muslims shows that as opposed to the predestinarians who believed that God's Knowledge is eternal and as such incompatible with human freedom, libertarians held that though God's Knowledge is eternal (or in the past of man) and though God knows everything (including human actions yet to happen) it is not incompatible with human freedom. Libertarians instead of denying Allah's foreknowledge of human action, try to prove that Divine Knowledge does not, in any way, function so as to determine its object. Denial of causative or determinative function for Divine Knowledge, in one way or the other, is the most common feature of traditional solutions offered by the libertarians. This is not a right approach towards the solution. These are mostly mere verbal quibbling. Divine Knowledge even if not causative still does not vouchsafe human free action. It is quite intelligible that it is not



knowledge of anything that causes or determines a thing. Foreknowledge always presupposes certain principles or factors or causes that tend to physically necessitate an action or event yet to happen, say for example an eclipse. Its prediction is possible with great precision only because there are certain laws of nature that physically determine its happening. If God knows that certain principles or factors are going to necessitate a future free human action, that action is necessarily determined though not because of God's Knowledge. Similarly, if God decides about something to happen in future, He foreknows that it will happen. He may set in motion certain laws to physically necessitate that event. Even if God knows that He will bring about a miracle, it is not the Knowledge that is supposed to set it about but His Will (*mashiyat*) behind the Knowledge. It will not be possible for anyone to go against Divine Knowledge, if there is any, about an action or event or a miracle yet to happen.

Analysing and critically appreciating these views we come to the conclusion that Omniscience in the sense in which libertarians have traditionally been trying to prove it compatible with human freedom is not a right formulation. The traditional Christian doctrine of Omniscience as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) is the most renowned example of such formulation.<sup>84</sup> This doctrine asserts God's foreknowledge of free human actions, in the absolute sense. There is essential incompatibility between God's Omniscience and human free will, if this doctrine of Omniscience is accepted.<sup>85</sup> Such a doctrine perceives God as an Eternal Script Writer who absolutely knows what role a character is going to play in any episode. Since, He Himself is the Producer of this everlasting drama, no inconsistency between the script and performance is conceivable. The conclusion we have reached in this article is that the correct formulation of Omniscience must not include the foreknowledge of free human actions in an absolute sense. Omniscience must include an indeterminate aspect that should be dependent on the realization of a free choice. Such a doctrine would deny Allah's Omniscience to free human actions, not because of any lack of Power on the part of Allah but because of His unfathomable Wisdom, and because of His own free Choice.

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Certain objections may be raised to such a concept of Omniscience. It may be said that to attribute indeterminate aspect in Divine Knowledge would make His Knowledge incremental, which is against Divine perfection? These objections are based on certain false concepts, held as Attributes of God. No Good-Name of God in Muslim tradition amounts to the concept of 'eternity', 'timelessness', 'immutability' or 'perfection' as they are understood and presupposed in discussions on Divine Knowledge by Muslim theologians of medieval centuries. Muslims borrowed these un-Qur'anic notions from Greeks either directly or through Christians.<sup>86</sup> Actually the Christian and Muslim theological thought in the early and medieval centuries is highly impressed by Greeks. A most significant feature of Greek culture and philosophy was that they observed 'change' or 'dynamicity' as a negative attribute. Aristotle said: the concept of God is the concept of an absolutely perfect being. He even denied the attribute of Will for god (which is very much a Divine Attribute in the Qur'an ) on the ground that volition implies change, and change implies imperfection, therefore, it is not worthy of god. The theologians accepted the idea of Divine immutability as excellence in perfection from Aristotle. The doctrine of immutability implied two things: that God does not change in character; that God does not change at all. The former meaning is quite in accordance with the scriptural teachings. Though the concept of change is not applicable to God in any human sense, yet the later implication is quite contrary to the concept of God given in the Scriptures for it would make God absolutely inactive. An absolutely inactive God cannot be the Creator and the Command-Giver. The doctrine of Eternity also had similar implications. The Christian theological tradition has identified at least two senses of the notion of God's Eternity. First, that the life of God has unending duration. Limits cannot be defined for the life of God. This is 'everlastingness'. Second, that God is 'timeless'. Both of these alternatives have implications of their own. For example, if God is 'everlasting' the doctrine of divine omniscience implies determinism. If God is 'timeless', he cannot be omniscient at all. For, according to this doctrine, God is not only 'out there' and apart from the world of temporal objects and happenings, God is 'out there' and removed from *time* altogether.<sup>87</sup> Actually the doctrine of 'timelessness' was formulated for providing backing to the doctrine of divine immutability.<sup>88</sup> Concepts of perfection, eternity, immutability and

timelessness maintained God's omniscience in a sense that was incompatible with Human Freedom and from here evolved the problem. Allah is *Al-Aḥad* (Supremely Singular, Unique, and Alone). *Aḥadiyyah* transcends all determinations. The spatio-temporal, numerical and logical concepts of infinity are but originated by Him. Eternity in none of the sense mentioned above, befits Him. He is *Al-Ṣamad*: All beseech Him; He is *Al-Ghani*: He transcends need, want, compulsion, longing, yearning, aspiration or any inner compulsion and created the universe absolutely out of His Free Will.<sup>89</sup> He is the Absolute Originator (*Al-Badi'*) of everything. Even the determinants *i.e.*, abstract ideas, forms or archetypes of His Knowledge on whose pattern He created the universe were brought into being by Him. Allah is the Beginner of His creation (*Al-Mubdi'*). He is prior to any beginning, He is *Al-Awwal* (the First). Every beginning with it has its termination. Allah is there after the termination of anything, He is *Al-Ākhir* (the Last). Allah is the Restorer of His creation (*Al-Mu'id*) after its termination. He is the External; the Manifest (*Al-Zahir*), none is more manifest than Allah is by his portents. He is the Internal, the Hidden (*Al-Bātin*); none is more hidden than Allah is as the Determiner of the purpose of created beings.<sup>90</sup> Allah is *Al-Wāḥid*, *i.e.* the Alone, the Unique. None is to be worshiped except Him Alone.



## CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIAN'S AND PHILOSOPHERS' VIEW OF OMNISCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM\*

*Abstract: It has been commonly understood that Divine Knowledge, even though eternal and inclusive of foreknowledge of free human actions, does not restrict human freedom. But the philosophers and theologians both in the Muslim and the Judaeo-Christian tradition have pointed out that apparently the doctrine of Omniscience of God does not cohere with the doctrine of freewill of man. The present research is an attempt to examine different formulations of the problem as well as solutions attempted by Christian theologians/philosophers. We observe that Saint Thomas Aquinas' formulation of the doctrine of omniscience in an absolutist manner makes it incoherent with the concept of human freedom. This formulation is known as Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience. History of Christian thought on this problem is basically formulation and reformulation of this doctrine in different ways. We agree with Swinburne that there is essential incompatibility between God's Omniscience and human free will, if the traditional doctrine of Omniscience is accepted. Though the basic fault of this doctrine lies in its absolutist approach, Swinburne asserts that it is contrary to Biblical teachings as well. On the basis of our understanding of 'Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom' we believe that the correct formulation of the concept of Omniscience must include an indeterminate aspect concerning free choice of a human action.*

Omniscience is generally considered to be a necessary characteristic of an absolutely perfect being. But is this concept coherent? In the western philosophical tradition, at least three main problems have been identified concerning the coherence of this Divine Attribute. First problem relates to the compatibility of Divine Omniscience with Immutability. As restated by Professor Norman Kretzman, it runs as follows:

- “(1) A perfect being is not subject to change.
  - (2) A perfect being knows everything.
  - (3) A being that knows everything always knows what time it is.
  - (4) A being that always knows what time it is, is subject to change.
- ∴ (5) A perfect being is subject to change.

(6) Therefore, a perfect being is not a perfect being.

Finally, therefore,

(7) There is no perfect being.”<sup>1</sup>

Religious people often claim that man is, at least in some sense, free to do what he chooses. But if God as an Omniscient being foreknows everything, how can man be free? Is it possible for man to go against infallible Divine Foreknowledge? The second problem identified in this context is: How is Divine Omniscience compatible with human freedom? The third problem concerns the compatibility of Divine Omniscience with Eternity. Eternity, as Immutability has been considered to be the necessary characteristics of the Omniscient being in Christianity. In the history of Western philosophy, St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) formulates the first and the second problem,<sup>2</sup> whereas the third problem is formulated by Boethius (c.480-524).<sup>3</sup> Since our basic concern in this article is with the problem of the compatibility of Divine Omniscience and human freedom, we shall confine ourselves to the second problem and touch the first and the third ones only if so needed.

St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, 14, 13, 3 states the second problem in two versions. First version shows that if man is supposed to be free, God cannot be considered to be Omniscient. The purpose of the second version is to show that if God is supposed to be Omniscient, man cannot be proved to be free. Hence: incompatibility of Omniscience and human freedom.<sup>4</sup>

### ***The first version runs as follows:***

“Whatever is known by God must be; for whatever is known by us *must* be, and God’s knowledge is more certain than ours. But nothing which is future and contingent *must* be. Therefore, nothing which is future and contingent is known by God.”<sup>5</sup>

St. Thomas uses the word ‘contingent’ as synonymous to ‘not causally determined.’ No causally determined action is a free action. Thus free human actions are contingent events. St. Thomas himself states this position.<sup>6</sup> As far as his position with respect to Divine Foreknowledge of contingent events is concerned, he states that “God knows all things, not only those actually existing but also those within His Power, or the creatures’, and since some of these are future contingents to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.” St. Aquinas distinguishes two aspects of a contingent thing: as *it is in*

*itself i.e.*, in the present, and as *it is in its cause* and in this way it is considered as future. Aquinas asserts that "God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself." He also holds that God does not know contingents successively, but simultaneously because God's Knowledge like His Being is eternal and eternity being simultaneous whole comprises all times. "Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God."<sup>7</sup>

***Aquinas states the Second Version of this problem in his Summa Theologiae, in the following words:***

"...every conditional proposition wherein the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the relation of the antecedent to consequent is like that of the premises to the conclusion: and from necessary premises only a necessary conclusion can follow,...But this is a true conditional proposition: 'If God knew that this thing will be, then it will be'; for God's knowledge is only of true things. Now the antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, both because it is eternal and because it is signified as past. Hence the consequent also is absolutely necessary. Therefore, whatever is known by God is necessary.

..."<sup>8</sup>

Brody<sup>9</sup> presents the following restatement of the above problem:

- "(A) Everything that has occurred is now necessary;
- (B) Suppose that a man does *A* at some future time;
- (C) Then God already has known that he will do *A*;
- (D) So it is necessary that God has known that he will do *A*;
- (E) It is necessary that if God has known that he will do *A*, he will do *A*;
- (F) Therefore, it is necessary that he will do *A*;
- (G) But then he did not do *A* freely and he had no free will concerning his doing *A*."<sup>10</sup>

Let us examine the solutions offered for these versions of the Second Problem.

### ***Solutions to the First Version***

St. Thomas recognises two difficulties in this problem. **First difficulty** relates to the meaning of first proposition in the above

argument. Second difficulty relates to the status of *necessity* to be attached to a past-tensed proposition. Concerning the first difficulty he provides a long answer part of which, as presented by Kenny, runs as follows:

“The proposition ‘*whatever is known by God must be*’ can be analysed in two ways. It must be taken as a proposition *de dicto* or as a proposition *de re*...”

As a *de re* proposition, it means:

“Of *everything* which is known by God, it is true that *that thing must be*. So understood, the proposition is false.”

As a *de dicto* proposition, it means:

“The proposition ‘whatever God *knows* is the case’ is necessarily true. So understood, the proposition is true.”<sup>11</sup>

As is obvious, in the former sense the proposition claims the necessary occurrence in future of what is known by God in the past or in the present. In the later sense it relates to God’s past or present knowledge of a present state of affairs.

Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz in their *Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy* observe that according to Thomas Aquinas a *de dicto* modality meant “the attribution of a modal property to a *proposition* as in the proposition: It is possible that Socrates is running.” Whereas “by a *de re* modality is meant the attribution of a modal property to an *individual* as in the proposition: Socrates is possibly running.” They observe that “the above distinction reflects accurately the uses of modal expressions in natural language” and the authors find nothing troublesome about it. However, some philosophers do not agree with this view.<sup>12</sup>

The **Second difficulty** identified by St. Thomas, as stated by Kenny, runs as follows:

“In any true conditional proposition whose antecedent is necessarily true, the consequent is also necessarily true. That is to say, whatever is implied by a necessary proposition is itself a necessary proposition.

The following is clearly a true conditional proposition: ‘If it has come to God’s knowledge that such and such a thing will happen, then such and such a thing will happen.’

The antecedent of the conditional, if it is true at all, appears to be necessarily true: for it is in the past tense, and what is past cannot



be changed. What has been the case cannot now not have been the case. Therefore, the consequent is also necessarily true.

Therefore, whatever is known by God is a necessary truth.”<sup>13</sup>

**St. Thomas’s solution** to this difficulty, as stated by Kenny, runs as follows:

“God is outside time: God’s life is measured not by time, but by eternity.

Eternity, which has no parts, overlaps the whole of time.

Consequently the things which happen at different times are all present together to God.

An event is known as future only when there is a relation of past to future between the knowledge of the knower and the happening of the event.

But there is no such relation between God’s knowledge and any contingent event: the relation between God’s knowledge and any event in time is always of simultaneity.

Consequently, a contingent event, as it comes to God’s knowledge, is not future but present; and as present it is necessary; for what is the case, is the case, and beyond anyone’s power to alter.

Hence, we can admit that what is known to God is a necessary truth; for as known by God it is no longer future but present.

But this necessity does not destroy contingency: for the fact that an event is necessary when it happens does not mean that it was predetermined by its causes.”<sup>14</sup>

Kenny differs with Aquinas concerning the above solution of the second difficulty. He finds following flaws in Aquinas’s solution.

i. Foreknowledge relates to God’s knowledge of free human actions, and divine Omniscience relates to God’s knowledge of all objects be it things, events, concepts or propositions or whatever. Since “St. Thomas insists that no-one, not even God can know contingent events”, Kenny observes that the above solution “forces us to deny not only God’s foreknowledge, but also God’s Omniscience. For the statement that God’s knowledge is outside time must mean, if anything, that no temporal qualifications (e.g., ‘now’, ‘then’, etc.,) can be attached to God’s knowledge.”<sup>15</sup>

ii. Kenny further observes that “the whole concept of timeless eternity, the whole of which is simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent. For simultaneity as ordinarily understood is a transitive relation. If A happens at the same time as B, and B happens at the same time as C, then A happens at the same time as C... But on St. Thomas’s view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole eternity. Again, on this view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.”<sup>16</sup>

Kenny not only makes plain the flaws in the above solution, but also offers a solution of his own. Let us first determine the real point as contained in the second difficulty. It states:

“[I.] What is implied by a necessary proposition is itself necessarily true.

[II.] But from ‘it has come to God’s knowledge that such and such will be the case’ it follows that ‘such and such will be the case’.

[III.] But, ‘it has come to God’s knowledge that such and such will be the case’ is necessarily true.

Therefore, if God knows the future, the future is not contingent.”<sup>17</sup>

If we substitute ‘such and such will be the case’ with ‘*p*’ the above formulation becomes:

X. What is implied by a necessary proposition is itself necessarily true.

Y. But from “it has come to God’s knowledge that *p*, it follows that *p*”.

Z. But, “it has come to God’s knowledge that *p*” is necessarily true.

Therefore, if God knows the future, the future is not contingent.”<sup>18</sup>

Apparently it seems undeniable that what follows from a necessary proposition is itself necessary. It also appears irrefutable that ‘it is the case that *p*’ follows from ‘it has come to God’s knowledge that *p*’. But what about the third premise? Is it true, for all substitutions for “*p*”? Kenny observes that this last premise is based on Aristotelian principle that all propositions in the past are necessary. Kenny differs with Aristotle and, for that matter with Aquinas too, concerning the validity of this principle in its different senses. Kenny examines the premise in question, in the perspective of the following

different senses of *necessary truth*: i) Necessity of present- and past-tensed propositions, as Aristotle thought,<sup>19</sup> in a way in which future-tensed propositions are not, compared to the sense in which logical truths are necessary. ii) Necessity of past-propositions, if they are necessary at all, as something *eo ipso* incompatible with freedom. (iii) Contrast of the past- and present-tensed propositions with the future-tensed propositions with the purpose of discovering any sense of necessity, if there is any, which is not shared by future-tensed propositions. Kenny rightly observes that there seems to be no reason to maintain that “It has come to God’s knowledge that *p*” is a necessary truth. He observes that “even if “necessary” is given the weak interpretation of “true at all times”, there seems no reason to believe the Aristotelian doctrine that past- and present-tensed propositions in *materia contingenti* are necessary.”<sup>20</sup> Regarding God’s Omniscience Kenny observes that “it does not at all imply that whatever we substitute for “*p*” in “God knows that *p*” is true.... In fact, God’s knowledge will only be necessary where what He knows is necessary (*i.e.*, is logical truth).... But by definition, a contingent proposition — such as a proposition reporting or contradicting a free action — is never a necessary truth. Hence the argument which we are considering has no tendency to show that human freedom and divine foreknowledge are incompatible.”<sup>21</sup> Thus Kenny differs with St. Thomas’s interpretation of this Aristotelian principle in the solution in question.

Kvanvig<sup>22</sup> seeks to answer the objection that ‘God’s past beliefs about events that lie in the future are, because past, also necessary’ through the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts. Marilyn McCord Adams and Alvin Plantinga<sup>23</sup> had brought out the explications of this distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts. William Haskers criticises this distinction and observes that “just what is it about the proposition, ‘God knows that *p*’, that makes this a ‘soft fact’? Is it that God’s *individual essence* entails the property of Omniscience, and therefore the truth of what God believed? Or is it the word ‘God’ which appears in the quoted sentence, connotes or implies essential Omniscience? If the former, the entire distinction between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ facts collapses.”<sup>24</sup>

### **Solutions to the Second Version**

I. St. Thomas’s solution to this problem rests upon his idea that

God's knowledge is not temporal in the way that our knowledge is. God is outside of time, in eternity, and everything is eternally present to God. As a result, what God knows is the present-tense proposition that the man is doing *A*, and not the future-tense proposition, and there is no reason why it must be contingent.<sup>25</sup>

II. Brody states that Professor Kenny suggests that we ought to deny (A) and, therefore, (D). "He urges that there really is no way in which what has occurred is now necessary, and that the whole problem rests upon this illusion."<sup>26</sup>

III. Brody states that Professor Prior<sup>27</sup> suggests that we ought to deny (C). "The trouble with this argument, as he points out, is its assumption that if at some future time he does *A*, then it was already true that he will do *A*, and that therefore God knows it. If we drop this suggestion as Pierce<sup>28</sup> suggested, then (C) will not follow from (B) and the argument collapses."<sup>29</sup>

IV. Brody observes that "both of these possible solutions rest upon views about the relation between time, reality, and truth. One can not simply adopt one of them without considering its implications for a whole host of related logical and metaphysical issues."<sup>30</sup>

### ***Doctrine of Omniscience and its Formulations:***

The problems, and for that matter their solutions, concerning the compatibility/incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom always presuppose some certain concept of Omniscience and some certain concept of Human Freedom. It is the implications of these concepts which manifest themselves when they are formulated into propositions, and propositions into arguments. The concepts are the building blocks of propositions and propositions, the building blocks of arguments. A concept can be self-inconsistent or inadequately formulated. It may be that incompatibility of two concepts arises from the self-inconsistency or inadequate formulation of one or the both concepts. Owing to such considerations it seems necessary to examine the different formulations of the doctrine of Omniscience and the doctrine of Free Will at the hands of philosophers to critically examine the coherence and consistency of their basic concepts. Let us first examine the formulations of the Doctrine of Omniscience.

### ***Traditional Formulation:***

It seems quite intuitive to think that what is meant by the concept of Omniscience is that God knows everything. Again, quite naturally the question which occurs to us is: What are the things which are known to God? A common answer can be that God knows everything that is true. There is nothing that is true and He is unaware of it. And it is also intuitive to believe that He does not make mistakes about what is true or not. But truth or falsity is the property of propositions. It means that a being is Omniscient if He knows all true propositions. But knowledge is defined as justified true belief. So Omniscience means that God justifiably believes all true propositions. This is what is known as Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience.<sup>31</sup> Aquinas is the first to formulate this doctrine. Kvanvig expresses this doctrine in the following way:

O: A being B is Omniscient = df B justifiably believes that  $p$  if and only if  $p$  is true.<sup>32</sup>

St. Anselm (1033-1109) had already given this traditional doctrine a deep philosophical tinge by asserting that 'God is essentially omniscient'. But 'if God is essentially omniscient', He simply could not be mistaken about anything, *i.e.*, He has infallible knowledge. This implication raises certain problems regarding God's knowledge of the future. Notwithstanding these problems Kvanvig is of the view that the traditional construal of the doctrine of Omniscience, according to which God knows all true propositions, is quite proper. In his book *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, he tries to defend the logical consistency of the traditional construal of this doctrine. However, he prefers reformulation of this doctrine in the hands of Molina (1535-1600)<sup>33</sup> and observes that a Molinistic account of Omniscience and essential Omniscience, combined with traditional construal of Omniscience as knowledge of all truths, is adequate for such an account implies that an Omniscient being knows everything there is to know without requiring that such a being be causally responsible for the actions of persons. Hence such an account does not imply that human beings are not free. According to this Molinistic account to say 'that a being is omniscient' is not simply to say that 'such a being exhibits 'maximal cognitive perfection''. Since no being could be God without being maximally perfect with regard to Omniscience, we ought also to affirm that God exhibits maximal

cognitive perfections other than Omniscience. Hence, God not only knows all truths, He is intimately aware of His Own Self and is as intimately acquainted with the natures of every other thing in the universe as He can be.<sup>34</sup> He further observes that these properties are also possessed *essentially* by God: no matter how the world might have turned out, God would have been maximally cognitively perfect. Kvanvig claims that the Molinist account of God's foreknowledge provides an explanation of how God knows what will be done freely and also how God can have this sort of knowledge essentially. He asserts that there is no incompatibility between the two unless God could not be essentially Omniscient.

The main features of the theory *i.e.*, the Molinist account as explicated by Kvanvig are that it explains:

- i) How God knows the future without its being determined in any manner whatsoever. The intuitive idea of the theory is that there are true statements about what a person would freely do, if he were in certain circumstances. Kvanvig calls this set of true statements as 'conjunction of claims' and says that there is a 'maximal conjunction' of claims of this sort that correctly state what each of us would do in certain circumstances. And since God knows these 'maximal subjunctives of freedom' He knows the future.
- ii) But the question is how does God know these 'maximal subjunctives of freedom'? Kvanvig observes that "in the standard semantics for such subjunctives, any subjunctive is true because of similarity relations between various possible worlds and the actual world. Such a theory may be adequate regarding subjunctives of freedom as well."
- iii) Conceiving a possible objection to this theory that 'there is no actual world before God creates it' Kvanvig says that the concept of 'actual world' is confusing one and the objection is based on a confusion of the above notion. His argument is: "Since it is impossible that there be no actual world, it is impossible for there not to have been an actual world before creation." It seems as if Kvanvig is of the view that the actual world is from all eternity.
- iv) Kvanvig conceives another objection, rather a more serious one, "which centres on the possibility of two worlds sharing exactly the same history and yet being such that in one, a person acts in

one way, and in the other, he/she acts in another way. The difficulty is in determining which of these words is most similar to the actual world." Kvanvig's answer to this objection is that "there is only one way for the standard semantics to solve this problem, and that is to hold that individuals have basic natures which explain the truth of the subjunctives of freedom in question."<sup>35</sup>

- vii) And if this response by the standard semantics fails it would not mean that the Molinist view presented here has failed; it would only mean that it is the 'standard semantics' that is in danger because the semantics are developed to account for what are intuitive truths. If a view of theory construction comes out to be such that one has to discard intuitive truths because they do not fit in the theory developed on that view, that view of theory construction is necessarily false.<sup>36</sup>

Hasker observes that Kvanvig discussing the concept of *middle knowledge* (i.e., a pre-creative grasp of what creatures would freely do if placed in appropriate circumstances) states that the subjunctives of freedom are contained in the *essences* of created individuals. But of course we neither freely chose nor we are responsible for what is contained in our essence. As Maryline Adams and Plantinga all clearly see, the notion that subjunctives of freedom are contained in one's essence, is fatal to certain other concepts of his theory, the theory of middle knowledge.<sup>37</sup> However, Kvanvig claims that the Molinist account of God's foreknowledge provides an explanation of how God knows what will be done freely and also how God can have this sort of knowledge essentially. He asserts that there is no incompatibility between the two unless God could not be essentially Omniscience.

The traditional account of the doctrine of Omniscience is mostly centred on the propositional view for it supposes that a being can be Omniscient by knowing all true propositions. Propositional view is a reductionist view for it only takes propositions as the objects of intentional attitude. But now further discussions have been arisen on the base of theories concerning our awareness of ourselves and others. Though Kvanvig attempts to defend the adequacy of the traditional doctrine of Omniscience, he does not accept its reductionist bias and challenges it on the base of issues surrounding what has been called *de re* and *de se* awareness. Kvanvig says that in a considerable recently published literature, it has been asserted that the

propositional view of literature is inadequate, and the reason is that it is reductive one. The propositional belief is a *de dicto* belief, and a claim is made that “there is also *de re* and *de se* belief. The *de re* belief is belief with a thing as the object of belief. For example, it is one thing to believe that the proposition the tallest spy is a spy is true; and quite another thing to believe of the tallest spy himself that he is a spy. Finally, it is perhaps one thing to believe of a person in the mirror that his pants are on fire; and quite another to be aware that that person is oneself and to believe of oneself (*de se*) that one’s own pants are on fire. So there is a suggestion here that one cannot know everything there is to know if one is limited to propositions as the objects of one’s awareness.”<sup>38</sup> He says that two ways have been suggested by the proponents of the propositional view to meet this objection: i) Some of the proponents of the reductionist view have suggested that a different kind of reductive account in which the object of intentional attitudes is a property, not a proposition, ought to be accepted. ii) The others have suggested that “the propositional account can still be defended if it is supplemented with additional features which imply that some propositions are *private propositions*: they are propositions which only some persons, at only some times and only some places, can access.”<sup>39</sup> Kvanvig finds neither of the alternatives as acceptable. He observes (1) that the fault with the *property theory* is that it cannot properly explain what it is to conceive one’s own non-existence. Hence the property theory is inadequate. (2) As far as the doctrine of private propositions is concerned, (i) Kvanvig claims that though there are strong reasons to deny the strict identity between beliefs of different persons about the same experience, yet it is intuitively obvious that there is such an identity. (ii) He also argues from theological point of view for rejecting the possibility of *private propositions*. He observes that God knows us better than we know ourselves; but if the possibility of private propositions is accepted, there is a sense in which we know ourselves best of all.

Kvanvig offers a way to avoid this view of private propositions through a distinction between *direct* and *indirect* grasping which entails, as we shall see, the rejection of a dyadic theory of belief in place of a triadic theory of belief.<sup>40</sup> He also suggests that it is the meaning of the sentence used to express the proposition in question which provides the ground to this distinction between directly and



indirectly grasped propositions. Because, as Kvanvig observes, it is the meaning of some terms that tie us in more intimate way to certain features of the world. He further says that the distinction between *direct* and *indirect* grasping is not something difficult to understand; it is quite intuitive “that we bear a special relation to ourselves which we bear to nothing else; that we are more intimately associated with what is here and now than to what was then or what is or what was there.” The way the theory of Omniscience suggested by Kvanvig captures this connection is by claiming that there are some propositions “that we grasp *directly* by virtue of being expressed by sentences which refer in an especially immediate way to oneself, the present moment, and the present place.” He further says that when such sentences “are used to pick out individuals other than ourselves, times other than the present, and spaces other than the local, such propositions are more remote and distant to our conceptual apparatus — we only grasp such propositions *indirectly*.”<sup>41</sup>

Let us study Kvanvig’s argument through which he draws the above conclusions.

Concerning range of knowledge for an Omniscient Being, Kvanvig observes that it seems quite intuitive that in order for a being to be Omniscient, He must know about all spatial regions; but the being in question also must know about all temporal regions *i.e.*, in addition to the present, the Omniscient being must also know the past as well as the future. Articulating the same view in technical terminology he observes that “in order for a being to be Omniscient, the being in question must have *maximal knowledge*” and discusses the question of the possibility of a *maximal knower*, *i.e.*, “are there special problems that limit any possible knower in such a way that the concept of a maximal knower is incoherent?”<sup>42</sup>

As is obvious, the concept of a maximal knower seems to ascribe the same status to future as to past. But can we allow the future the same status as the past? Kvanvig identifies issues regarding the knowledge of future having two aspects: metaphysical and epistemological. The issues regarding the metaphysical aspect of the knowledge of future arise from the ontology of future. The epistemological questions deal with the possibility of knowing the future events.<sup>43</sup> Concerning the issue of the reality of future, Kvanvig sees two further points of note:

a) The ontological question of the reality of future involves the

objection that the future can not be real because if it were it would be present, not the future. Kvanvig is of the opinion that the future is real. He thinks that there are strong intuitions which support the view that the future can be the object of knowledge and other *intentional attitudes* and that it must be known in order for a being to be Omniscient. He thinks that if it can be shown that there is no good argument for denying connection between Omniscience and knowledge of the future, it can be considered a sufficient reason in favour of the view that Omniscience requires knowledge of the future.<sup>44</sup> It is with this purpose in his mind that he examines the argument offered by Swinburne and others.

- b) That the issue of the reality of future should be kept distinct from the issue about whether the future is determined or not. These are two different issues and should not be confused with each other. Kvanvig conceives four possible stand points concerning these issues. He observes that one can hold that i) the future is both not real and yet determined; one can also believe that ii) some parts of the future are real and yet indeterminate iii) that the future is both real and determined; and, iv) the future is not real and undetermined.<sup>45</sup>

Let us take the first point to discuss in detail:

Kvanvig does not attempt to show that God can know the future, rather he tries to show that unless a being does know the future, that being cannot be Omniscient. In order to defend his view he examines two attempts to deny this claim. The first of these attempts is a metaphysical claim made by Geach<sup>46</sup> 'that since the future is not real, it cannot be known'. The second attempt to deny Kvanvig's claim is "an epistemological attempt, a version of *limited scepticism* about the future presented by Swinburne. This attempt is directed at showing not that there is no Omniscient being, but rather that we need a new understanding of Omniscience — a limited version of the doctrine of Omniscience."<sup>47</sup> Let us first examine Geach's anti-realism concerning the future as presented by Kvanvig.

Geach thinks that there are no truths about future. The apparent knowledge of the future is really only knowledge of the present tendencies of things. He says that "The future consists of certain actual trends and tendencies in the present that have not yet been

fulfilled.”<sup>48</sup> This is his *anti-realism* of the future. Geach also “holds *anti-deterministic* view of the present tendencies of things when he claims that “what was going to happen at an earlier time may not be going to happen at a later time because of some action taken in the interim.”<sup>49</sup> However he does not claim his anti-realism about the future to be based on his indeterminism of the present tendencies. Kvanvig thinks that Geach rightly recognised that the two views were logically independent but observes that Geach’s thought suffers from a confusion of these views.

Kvanvig says that if we assume that objects of knowledge are propositions, Geach’s view amounts to enabling him to translate any proposition apparently about the future into some other proposition which is not about future. Kvanvig construes Geach’s reasons for rejecting realism about future into the following propositions:

1. Propositions apparently about the future are propositions about what is going to be the case.
2. Propositions about what is going to be the case obviously refer to the present, not the future.
3. If (1) and (2) are true, then there are no propositions about the future.
4. If there are no propositions about the future, then the future is not real.
5. Therefore, the future is not real.

Geach says that one might claim that there are two different senses of ‘is going to be’ so that (2) can be read as either:

(2a) Propositions about what is *really* going to be the case obviously refer to the present, not the future.

or

(2b) Propositions about what is going to be the case *if not prevented* obviously refer to the present, not the future.

Geach claims that the notion of ‘*prevention*’ cannot be explained without appeal to the notion of ‘what is going to happen’. Kvanvig differs with him and claims that this notion can be clarified in another way. He also asserts that Geach is confusing the two senses of ‘is going to be the case’, and that his response to the objection is inadequate.<sup>50</sup>

Kvanvig concludes that the future is real, and that in order to be Omniscient, a being must know about it. Kvanvig also criticises Swinburne for his denial of foreknowledge for an Omniscient Being.

Before we turn towards Kvanvig's observations and his criticism of Swinburne's limited doctrine of Omniscience, let us study Swinburne first.

***Richard Swinburn's Criticism of the Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience:***

Swinburne argues that there is essential incompatibility between God's Omniscience and free will, if the traditional doctrine of Omniscience as formulated by Aquinas is accepted. According to Swinburne this incompatibility can have two aspects:

- i) that there is an incompatibility between God's Omniscience and human free will;
- ii) that there is an incompatibility between God's Omniscience and His Own free will;

The first objection if valid would show that man does not have free will; and the second objection if valid would show that a person could not both be Omniscient and Perfectly Free. The argument purporting to show an incompatibility between divine Omniscience and human freedom runs as follows:

If God is Omniscient then he foreknows all future human actions.

If God foreknows anything, then it will necessarily come to pass.

But if a human action will necessarily come to pass, then it cannot be free.

Augustine's solution to this objection is that human actions may be free even if they come to pass by necessity. Whereas Aquinas says that although it is true that 'necessarily' if God foreknows anything, then it will come to pass', it is false that 'if God foreknows anything, it will necessarily come to pass'. Only the latter yields the conclusion that man does not have free will.<sup>51</sup>

Discussing and criticising Aquinas, Swinburne gives the following understanding of the concept of Omniscience:

A person  $P$  is Omniscient at a time  $t$  if and only if he knows of every true proposition about  $t$  or an earlier time that it is true and also he knows of every true proposition about a time latter than  $t$ , such that what it reports is physically necessitated by some cause at  $t$  or earlier, that is true.<sup>52</sup>

On this understanding of the concept of Omniscience, P is Omniscient if he knows about everything except those future states and their consequences which are not physically necessitated by anything in the past; and if he knows that he does not know about those future states. Hence God is Omniscient in the attenuated sense, and this of course has resulted from His Own choice. Swinburne feels that Bible, or at any rate the Old Testament, contains implicitly the view that God is Omniscient only in the attenuated sense.

The God thus postulated brings about all things which exist (or permits them to exist) and in so doing knows what He brings about and knows what that will lead to, so long as He has brought about things which physically necessitate certain effects. Yet to maintain His freedom, He limits His knowledge of His own future choices.

Turning towards Swinburne, Kvanvig observes:

1. Swinburne is not anti-realist about future. He does not claim that there are no truths about the future, as does Geach. He simply holds that the knowledge of future free actions of individuals is not possible for anyone, even for an Omniscient being, otherwise they will not be free actions at all.
2. Swinburne does not think it necessary for a being to know all of the future, (*i.e.*, including foreknowledge of future free actions of human beings), to be Omniscient. He thinks that this lack of knowledge on the part of an Omniscient being, does not impair His claim of Omniscience.
3. These restrictions on what an Omniscient being must know in order to be Omniscient, does not arise from any metaphysical position concerning the ontology of future; they arise as a result of Swinburne's sceptical views about the possibility of foreknowledge of future free actions hence from a purely epistemological concern.
4. Swinburne believes in the *indeterminacy view of freedom i.e.*, free actions of men, although influenced, are not necessitated by other agents or prior states of the world.
5. Swinburne argues that if persons are free then they are able to do otherwise than they actually do. Then no being *B* could be Omniscient in the traditional sense unless as a matter of fact no person ever chose to make *B*'s beliefs false. On the *Indeterminacy View of Freedom*, it will be a mere fortunate coincidence, and

a theist would never claim God to be Omniscient in this uncertain way.

6. Swinburne does not suggest that we should discard the doctrine of Omniscience, he only recommends a better formulation of the doctrine. From the precedent of divine attribute of omnipotence where theologians such as Aquinas have been careful to explain omnipotence, not as the ability to do anything, but as the ability to do anything logically possible,<sup>53</sup> Swinburne suggests that on similar lines an account of Omniscience can be developed not as knowledge of everything true, but as knowledge of everything true which is logically possible to know. He thus rejecting 'the traditional doctrine of omniscience' formulates a '*limited doctrine of omniscience*' in the following words:

A person P is Omniscient at a time  $t$  if and only if he knows of every true proposition about a time later than  $t$ , such that what it reports is physically necessitated by some cause at  $t$  or earlier, that is true.<sup>54</sup>

Swinburne claims that this doctrine preserves both the freedom of human actions and the Omniscience of God. Criticising this limited doctrine of Omniscience Kvanvig observes:

1. That the basic supposition in Swinburne's thesis is the claim that knowledge of free actions of human beings is impossible. The reason is that if such knowledge were *possible*, but not *actual*, Swinburne would be forced to discard his view that there is an Omniscient being. Given that, a question naturally arises as to whether there is any good reason for thinking that such knowledge is impossible.

Kvanvig argues: Given that Swinburne has admitted that true beliefs about the future are possible, he must maintain that the condition of justification which is necessary for a true belief to acquire the status of knowledge cannot be satisfied. So a being who had all true beliefs about future free actions would be quite lucky. Such a claim may influence the justification for the beliefs in question in two ways: i) that the element of luck would taint any belief about what a free individual will do; ii) that the problem of luck only affects, not all, but a maximal set of such beliefs so that only some of the members of the set of true beliefs are epistemically secure enough to be justified, but not the entire

set. Kvanvig observes that Swinburne holds it only in the first sense and only the first sense can fit in with his move to his limited doctrine of Omniscience.

2. That Swinburne has made the emphasis on luck the basis of his move from 'the traditional doctrine of omniscience' to 'the limited doctrine of omniscience' so he must defend this move; and that he can defend this move only by showing that the luck in question spreads over every possible belief about any possible free action. He says that to show that his emphasis on luck is true because whole collection of such beliefs cannot be held, will not be sufficient for this purpose. The question is not to show that the whole collection of such beliefs cannot be held true on the basis of luck, but to show that it is true of every possible belief. Kvanvig claims that only in the later case, Swinburne's doctrine of Omniscience is proved.<sup>55</sup>

3. Kvanvig says that Swinburne's thesis that justified beliefs are not possible regarding future free actions, can be defended in three ways:

i) The first is to affirm an infallibilist conception of justification. Kvanvig shows that to affirm this is simply a mistake "for if believing all and every truths about the future would be an accidental or lucky coincidence at best, God could not have the sort of evidence that guaranties the truth of what he believes."<sup>56</sup>

ii) The second way to affirm the above thesis is by affirming God's essential Omniscience *i.e.*, "in order for a being to be God, He must not only know everything there is to know, but He must also be incapable of not knowing what there is to be known."<sup>57</sup>

This approach presupposes that a) God must be incapable of error *i.e.*, no being is worthy of the title 'God' unless that being is infallible; b) and that at least He will not know the free actions of human beings for the knowledge of such actions can only be contingent and does not abort the possibility of mistake. Thus He must be essentially Omniscient, not just Omniscient; and in this sense of Omniscience a being cannot be required to know what free actions any individual will perform. Kvanvig also rejects this argument.

iii) The third and the final way, according to Kvanvig, to defend the claim that God need not know what free individuals will do in order to be Omniscient, is that future free actions have

characteristics which prevent any individual from knowing that they will occur. According to Swinburne, a perfectly free individual is an individual who is not influenced in his choices by any causal factors, so he claims that justified beliefs about the future free actions of such an individual are impossible. Kvanvig says that this argument, if sound, may give some reason to discard the traditional construal of Omniscience and accept Swinburne's limited doctrine in place; but it is not sound.<sup>58</sup>

4. The fundamental intuition in Swinburne's account is that an Omniscient being need only know all that can be known, rather than all that is true. Swinburne argues for this from the analogy with the doctrines of omnipotence. Kvanvig claims that this analogy is not justified: "The analogy intended to support a limited doctrine of Omniscience is between feasible tasks and knowable truths and between unfeasible tasks and unknowable truths; but the analogy is crucially defective. Whereas an unknowable truth is still a truth, an unfeasible task is not a task at all."<sup>59</sup>

From all this discussion Kvanvig draws the following conclusions:

I) That the reasons given by Swinburne for accepting his 'limited version of the doctrine of omniscience' are really the reasons for accepting the 'traditional doctrine of omniscience'.

II. His limitations are inadequate because the limitations imposed by the traditional doctrine are only apparent whereas the limitations imposed by limited version of the doctrine are real limitations on the knowledge of the being in question.

III. A being must know all truths in order to be Omniscient, and that includes knowing truths about the future free actions of human beings.

Let us turn to the third problem relating Foreknowledge and Eternity.

The concepts of Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom are also discussed in the perspective of the notion of God's Eternity. The Christian theological tradition has identified at least two senses of the notion of God's Eternity. First, that God is eternal is to say that the life of God has unending duration. God always has existed and will exist.



This is the concept of 'Everlastingness'. Second, to say that God is eternal is to say that God is 'timeless'.

The both of these alternatives have implications of their own. For example, if God is 'everlasting' (rather than 'timeless') the doctrine of divine omniscience implies determinism. But if God is 'timeless', He cannot be omniscient at all. For, according to this doctrine, God is not only 'out there' and apart from the world of temporal objects and happenings, God is 'out there' and removed from *time* altogether. Thus, in this sense the doctrine of divine omniscience presents the most complete and strong assertion of divine transcendence.<sup>60</sup> Let us observe in some detail, the implications of the predicate 'eternal' in this sense.

The concept of divine 'timelessness' includes "that God exists outside the stream of time; that his actions are timeless, though they have their effects in time; that his thoughts and reactions are timeless, though they may be thoughts about or reactions to things in time; his knowledge is timeless, though it includes knowledge of things in time; that there is no temporal succession of states in God." Put in a different way we can say "that God has his own time scale; that there is only one instant of time on the scale; and everything which is ever true of God is true of Him at that instant. In a sense, however; that instant of time lasts for ever." Most of the great Christian theologians from Augustine (354-430) to Aquinas taught this doctrine and best known exposition of this doctrine occurs in the 6th century Christian philosopher Boethius. His most quoted definition of eternity is that it is "the complete and perfect possession at once of an endless life."<sup>61</sup> Concerning omniscience Boethius held that:

If God is infallible and if God knows the outcome of human actions in advance of their performance, then no human action is voluntary;

At least some human actions are voluntary;

Either God is not infallible or God does not know how human beings will act prior to the time of action.

Boethius opts for the second alternative. He argues in the following manner:

To know something before it happens requires that one's cognitions be located in time relative to the thing in question;

A timeless being could not have temporally located cognitions.

A timeless being cannot know the outcome of human actions in advance of their performance;

∴ God is timeless; therefore He cannot know the outcome of human actions in advance of their performance.<sup>62</sup>

Swinburne thinks that though this doctrine provides Boethius with a neat solution of the problem of divine foreknowledge that since all times are present to God, God can just as easily see our future acts as other men can see present acts, there is no evidence for this doctrine of divine timelessness in Christianity before Augustine, nor is there any evidence in the Old Testament for it. He thinks that “like the doctrine of His total immutability, the doctrine of timelessness seems to have entered Christian theology from neo-Platonism, and there from Augustine to Aquinas it reigned. Duns Scotus seems to have rejected it and so did William of Ockham.”<sup>63</sup>

Swinburne thinks that the reasons for which the scholastics put forward the doctrine of timelessness were poor on two counts. First that it would provide backing for and explanation to the doctrine of God's total immutability. However, to Swinburne, this view seems to be mistaken. After all why should the theists advocate God's total immutability? The second reason is that it allowed them to maintain God's omniscience in the very strong sense. However, Swinburne does not think the doctrine of omniscience in the above sense (*i.e.*, in the sense that it includes knowledge of future free actions of human being) to be undetachable part of theistic tradition. He further observes this doctrine to contain inner incoherence and also to be incompatible with most things which theism wish to uphold. Therefore, no need to incorporate the doctrine of timelessness to theism.<sup>64</sup>

### ***Pike's Analysis***

Nelson Pike comprehends two items generating the problem for Boethius *viz.*, i) the claim that God is infallible, and ii) that God knows the outcome of human actions in advance of their performance. Analysing the problem, he identifies six assumptions or theses, as he calls them, working in Boethius's formulation of the problem. Boethius either approves them or any of them he will deny.

“*Assumption 1: God is omniscient*’ is a necessary statement. Here, God appears as a ‘title term’ and the proposition as a whole is to be read as having hypothetical form [*i.e.* if God then omniscient.]”

*Assumption 2:* Being omniscient means that the individual who is omniscient believes all true propositions. "In logical notation: ' $\forall x (p) (If\ x\ is\ omniscient,\ then\ if\ P,\ x\ believes\ that\ P)$ ' e.g., if two plus two equals four, then if  $x$  is omniscient,  $x$  believes that two plus two equals four."

*Assumption 3:* It is part of the meaning of the predicate 'omniscient' that "if a given individual is omniscient, then that individual believes nothing that is false."

*Assumption 4:* "Omniscience is an essential property of any individual possessing it. If a given individual is omniscient, that individual would not be the individual it is if it were not omniscient. [For example] a statement of the form 'if  $x$  is Yahweh, then  $x$  is omniscient' is a necessary truth, if it is true at all."

*Assumption 5:* "Let this be a necessary truth that if a given individual is God, that individual has always existed and will always exist *i.e.*, that individual have duration extending indefinitely both forward and backward in time." (This is the assumption which, as Pike observes, Boethius will eventually deny as incorrect in formulating his solution).

*Assumption 6:* "If a given individual exists at a given moment in time, then in order to count as omniscient, that individual must hold any belief he holds at that moment in time. ' $\forall x (P) (T) (If\ x\ is\ omniscient\ and\ exists\ at\ T,\ then\ if\ x\ believes\ P,\ x\ believes\ P\ at\ T)$ '. Here ' $T$ ' takes times...as values."<sup>65</sup>

Yahweh is the name of God in Hebrew tradition as Allah is the name of God in Muslim tradition. Pike draws the implications of Yahweh's foreknowledge at a time  $T_1$  in the case of a hypothetical person Jones who 'mows his lawn at a time  $T_2$ ', (eighty years later than  $T_1$ ) in the light of the above assumptions and attempts to reformulate the problem underlying Boethius's concern. Pike's reformulation of the problem is as under:

"(1) Yahweh is omniscient and Yahweh exists at  $T_1$ ' entails 'if Jones does A at  $T_2$ , then Yahweh believes at  $T_1$  that Jones does A at  $T_2$ ' (Assumptions 2 and 6)

(2) If Yahweh is (essentially) omniscient, then 'Yahweh believes P' entails 'P'. (The doctrine of divine infallibility from Assumptions III and IV.)

(3) It is not within one's power at a given time so to act that both 'p' and 'not-p' are true.

(4) It is not within one's power at a given time so to act that something believed by an individual at a time prior to the given time was not believed by that individual at the prior time.

(5) It is not within one's power at a given time so to act that an individual existing at a time prior to the given time did not exist at the prior time.

(6) If Yahweh believes at  $T_1$  that Jones does A at  $T_2$ , then if it is within Jones's power at  $T_2$  to refrain from doing A then either: (i) It was within Jones's power at  $T_2$  so to act that Yahweh believed P at  $T_1$  and 'P' is false; or (ii) it was within Jones's power at  $T_1$  so to act that Yahweh did not believe as He did believe at  $T_2$ ; or (iii) it was within Jones's power at  $T_1$  so to act that Yahweh did not exist at  $T_1$ .

(7) If Yahweh is (essentially) omniscient, then the first alternative in the consequent of line 6 is false (from lines 2 and 3).

(8) The second alternative in the consequent of line 6 is false (from line 4).

(9) The third alternative in the consequent of line 6 is false (from line 5).

(10) Therefore: If Yahweh is (essentially) omniscient and believes at  $T_1$  that

Jones does A at  $T_2$ , then it was within Jones's power at  $T_2$  to refrain from doing A (from lines 6 and 7-9).

(11) Therefore: If Yahweh is (essentially) omniscient and exist at  $T_1$ , then if Jones does A at  $T_2$ , it was not within Jone's power at  $T_2$  to refrain from doing A (from lines 10 and 1)."<sup>66</sup>

We see that the problem as conceived by Boethius, clearly ends at the conclusion that if God exists, no human action is voluntary. (Though Pike does not attempt to formally reconstruct his concept of what a voluntary action is, he recognises a situation not-representing a voluntary action if it would be wrong to assign a person, say Jones, the ability or power to do other than he did.) Pike examines three attempts to deal with the problem before examining Boethius's solution. The first of these attempts is made by Leibniz.

Leibniz attempts to solve the problem on the basis of a distinction made between *absolute necessity* and *hypothetical necessity*. He observes that to say that an action is necessary or to say that it is not contingent or to say that it is not the effect of free choice, presupposes

*absolute necessity*. What is foreseen is not necessary in the first sense, for necessary truth is that 'whereof the contrary is impossible or implies a contradiction.' Leibniz denies that the truth stated in the sentence expressing a contingent human affair (say for example 'Jones does A at time  $T_2$ ') is a necessary truth. Given God's foreknowledge and essential omniscience, all that follows is that the consequent is *true*, not that it is *necessarily true*. Criticising Leibniz, Pike observes that he uses the term '*necessity*' in contrast with the term '*contingent*' rather than using it in contrast with the term '*voluntary*'.<sup>67</sup>

The second attempt which Pike would mention relates to Cicero. Pike states Cicero's position on the problem of divine foreknowledge as follows:

"If all things have been foreknown: and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God;  
And if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause.

But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate all things happen which happen.

But if this be so then there is nothing in our own power and there is no such thing as freedom of will;

And if we grant this, the economy of human life is subverted."<sup>68</sup>

According to Augustine, Cicero could not face this conclusion. He transposed the order of the argument as under and drew the conclusion that God does not have foreknowledge of human actions:

"If there is freewill, all things do not happen according to fate;

If all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God — for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes;

But if there is no fixed and certain order of things foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknows that they would happen.

If it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not in God foreknowledge of all future events."<sup>69</sup>

This account of the problem makes foreknowledge dependent on 'a certain order of causes'. But given 'a certain order of causes', no human action is voluntary. Cicero's solution of the problem consists in denying that future events and actions are the products of 'a certain order of causes'. Hence, a denial of foreknowledge. The difference in the thinking of Cicero and that of Boethius and Calvin is that Cicero seems to make foreknowledge of what will happen in the future dependent upon God's knowledge of the present state of the universe and on the conception of certain rigid causal laws governing the temporal events; whereas Calvin and Boethius envisage God's foreknowledge of things in that 'He sees them as actually placed before Him'. Criticising Cicero, Nelson Pike observes that the problem, Cicero addresses to is not the one we are discussing. "His 'solution' of the problem consists of denying a premise that is not involved in the issue".<sup>70</sup> According to Pike's analysis, the problem as conceived by Boethius does not involve any conception of 'a certain order of causes'.

The third attempt at solving the same problem, relates to Arthur N. Prior. Prior argues:

"If God is omniscient and if God exists at a given time (*e.g.*,  $T_1$ ), He can know at  $T_1$  only what is true at that time (*e.g.*, at  $T_1$ ).

If a given proposition is not true at  $T_1$ , then even an omniscient being could not know it to be true at  $T_1$ ...

The claim that a voluntary action will be performed in future (*i.e.*, at  $T_2$ ) is neither true nor false (*i.e.* is *indeterminate*) at  $T_1$ ...

Therefore, God does not have foreknowledge of human actions."<sup>71</sup>

Pike observes Cicero and Prior's analysis of, and solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge, not merely parallel in a number of respects to each other, rather he conceives Prior's understanding of the issue to be precisely the same as Cicero. For example the arguments of Cicero and Prior share that "the doctrine of divine foreknowledge entails determinism." According to both of these arguments, the doctrine of divine foreknowledge entails determinism by way of an intermediate thesis, specifically, "the claim that propositions describing human actions are true at times prior to the times that the actions are performed."<sup>72</sup> Concerning the solution, Pike observes, that they both solve the problem by denying the intermediate thesis *i.e.*, line 1 of Boethius problem (as reformulated

by Pike) which reads: *Yahweh is omniscient and Yahweh exists at  $T_1$  entails 'if Jones does A at  $T_2$ , then Yahweh believes at  $T_1$  that Jones does A at  $T_2$ '*. Criticising and examining Prior's view, Pike observes that it is not right to think that God's foreknowledge needs evidence of grounds, for God's foreknowledge has a special visionary nature and to insist on the above would be to disregard this difference. Referring Rogers Albritten's 'Present, Truth and Contingency' which involves discussions on dating truth-values, Pike observes that "the whole idea of dating the truth-value of a statement in which a date is already assigned to a given event or action, is obscuristic and strange."<sup>73</sup> In support of his criticism Pike examines Prior's thesis that 'God's foreknowledge of human actions presupposes *the prior truth* of propositions describing these actions.' Examining different interpretations Pike observes that none of them support this thesis and that Prior's formulation of the problem involves an obscure thesis which is either irrelevant or trivially true and Prior's solution consists of denying this trivially true or irrelevant thesis.

Let us turn now towards Boethius's solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge.

Pike observes that the central point of Boethius's thinking is his thesis that God has no temporal extension. He further observes that it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that Boethius would also hold that God has no temporal position. Thus he would reject assumption 5 in the list of original assumptions and would conclude that "God's (infallible) beliefs cannot be dated nor can they be located in time relative to human actions."<sup>74</sup> Quoting a passage from Augustine's *City of God*, in which he sketches the picture of God and his cognitions operating in Boethius's thinking, Pike observes that for Boethius and for Augustine, "God does not look forward to what is future, nor at what is present, nor back to what is past".<sup>75</sup> A-temporal existence of God requires radical present tense description of God's knowledge and the verbs 'knows', 'sees', 'beholds' must be used in the present tense and must occur without time qualifiers (such as  $T_2$  or  $T_1$  or time-relative predicates *e.g.*, 'now' or 'before'.) Thus Boethius's solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge consists of a denial of God's foreknowledge of events and circumstances making up the temporal matrix. God beholds human actions timelessly; His knowledge is the knowledge of a never fading instant. This is why

Boethius prefers to call God's attribute as Providence rather than Prescience or Foresight.

Quoting a passage from Augustine, Pike brings out two points: first that God's foreknowledge, and man's foreknowledge of a person's actions (say for example Jones') are parallel concerning deterministic implications. God's foreknowledge of a person's actions, in a similar way, does not entail determinism as man's foreknowledge of another's actions does not entail determinism. The second point which Augustine spots is that man's foreknowledge of a person's actions (say for example Jones') includes that what a man knows before a person acts is what the person is going to do 'with his own free will'. Augustine claims God's foreknowledge to be parallel to man's foreknowledge in this second respect too. The point which Augustine makes seems to be that 'God knows in advance that a given person is going *to choose* to perform a certain action at some specific time in future.' But this claim, on the set of assumptions mentioned earlier, is incoherent. Pike makes an analysis of both the above concepts of foreknowledge to show the incorrectness of Augustine's thinking. Pike says that divine foreknowledge is not parallel to ordinary human foreknowledge, for whereas the first entails determinism, the second does not. Pike says that Augustine also holds that divine foreknowledge, notwithstanding parallel in relevant respects to ordinary human foreknowledge of human actions, differs concerning the fact that while human foreknowledge needs rest on some evidence, God's beliefs do not rest on evidence. Pike distinguishes two kinds of infallibility: a strong sense, and a weak sense and further observes that Augustine's thesis (*i.e.*, parallelism of divine and human foreknowledge) implicitly contains the denial of the infallibility of God in the strong sense of the word. As we have seen, the problem of divine foreknowledge rests on two premises, *i.e.*, that God is infallible, and that God knows the outcome of human actions in advance of their performance. Boethius tries to solve the problem by denying the second premise on the basis of his denial that God is a temporal being. Whereas Augustine seems to solve the problem by denying the first premise through his claiming a parallelism between divine and ordinary human foreknowledge of human actions.

Pike attempts to investigate the traditional theological doctrine of 'timelessness' from different angles to identify the logical status of the statement 'God is timeless' as it occurs in theological statements



and finally reaches the conclusion that the doctrine of 'timelessness' does not lend itself to justification. Pike observes that "it is extremely hard to understand why the doctrine (of timelessness) has had a place in traditional Christian theology."<sup>76</sup>

Linda Zegzebski in *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*, discusses the problem in the form of following dilemma:

"Either God knows what we do before we do it, or we do it freely, but not both. For if God's knowledge and his being God are in our past, we cannot alter them, and if God is infallible, we cannot make his past belief turn out to have erred, and so we cannot do other than God foreknows that we will do."<sup>77</sup>

Linda, arguing that older solutions to this dilemma are to varied degrees inadequate, offers new solutions, and suggests finally that philosophers have misconceived the problem Foreknowledge poses. She considers the three chief older solutions, Boethian, Ockhamist, and Molinist and observes that

"Boethians claim that God is timeless and so the dilemma does not truly arise: If His Knowledge of our future is not in time, it is not in our past.

Ockhamists argue that though God is in time, His Foreknowledge falls into a class of past facts ---- "soft facts" ----- which do not constrain the freedom of future actions.

Molinists contend that God's Foreknowledge does not restrict human freedom because it is based on His "middle Knowledge," a pre-creative grasp of what creatures would freely do if placed in appropriate circumstances."<sup>78</sup>

Her objection to Boethianism is that eternal Knowledge is enough like past knowledge to create a dilemma like that of Foreknowledge. Against Molinism, she contends that there are not enough pre-creative truths about creature's free actions for God to base all His Foreknowledge on these.<sup>79</sup> Linda finds current attempt to distinguish "hard" from "soft" facts, sterile. This does not solve the Foreknowledge problem, because no account of hardness and softness on which God's beliefs are soft facts is significantly simpler, more illumining, or more broadly explanatory than any which makes them hard.<sup>80</sup> Ockhamism argues that we have "counterfactual power" over God's past beliefs, that is, "that even if we will in fact do *S* at *t*, we have power at *t* to do not-*S* and had we been going to do not-*S*, God

would have believed so before *t.*”<sup>81</sup> Linda argues at length that there can be no such power.

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### **Conclusion:**

Examination of the different formulations of the problem as well as solutions attempted by Christian theologians /philosophers leads us to the conclusion that Saint Thomas Aquinas' formulation of the doctrine of omniscience in an absolutist manner (*i.e.*, Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience) makes it incoherent with the concept of human freedom. History of Christian thought on this problem is basically formulation and reformulation of this doctrine in different ways. The author agrees with Swinburne that there is essential incompatibility between God's Omniscience and human free will, if the traditional doctrine of Omniscience is accepted; that the basic fault lies in its absolutist approach. Swinburne asserts that it is contrary to Biblical teachings as well. On the base of our understanding of 'Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom' we believe that the correct formulation of the concept of Omniscience must include an indeterminate aspect concerning free choice of a human action.

## IQBAL'S VIEW OF OMNISCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM\*

*Abstract: Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was an eminent Muslim poet-philosopher of the Subcontinent. He wrote his philosophical poetry in both Urdu and Persian. After getting his master's degree in philosophy from Government College Lahore in 1899, he proceeded to Cambridge for further education (in law) and then obtained his Ph.D. from Munich University, Germany in 1907. The title of his dissertation was "The Development of Metaphysics in Persia." Iqbal's range of interests includes religion, philosophy, science, art, politics, economics, nationalism, the revival of Muslim life, and universal brotherhood of man. His main philosophical contribution is his famous *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. This is a collection of seven lectures he delivered during 1929 to 1932, and published in complete form in 1932, only six years before he passed away.<sup>1</sup> Reconstruction can rightly be regarded as containing his most mature thought. Its importance also lies in another fact: had Iqbal produced only philosophical poetry, it would have been very difficult to accurately synthesize his thought into a coherent philosophy. In *Reconstruction*, Iqbal undertakes this task himself. As is evident from the very title of this work, Iqbal undertakes a philosophical discussion of some of the basic ideas of Islam in order to attempt a reconstruction of Islamic religious thought in terms of modern science and philosophy, considering them a standard of rationality. Iqbal considers that the essence of religion is faith, that faith is based on religious experience (revelation) or intuition, and that science is a systematization of sense experience and philosophy an intellectual view of reality.<sup>2</sup> Developing an extended concept of thought, Iqbal persistently advocates his conviction that senses, reason and intuition are not independent sources of knowledge but only aspects of thought. They seek visions of the same reality so they must be absolutely reconcilable. Intuition, however a higher form of thought, is more basic than intellect and sense experience and is not devoid of cognitive element. In the first lecture of *Reconstruction*, Iqbal considers the genuineness of intuition as a source of knowledge, and taking the *Qur'an* as the embodiment of religious experience, gives an account of reality revealed by it. In order to prove his contentions, he critically interprets and examines the accounts of reality discernible from scientists and philosophers with a view to discovering whether they ultimately lead us to the same*

*character of reality as is revealed by religious experience. Through philosophical discussions of levels of human experience and the meaning of creation, the primacy of life and thought, the teleological character of reality and the meaning of teleology with reference to God, by the end of second lecture he is able to reach the idea of God (or Ultimate Reality). He reaches this idea by identifying Time with God, and the spatial aspects of reality with God's manifestation in serial time. Conceding the limitations of the intellectual view of life, Iqbal asserts that it cannot take us beyond a pantheistic view of life whereas intuition of one's own self reveals that the ultimate nature of reality is spiritual (i.e., a self) and must be conceived as an Ego. Further, the Qur'an emphasizes the individuality of the Ultimate Ego and gives Him the proper name of Allah.<sup>3</sup> Having reached and having identified the Ultimate Ego with the Qur'anic God citing Surah al-Ikhlāḥ, which declares the incomparable uniqueness of God as individual, in the third lecture of Reconstruction, Iqbal embarks upon drawing out either the characteristics of the Absolute Ego and reinterpreting the attributes of the Qur'anic God to reconcile them or the other way round. In this perspective, Iqbal also attempts to reconstruct the attribute of Omniscience. This study examines Iqbal's concept of omniscience, and highlights its implications for human freedom.*

Divine Omniscience and human freedom are two of the basic postulates of the Islamic faith. Islam sets forth in the Qur'an a certain concept of God and His attributes derivable from His Good-Names (*al-Asmâ' al Husnâ*). Omniscience is one of the Divine attributes recognized by Islam. Similarly, belief in requital, which necessarily implies free will for man, is presupposed in all teachings and injunctions of Islamic faith. Philosophers and theologians from both Muslim and Judeo-Christian traditions have remarked that the doctrine of the Omniscience of God does not seem to be coherent with the doctrine of man's free will. So far as Muslim tradition is concerned, according to our understanding, this problem arises only because Muslims in a bid to rationally reconstruct their religious concepts of Omniscience and human free will have tried to reconcile them with a philosophic understanding of these concepts. The Qur'an is the standard of truth.<sup>4</sup> What the *Truth* certifies is truth. If anything is contrary to what is taught in the Qur'an, it is untruth and cannot help but produce confusion and incoherence with other concepts.

Iqbal has taken account of many subtle problems of Muslim theology, philosophy and culture. He has critically viewed the classical formulations of Divine knowledge in the third chapter of his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. He discusses the problem and nature of the freedom of human ego in chapter four, but does not discuss the problem of God's Knowledge with reference to its compatibility with human freedom. Iqbal's discussion of Divine Knowledge refers to securing God's own freedom. A formulation of Divine Omniscience that does not warrant freedom for God would not by implication warrant any freedom of creative action to man. And a concept of Divine Knowledge that warrants free creative action to God, may allow freedom of creative action to man. Therefore, to expect anything from Iqbal like what we see in Muslim theologians of early centuries (*i.e.*, the *Mu'tazilites* and *Ash'arites*) or Western theologians such as St. Augustine (354-430), Boethius (c.480-524), or St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) would be disappointing. In what follows, we shall elaborate Iqbal's formulation of Divine Knowledge, draw its implications for freedom of choice for man, and critically examine the presumptions found in Iqbal's thought.

Iqbal identifies three theses concerning Divine Knowledge. He rejects theses that conceive Divine Knowledge as discursive or passive Omniscience, as they do not warrant freedom for God.<sup>5</sup> Iqbal conceives God's knowledge as living creative activity, the proper concept of Divine Knowledge. When we apply the word "knowledge" to finite egos, it always means discursive knowledge. It means knowledge of something that already exists independent of the knowing ego. It is bound to be temporal as well as relative to the object known. Even if such knowledge extends to include everything, since it presupposes the independent existence of the object known prior to its knowledge, it is not worthy of God, whom Iqbal conceives of as all-inclusive.<sup>6</sup>

Examining an alternative concept of Divine Knowledge as "omniscience in the sense of a single indivisible act of perception which [would] make God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history regarded as an order of specific events in an eternal now," Iqbal agrees that there is an element of truth in this concept but goes on to say "it suggests a closed universe, a fixed futurity, a predetermined unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior Fate, has once for all determined the directions of God's

creative activity.” Iqbal calls it a kind of “passive omniscience.” He compares it to a “sort of mirror passively reflecting the details of an already finished structure of things which the finite consciousness reflects in fragments only.”<sup>7</sup> This view regards history as a movie gradually revealing a predetermined order of events. Such a concept would make the objects of Divine Knowledge equally eternal with God. Iqbal does not accept this view either. He observes that if we conceive of God’s knowledge as a kind of reflecting mirror, we no doubt keep intact His foreknowledge of future events, but we do so at the expense of His freedom. He further observes that with this view it is not possible to prove God as Creator; no meaning can be attached to the word “creation” if “creation” means capacity for original action.<sup>8</sup> Spontaneity, novelty, and initiation lose their meanings if Divine Knowledge is considered to be passive omniscience.<sup>9</sup> Iqbal thinks that the above views presuppose a false concept of creation. To him, the act of creation is not a specific event in the life history of God that has occurred once for all and now there is a question of knowing it. This perspective denotes a finally finished structure to the universe, an independent ‘other’ in no need of its Creator, which to Iqbal, is a false concept of creation. The right perspective is to see creation as one continuous creative act. Denying the above interpretations, Iqbal develops his own view by identifying God’s act of knowing with the act of creating.<sup>10</sup> This means he sees the act of knowing in God as one continuous act. He thinks “Divine Knowledge must be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own right are organically related.... The future pre-exists in this organic wholeness of God’s creative life but as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines.”<sup>11</sup> This view implies: (i) an open universe, and (ii) it saves God’s freedom at the expense of His foreknowledge of future free events. The problem for Iqbal is not to establish the compatibility of Divine Omniscience with human freedom, however, the implication is that he finds it necessary to deny God’s foreknowledge of free actions to uphold God’s freedom as well as the freedom of man.

Iqbal argues that God has given this freedom by His own choice. But how is freedom of the human ego intelligible in the face of the system of efficient causality! Iqbal thinks that the view of ego-activity taken by the physical sciences — a succession of thoughts and ideas that are ultimately reducible to units of sensations — is not correct.

He argues that a system of cause and effect is not a final expression of reality,<sup>12</sup> but an artificial construction of the ego for maintaining its life in a complex environment, and there is an element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity that clearly shows that the ego is free personal creativity. Iqbal observes that the human ego is capable of private initiative on its own. In order to theologially substantiate his view of ego as free personal causality, he refers to the Qur'an: "And say: The truth is from your Lord: Let him, then, who will, believe: and let him who will, be an unbeliever." (18:29) "If ye do well to your own behoof will ye do well: and if you do evil against yourselves will ye do it." (17:7)<sup>13</sup>

With these preliminary remarks, let us examine the basic propositions of Iqbal's thesis of Divine Knowledge as living creative activity: (1) in the Ultimate Ego, "thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating are identical"<sup>14</sup>; (2) "Divine Knowledge must be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist *per se* are *organically related* to Omniscience";<sup>15</sup> (3) "The future pre-exists in organic wholeness of God's creative life but as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines."<sup>16</sup>

### ***Criticism of Basic Propositions of Iqbal's Thesis***

If the act of knowing and the act of creating in God are identical (cf. proposition 1 above—which thesis cannot be supported by the Qur'an) and knowledge of God includes the infinite possibilities of His "all-inclusive being"<sup>17</sup> (cf. proposition 3 above), then the act of knowing must be eternal and with it the act of creating must also be eternal; moreover, there will be no place for Divine will and command in such act of creation. Although Iqbal does not conceive of creation as a specific event in the "life history of God" but as a living creative activity, (*i.e.*, as a continuous process) even then there is no doubt that he would conceive of this "living creative activity" without specific beginning. This view resembles, in certain respects, both the 'doctrine of emanation' of al-Farabi (870-950) and Ibn Sina (980-1037),<sup>18</sup> and 'the doctrine of the continuity of effects' propounded by Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328).<sup>19</sup> The former conceives of *thought* as an essential attribute of God rather than *Will* (for they consider *Will* to imply imperfection in God). In the emanationistic cosmology, God is only logically prior to the world; temporally, they are co-eternal.

Muslim philosophers present this view by asserting that knowledge of God is identical with His Self-Knowledge, and Self-Knowledge of God is identical with creation (in the sense of emanation). The doctrine of the continuity of effects states that it is logically impossible for the Divine attributes to be inactive at any time, drawing the conclusion that Divine attributes including His attribute of creation have been acting from eternity and creating objects from ever. The objects are the effects of the attribute of creation. Any particular object has a beginning but the activity of creation and for that matter the coming into being of its effects, are beyond beginning. This view, too, conceives of creation as eternally continuous activity. If *Will* is also a Divine attribute, where does its activity stand? 'Will' means will either to create or not to create the world. Does the doctrine of the eternity of the world, the eternity of the act of creation, or the doctrine of the continuity of effects not deny consigning any role to the will of God concerning the beginning of the universe? If creative activity were eternal, then there would be no beginning to the process of creation. Hence, the process of creation would be co-eternal with God. The co-eternals are parallel to one another. The parallels have no power over each other. God has no power over His creative activity. Creation in the sense of continuous creative activity without specific beginning would amount to a necessary activity. The Muslim philosophers were true to their doctrine when they asserted that even God couldn't change the course of the world.<sup>20</sup> Muslim philosophers conceived of God as *pure actuality*. They further conceived that everything flows from the self-knowledge of God with logical necessity. In their system of emanation, even God was not free. In order to avoid this conclusion and secure Divine Freedom, Iqbal conceives of God not as *pure actuality* but as Absolute Ego with *infinite possibilities* of self-revelation. But how freedom could be secured for God if future lies in Him as an open possibility and Absolute Ego has no power over His self-revelation! (Cf. proposition 1 above.) As far as the attribute of creation is concerned, freedom of God demands volition and then power to issue command. If thought and deed, and the acts of knowing and creating in God are identical and omniscience as living creative activity is eternal, where is a place for volition and command? Such a view is also contrary to the teachings of the Qur'an: "*Is not He Who created the heavens and the earth, Able to create the like of them? Aye, that He is! For He is the*



*All-Wise Creator. But His command, when He intends a thing, is only that He says unto it: Be! And it is.*" (Qur'an 36:81-82)

The expression "self-revelation" is also objectionable. "Self-revelation" is not creation in the real sense of the word. It can only figuratively be used for creation. It is evident from the fact that Iqbal, quite true to his thesis, uses the epithet "all-inclusive" for God. If creation in God means Self-revelation and God is "all-inclusive," then the objects are only relatively real; they just appear to exist *per se*, when actually they don't. Everything is included in God when Iqbal asserts, "Reality lives in its own appearances."<sup>21</sup> Since Iqbal is trying to rationally reconstruct a religious concept (*i.e.*, the Qur'anic concept of God) it is better to call this position, *hama ander oowst* (All is in Him.) So far as the relation of God and His manifestation is concerned, Iqbal's view seems to be *tanzih-m'at-tashbih* (transcendence with similarity/ immanence).<sup>22</sup>

If God has infinite possibilities of self-revelation, the self-revelation of God is an eternal process,<sup>23</sup> and God is rationally directed life (*ibid.*, p. 62), then whatever comes into being *in* God will be in accordance with the laws of reason, and necessary and logically determined. This position is ultimately identical with the position of Muslim philosophers al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Iqbal himself is conscious of these implications when he says that Absolute Ego Himself out of His creative freedom made the finite egos share in His Life, Power and Freedom.<sup>24</sup> In this way, Iqbal tries to prove freedom for man but it is impossible to overcome the basic incoherence of his thought. If even God is not free, how can man be free? And if thought in God is identical with deed, how could He Will freedom to man. And if there is no place for Will in the creative activity of God, which is a necessary postulate of freedom of an Ego, how can He bestow 'will' to the finite ego? The concept of the finite ego as a real agent in the fold of an all-inclusive Absolute Ego is incoherent. It shows that whether Divine Knowledge in Iqbal's metaphysical system leaves any scope for freedom of God or not, it definitely leaves no scope for freedom of man.

Without volition and command, the concept of God as *Self (Dhat)* is inconceivable. In a way, Iqbal denies creation *ex-nihilo* (*i.e.*, not out of something already existing, on a pattern not eternally existing in God's Knowledge as possible existents or whatever.) This view is not reconcilable with the Qur'anic concept of God. Creation is real only if

it is essentially *ex-nihilo*. God, in his essence is beyond determinations. A prior phase of privation of all determinations is a must for creation. "Thought of the Ultimate Ego" can only be identical with "the Deed of the Ultimate Ego" in an emanationistic cosmology and pantheistic ontology but not in theistic ontology and cosmology. The concept of "organic relationship" in the context of ontology is misleading.<sup>25</sup> It would further make the objects of God's knowledge to appear as members of an organism. If the objects of Divine Knowledge were organically related to Divine Knowledge, then Divine Knowledge would be organically related to Divine Being. If the objects that appear to exist *per se* were organically related to Omniscience (as a living creative activity), they would not retain their uniqueness as egos. How could egos that being organically related to the all-inclusive Ego as members retain their uniqueness, freedom, and impenetrability? A pantheistic ontology and emanationistic cosmology do not allow an open universe or future free actions of human beings nor of God. The concept of creation necessarily demands a prior phase of absolute indetermination. It demands the Will of God and then issuance of command to create the world.<sup>26</sup> It also demands creation *ex-nihilo*, otherwise it is only a manifestation, self-revelation or self-disclosure. It demands that the Creator be supremely transcendent or incomparably unique of its creation. It also demands that the Creator must sustain reality and run it freely with His Knowledge and Wisdom. But the governance of reality and sustaining it demands that He must encompass creation in His Knowledge as well as Power. One may observe that transcendence is not a unilateral relationship. Iqbal apprehends that such a view makes reality confront and limit God (Iqbal's Ultimate Reality). But this apprehension is based on a misconception. It arises only when one conceives a difference of degree and not of kind between reality and the Creator of reality. But the Creator of reality, unlike a human creator, is singular, unique, alone and transcendent of all determinations (*Aḥad*). No such concept as "to confront Him" validly applies to Him. Reality in its essence is not self-subsistent; it needs its Creator to sustain it. To sustain reality, the Creator must be omnipresent. To be omnipresent means to encompass reality in knowledge and power. Iqbal misconceives this concept too. He seems to think that omnipresence would easily lend itself to pantheistic interpretation, and suggests that the Creator be conceived as

immanent in reality.<sup>27</sup> Iqbal conceives the immanence of God in nature on the analogy of spirit [*i.e.*, Iqbal uses the word “soul”] in the body.<sup>28</sup> Spirit is immanent in body. Body belongs to the category of creation of God and spirit (*Ruh*) belongs to the category of Command of Allah,<sup>29</sup> and both belong to the order of originated beings.<sup>30</sup> It is Allah’s Command (*Amr*) which makes what is to be created active in a well-defined course of action and subservient in its area of operation. “...*And the Sun and the Moon and the Stars are made subservient by His Command (Amr). Surely His is the Creation (Khalq) and the Command (Amr)...*” (7:54)<sup>31</sup> Iqbal conceives the Creator on the analogy of created beings. In order to get support for his thesis, Iqbal refers to the following verse: “*He is the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible [Bâtin], and He is the Knower of all things,*” (Qur’an, 57:03) and interprets it to draw the immanentism of God. To conceive the Divine attribute of being invisible [*Bâtin*] in the sense of immanence on the analogy of spirit in the body is to violate the Qur’anic principle of Absolute Transcendence and Incomparable Uniqueness of God.

Iqbal’s criticism of the views of Divine Knowledge (*i.e.*, Discursive Knowledge and Passive Omniscience), which he rejects, as well as the concept of Omniscience as Living Creative Activity (which he formulates) is based, in the final analysis, on his concept of God as Absolute Ego. Let us first elaborate and then critically examine this concept to finally appreciate Iqbal’s Doctrine of Omniscience.

Iqbal conceives the Absolute Ego as “*the whole of Reality.*”<sup>32</sup> He also conceives of God “as essentially *spiritual* - spiritual in the sense of being an individual and an ego.”<sup>33</sup> He is an ego because He responds to our reflection and prayer. God is an ego, because, *like the human self*, He is “an organising principle of unity, a synthetic activity that holds together and focalises the dispensing dispositions of *His living organism* for a constructive purpose.”<sup>34</sup> He is living. He lives in pure duration.<sup>35</sup> This is what Iqbal calls the appreciative aspect of Absolute Ego. The creative activity or spatio-temporal world is self-revelation of the Absolute Ego in its efficient aspect.<sup>36</sup> God or what Iqbal calls Absolute Ego is *all-inclusive* and universe is not an ‘other’ existing *per se* and confronting Him.<sup>37</sup> Since there is nothing beside Him to put a limit to Him, He is an absolutely free creative spirit.<sup>38</sup> Absolute Ego is absolutely perfect. The perfection of

the Creative Self consists in an infinite scope of His creative activity and vision. It consists of the unfailing realization of the infinite creative possibilities of His being. God's life is self-revelation and not the pursuit of an ideal. Absolute Ego is also *infinite* but He is not infinite in the spatial sense, His being a free living spirit with infinite creative possibilities means that He is Omnipotent."<sup>39</sup> Change as a movement from one imperfect state to a relatively more perfect state, or vice versa, is inapplicable to Him. He is *continuous creation*,<sup>40</sup> and therefore changes only in the sense in which a continuous creation can be said to change. But change as continuous creation does not imply imperfection.<sup>41</sup> There is no reproduction in Him.<sup>42</sup> "From the unity of the all-inclusive Ego who creates and sustains all egos follows the essential unity of all mankind."<sup>43</sup> Iqbal quotes from the Qur'an to reconcile his philosophical concept of the Absolute Ego with the Qur'anic concept of God.

When we critically examine Iqbal's concept of Absolute Ego we see that he conceives of God as "*the whole of Reality*." The word 'Reality/reality' is applicable only to the world, the universe, and the created order. God is the Creator of Reality/reality. The epithet "*the whole of Reality*" cannot be applied to God without effacing this difference and including creation in the Creator.

Actually, Iqbal creates difficulty for himself by wrongly conceiving of God on the analogy of man.<sup>44</sup> Iqbal conceives of human self as ego. Human being as ego is finite. He identifies appreciative and efficient aspects of human ego. Now Iqbal conceives of God as Ego. In comparison to man, who is finite, God is infinite; man is relative, God is Absolute. The life of the finite ego consists in its coming from appreciative to efficiency. God as appreciative Self lives in pure duration. On the analogy of the life of the finite ego, Iqbal conceives of world as creative activity of the Absolute Ego (in its coming from appreciation to efficiency) by way of Self-revelation.<sup>45</sup> He conceives of nature as character to the Divine Self.<sup>46</sup> Nature at any instant is only a fleeting moment in the life of God, however, it is a living, ever-growing organism. (This is why Iqbal emphasizes the all-inclusiveness of the Absolute Ego.) All these things arise as implications of his viewing God on the analogy of man, which is anthropomorphism.<sup>47</sup> To avoid this, Iqbal also tries to see things other way round, *i.e.*, theomorphically when he states that from the Absolute Ego only egos "proceed."<sup>48</sup>

As compared to nature, which is only transitory and ephemeral, the "I-amness" of God is independent, elemental and absolute."<sup>49</sup> Iqbal sees the metaphor of *Light* in the Light Verse of the Qur'an as a metaphor "to suggest the absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence, which easily lends itself to a pantheistic interpretation."<sup>50</sup> But according to our understanding, the metaphor of light in this verse does not refer to God or to the Absoluteness of God as individual. This interpretation suits Iqbal because he sees God as all-inclusive and immanent. Otherwise this interpretation is not coherent with the Imperatival Verses of the Qur'an. The reality of light is guidance. The light of heavens and earth, as referred to in this verse, is the light of the guidance (*Nur e Hidayat*) of Allah. The heavens and the earth are lighted with it. '*Al-Nur (The Light)* is the Good-Name of Allah and Allah has placed the light of guidance in the heavens and the earth.<sup>51</sup> The Qur'an says that the heavens and the earth and whatever is therein are the signs of Allah for those who ponder it. (3:116; 3:190; 10:6) It is in this sense that Allah is the Light (*Nur*) of heavens and of the earth. Allah is the Creator, and the heavens and the earth and whatever therein (*i.e.*, including all the forms of physical light) are His creation. (25:59; 30:8; 32:4; 15:85; 46:3) It is necessary to observe this distinction in interpreting this verse at all times, but Iqbal has overlooked this.

The Qur'an divides the whole originated order of being into two ontological categories: *Khalq* (Creation) and *Amr* (Command). It is Allah to whom the creation (*Khalq*) of every thing belongs, and it is He, according to whose command (*Amr*), everything is active in its sphere. (Qur'an,07:54) It is this *Amr* within a thing that guides it upon its destiny. (Qur'an,20:50) Soul (*Ruh*) belongs to the category of Allah's command. (Qur'an,17:85) This is the Principle of Guidance from Allah within man.<sup>52</sup>

The Qur'an consists of two kinds of verses: the imperatival (*muhkamat*) and the allegorical (*mutashabihat*). The imperatives (*Muhkamat*) are those verses that are directly in the form of commandments. The allegorical (*mutashabihat*) are the verses that, on reading or listening, render an obligation on the reader or the listener according to that statement. Only the imperatival verses (*muhkamat*) of the Qur'an are called the "Mother of the Book" (*Umm ul Kitab*). Some verses can clearly be categorized as imperatival and some others as allegorical, while the remaining others can be categorized on

the basis of already established set of imperatival verses. The imperatival verses are the standard in any decision. These are the foundation of the Book. Whatever is to be inferred from the allegorical verses is necessarily to be verified by and be coherent with the imperatival verses. If otherwise, the interpretation is false.<sup>53</sup>

The verse in question clearly belongs to the set of allegorical verses. Keeping this fact in mind, let us develop the parable. The heart of man is like a niche in which is placed the lamp. The lamp is encased in a glassy globe. The globe is so clean that it glitters like a star. Imagine how much illumination the globe can add to the light of the lamp when it is lighted, and how beautifully will it distribute this light! The lamp in the heart of man is filled with blessed oil, the *Reason*. Heart is the seat of Reason.<sup>54</sup> This blessed oil is pure like the oil extracted from the fruit of an olive tree which is neither in the east nor in the west but in the center of the garden where the sun shines over it from morning until it sets. The oil of such a tree is so pure that it is just to be lighted up as soon as a spark approaches it. Now imagine when this lamp is lighted, how luminous would it be! Light upon light! The role of Reason is to free man from contradictions. Reason, when pure, has the greatest capacity to catch light from the Light of Guidance of Allah by which the heavens and the earth are lighted and luminous. But when man follows his desires, reason loses its purity.<sup>55</sup> The heavens and the earth are filled with the light of Allah's guidance. If there is a heart whose oil has not lost its purity and whose globe has not lost its shine, Allah guides him to the way of His Light, to the way of His gnosis. This is the heart of the believer. When it is lighted by gnosis (*nur-im-m'arifat*), it becomes light upon light. Allah is the knower of everything, He knows with absolute knowledge whom to bless with this favour. Allah sets parables for the guidance of mankind.

The word "Self" (*Dhât*) is more proper and nearer to the Qur'anic insight to be used for God than "ego." "Ego" emphasizes His "I-amness" more than anything else; "Self" (*Dhât*) denotes the whole person of the Divine with emphasis on His 'Will' and 'Power'. (Qur'an, 17:1; 67:1) He is individual but alone, singular and unique (*Al-Ahad*). Of course, He is not a principle, but transcends all conceptions of spirit, soul, and matter and principle. Whatever He has originated is either creation or command. Creation definitely bears the signs of the person of its creator but is never like the creator, nor the

command in any sense identical to the command-giver. Naught is like Him.<sup>56</sup> The principle of the incomparable uniqueness of the Creator leaves no scope for conceiving God as Absolute Ego on the analogy of one's experience of one's own ego. Iqbal, throughout in his *Reconstruction*, in almost all the terms, metaphors and analogies he uses, violates this principle. A created being cannot by any stretch of imagination, psychological analysis or intellectual abstraction ever imagine, conceive of or encompass the Being of its Creator. One may experience one's presence (*hazoori*) before the Omnipresent but can never experience His Being.

Of course, God is a Self; Unity in the comprehensive, perfect and unique sense is His characteristic. But He is not like an organism in any respect. No analogy can hold between God (who is unique) and creator, and an organism that is His creation. The concept of "organism" in the context of ontology, as said earlier, is a false concept. Organisms reproduce them, whereas Iqbal himself admits that reproduction is contrary to the Absolute Ego. Organisms are born, and they die. Then what is the sense in saying that Absolute Ego is "living organism" but doesn't reproduce etc? Why not assert His incomparable uniqueness and transcendence?

Iqbal conceives of God as *continuous creation*. This may imply pantheism and identifying God with nature but not God of the Qur'an Who is Creator at Will and Command. Essentially, He is Creator *ex-nihilo*—both of forms as well as matter, but He is also Creator out of things already created by Him. To conceive of nature as the character of God is also misleading. It would be conceiving God on the analogy of man and would imply the eternity of nature.

According to M. M. Sharif, "A perfect individuality means to Iqbal, as to Bergson, an organic whole of which no detached part can live separately." The Ultimate Ego is perfect in this sense but not only in this sense. His perfection also implies "the infinite scope of His creative vision."<sup>57</sup> Terms and concepts used or coined for God should be such that nothing should harm the incomparable uniqueness of God. To call God infinite as compared to man is to fail to observe the above principle. God is neither finite nor infinite; He is beyond determinations (*Al-Ahad*).<sup>58</sup>

Iqbal conceives of *time* as an essential element in Reality (*i.e.*, God)<sup>59</sup> on the analogy of the human ego. All such concepts based on analogy of human self are misleading. The tradition that identifies

*time* with God referred to by Iqbal is 'stated thusly: "*la tasubbu al-dahra fa inn- Allah huwa'l-dahru*", and means "*Do not vilify Time for Allah is Time.*"<sup>60</sup> This tradition is narrated by Ahmad Hanbal in his *Musnad*, V, 299 and 311.<sup>61</sup> To further corroborate his identification of *time* with God, Iqbal refers to the eminent Sufi Muhyuddin Ibn al-'Arabî, who asserts that *Dahr* is one of the beautiful names of God.<sup>62</sup> Both these views are incorrect. Neither the alleged tradition can be a saying of the Prophet nor *al-Dahr* is the Good Name of Allah. The Qur'an does not endorse any of the views.<sup>63</sup>

### **Criticism of M. S. Raschid's Views**

In the introduction to his book *Iqbal's Concept of God*, M. S. Raschid observes: 1) that Iqbal's concept of God is a finite (panentheistic) one; 2) that Iqbal's finite deity cannot be reconciled with the supremely transcendent but also immanent God of the Qur'an.<sup>64</sup> Raschid further notes that not only has Iqbal developed a finite conception of deity but he has also argued for the inclusion of the created order (nature) within the being of the creator (God). He makes us conceptualize this process of inclusion by taking nature as an organic part of "the ultimate self." It is obvious that according to Iqbal, God and the world form a unity and this united whole is divine.<sup>65</sup> Raschid rightly terms such a position as panentheism.<sup>66</sup> But he points to incoherence in Iqbal's thought. He says that Iqbal also argues that nature is "a rationally directed creative life" as an ego. Raschid observes that it sounds more like straight forward pantheism. These are two incoherent positions that are found in Iqbal. But Iqbal further complicates the problem by equating and identifying his concept of 'Absolute Ego' with the Qur'anic concept of God.<sup>67</sup>

Raschid is right to declare Iqbal's concept of God as finite (panentheistic). But his own view that the Qur'anic concept of God is the concept of a supremely transcendent but also immanent God and that Iqbal's concept of a finite deity cannot be reconciled with it<sup>68</sup> is also partially incorrect. Of course Iqbal's concept of God cannot be reconciled with the Qur'anic concept of God, but Raschid is not right to call the Qur'anic God "immanent." Immanence refers to the immanence of the soul in the body or of fire in the red-hot iron. "Immanence" also means "similarity."<sup>69</sup> "*Naught is as His likeness*" means none of the creations is similar to Allah, the Creator. The Qur'anic concept of God definitely is the concept of a "supremely



transcendent" God, but it is not in any sense the concept of an "immanent" God. The Qur'anic concept is the concept of a 'Creator God' who is also "Omnipresent and Sustainer."<sup>70</sup>

The Qur'anic God is supremely transcendent but not immanent. He is transcendent because He transcends all determinations. He transcends form, matter, and energy. He transcends beginning, end, want and need, He transcends imperfection but also transcends human conceptions of perfection. He transcends change but He also transcends to be analogical to a process or activity.<sup>71</sup> He has *Will* as ability to bring about or not to bring about determinations. He is a Self but He is an incomparably unique Self that transcends what He has created whether man, angel or any other sort of spirit, law, fate, process or organism. He is Creator of everything, its form, matter, quiddity, essence and existence but "*naught is like Him.*" Everything comes to be because Allah brings it into being. Everything exists because Allah sustains it. Nothing can be created or sustained without knowledge and power. Allah encompasses everything in His Knowledge and in His Power. To encompass everything in knowledge and power proves that He is present everywhere. The concept of a 'confronting-other' does not arise in the above said perspective. Nothing limits Him nor confronts Him as 'other'; these are but human misconceptions. He is self-conscious, willing, knowing, commanding, creating and responding. The attribution of descriptive phrases like "organizing principle of Unity" or "Pure Duration" does not befit Him. He is the Person without any similarity to any person. It is wrong to apply words like "Reality," "Absolute Reality" or "Ultimate Reality" to God. These at the very outset presuppose a pantheistic or panentheistic ontological set up. Whereas the right thing is that what Allah has created is "reality." Everything, whether changing, ephemeral and transitory, is real because the creation of Allah is no illusion.<sup>72</sup> Allah has stated the change in time as real. Space, time and universe are reality. Allah has specifically stated that the creation of heavens, and the earth and what is between them is reality and that the order of reality will last even after the Day of Judgment, though in a reshaped form.<sup>73</sup> They are not interpretations put by finite egos on experience. The objective aspect of time is not unreal; man is accountable for his deeds performed in this succession. 'Reality'/reality refer to determinations; Allah is Creator of reality and transcends determinations. M. M. Sharif, an

eminent Pakistani philosopher,<sup>74</sup> encompassing Iqbal's poetry and philosophical works, delineates the development of Iqbal's concept of God into three stages. As far as Iqbal's views about God in their final form are concerned, he observes that Iqbal's thought took its final shape under the influence of the philosophies of Rumi, McTaggart, James Ward, Bergson and Nietzsche. Whatever the influence of other philosophers in other directions, with regard to the concept of God, Iqbal's thought was molded chiefly by Ward.<sup>75</sup> Sharif, in an attempt to examine different Western and Eastern philosophers' influence, finally observes that Ward's influence on Iqbal is greater than anyone else.<sup>76</sup> To measure this influence he has given a list of common elements and their respective views on the concept of God, which are as follows:

[i] Both of them, after the manner of Kant, reject the three notorious arguments for the existence of God, [ii] discard Platonism, Pantheism, and Absolutism, and [iii](a) object to omniscience as foreknowledge of a preordained reality and, (b) to applying the idea of serial time both to God and to the finite self—and all this for exactly the same reasons. [iv] Both are Pluralists, Theists, and Spiritual Monists. [v] Both hold Panpsychism against Berkeley's occasionalism, and [vi] windowed monadism against Leibnitz's windowless monadism. [v] Both believe in the creative freedom and immortality of the individual. [vi] For both, the sensuous world is due to interaction between egos, [vii] the body is created by the mind to serve its own purposes, and [viii] serial time is only an act of the mind. [ix] Both hold on exactly the same grounds and in exactly the same sense that God is an infinite, conscious, omnipotent and omniscient spirit, which is immanent in the finite egos and yet transcends these parts. [x] For both He is a perfectly free creative spirit that limits its own freedom by creating free finite egos, and [xi] for both this internal limitation is not inconsistent with His own perfect freedom. [xii] According to both, God is perfect throughout His creative progress, for this progress is progress *in* perfection, not *towards* perfection. [xiii] Both hold that God's Will functions through the will of the finite egos. [xiv] Both believe with Wundt that reason can prove the necessity of faith, but cannot turn faith into knowledge. [xv] Both agree that belief in God is ultimately a

matter of faith, though of a rational faith, that conviction or complete certitude about Him comes not from reason but from living, that direct communion with Him is gained only through *rapport* or love, and that it is only love for Him that immortality is achieved by the finite self.<sup>77</sup>

This does not mean that Iqbal owes everything to Ward and does not go beyond Ward's conception of God. He certainly does and in a very important respect. Sharif notes the following points of difference between them:

[i] Ward regards God as eternal, but fails to explain eternity, chiefly because he has no idea of time as non-serial. Iqbal taking clue from a saying of the Prophet of Islam in which time is identified with God—accepts Bergson's theory of pure duration with some modifications, and thereby succeeds not only in explaining Divine eternity but also in laying greater emphasis on the dynamic aspect of reality.

[ii] Again, the idea of perfection is not the same as Ward's. It is partly Bergsonian and partly his own.<sup>78</sup>

### ***M. M. Sharif's Comments***

Sharif observes that Ward, Bergson and Iqbal follow similar procedures when they start from the individual experience and that there seems to be nothing wrong with this. Since we are certain before all other things of our own experience, Sharif sees it as the best way to proceed. However, he agrees with Iqbal that it is not the only right procedure. Sharif points out a great danger in this allegedly best method of study, and that is the pitfall of viewing everything anthropomorphically.<sup>79</sup> He thinks that "what reality is as a whole must forever remain hidden from the finite self, for how can the part with all its limitations comprehend the whole, which essentially goes far beyond its compass?"<sup>80</sup>

Sharif is right in his conclusion that to conceive of God on the analogy of man is not the right approach but he is wrong in his observation at two points: he seems to use the phrase "reality as a whole" for God; he calls man "the part" of this whole. God is the Creator of reality and man is creature. The right thing would be to say, "How could the creature with all its limitations comprehend the Creator, which essentially and absolutely transcends its compass!" On the basis of our own analysis, we find ourself in agreement with

Raschid in his contention that "Basically Iqbal's procedure involves two moves. First, he draws some quite unreasonably extravagant, and indeed, in very important respects, illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from his philosophical inquiry into modern science and philosophy...The second move," as he rightly observes, is "Iqbal's repeated and persistent attempt to read the results of his inquiry into the Qur'an."<sup>81</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Philosophers coin, stipulate or use certain terms to express their thought. These terms express their concepts relating their subject matter. Terms are constructed into propositions. In order to rightly understand a philosopher and evaluate and appreciate his position, it is necessary to determine the meaning of these terms. In this article, the author has examined propositions expressing Iqbal's view of Omniscience and has analyzed the basic terms and concepts he used. We have come to the conclusion that Iqbal finds foreknowledge of God to be incompatible with freedom of God as well as freedom of man and, therefore, does not attribute Omniscience in the traditional absolutist sense to God. However, we have found that Iqbal does not succeed in proving freedom for God because of his panentheistic concept of God. Allah is *Al-Aḥad* (Supremely Singular, Unique, and Alone). *Aḥdiyāt* transcends all determinations. The spatio-temporal, numerical and logical concepts of infinity are but originated by Him, they do not apply to Him. Nothing could ever encompass His Being. He is *Al-Ṣamad*; He transcends need, want, compulsion or imperfection. He created the universe absolutely out of His free will without any longing, yearning or aspiration in the sense of inner compulsion.<sup>82</sup> He is the Absolute Originator (*Al-Badi'*) of everything. Allah is the Beginner of His creation (*Al-Mubdi'*). He is prior to any origination and beginning, He is *Al-Awwal* (the First). Every beginning has with it its termination. Allah is there after the termination of anything, He is *Al-Ākhir* (the Last). Allah is the Restorer of His creation (*Al-Mu'id*) after its termination. He is the External; the Manifest (*Al-Zahir*), none is more manifest than Allah is by his portents. He is the Internal, the Hidden (*Al-Bātin*); none is more hidden than Allah is as the Determiner of the purpose of created beings.<sup>83</sup> Allah is *Al-Wāhid*, i.e., the Alone, the Unique. No one is to be worshiped except He alone. Any concept of Absolute Ego or the

philosophical concept of Omniscience must reconcile with the above teachings in order to be a genuine Islamic concept.

Proponents of Iqbal's thought, in order to save him from criticism, try to show that Iqbal's *Reconstruction* does not have any permanent value, universal appeal or central place in Iqbal's thought as compared to his poetry. They assert that in these lectures Iqbal addresses a specific audience. The addressees of these lectures were those Muslims of India who, being highly impressed by contemporary Western philosophical and scientific thought, became skeptical about the truth of religion. These scholars assert that the purpose of these lectures was to bring out reconciliation between Islamic religious thought and modern knowledge (science and philosophy) by reinterpreting dogmas of the Islamic faith using contemporary philosophical terminology and critically reinterpreting the discoveries of modern philosophy and science to prove that they do not contradict with each other. In order to bring these Indian Muslims out of their skepticism, Iqbal prefers to accept the basic postulates of contemporary philosophical thought (*i.e.*, the British Empiricism and Utilitarianism that were taught in India those days) to reinterpret them to ultimately show that the findings of these disciplines were not contrary to the doctrines of religious thought, but they rather supported them. So if one finds Iqbal's reconstruction of religious dogmas inconsistent with Qur'anic teachings, he should be considered helpless because of the above limitations. Such scholars also say that in order to rightly appreciate the worth of Iqbal's thought as expressed in *Reconstruction* and to reach and understand its real meaning, it is necessary to study the whole corpus of Iqbal's writings in Urdu, Persian and English, *i.e.*, poetry, articles, letters and whatever, many of which were written before as well as after the writing of these lectures.<sup>84</sup> But this is not the end of it. These scholars also suggest that one should try to determine the time of writing of a poetic verse or piece, and then try to read it from the perspective of the international as well as contemporary political situation in India. Only then will one be able to rightly appreciate Iqbal's thought and succeed in resolving its contradictions — an unending and fruitless task. The readers can best appreciate the value of such a lame defense. To the author, it is a straightforward admission of the failure of Iqbal's alleged attempt at the reconstruction of Islamic religious thought.



# **FREEWILL AND PREDESTINATION**





## ALLAH'S OMNIPOTENCE AND FREEDOM OF WILL FOR MAN\*

*Abstract: Divine Power encompasses all things is a principle taught in the Qur'an. In the presence of such a principle a school of Muslim theologians with predestinarian bent of mind—the Ash'arites, found it impossible to believe human free will without certain preconditions. Whereas the Mu'tazilites—a school of Muslim theologians with libertarian bent of mind—stressed human free will in an unconditional sense. This disagreement involved these groups in polemics. They not only formulated arguments to justify their point of view, but also devised arguments to falsify their opponents. Antinomy is a form of argument which is presented as a challenge to show that whatever approach the opponent adopts, he is bound to meet such results as are equally unacceptable to him. Abu al-Hasan Al-Ash'ari, the founder of Ash'arite school, formulated antinomies on different aspects of the problem of human free will, 'antinomy of Divine Power and human free will' being one among them.<sup>1</sup> The study examines the views of the Ash'arites and the Mut'atazilites with reference to this antinomy.*

Al-Ash'ari says:

- a) "Given Divine Power, it must mean infinite power; and so everything must be within the Power of Allah."
- b) "But given man's free will, it means that man's power to choose between two kinds of action is not within the Power of Allah."<sup>2</sup>

As for the antinomy on the score of Allah's Power, three solutions were presented by the Muslim theologians of the early and medieval ages, of which the second solution consisted of two versions. This second solution in its two versions, and the third solution are referred to as 'theories of acquisition'. This study examines these theories in the context of Qur'anic teachings. We shall make a comparative study of the meanings of the term *KASABA* (to acquire)—the key term of these theories, and the terms *KHALQ* and *'AML*—as used by theologians in their 'theories of acquisition' with the meanings of these terms as these are used in the Qur'an. The author has especially examined the translation of the Qur'anic word *'ta'malûn'* by Al-Ash'ari in his *Kitâb Al-Luma'* where he presents verse 37:96 as defense to his theory of acquisition. His theory of acquisition is actually based on this verse. With these preliminary remarks let us examine these solutions.<sup>3</sup>

### **1. View of the Most of the M'utazilites**

One of the above mentioned three solutions is attributed to most of the M'utazilites. They believed that Allah is not to be ascribed Power over a thing over which He has endowed man with power. For Allah to exercise His Power in cases involving man's free will is one of the impossibilities which Allah, in His absolute Wisdom, has established in the world.

As is apparent, these Mu'tazilites try to secure human freedom at the cost of Allah's Power in their first proposition, which is not correct. According to the Qur'anic teachings Allah's Power encompasses everything except what is a logical impossibility. Their thesis stated in the first proposition that Allah has Power over all things, does not reconcile with the Qur'anic teachings. However, in their second premise they seem to be right. Had they expounded their views only in the form of the second premise, it should have been sufficient.

### **2. Theories of Acquisition:**

#### ***Dirâr and Najjâr's View***

Dirâr and Najjâr, both M'utazilites, presented a solution of the antinomy which draws upon a distinction commonly made in ordinary speech between the artisan who makes a thing and the purchaser who acquires the thing and thus becomes its owner. They applied that distinction to human actions: "Every human action is created by Allah but is acquired by man, and it is in the sense of man's being acquirer of the act that he may be called its agent. Accordingly every human act comes from two agents, namely Allah the creator and man the acquirer".<sup>4</sup>

While Dirâr and Najjâr are in agreement as to the description of the human act as an acquisition in this new sense of the term, they differ as to the origin and meaning of this acquisition. According to Dirâr, Allah endows man from birth with the power to acquire the act which is to be created for him by Allah, so that the power to acquire and the act of acquiring are to be ascribed to man's own free will. "Man, therefore, is to be called simply 'an agent in reality'; the term 'acquirer' is to apply to man also in the case of 'generated effects'."<sup>5</sup> Whereas according to Najjâr's view, "the power to acquire as well as act of acquiring is created in man by Allah simultaneously with His

creation of the act for man, so that both man's power to acquire and his act of acquiring are created for him by Allah; man, therefore, is to be called simply 'an agent' but not 'an agent in reality', and the term 'acquirer' is not to be applied to man in the case of 'generated effects'."<sup>6</sup>

### **3. Use of the Term 'Creation' for 'Acquisition' in M'utazilite's and Use of the Term 'Power' for 'Acquisition' in Ash'arites.**

Differing with most of the M'utazilite's, Shahhâm believed that i) Allah may deprive man of the free will with which He has gifted them, and, ii) unlike Ḍirâr and Najjâr, he retained the original libertarian use of the term 'acquisition' as meaning 'the act of man's free will with which he has been gifted by Allah.' Thus in contradistinction to the view common to both Ḍirâr and Najjâr, Shahham believed "that every act of man may come from either one of two agents, namely, Allah, in case He has deprived man of his freedom, in which case man's act is 'by necessity', or man, in case Allah has not deprived man of his freedom, in which case man's act is 'by acquisition', that is to say, it is a free act of man's will."<sup>7</sup> Their fellow M'utazilites rejected the Ḍirâr-Najjâr solution, but Shahham's pupil al-Jubbai and a group of M'utazilite's followed Shahham's solution. However, al-Jubbai and probably also his followers, rejected the term "acquisition" as a description of man's free action, substituting for it the term "creation". Thus they said that man was the creator of his actions.<sup>8</sup>

The Ḍirâr-Najjâr solution, if not accepted by the libertarians, was accepted by the predestinarians. It seems as if they saw in it an explanation of the libertarian verses of the Qur'an. Al-Ash'ari, quite clearly states that he followed the Najjârite version of 'acquisition'. However, in his attempt to show that 'acquisitionism' is against both compulsionism and libertarianism, al-Ash'ari emphasized on the one hand that acquisition is a 'power' and on the other hand that it is 'created' in man by Allah and that Allah has power to force man to it.<sup>9</sup>

As could be expected, the question arose how acquisition could be called a 'power' when it has no influence upon the object of the power. Attempts to answer this question were made by Baqilani, Juwayni, and Ghazali.

- i. Bakillani's answer is a revision of al-Ash'ari's version of the theory of acquisition. Admitting with the acquisitionists that man's actions

are created by God, Bakillani tries to show how acquisition is a power in man and is not without influence upon the actions of man. He distinguishes in every human action between 'the act itself' and 'its mode of operation'. Allah creates the former whereas the latter is within the power of man, and it is the latter to which the term 'acquisition' is to be applied. Bakillani's version of Acquisition is based on the affirmation of an unintelligible influence upon 'the mode of operation of an action'. He denies Allah's direct creativity of human action at 'the mode of operation of that action'. Bakillani thus introduced into human action an element of freedom. Juwaini's criticism on this view is that it amounts to the denial of Allah's influence on the mode in a special sense inasmuch as mode is defined as that which is neither existent nor non-existent. He also says that the acceptance of this conception is a turning away from the path of truth and salvation as it is against fundamental religious beliefs.<sup>10</sup>

- ii. Juwaini criticizes Ash'ari's concept of acquisition by saying that the affirmation of a power which has no influence whatsoever is like the denial of power altogether. Criticizing Bakillani's version of acquisition he says that 'the affirmation of an unintelligible influence upon a mode' is like the denial of an influence in a 'special sense'. Criticizing compulsionism—the view of the denial of power and capacity on the part of man—he says that it is contrary to both reason and sense-perception. Hence he rejects all. Juwayni himself, tries to solve this problem by using the term 'power' in the sense of 'will'. He tries to show that power in the sense of will does not have to influence its object. He shows this by comparing 'will' to 'knowledge'. He argues that, "just as one may be said to be knowing something without his influencing the existence of that something, so one may also be said to be willing something without influencing the existence of that something."<sup>11</sup> "Now when God creates in man a knowledge of some existent thing, it means that the very creation of the knowledge implies its having that existent thing as its object, so that the knowledge itself has no influence either on the existence of the thing or on its having it as its object. So also, when God creates in man a power to will, to acquire implies its having that created something as its object, so that the power to will itself has no influence, though it is called power."<sup>12</sup> Thus Juwayni endorses and justifies Ash'ari's use of acquisition by construing it into a moderate kind of interpretation of the traditional belief in predestination.

iii. Ghazali does not discuss this question directly, but his answer for it is contained in two, out of his three discourses in which he deals with 'acquisition'.<sup>13</sup> In the first of his three discourses on acquisition he, like Juwayni, tries to show how 'power' need not have an influence upon its object. "But whereas Juwayni tries to show it by the analogy of 'man's power' (in the sense of man's will to acquire) to 'man's knowledge' of something, Ghazali tries to show it by the analogy of 'man's power to acquire', to 'Allah's power to create'; for prior to the creation of the world Allah's eternal power to create was a power without an object influenced by it."<sup>14</sup> Ghazali's answer to this question is also contained in the third of his three discourses on acquisition where he explains of how what 'the People of Truth' call acquisition is a combination of 'compulsion' and 'choice'. Explanation brought forth by Ghazali is that acquisition is a 'choice' despite its being also a 'compulsion', because man is abode of 'compulsion' as he is of the 'choice' because the compulsion in the case of acquisition comes from within man himself and not from something external to man.<sup>15</sup>

As we see, the discussion of almost all the theologians belonging to both schools *i.e.*, the libertarians as well as the predestinarians and the compulsionists revolves around the controversy in the use of the term *KASB* (acquisition). We have also seen that the latter M'utazilites of the group of al-Jubbai substituted this term with the term *KHALQ* (creation). In order to make a criticism of the dilemma under discussion it is necessary to make an appreciation of the theories of acquisition; and in order to make an appreciation of these theories it is necessary to examine the concepts of *KASB* and *KHALQ* so as to find Qur'anic view in this regard.

1. Some uses of the derivatives of the root *KĀF SĪN BĀ* in the *Qur'an*.

i) *KASABA*

Nay, whosoever earns (*kasaba*) evil (*sayyiatohu*) and is surrounded by his wrong-doings (*khatiatuhu*).....(02:81)

,.... Each man shall be pledged for what he earns (*kasaba*).....(52:21)

ii) *KASABĀ*

And as to the thieving man or thieving woman, cut off their hands, as a reward for what they have earned (*kasabā*)...(05:38)

iii) *KASABAT*

These were a people, they have passed away, for them what they earned (*kasabat*), and for you what you earn (*kasabat*); and you shall not be questioned as to what they did (*yamaloon*). (02:134) (02:141)

In order that Allah may reward every soul as it has earned (*kasabat*); surely Allah is quick to take account. (14:51)

iv) *KASABTUM*

These were a people, they have passed away, for them what they earned ( *kasabtum*), and for you what you earn (*kasabtum*); and you shall not be questioned as what they did (*yamaloon*). (02:134) (02:141)

,...nothing which they earned (*kasabtum*) is of any avail, for Allah guides not the disbelieving people. (02:64)

v) *KASABU*

And those who earn (*kasabu*) evil (*sayyiate*) their reward is an equivalent evil...(10:27)

And the evil (*sayyiat*) which they earned (*kasabu*) will become apparent to them, and that which they laughed at would recoil on them. (39:48)

vi) *TAKSIBO*

,...And no soul earns (*taksibo*) anything except for itself, and no bearer shall bear the burden of another... (06:164)

vii) *TAKSIBOONA*

,...,then taste the agony for what you earned (*taksiboona*) (07:39)

viii) *YAKSIB*

And he who commits (*i.e.*, earns) a sin (*ithmann*), commits (*i.e.*, earns) it then against himself alone;...(04:111)

And he who earns (*yaksib*) a sin (*ithmann*), then falsely accuses an innocent person therewith, he then surely is the bearer of a slander and a clear sin (*ithmam mobina*). (04:112)

ix) *YAKSIBOHU*

And he who commits (*i.e.*, earns) a sin (*isman*), commits (*i.e.*, earns) it then against himself alone;.....(04:111)

x) *YAKSIBŪN*

,...So woe be to them for what their hands have written, and woe be to them for what they earn (*yaksibŭn*). (02:79)

xi) *AKTASABA* ,... Each man of them has his share of what he has earned (*aktasaba*) of the sin (*ithm*),... (24:11)

## Analysis

### 1. The Derivatives of the root KÂF SÎN BA

- (i) The verb *kasb* meaning “to earn, to commit, or to do” has been used in the Qur’an specifically with reference to ‘what man does’ and nowhere has it been used with reference to ‘any of Allah’s act or activity’. The verb *kasb* has never been used in the Qur’an as a human opposite of the Divine act of *khalq* (creation), nor as a human complimentary to it. The proof for drawing this conclusion is that nowhere in the Qur’an the term *kasb* has been used for Allah; and wherever it has been used in the Qur’an, is used in the sense of ‘an accomplished human moral act (*‘amal*)’ in its noun form or, ‘accomplishing’ of a moral act (in verbal form) on the part of human agent.
- ii) Nowhere in the Qur’an the verb *kasba* or the verb *iktasaba* or any other derivative of the root *kâf-sîn-ba* has been used as an equivalent to any form of the verb ‘to acquire’ in the sense of ‘to own something already created by Allah’ or ‘to own something created by Allah simultaneously with man’s doing of a moral act’.
- iii) That wherever in the Qur’an the verb ‘*kasb*’ or some other derivative of the same root has been used in its verbal form or as a ‘noun’ in connection with human moral act, it is used in the sense of ‘to earn the blessing’ or ‘to earn the wrath’ of Allah as a consequence of a moral act (a righteous act or an evil-doing); or it has been used to refer to ‘the righteousness or the evil’ which man earns as a moral agent, which ultimately refers to the reward or punishment to be met with in the Hereafter.
- iv) That the difference in taking the verb *kasb* or some other derivative of the same root to mean (a) ‘to earn’ with conscious effort and with free choice (in which sense it has been used in the *Qur’an*), and in taking it to mean (b) ‘to acquire’ as distinguished from ‘to create’ (in which sense it has been used in the analogy of an artisan who makes a thing, owns it, and a purchaser who acquires the thing and becomes owner) lies in the fact that taking it in the latter un-Qur’anic sense renders the moral responsibility of man unreal and questionable. It also gives rise to a kind of fatalism. This analogy was an outcome, as we shall see, of a confusion concerning the Will of Allah and the Pleasure of Allah.

## 2. Derivatives of the root 'KHA LÂM QÂF'

That the verb *khalq* as a description of the Divine act of "creation" has been used in the Qur'an:

- i) Mostly with reference to concrete things (*ashyâ*) e.g., the creation of the earth, or the creation of the heavens, or to both the earth and heavens, or to the creation of both the earth and the heavens and whatever therein is; ( 16:20, 25:03, 52:35)
- ii) It is also used in the Qur'an with reference to the biological phenomena of 'death' and 'life'. Hence it is used in connection with the creation of all the living beings including human beings and animal beings.
- iii) The verb *khalq* has been used in the Qur'an both for (a) creation 'not out of something' (*min ghayri shayin*); 52:35 and (b) creation out of something (already created by Allah). 15:26, 23:14, 17:61. (It is in this second sense that the use of the word 'creator' (*khaliq*) for a human being can be deduced from the Qur'an. But no moral significance is construed here for even a disbeliever can be a creator in this sense.)

## 3. 'Amal and Khalq

- i)(a) Nowhere, the word *khalq* (to create) in any of its verbal forms, or in any of its noun and other nonverbal forms e.g., *khaliq* (creator) has been used in the Qur'an for Allah in the sense of doing, accomplishing, or bringing about a human act of moral responsibility ('*amal*) nor participating in it in any sense, nor as the Doer or Accomplisher of such act ('*amal*); (b) nor the word *khalq* (to create) in any of its verbal or nonverbal forms has been used for a human agent with reference to bringing about, or accomplishing, or doing a moral act (i.e., '*amal*), nor as doer and accomplisher of such act.
- ii) The word '*amal* (to do or to accomplish a moral act, or an accomplished moral deed) in any of its verbal forms has never been used as synonymous to the word *khalq* (to create) nor in the sense of *takhlîq* (something created). It has never been used in any of its verbal or nonverbal form for Almighty Allah. Throughout in the Qur'an the word '*amal* in its different derivatives has specifically been used to denote man's act of moral responsibility.
- iv) Nowhere in the Qur'an any derivative of the verb *khalq* (to create) attributes creation of any manmade thing or any human



moral act to Allah. The verse 37:96 is the only verse of the Qur'an in which the terms *khalaqakum* (creation) and *ta'malûn* (which you utilize) occur together in one verse. Al-Ash'ari, interprets it to mean the manmade things to secure support for his thesis which interpretation is not supported anywhere from the Qur'an.<sup>16</sup> Al-Taftâzânî also quotes verse 37:96 but also refers to verse 5:110 which he thinks the Mu'tazilites can use in their support. Al-Taftâzânî interprets it to support Ash'arite stand.<sup>17</sup>

#### **4. 'Amal and Other Synonymous Words**

Three other words used in the Qur'an, in different forms, for doing or bringing about something are *ja'ala* and *fa'ila* and *şana'*. All of these words have been used for describing the activity of both man and Allah. However whenever these words have been used for man, they are used almost synonymous to the word '*amal* (*i.e.*, human act of moral responsibility) 28:4; 16:112; 24:30 and whenever they are used to describe some Divine activity, they are used absolutely devoid of the above sense. 20:39; 20:41; 39:6; 40:64.

#### **5. Examination of the Mu'tazilite Theories of Acquisition and Creation**

The above theories, whether Mu'tazilite or Ash'arite, consist of the following thesis:

(i) Human actions are 'acquisition' (*aksab*).

Mu'tazilites develop this thesis to further include the proposition 'Man is creator of his actions.' construing the term 'acquisition' by the term 'creation' to secure complete moral liberty for man.

The above thesis contains two terms 'acquisition', and 'creation' used synonymous to each other with reference to man. In order to examine the above theses, we must examine the use of these terms in the Qur'an from the point of view of how far is it correct and proper. Nowhere in the Qur'an have these terms been used as synonymous with reference to man, not only in the context of moral action but also in any context whatsoever. So the Mu'tazilites' construal of the term 'acquisition' by the term 'creation' to secure complete moral liberty for man was un-Qur'anic. But the original thesis common both to Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite (*i.e.*, human moral actions are 'acquisition' (*aksab*)) was right.

## **6. Examination of Ash'arite Theories of Acquisition and Creation**

The Ash'arites construe the term 'acquisition' into the term 'power' or 'capacity' to develop the above thesis to include 'Acquisition is a power and that it is created in man by Allah and that Allah has Power to force man to it' ultimately to say that Allah is the creator of actions and man is the acquirer.

The above theses contain three terms 'acquisition', 'creation', and 'power'. In order to examine the above theses, we must examine the use of these terms in the Qur'an from the point of view of how far are these correct and proper.

We have seen that the term *kasaba* (to acquire) has been used in the Qur'an in the sense of 'to earn the moral responsibility of the accomplishment of an action as a consequence of one's own effort'. Nowhere in the Qur'an it has been used in the sense 'to get something without one's effort at earning it either (a) as a gift; or (b) as a trust; or (c) as oversight'.

Allah is the Creator of the earth, the heavens, and whatever is between them. He gives man life, capabilities needed, and everything at man's disposal. Allah also gives him 'freedom of will' but as 'trust' conditional to maturity of intellect and moral consciousness.<sup>18</sup> Man neither 'acquires' (*kasb*) any of these things nor 'creates' them; he just receives them as Bounty. Allah creates man and only He bestows these capabilities to man.

### ***Raḍa and Mashiyat (Divine Pleasure and Divine Will)***

At the maturity of moral consciousness, man, by exercising the trust of 'freedom of will' in the utilization of Divine bestowment acquires the responsibility of exercising the trust and of the utilization of capabilities accordingly. But man has no control over the consequences. Allah is Omnipotent; He has absolute control over the consequences. Consequences flow only from the Will of the Lord. It is only in this sense that good or evil happens only if willed by Allah. This is known as *mashiyat*. Allah's willing certain consequences is based on His Knowledge but it is not the same as His decreeing. Allah does not decree evil. Allah decrees only to exercise one's free choice in the utilization of Divine bestowment in accordance with His Pleasure (*raḍa*).

### **Critical examination of Al-Ash'ari's interpretation of Verse 37:96**

Thus using the term '*kasab*' (to acquire) for man and the term '*Khalq*' (to create) for God to describe the nature of man-God relationship in the accomplishment of moral action is un-Qur'anic. Qur'an never uses these terms in this sense. Use of the term *KASAB* or any of its derivative in this sense is un-Qur'anic and absolutely improper, incorrect and illegitimate. The Qur'anic terminology relevant in this perspective is *kasab* (acquisition) and *Qudrah* (Omnipotence). Al-Ash'ari in the fifth chapter of his *Kitab Al-Luma'* in an answer to the question: 'Why do you claim that acquisition (*aksab*) of creatures are created by God?' presents verse no. 37:96 which says that "God has created you (*khalaqakum*) and what you make/do (*ta'malûn*) [?]" and verse no. 46:14 which says: "Such are the rightful owners of the Garden, immortal therein, as reward for what they used to do (*ya'malûn*)."<sup>19</sup>

Ash'ari argues that as in verse 46:14 the word *ya'malûn* refers to human beings' acts of moral responsibility (*'amalohum*) and the reward attached to their such works, similarly in verse 37:96 the meaning of the word *ta'malûn* should also be taken in line with the above as acts of moral responsibility (*'amalohum*). Thus God is the Creator of human beings as well as their acts of moral responsibility. Hence God creates moral acts, the human being only acquire these acts. The acquisitions of creatures are created by God.<sup>20</sup>

Verse 37:96 is the only verse of the Qur'an in which the terms *khalaqakum* and *ta'malûn* occur together in one verse. The term "*khalaqakum*" (created you) has only one meaning and there is no disagreement about it. The disagreement is on the meaning of the term *ta'malûn* which can have the following meaning: i. you utilize; ii. you make; iii. you do; iv. you work. The meaning at ii, iii, and iv above are synonym to moral act, and making an examination of the different derivatives of the root *kâf sîn bâ*, *kha lâm qâf*, and '*amal*, *ja'ala*, *fa'ila* and *şana'a* we have seen that nowhere in the Qur'an, any derivative of the verb *khalq* (to create) ascribe creation of anything manmade to Allah nor it attribute any human moral act (*'aml*) to Allah. Al-Ash'ari, takes *ta'malûn* in verse 37:96 equivalent in meaning to *'amalohum* to attribute the creation of moral act to Allah to secure support for his thesis.<sup>21</sup> Most of the exegesis of the Qur'an including Marmaduke Pickthall has translated the word

*ta'malûn* in this verse as 'you make'. Richard J. McCarthy, in the translation of Al-Ash'ari's *Kitab Al-Luma'*, on the authority of Bell<sup>22</sup>, translates it as 'you make'. But McCarthy admits at footnote 3<sup>23</sup> that the Arabic word "*ta'malûn*" contains the idea of "make" and "do". But our point is that here in this verse it makes no difference whether you translate "*Wallaho khalaqakum wa ma ta'malûn*"(37:96) as "and Allah has created you and what you make" or as "and Allah has created you and what you do". This verse occurs in the context of carving certain materials into idols by the idolaters for worshipping. (Thus in the verse just before *i.e.*, in 37:95 Hazrat Ibrahim (pbuh) draws attention of the idolaters: Do you worship those that you yourselves carve!) Thus if you take the word "*ta'malûn*" to mean "you do" *i.e.*, act of worshipping idols, or you take it to mean "you make" *i.e.*, idols, it makes no difference. As have been said above, nowhere in the Qur'an the word "*khalq*" or any of its derivatives ascribes the creation either of a moral act or of any manmade object to God. Qur'an does not endorse any of these two meanings. In our opinion the word "*ta'malûn*" in this verse refers to the materials which the idolaters carve out for worshipping. Thus it renders verse 37:96 to mean "And Allah has created you and the materials you utilize (for carving into idols)".<sup>24</sup>

### Conclusion

1. To use the word *kasb* as opposite to *khalq* in a discourse concerning human acts of moral responsibility is to use it in an un-Qur'anic and wrong sense. Dirâr and Najjâr committed this fallacy.
2. To use the word *khalq* (to create), either for man or for Allah, in a discourse of bringing about or accomplishing or doing an act pertaining to moral responsibility (*i.e.*, 'amal), is also quite un-Qur'anic; hence illegitimate and out of place. Therefore, al-Jubbai's substitution of the term 'acquisition' by the term 'creation' was wrong. However, Shahham's distinction of man's act by necessity (in case Allah withdraws moral consciousness from man) and man's act by acquisition and his definition of the term "acquisition" is correct. Ash'ari's acceptance of Najjâr's version of 'acquisition' indulged Ash'ari, and for that matter Baqillani, and others in un-Qur'anic comparison of '*khalq*' and '*kasb*' in a discourse of moral act.
3. The Qur'anic terminology relevant in this perspective is *Kasab* (Acquisition) and *Qudrah* (Omnipotence). Man acquires the evil or

the righteousness of an act by exercising his freedom of choice in favour of any one of the two alternatives and then utilizing the divine bestowment at his disposal. What consequences to allow occurring, is Allah's prerogative as Omnipotent.

4. Since the antinomy is formulated on the concept of Divine Power and man's free will, in order to finally decide the antinomy we need to determine the concept of Allah's Power as taught in the Qur'an. But let us analyze the dilemma first. It says:

- a) Given Divine Power, it must mean infinite power; and so everything must be within the Power of Allah.
- b) But given man's free will, it means that man's power to choose between two kinds of action is not within the Power of Allah.

If Allah's infinite Power means that everything must be within the Power of Allah, it should be admitted that it must be within the Power of Allah that He might create such a creature whom He could give freedom of will for his limited span of life such that even Allah does not, at all times, pre-ordain which one of the two alternative kind of moral actions this creature will choose. Does it not accord with the concept of Allah's Power as defined in the first part of the dilemma? It certainly does. Let us now define the concept of 'freedom of will' to examine the second part of the dilemma. 'Freedom of Will' on the part of Allah means that He has Power to bring about what He in His Absolute Wisdom wills, including to create a creature whom He could give a real freedom of will in that creature's limited sphere. Does this concept of Freedom of Will contradict with the concept of Allah's Power as described in the Qur'an? Not at all!<sup>25</sup> If Allah's Freedom of Will does not contradict with the concept of Allah's Power then how can it contradict with man's such power if by exercising His Free Will Allah chose to create such a creature whom He granted freedom of will. The dilemma is based on a false concept of the relation of Allah's Power, Allah's Freedom of Will, and man's freedom of will as granted by Allah in His Absolute Wisdom.

5. Qur'anic concept of 'Allah's Power' ( Allah possesses Power over all things: 46:33; 85:40; 2:20; 2:106; 2:109; 2:148; 2:259; 3:26; 3:29) and Qur'anic concept of Allah's Will (*Mashiat*—All

consequences are in His control.) nowhere contradict human freedom, for Allah has so created man that the responsibility of a moral act (*'amal*) lies with man for it is man who by exercising his free will chooses between alternative kinds of moral actions and employs divine bestowment in its favour. Hence it is he who earns (*kasb*) the moral act (*'amal*). The part of the verse 46:33 that *'Allah possesses Power over all things'* and part of the verse 5:17 that *'Allah is the Sovereign of the heavens and the earth and all that is between them. He creates what He wills (Yashâ')*. And Allah is Able to do all things.' This in a moral discourse means that 'all the consequences flow from the Will of Allah', man does not possess power over consequences. Freedom of will and utilization of divine bestowment on the part of man is no guaranty that he will necessarily be able to bring about the desired consequences. (b) Since Allah is the Knower, the Seer, the Aware of everything and the Wise, which consequences are to be permitted depend upon His absolute Knowledge. Hence Allah's Will (*Mashiyat*) is based on His being Knower, Seer, Aware, and Wise.<sup>26</sup> This is why the attempt to perform an action on the part of man, is a "return of that affair to Allah":...*And to Allah are all affairs returned. 22:76.* (c) All human actions are related to a specific present. Allah's *'Mashiyat'* also relates to that present. 'Allah's *Mashiyat*' may not at all times pre-determined, it may not be pre-known, it is not pre-declared and pre-defined.

6. In order to clearly understand the concept of *'Mashiyat'* let us differentiate it from the concept of Allah's *Rada'* (Pleasure) as stated in the Qur'an: ,... *and I Am pleased to choose (radîto) for you al-Islam as Dîn...*(al-Qur'an, 5:3)

*...Indeed, there has come to you from Allah, a Light and a clear Book; Whereby Allah guides such as follow His pleasure (ridwanahû) into the ways of peace, and brings them out of darkness into light by His Will, and guides them to the right path. (Ibid., 5:15-16)*

"A Light and a Clear Book" *i.e.*, the Qur'an contains the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure (*Rada*). Hence Allah's Pleasure (*Rada*) is pre-known, it is pre-determined, pre-defined and well-defined whereas the *'Mashiyat'* (What will be the consequences!) is neither pre-known, nor pre-defined, nor necessarily pre-determined. One knows it when it occurs. One who performs an act either follows the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure (which he happens to possess at

that point of time) or follows his own likes and dislikes. This is why one is responsible for the exercise of his choice in favour of a specific act and for the utilization of Allah's bestowment in this respect. However, he does not possess power over the consequences. It is Allah who possesses Power over the consequences. Hence the consequences are always according to Allah's Will (*Mashiyat*). In order to avoid any confusion and for more clarity let us examine the concepts presented above in the form of propositions.

i. Allah has Power over all things.

All the consequences flow from the Will of the Lord.

Therefore, no consequences flow from the will of man.

ii. Allah has Power over all things.

Man has power over certain things.

Allah's power over all things is a power to create them, to determine their function, to modify their function, or to annihilate them.

Man's power over certain things is to utilize certain things.

Allah's Power over all things is absolute.

Man's power over certain things is a trust.

iii. Everything at man's disposal is a Divine Bestowment.

Allah has determined the right line of action in the utilization of Divine Bestowment.

Allah decrees man to choose the right course.

To choose the right line of action or to choose the opposite in the utilization of divine bestowment is to perform a moral action.

Man is responsible for the action man performs.

There is freedom. Man is not determined.





## FREE WILL AND PREDESTINARIAN VERSES IN THE QUR'AN \*

*Abstract:* According to the Qur'anic concept of human life, the creation of man was neither a privilege of man nor an obligation or compulsion on Almighty; nor has he been placed on earth as punishment. Life of man is nothing but Grace. The physical, psychological, spiritual and whatnot capabilities of life, and the earth, the heavens and whatever between them, are Divine bestowment to be utilised by man. Divine Guidance enlightens the right course in the utilisation of this bestowment. Man has been placed on earth to see whether he chooses to utilise Divine bestowment at his disposal in accordance with Divine guidance or he chooses to follow his desires. Faith is a declaration to acknowledge the Prophet (pbuh) as upholder of Divine Guidance and to acknowledge him as certified standard of excellence as human being to be followed in one's life. Mere claim of faith is not considered enough, Qur'an enjoins to join faith with righteous deed. Man is to be held accountable for what course he chooses at present in the utilisation of Divine bestowment, and this very present is going to change into Future (i.e., afterlife). Qur'an, thus, holds freedom of will as a trust. This is the gist of the teachings of Islamic faith as enunciated in the Qur'an. It leaves no scope for anything in the Qur'an (be it Divine Power or Divine Knowledge or anything else) to be contrary to the idea of freedom of will. But it is very strange that the Muslims, from the early centuries of Islam indulged into discussions concerning whether man was free or he was determined. Hence, there arose sects known as the predestinarians, and the libertarians. According to the former there is no distinction between the actions that occur in the world including the actions which occur to man, and the actions which are performed by man.<sup>1</sup> According to the later, there is a distinction between actions that occur in the world, including actions which occur to man — and actions performed by man. The former actions admitted by all (but two of the libertarians<sup>2</sup>) to be directly created by Allah; the later actions are taken by them to be performed by man's free will. Conflicting sects formulated arguments, mostly in the form of antinomies, to confront each other with difficulties. H. A. Wolfson, presents five of these antinomies in his *The Philosophy of the Kalam*<sup>3</sup> with reference to Ashari's *Ibana...*, and Makalat, Bagdadi's *Fark*, and Shahrastani's *Milal*, and other sources. This study examines only the first of these antinomies. Instead of highlighting

*the socio-political conditions instrumental to these theological conflicts, or tracing the external influence, if any, we have preferred to directly examine, in the vast perspective of Qur'anic teachings, the concepts on which the dilemma is based to show that among other things, it were the unwarranted formulations of certain key concepts which gave rise to these disagreements.*

The Qur'an contains condemnation of two sinners; one, Abu Lahb, whose name is explicitly mentioned at 111:1-5, and the other, Walid b. Mughira, who is only alluded to at 74:11-26. Moreover, at the conclusion of the predestined condemnation of Walid for his predestined sin, as Wolfson observes, there is the verse, ...*Thus Allah leads astray whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases*, which is a direct denial of man's freedom in both his doing of evil and doing of good. Now the antinomy involved in the statement of these events is that:

“With the belief in a pre-existent Qur'an, even in a pre-existent created Qur'an, it means that these sinners were condemned long before they were born, with the inevitable implication that they were predestined to be sinners. And if the libertarian refuses to believe the sin of these sinners and the condemnation in this regard, to be predestined, he is bound to abandon his belief in the pre-existent Qur'an and even pre-existent created Qur'an, and is obliged to believe that the Qur'an was created at the time of its descent. And this confronts the Libertarian to face the antinomy of considering the “Word of Allah” (*i.e.*, Qur'an) as created?”<sup>4</sup>

Let us examine this dilemma.

The verses referred to at 74:11-26 does not contain the name of any particular person towards whom the condemnation contained in these verses can be said to be definitely directed. It may be a general condemnation of a person, in whatever period, in whom the qualities stated in these verses are found to exist. The view that condemnation contained in these verses is only alluded to a particular person, named Walid bin Mughira, is without proof and may or may not be true. It is only a conjecture of some commentators of the Qur'an which cannot be substantiated from within the Qur'an itself, so it is not wise to make a hypothetical proposition the ground of such a serious discussion of utmost religious significance. However, it is true that the Qur'an contains the condemnation of a sinner, Abu Lahb,

explicitly mentioned by name at 111:1-5. (This chapter of the Qur'an consists of these 5 verses only.) It is certainly wise to focus our attention on these verses to see do they really present a case which can legitimately allow a predestinarian, or anyone on his behalf, to formulate an antinomy, like the one mentioned above.

Wolfson has also stated another part of a verse (*i.e.*, "...*Thus Allah leads astray whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases.*" 74:31)<sup>5</sup> which occurs, as Wolfson observes, as a conclusion at the end of the verses which contain the so-called predestined condemnation of Walid bin Mughira for his so-called predestined sin. Wolfson interprets it to mean the direct denial of man's freedom in both his doing of good and his doing of evil. Since we have shown that it is not wise to relate the condemnation contained in these verses to any particular person, so we don't think that the part of the verse, referred to above, can be taken as the conclusion of this so-called predestined condemnation of a particular person. This part of the verse does not merely occur at this one place in the Qur'an. It occurs at 14:04 in exactly similar words, and with a very slight variation in expression but almost same in meaning at 13:27, 16:93, 35:08, 6:39 and with some more variation in expression but with similar meaning at many other places. This fact further proves our point. This part of the verse and others with similar meanings, as we shall see later, state a Divine Law to let a person led astray or to be guided aright. With these clarifications, let us examine the dilemma:

Belief in the pre-existence/createdness of the Qur'an is among those highly debatable problems which gave rise to very heated discussions among the Muslim theologians in the early centuries of Islam. The Ash'arites believed that the Qur'an, prior to its being revealed, existed in a pre-existent form on the Preserved Tablet (*Lohim Mahfooz*). Some of them believed that this pre-existent Qur'an was created on the Preserved Tablet prior to the creation of the universe. The Mu'tazilites believed that the Qur'an was created at the time of its descent. Wolfson in his book *The Philosophy of Kalam* states that "in the Qur'an, the Qur'an presents itself as having existed prior to its revelation and even prior to the creation of the world. By this pre-existence of the Qur'an, it can be shown, was meant in the Qur'an itself and by the earliest followers of the Qur'an, a pre-existent created Qur'an."<sup>6</sup> However, in the later centuries the arising of the belief that the terms predicated of Allah were real eternal

attributes, gave rise to a belief that Qur'an existed in the Being of Allah as a real eternal Divine attribute of Speech (*Kalâm*) from all eternity; and on the creation of the universe it was created or placed on the Preserved Tablet whence it was revealed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) at the time of its descent.<sup>7</sup>

If one believed in the pre-existent Qur'an, even in the pre-existent created Qur'an, as a necessary implication, one had to believe that a sinner named Abu Lahb was predestined from all eternity, or at least from the creation of the universe to be a sinner. Now such a belief presented a moral fatalism which was quite contrary to the spirit of Islamic Faith. Belief in Resurrection and man's accountability for his deeds on the Day of Judgment is one of the basic components of Islamic Faith. But 'the predestined condemnation of Abu Lahb' was a necessary corollary of the belief about the pre-existent nature of the Qur'an. A libertarian among the Muslim theologians could not accept this view. So he could not accept a belief in the pre-existence of the Qur'an. Therefore the libertarians, *i.e.*, the Mu'tazilites refused to accept the pre-existence, in whatever sense, of the Qur'an. But with their belief that Qur'an was created at the time of its descent, they had to face the objection of declaring Word of Allah as created which was equally unacceptable.

As we see, the dilemma is based on the supposition that a) the Qur'an is either pre-existent; or b) it is created either at the beginning of the universe, or at the time of its descent. The dilemma presents that either of the beliefs makes its upholder to confront an implication which, in one way or the other, is equally unacceptable. It is a fact that the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites—the two major theological schools in the early centuries of Islam—held one or the other of the view regarding the nature of the Qur'an. So it seems necessary to examine this supposition first. Let us see this supposition in the light of the Qur'an.

i.) Allah is the originator of everything. Qur'an divides the whole originated order of being, in two categories: *Khalq* (Creation) and *Amr* (Command). It is Allah to Whom belongs the creation (*Khalq*) of every thing, and it is He, according to Whose Command (*Amr*) everything is active in its sphere. ....*Surely His is the Creation (Khalq) and the Command (Amr).... (07:54)*<sup>8</sup>

ii.) The heavens and the earth, and whatever therein is, belongs to the category of *Khalq* (Creation). Even the phenomenon of life

and the phenomenon of death fall in the same category. *Allah is He Who created the heavens and the earth and what is between them... (32:04)*<sup>9</sup> *He Who created death and life ... (67:2)*<sup>10</sup>

iii.) Allah has not created the heavens and the earth without a purpose. The purpose of what Allah creates, stands prior to its creation. *... Allah created not the heavens and the earth and that which is between them save with the truth,...* (30:08)<sup>11</sup>

iv.) It is Allah's *Amr* (Command) which makes *Khalq* (creation) active in a well-defined course of action and subservient in its area of operation. *Surely your Lord is Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and He established on the throne of Power. He makes the night cover the day, which it pursues incessantly. And the Sun and the Moon and the Stars are made subservient by His Command (Amr). Surely His is the Creation (Khalq) and the Command (Amr)... (7:54)*<sup>12</sup>

v.) Though *Amr* (Command) is determined or prescribed prior to anything's creation yet it is expressed or issued in the present; for *Amr* (Command) is issued when the thing or the person (to be created) is capable of receiving it. *He said: Our Lord is He Who gave to everything its nature, then guided it aright. (20:50)*<sup>13</sup>

vi.) (a) Qur'an belongs to the category of *Amr* (Command) and not to the category of *Khalq* (Creation). *That [Qur'an] is the Commandment [Amr] of Allah, which He revealeth unto you... (65:05)*<sup>14</sup> (b) It is the source of knowing *Shari'a* (Divine course); and *Shari'a* is Allah's *Amr* (Command) and not His creation. *And now We have set thee on a clear road [Shari'a] of (Our) Commandment [Amr], so follow it, and follow not the whims of those who know not. (45:18)*<sup>15</sup> (c) *Amr* (Command) is always descended, revealed or blown but not created. *Allah is He Who created seven heavens, and of the earth the like thereof. The Command (Amr) descends among them, that you may know that Allah is Possessor of Power over all things, and that Allah encompasses all things in (His) Knowledge. (65:12)*<sup>16</sup>

### **Conclusion:**

1. It was wrong on the part of the theologians to have talked of the Qur'an in terms of its createdness/uncreatedness. The principle that what does not come under the category of creation is uncreated, and what is uncreated must be eternal, is false. To describe Qur'an as 'pre-existent created Qur'an' is also false and unjustified. Qur'an is

neither created nor uncreated; it is neither 'pre-existent created Qur'an' nor 'pre-existent uncreated Qur'an'; it is Allah's *Amr* (Command) which He descended to His Prophet Mohammed (pbuh). The same is true regarding the Scriptures which had been descended before the Qur'an on other prophets.(4:46; 5:13)

2. To state Qur'an uncreated and pre-existent in the sense of real, incorporeal Divine Attribute of Speech (*Kalâm*) is more false and unjustified for it makes the Divine Attribute of Speech incarnated in the Qur'an. There is no concept of incarnation in Islam. Qur'an states such a thing as setting associates for Allah (*i.e., Shirk*) and calls the people who commit this sin as associators (*Mushrikûn*). To state Qur'an uncreated and pre-existent in the sense of real, incorporeal Divine Attribute of Speech (*Kalâm*) is to make Qur'an eternal or rather coeternal with God. The Ash'arite distinction of *Kalâm-i-nafsi* and of *Kalâm-i lafzi* meant the same thing.<sup>17</sup> By *Kalâm-i-nafsi* (Immanent Speech) Ash'ari meant the ideas in the mind of a person before he had expressed them. After being expressed in words it becomes *Kalâm-i lafzi* (Verbal Speech). This view is based on the view of Divine Attributes as real, incorporeal entities seated in the being of Allah. Such a view in the fold of Islam could not have arisen except under the influence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity which is ultimately traceable to Philo's rational reconstruction of Jewish theology on the basis of intradeical interpretation of Platonic Ideas.<sup>18</sup> What wrong actually the Muslims did under the above influence was that they adopted the un-Qur'anic concept of Divine Attributes instead of the Qur'anic concept of Divine Names in a religious discourse without attending to the fact that 'the logic of names' was utterly different from 'the logic of attributes',<sup>19</sup>.

3. That Allah is able to speak, if He please, or address His Word to any of His servants, in this world and in the Hereafter, is manifest from the following verses of the Qur'an: 2:174; 2:253; 3:77; 4:164; 7:143; 7:144; 42:51; 4:164. The Qur'an states itself, and the other sacred Books revealed before, as Allah's Speech (*Kalâm Allah*) at 2:75; 9:6; 48:15. Speech (*Kalâm*) is Allah's Attribute as to create is Allah's Attribute. The creation and origination of the heavens and the earth and of all things between them is the expression of the Being of Allah with reference to His Attributes to create (*Khalq*), to originate (*Ibda'*) and others. The Qur'an is the expression of the Being of Allah with reference to His Attribute of Speech (*Kalâm*) and to Ordain or to

Command (*Hukm* and *Amr*) and others. This is also true of other revealed Books and of the Speech which Allah made to any of His servants or creatures.<sup>20</sup>

4. It is not the case that Allah has created what He pleased, once for all. He creates in the present. (*...He multiplieth in creation what He will...35:01; If He will, He can be rid of you and bring (instead of you) a new creation. (35:16)*) Similarly it is not the case that Allah had made His Speech 'once for all times', which He placed on the Preserved Tablet, and He revealed it to any of His Prophets or creatures therefrom when needed. He is Able to Address His Word or to speak to any of His servants or creatures, if He please, at any present: *... And Allah spake directly to Hazrat Musâ. (04:164)*<sup>21</sup>

5. (a) As Word of Allah, Qur'an consists of two kinds of verses: the Imperative (*Muḥkamât*) and the Allegorical (*Mutashabihât*). The Imperative (*Muḥkamât*) are those verses which are directly in the form of Commandments. The Allegorical (*Mutashabihât*) are the verses which, on reading or listening, render an obligation on the reader or the listener in accordance with that statement.

It is not the whole of the Qur'an, but only the Imperitival verses (*Muḥkamât*) which are called the "Mother of the Book" (*Umm ul Kitab*). They are the standard in any decision. These are the foundation of the Book. Whatever is inferred from the Allegorical (*Mutashabihât*) verses by way of interpretation is necessarily to cohere with the Imperitival verses (*Muḥkamât*); if otherwise, the interpretation is false. It is also necessary to have faith that the whole of the Book is revealed by Allah. (03:07) *It is He, Who has sent down this Book on you. Some verses thereof are Imperative [Muḥkamât]. These be the Mother of the Book [Umm ul Kitab i.e., foundation of the Book]. And others are Allegorical [Mutashabihât]. Then, those in whose hearts is perversity, follow the part of it which is allegorical, seeking to mislead and seeking to give it interpretation. And none knows its interpretation save Allah. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say: We believe in it, it is all from our Lord... (03:07)*<sup>22</sup>

As Allah's Command (*Amr*) Qur'an entertains the status of Authority (*Hukm*) from Allah, and it is in Arabic. (13:37) Qur'an is (contained) in the *Umm ul Kitab* (Mother of the Book) (43:4); It is the Imperitival verses (*Muḥkamât*) that are the *Umm ul Kitab* (03:07); Thus the Qur'an is founded in the *Muḥkamât*. (43:4)<sup>23</sup>

(b) Qur'an also states *Umm-ul-Kitab* to be the standard or authority on the basis of which *Allah effaces and establishes what He please* (13:39); hence (*Umm-ul-Kitab*) refers to the Divine Laws which He in His Omniscience and Absolute Wisdom prescribed for man prior to the revelation of the Books from the time best known to Allah Almighty, and according to which He decides the destiny of a person or a people. The Qur'an also states *Umm-ul-Kitab* to be with Allah (13:39; 43:1-4). It means that the exact knowledge of these Divine Laws regulating human destiny is with Allah and it is with His authority that they are enforced.

(c) The identification between the Mother of the Book (*Umm ul Kitab*) and the Imperitival Verses (*Muhkmât*) implies that the Imperitival Verses of the Qur'an contain Divine Guidance in accordance with the Divine Laws which regulate the destiny of a person or a people. This identification further implies that the Imperitival Verses of the Qur'an, at least with reference to their essence, existed prior to the revelation of the Qur'an, from the time best known to Allah. But this is not true regarding the Allegorical Verses (*Mutashabihât*), for they are not the *Umm ul Kitab*. In the light of the discussion made above it can be argued that all those verses that are not Imperitival, whether they are concerned with the past, present or future events of human history or eschatological events (as descriptions, statements, judgments, predictions, allegories, analogies, glade-tidings, warnings, condemnation and the like) did not necessarily exist prior to the time of there being revealed.

6. The last of the following three verses (56:77-78-79) that: *Most certainly this is an honorable Qur'an ; In a book well protected [Kitab-im-Maknoom]. None touches it except the pure*, clearly shows that the second verse is about the revealed Arabic Qur'an, and Allah has taken upon Him to keep its text intact from all attempts at distortion and transposition. The same fact is further corroborated when Qur'an says: *Surely We have descended the Reminder, and surely We shall guard it.* (15:9)<sup>24</sup>

Ghulam Ahmed Pervez, a Muslim scholar, identifies *Loḥim Mahfooḏ* (Preserved Tablet) with the *Kitab im Maknoom* (Well-Protected Book) as one and the same entity and identifies both with the revealed Qur'an, we shall examine this view while discussing the concept of the Preserved Tablet below.<sup>25</sup>



7. The dilemma as presented and formulated by Wolfson is based, among other things, on a false concept of the Preserved Tablet (*Lohim Mahfooz*). This concept is false because it is contrary to the Qur'anic concept of such a Book, as well as it contradicts basic components of Islamic Faith.<sup>26</sup> Let us reconstruct the Qur'anic concept of the Preserved Tablet (*Lohim Mahfooz*).

(a) According to Qur'an, the concept of *Lohim Mahfooz* is distinct from the Revealed Books. The validity of such a concept of Preserved Tablet as distinct from Qur'an is proved when we read in the Qur'an: *He (Pharaoh) said: What then is the state of the former generations? He (Hazrat Musâ) said: The knowledge thereof is with my Lord in a Book; my Lord errs not, nor does He forget. (20:51-52)*<sup>27</sup> *Know you not that Allah knows what is in the heaven and the earth? Surely this is in Book. That is surely easy to Allah. (22:70)*<sup>28</sup>

(b) The concept of the Preserved Tablet (*Lohim Mahfooz*) as a Book with the Lord containing i) the knowledge of former generations with reference to their destiny, and ii) the knowledge of what is in the heaven and the earth, and iii) containing Mother of the Books (*Umm ul Kitab i.e., Divine Laws regulating human destiny*), is neither inconsistent with the view of the freedom of will for man nor with any other component of Islamic Faith.

The concept of a Book which contains the knowledge of former generations implies that it must contain the knowledge of all the former generations. The generations which are yet to come are not the former generations. Thus Qur'an does not certify that the Preserved Tablet contains the knowledge of the generations yet to come (not to talk of its containing knowledge of the generations yet to come with reference to which of them would be condemned or blessed),<sup>29</sup> and it is against the basic teachings of Islamic Faith that it should contain such knowledge. So this Book could never contain the condemnation of Abu Lahb or the knowledge of any sin on his part prior to Abu Lahb's being born and having committed it. From what is mentioned in the above paragraph it is inferred that this Book could not contain any of the above mentioned three kinds of knowledge from eternity. It must not contain this knowledge before the time of the creation of the heavens and the earth. There is no concept in the Qur'an of anything pre-existent and co-eternal with God may it be Preserved Tablet or anything else for that matter. It is to be admitted then that such a Book

was brought into being<sup>30</sup> simultaneously with the world. It itself must belong to the category of Creation or to the category of Command.

(c) Mother of the Book (*Umm-ul-Kitab*), which is the foundation of the Qur'an as we have shown, refers to the Divine Laws which He in His Omniscience and Absolute Wisdom prescribed for man prior to the revelation of the Books, from the time best known to Allah Almighty; and according to which He decides the destiny of a person or a people. Since the Preserved Tablet (*Loh im Mahfūz*) contains what is in the heavens and earth, it must contain *Umm ul Kitab* from the time when it was placed by Almighty on the Preserved Tablet. We have also shown that Preserved Tablet could never contain the condemnation of Abu Lahb nor the knowledge of any sin on his part prior to Abu Lahb's being born and having committed it. It means that *Lohim Mahfooz* could never contain the verses of the chapter 111 of the Qur'an. It is also true of other such verses which had reference to any act of moral significance of a particular person or a people in a particular spatio-temporal reference.

(d) But the Qur'an says: *Nay, it is a glorious Qur'an, in a Preserved Tablet (85:22);*<sup>31</sup> does it not contradict with our interpretation above? No, it does not. The Preserved Tablet contained Mother of the Book (Imperitival verses) prior to the revelation of the Qur'an from the time best known to Allah Almighty (but never from eternity), and it contained the Allegorical verses from the time of their descending on the Prophet (pbuh). It is in this sense that the Preserved Tablet contains the whole of the Qur'an.

8. The verses at 111:1-5 referred to above by Wolfson concerning Abu Lahb belong to the category of Allegorical Verses (*Mutashabihât*). These do not belong to the category of the verses which are said to be the *Umm ul Kitab*. The verses of the Chapter 111 simply state Abu Lahb's inability and disqualification regarding Divine Guidance. It is quite in accordance with the laws of Divine Guidance that when a person or a people pass a certain limit in the enmity of the prophet and in the disobedience of Allah's injunctions, they are declared to be transgressors (*fasiqoon*), who have closed the door of Guidance on them. Allah never Guides such a people. Allah leaves them to advance in their transgression because of their persistence in ungratefulness.<sup>32</sup> Abu Lahb preferred to be a staunch enemy of the Prophet, hence a transgressor by his own free choice. It is after Abu Lahb's being proved himself a transgressor (*fasiq*) that

the judgment contained in these verses was passed by Allah and the same were revealed to the Prophet (pbuh). These verses, containing Abu Lahb's condemnation, certified his being a transgressor. It is absolutely wrong to state these verses to contain pre-destined condemnation of Abu Lahb on his pre-destined sin. The dilemma does never present a case for incoherence of some verses of the Qur'an wrongly called the predestinarian verses, with certain other verses wrongly called libertarian verses. The dilemma also does not present a case of incoherence of Allah's Knowledge and Human Freedom, for none of the human beings Allah ever create is determined as sinner in His Knowledge from all eternity or prior to his birth. It is also un-Qurânic to categorize the verses into predestenarian and the libertarian. The Qurân categorises them as Imperitival and Allegorical.



## FREE WILL AND THE APPOINTED TERM (AJL-E MUSSAMMA)

*Abstract: There arose in the early centuries of Islam two theological sects on the problem of whether man was free or he was predetermined. In the history of Muslim theology these sects are known as the predestinarians and the libertarians. According to the former, there is no distinction between the actions that occur in the world including the actions which occur to man, and the actions which are performed by man.<sup>1</sup> According to the latter, there is a distinction between actions that occur in the world (including actions which occur to man) and actions performed by man. The former actions admitted by all but two of the libertarians<sup>2</sup> to be directly created by Allah; the latter actions are taken by them to be performed by man's free will. With regard to their common belief in free will, there were certain differences among the libertarians: i) Some of the them believed that man from birth was endowed by Allah with the gift of free will. ii) Others believed that before each act Allah endowed man with such a power.<sup>3</sup> However, their assertion of free will, as Wolfson states, confronted the libertarian with two difficulties: First, how would he explain those verses in the Qur'an which either directly or indirectly ascribe to Allah control over human action! Second, how would he reconcile the description of Allah in the Qur'an as All-Knowing and All-Powerful with his (i.e., libertarian) conception of man's free will!<sup>4</sup> There arose several antinomies from these difficulties. This study examines the antinomy arising for human freedom from the concept of the inexorability of the appointed term (ajal-e mussamma), reconstructs the concepts of 'the appointed term' and its 'inexorability' in the light of the Qur'anic teachings and argues that the original teachings of Islam had never been predestinarian.*

Wolfson states that the libertarians believed in the preordination of man's term of life as expressed in the Qur'anic teaching of 'an appointed term' of life (*ajal-e mussamma*). (06:02) Wolfson further states that al-Ash'ari taking it for granted supposes that they would also accept the Qur'anic teaching that the *ajal* is inexorable. (7:34; 63:11) "Then, having in mind the Mu'tazilite's (i.e., the libertarians) belief in the freedom of will which as Ash'ari thinks, includes the freedom of will to kill, says that the Mu'tazilites' may be asked: Tell us then about him whom someone kills violently—do you think that

he is killed in his appointed term, or rather at his appointed term?" He thus confronts the Mu'tazilite with a dilemma that:

"If one believes in an inexorable appointed term, then the act of killing had to take place at the appointed term, whence it is not a free act; and if one believes in free will, then the act of killing could take place at any time it pleased the killer, whence the appointed term is not inexorable."<sup>5</sup>

The Mu'tazilites being libertarians, could in no way accept the first part of the dilemma, so the only alternative for them would have been to meet the question of 'what would happen to the killed one, if the killer, by the exercise of his free will, does not kill him at what is supposed to be his appointed term *i.e.*, *ajal*? Ash'ari, in his *Maqalât* reports the following four solutions which had been offered by the different sects of the Mu'tazilites:<sup>6</sup> Before we examine the dilemma on our own, let us see how did the Mu'tazilites meet this problem.

I) That a man's *ajal* is the time until which God knows that he will last if he is not killed, and not the time at which he is killed. This view implies that there is an *ajal* as Qur'an teaches; but a killer can undo that divinely decreed *ajal* by using his free choice.

II) Ash'ari states another view on the name of Abu al Hudhayl: That the man would die at the time of *ajal* even if he were not killed. What would this view seem to mean is that (i) the *ajal* is inexorable; (ii) that God has a foreknowledge of the act as well as of the time of the killing, but that foreknowledge is not the cause of either the act or the time of killing, so that the killing at that particular time is the free choice of the killer; (iii) that God synchronizes the *ajal* with the freely chosen time of killing foreknown to him.<sup>7</sup>

III)(a) The third view as described by Ash'ari in the name of other Mutazilites is: that if the murderer did not kill him, he might either die or live. This view can be interpreted to imply either a denial of the *ajal* or a denial of God's foreknowledge of the murderer's free act of killing.

(b) Another view based on a tradition which mentions the fact that some acts of obedience prolong one's span of life is as follows: If the man before his being killed deserves a prolongation of his span of life by reason of 'some acts of obedience', he will live; if

not, he will die at the time at which he would have been killed which is also the time of his *ajal*.

IV) Some others, as stated by Ash'ari, consider the preceding III(a) view as impossible. Their objection to this view seems to be on the ground of its denial of God's foreknowledge of the time of the murderer's free act of killing.

In order to examine the dilemma as well as the proposed solutions, we need (1) to determine the Qur'anic concept of 'the appointed term' (*ajal/ajal-e mussamma*) and the Qur'anic concept of its 'inexorability' as referred to above in the dilemma; then (2) we are to examine the Qur'anic concept of 'the freedom of will' to see whether it includes "the freedom of will to kill". (3) At the end we are to differentiate "the attempt at killing" from the "act of killing" itself.

Let us now examine the premises of the dilemma:

That *Ajal* means term of life.

That *Ajal* is appointed.

That *Ajal* is inexorable.

i) Qur'an uses the term *Ajal* in the sense of 'term of life' appointed by Allah for each individual. It is decreed by Allah that the extent of life for an individual, whosoever he may be, will be up to a limited term. It is in this sense that the term of life for an individual is appointed. *He it is Who created you from dust, then from a small life germ, then from a clot, then He brings you forth as a child, then that you may attain maturity, then that you may be old; and of you are some who die before, and that you may reach an appointed term (Ajal Mussama), and that you may understand.(40:67)*

ii)(a) Man has not been sent to the earth as a punishment. The purpose for which Allah has decreed this "term of life" is to see whether he chooses "to be among the righteous" by freely using the capabilities and the provisions given to him by Allah, according to the *Guidance* sent by Allah through His messengers, or whether he chooses to spend it at what pleases him. Hence the appointment of 'the term of life' means an assignment for man with respect to the utilization of Divine bestowment. *'And spend of that wherewith We have provided you before death comes unto one of you and he says: My Lord! If only You would relieve me for a short term, then I would give alms and be among the righteous. al-Qur'an,(63:10)<sup>8</sup> Blessed is He in Whose hand is the*

*Kingdom, and He is the Possessor of Power over all things. Who created death and life that He might try you which of you is best in deeds. And He is the Mighty, the Forgiving.* (67:1-2) (b) Allah has placed one, wherever he is, with His Knowledge, and the divine bestowment to anyone varies from individual to individual. This is why, the extent of the appointed term (*Ajal*) is not same for everyone. It is determined by Allah according to His Absolute Knowledge..... *And We said: Descend you all; some of you are enemies to others, and there is for you in the earth a dwelling place and a provision for a time.* (02:36)<sup>9</sup>

iii) Prophet of Allah, is the absolute model to be followed if one is to fulfill this assignment. One who follows in the footsteps of the Prophet in using these capabilities and the provisions of life is a *righteous* person. One who follows him not is a disbeliever, hence: *Say: Obey Allah and the Messenger; but if they turn back, Allah surely loves not the disbelievers.* (03:31-32).<sup>10</sup> Similarly, one who follows in the footsteps of the *righteous* is *righteous*, and one who does not follow in the footsteps of the *righteous* is the one who follows his desires. (cf. 31:15) and also, *Show us the straight path: The path of those whom You has favoured..... (al-Fatiḥa :6-7)*<sup>11</sup>

iv) Allah can take one to task on one's being a wrongdoer. However, Allah does not make hurry in seizing the wrongdoers. He gives him/them respite. This respite is, but up to a limited term. Qur'an says: *And if Allah were to hasten for men the evil, as they would hasten on the good, their appointed term (Ajal) would certainly have been decreed for them... (10:11)...For each decree, there is an appointment (Ajal-in Kitablit. writing, or a prescribed Divine Law).* (13:38)<sup>12</sup>

v) (a) In order to take benefit from this respite, it is necessary to say "yes" to the Call of Allah to forgive one's sins, before the appointed term (*Ajal Mussamma*) comes: *And ask forgiveness of your Lord, then turn to Him. He will provide you with a goodly provision to an appointed term (Ajal Mussamma)...(11:3).*<sup>13</sup> (b) Allah does not accept saying "yes" by anyone to His Call of forgiveness, when the appointed term has reached; for the time to prove oneself true in deeds, has ended. *And if Allah were to take men to task on account of their wrongdoing, not a single creature (i.e., out of the wrongdoers) would he leave thereupon (i.e., on*



*the earth), but He respites them to a fixed term (Ajāl Mussamma). So when their appointed term comes they are not able to delay it an hour, nor can they advance it. (16:61); ..... For each decree, there is an appointment (Ajāl-in Kitāb lit. writing, or a prescribed Divine Law). (13:38)*

### **Conclusion:**

1. What becomes clear from this study of the Qur'anic concept of the 'Appointed Term' (*Ajāl or Ajāl Mussama*) and its so-called 'inexorability', is that the so-called 'inexorability' of the 'Appointed Term' only relates to the wrong-doers. It is the wrong-doers who, when they have wasted their life in not following the Guidance of Allah in using the capabilities and the provisions granted to them, and also did not say "yes" to Allah's Call of forgiveness before the appointed term comes, they wish for respite. But it is the Divine Law that Allah does not relieve such people at this juncture. The evil-doer, notwithstanding their wishing to do, are absolutely unable to prepone or postpone it for an hour. Thus the so-called 'inexorability' of *Ajāl Mussamma* (the appointed term) as misstated in the dilemma, only refers to the inability on the part of the wrong-doer to prepone or postpone the appointed term for an hour. It does not refer to any such inability on the part of God.
2. The concept of the so-called 'inexorability of the appointed term' as stated in the dilemma is contrary to the Qur'anic teachings: It contradicts with the Qur'anic concept of Allah's Power over all things as referred to in the verses 46:33, 67:01 below. It seems to be an alien concept mistakenly accepted by the Muslim theologians. The Qur'anic concept in this aspect, as stated in the verses no. 23:99-100, 35:45, 10:11, 71:1-4, is (i) the concept of a Divine Law for not allowing respite to the wrongdoer when the appointed term has reached; (ii) and inability of the wrong-doer at the preponement or postponement of the Appointed Term. In general terms it can be stated as the Divine Law of the Non-Postponement and Non-Preponement of the Appointed Term (*Ajāl Mussamma*) for the wrong-doer/s.<sup>14</sup>
3. Nowhere in the Qur'an it is stated that when the Appointed Term of life comes and the death approaches to the righteous, he asks Allah to postpone it for a further term. And nowhere in the Qur'an Allah says that he will never extend the life term even for the righteous. He, Who has created death possesses Power to postpone death; and He, Who

has created life possesses Power to extend the term of life, as many times as He please and up to any extent He please. *Blessed is He in Whose hand is the Kingdom; and He is the Possessor of Power over all things; Who created Death and Life that He might try you which of you is best in deeds. And He is the Mighty, the Forgiving.* (67:02) *See they not that Allah Who created the heavens and the earth and was not tired of their creation, is Able to give life to the dead. Aye, He is surely Possessor of Power over all things.* (46:33)

4. The attempt of the killer, as presumed on behalf of the Libertarian in the dilemma, was his free choice. The attempt resulted in killing. The killer could not have known what Allah's Will was, before it had occurred. How could the killer know whether the 'appointed term' of the 'to be killed' had come before the killing had taken place? It is Allah Who is the Possessor of Power over all things (46:33), so only He possesses Power over all consequences. Allah so synchronized that the killer could exercise his free choice in favour of his attempt at killing, just at the moment which Allah approved as end of the "appointed term" of the 'to be killed'.

5. Second part of the dilemma reads as follows:

"and if one believes in free will, then act of killing could take place at any time it pleased the killer, whence the appointed term is not inexorable *i.e.*, such that "it could not have been postponed or preponed".

The occurrence of the death of the person by his being killed was according to Allah's Will (*i.e.*, *mashiat*) and Allah's Permission. [*And no Self can die but with Allah's Permission (bi izn illah).* (03:145); *And He is the Supreme above His servants, and He sends keepers over you; until when death comes to one of you, Our messengers cause him to die, and they are not remiss.* (6:61)] If Allah did not will the death of the murdered, how could the killer, by exercising his free choice, kill him. Did the killer possess power over all things? It is in the orbit of his free choice that the intended killer can attempt at killing of a person if the situation so allows, but it is not in his power that he could kill that person at any time it pleased him if Allah does not so will. Qur'an says: *.....And no one living long is granted a long life, nor is aught diminished of one's life, but it is all in a book.....* (22:11)

6. For further clarification of this point, let us examine the concepts of "Death" and of "Killing".

(i) Everyone is to die one day. This is Allah's Law. (3:185) He states the creation of *death* before He states the creation of *life*:

(ii) Death comes with Allah's permission: *And no Nafs (self) can die but with Allah's permission — it is prescribed that the term (Ajāl) is to come .....* (3:145)

(iii) One cannot be caused to die mistakenly by the angles sent by Allah. Death comes only to that person whom Allah decrees: *And He is the Supreme above His servants, and He sends keepers over you; until when death comes to one of you, Our messengers cause him to die, and they are not remiss. (6:61) Say: the angel of death, who is given charge of you, will cause you to die, then to your Lord you will be returned. (32:11)*

Thus we see that the antinomy as well as its proposed solutions, both suffer from the distortion of the concepts of the 'appointed term' and its 'inexorability'.

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## **KNOWLEDGE OF ALLAH'S PLEASURE (RAḌA) AND KNOWLEDGE OF ALLAH'S WILL (MASHIYAT)\***

*Abstract: There is essential difference between 'Allah's Pleasure' (Raḍa) and 'Allah's Will' (mashiyat). Much confusion in Muslim thought in problems relating human freedom and predestination has arisen because of not understanding this difference. The narration of the event of killing of a boy by Hazrat Khidr in the Qur'an makes the difference between these two kinds of knowledge evident. Focusing on the above narrative the present study attempts to define the contours of these dimensions of God-given knowledge in Qur'anic perspective.*

Various antinomies which arise from the problem of free will and predestination have been identified by Muslims as well as orientalist. Some of which include: i) the antinomy of freewill and the predestinarian verses in the Qur'an; ii) the antinomy of free will and the appointed term (*Ajal Mussamma*); iii) the antinomy of free will and Allah's Fore-Knowledge; iv) the antinomy of free will and Allah's Power. v) the antinomy of free will and preordained sustenance.<sup>1</sup> Killing of a boy by a servant of Allah (commonly known as Hazrat Khidr) presents a typical instance in which if the difference between Knowledge of Allah's Pleasure and Knowledge of Allah's Will (*Mashiyat*) is not kept in view, it is impossible to reach a correct conclusion with respect to the problem under discussion.

In Surah al-Kahf of the Qur'an the event of the killing of a boy by a person, who is said to be a servant from among the servants of Allah whom He had bestowed a special knowledge, is narrated. The name of this servant of Allah is not mentioned in the Qur'an, however in Muslim tradition he is known as Hazrat Khidr (pbuh). In what follows we will call him Hazrat Khidr. It does not follow from the Qur'an that he was a prophet or a messenger. Hazrat Khidr, as the story goes, sees a boy. He kills him. Hazrat Musâ (pbuh), who was in his company, objects that he has taken a life without a just cause. (18:74) Hazrat Khidr replies:

1. *That the boy whom he murdered was the son of a faithful parents.*

2. *That he, on the basis of that special knowledge granted to him by Allah Almighty, feared lest the boy should trouble his parents by way of his rebellion and disbelief. (18:75)*

3. *Hazrat Khidr (a.s.) prayed to the Lord to give them in exchange a son better than he in innocence and nearer in mercy. (18:80-81)*

4. He also said: *'And I did not do anything on my own accord.'* (18:82)

Faithful parents always pray to the Lord for a goodly offspring.<sup>2</sup> A goodly offspring definitely is one that does not trouble his parents by way of rebellion and disbelief.

The activities of the boy and the line of action he used to take were before his parents. It seems that the parents of the boy also feared trouble and distress from him, as did Khidr (a.s.). The faithful people pray their Lord for the protection of their faith in trials and tribulations.<sup>3</sup> They also pray God to vouchsafe them comfort of their wives and offspring.<sup>4</sup> In fact progeny of faithful parents, if not following their parents, may become a most severe test to their faith.<sup>5</sup> Allah Almighty hears the prayers and saves his faithful servants from any harm to their faith. (2:286; 3:16) Allah accepts prayers from the faithful and the righteous. (42:25-26)

The antinomy identified in this case with respect to human freedom can be formulated in the following manner:

If Allah foreknows that someone will take a wrong line of action, and He causes him to die (through a person whom He has given a special knowledge or in whatever way He likes), then why He did not do this favour to other such persons!

As we have seen in a previous article that not a single soul comes in this world such that it is foreknown to Allah that he/she will leave the world as a sinner. Not even Abu Lahb, or Phiraun were born in such state. It is after being born that they consciously take a wrong line of action. So far the second part of the dilemma is concerned it is again based on a misconception about God's Knowledge. God's Knowledge encompasses everything. Whatever He does or whatever He does not do, is with His absolute Knowledge. While talking about God's Knowledge or Power or whatever it is utmost necessary that it is kept in mind that *Allah does not do injustice to anyone.* (3:182, 8:51, 22:10, also cf. 41:46, 50:29). Any view, argument or the

antinomy which does not observe this principle, is not worth entertaining. The second part of the dilemma violates this teaching.<sup>6</sup>

There is a difference between 'Allah's Pleasure' (*Raḍa*) and 'Allah's Will' (*mashiyat*). Much confusion in Muslim thought in problems relating human freedom and predestination has arisen because of not understanding this difference. The narration of the killing of a boy by Hazrat Khidr makes the difference between these two kinds of knowledge evident.

Divine revelation has always been the source of knowing Allah's Pleasure and the prophets, the messengers, have always been presenting the best model of acting upon this knowledge in their lives. So the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure is always clearly stated, declared, predetermined and foreknown. For the Muslims the Holy Qur'an is the source of knowing Allah's Pleasure as for the teaching, precept and the principles are concerned. The illustrious lives of the Prophet (pbuh) and the believers, whom he certified as his true followers, present authentic model of this knowledge. In contrast to this, Allah's Will relates to His Absolute Power over the consequences. Only that comes out which He approves. Allah's Absolute Power over the consequences is His Will (*mashiyat*). Allah's Will is not known, or foreknown (except to him whom He please), it is not declared. It may not be predetermined even in Allah's Knowledge as stated in verse 3:166-7: '*What befell you on the day the two armies met in battle, happened with God's permission, and in order for Him to see who were the true believers and who were the hypocrites.*' What Allah wills is always with His Absolute Knowledge. The believers are accountable for acting in accordance with the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure. To accept the consequences as Allah's Will is part of their faith too.

Hazrat Musâ (pbuh) was a prophet. The knowledge granted to him related to Allah's Pleasure. *Shariat* is embodiment of the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure. The Qur'an does not certify Hazrat Khidr to be a prophet. He was one of the righteous servants of Allah whom Allah had granted a special knowledge as stated in the following verse: "*and (Hazrat Musa) found one of Our servants— a man to whom We had granted Our mercy and whom We had given knowledge of Our Will [ilm-e ladunni]*". It is the majesty of Hazrat Khidr (pbuh) that Allah Almighty has acknowledged him as 'one of His servants'. He has been blessed with two favours: Allah's Mercy and *Ilm-e-ladunni*. *Ilm-*

*e-ladunni*, as inferable from the present verse and verse no. 18:82, is that knowledge which Allah grants to the people He likes, and they employ this knowledge where Allah likes. They do not use it on their own accord. The caption pronounced with this knowledge always materializes.<sup>7</sup> Thus *Ilm-e ladunni* refers to the knowledge of Allah's Will or *Mashiyat* as distinguished from the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure. This point becomes further clear when we see that Hazrat Mûsa had a high regard for the knowledge which was a distinction of Hazrat Khiḍr, and was ready to follow him so that this knowledge be granted to him. As stated in the verse, *Hazrat Musâ (pbuh) entertains Hazrat Khiḍr: 'Would you please allow me to follow you to benefit from the special knowledge bestowed upon you!' (18:66)* Another point which derives from the story of Hazrat Musâ and Hazrat Khiḍr (pbut) is that at times the act of a person bestowed with *Ilm-e ladunni* may appear to be contrary to the *sharia* which in reality it is not. The servants of Allah whom He grants *Ilm-e ladunni* observe great regard for *Sharia* and do not employ their knowledge in opposition to the *Divine Law*. Would anyone ever know about the killing of a boy by Hazrat Khiḍr, had it not been narrated in the Qur'an! Similarly, none would ever know about *Ilm-e ladunni*, had it not been stated in the Qur'an. To say that Hazrat "Khiḍr's knowledge exceeds that of Hazrat Musâ" or to say that Hazrat "Khiḍr was a saint and therefore superior to a prophet in esoteric knowledge"<sup>8</sup> is an observation not based on authority. The status of authority lies with the Qur'an and the Qur'an does not endorse any such thing. Some argue that "Khiḍr's divinely infused knowledge was esoteric, whereas that of Hazrat Musâ's was more exoteric".<sup>9</sup> The terms 'esoteric' and 'exoteric' are un-Qur'anic philosophical terms. There is much space in them that one hides his own suggestions and conjectures in them. Most appropriate distinction that can be made between them is that the Qur'an makes us aware of two dimensions of knowledge: Knowledge of Allah's Pleasure; and Knowledge of Allah's Will. The upholders of these both kinds of knowledge do not do anything on their own. The way to benefit from the upholder of the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure is that after witnessing his veracity and trustworthiness, one follows him without asking how and why. (al-Qur'an, 02:3) If one has the honour to be in the company of a servant of Allah who has *ilm-e ladunni* (knowledge of Allah's Will) it is necessary that one bears patiently on what one does not comprehend. This connection between



utter patience and special knowledge (*ilm ladunni*) is made explicit in this narrative.<sup>10</sup> The dilemma based upon above narrative about human freedom and predestination, is based upon false un-Qur'anic notions.



## ANTINOMY OF FREE WILL AND PRE-ORDAINED SUSTENANCE\*

*Abstract: The problem of free will and pre-ordained sustenance presents one of the various dimensions of the problem of free will and predestination identified by Muslims and orientalists both with respect to Islam. Present study argues that the problem arises from un-Qur'anic concepts of Allah's Bounty, His Will and Pleasure. Allah approves at present the measure of sustenance for each individual according to His Absolute Knowledge and Wisdom. Qur'an says: He straitens the provisions for some, He amplifies for some, and He gives provisions without measure for whom He please. Therefore pre-ordaining of sustenance as wrongly supposed in the dilemma does not mean that it has been preordained as to its measure from the creation of the universe or from the birth of the individual.*

The problem of freewill and predestination in Islam has been identified both by the Orientalists as well as the Muslims. W. Montgomery Watt,<sup>1</sup> (1909–2006) in his *Freewill and Predestination in Early Islam*, and in *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, identifies various aspects of this problem.<sup>2</sup> The writings of Harry Austryn Wolfson (1887-1974)<sup>3</sup> on the problems of Muslim theology reflect vastness of his learning. He, in his *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, mostly discusses the problem of Freedom and Predestination with reference to Divine Power. He cites in great detail the views of the Muslim theologians and their formulations of the theories of acquisition. He, however, does not miss to identify aspects of the problem of predestination other than those based on the concept of Divine Power. He states these problems in the form of antinomies. He does not miss to identify the antinomy that arises for human freedom by believing in pre-ordained sustenance.<sup>4</sup> Franz Rosenthal, in his *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, discusses different definitions of knowledge including views of Muslim theologians about God's Knowledge. Dilating upon the implications of the view that takes God's Knowledge to be eternal he identifies the problem of the incompatibility of Omniscience with human freedom in Islam.<sup>5</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), who is an eminent Muslim thinker of the modern era, discusses the problem of freewill and predestination in the perspective of Divine Omniscience. However he discusses it only with reference to its

implications for Freedom of God and develops his own philosophical concept of Omniscience.<sup>6</sup> Syed Abul A'la Moududi (1903-1979)<sup>7</sup> identifies the problems that arise for human free will with reference to its compatibility with Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Eternal Will but observes that the Qur'an does not discuss these problems in their metaphysical aspect because of man's inability to understand them.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Abdul Khaliq,<sup>9</sup> in his *Problems of Muslim Theology* while discussing the problem of Determinism and Human Freedom, mostly concentrates on the implications of the concept of Divine All-Powerfulness on free human actions and does not address to the problem that arises for Human Free will from any interpretation of the concept of pre-ordained sustenance.<sup>10</sup> The same is the case with Professor M. Saeed Sheikh (d. 2003).<sup>11</sup> His ultimate focus in his article, "Freedom and Fatalism in Islam",<sup>12</sup> is to examine and explain the following three Arabic terms: 'Qadar', 'Taqdîr', and 'Hâdith'. This essay is primarily an analysis of some of the statements of the renowned Western scholars with regard to freedom and fatalism in Islam. However, he nowhere finds an occasion even to identify the problem under discussion. Dr. Hanifi Ozcan in his article "The Relationship between God's Knowledge and Human Freedom: A New Approach to the Problem." discusses the problem only in the context of the statement that "Knowledge (*'ilm*) depends upon the known (*ma'lûm*)."<sup>13</sup> The problem that arises from the belief in preordained sustenance mostly has not attracted the attention of those who have worked on freewill and predestination. Encyclopedia of the Qur'an just gives stray reference but does not very clearly identify the problem under discussion.<sup>14</sup>

Preordained sustenance (*rizq*) is a principle taught in the Qur'an. Its antinomy with free will, as stated by Wolfson, is as follows:

"Given free will, a thief who steals for a living, acts of his own free will and his sustenance therefore is not pre-ordained by Allah. But given pre-ordained sustenance, the sustenance which comes from stealing must be pre-ordained by Allah."<sup>15</sup>

In order to examine the dilemma we need to understand the Qur'anic concept of "pre-ordained sustenance" and Qur'anic concept of "earning" this sustenance. Qur'an says: *And there is no animal in the earth but on Allah is the sustenance of it, and He knows its resting place.*<sup>16</sup>

1. It is in the sense of its being on Allah, that the sustenance for every living being in the earth is pre-ordained. However, as for the human beings are concerned, the measure of sustenance for every individual is not same: *And Allah has made some of you excel others in sustenance.*<sup>17</sup> Allah approves at present the measure of sustenance for each individual according to His Absolute Knowledge and Wisdom. Qur'an says: *He straitens the provisions for some, He amplifies for some, and He gives Provisions without measure for whom He please.*<sup>18</sup> Therefore pre-ordaining of sustenance as wrongly supposed in the dilemma does not mean that it has been preordained as to its measure from the creation of the universe or from the birth of the individual. In all these antinomies the false concept of a God who cannot act in the present is pre-supposed.

2. As for the earning of this provision is concerned, Allah decrees the servants to seek Allah's bounty (*faḍal*) in earning sustenance. Only he who observes the limits prescribed by Allah in earning the provisions ordained for Him, seeks Allah's bounty (*faḍal*). One who does not observe these limits does not seek Allah's bounty (*faḍal*).<sup>19</sup>

3. No one can earn more, by any machinations on his part, than what Allah has ordained for him, for: *And there is no animal in the earth but on Allah is the sustenance of it....*<sup>20</sup>; also: *only Allah knows what a soul will earn on the morrow.*<sup>21</sup>

4. One who earns something by means of theft, is the one who does not observe the limits prescribed by Allah, so whatever he gets is not Allah's bounty (*faḍal*). Since Allah possesses Power over all things, it is by Allah's Will (*mashiyat*) that the thief, even in spite of choosing the wrong course, gets the sustenance which is ordained for him. Whatever a thief earns is out of that sustenance which is on Allah to provide him<sup>22</sup> and which has already been ordained for him.<sup>23</sup> So far as human action is concerned there are always two lines of action open to him: a right line of action (*i.e.*, the way of the righteous) and a wrong line of action (*i.e.*, to follow ones desires), and it is man who is to freely choose one of them. A thief chooses the wrong line of action.

Examples help in understanding things. A person presented some quantity of rice to his sufi mentor. The mentor asked one of his disciples to put this rice into 5 kg bags. The mentor also told him to whom these were to be given. Concerning one of the beneficiaries the mentor gave a special direction. "Mr. ABC will be given two bags of 5kg each. But if he takes one on his own, then he will be given just

one.” Mr. ABC comes to the mentor’s abode. He goes towards the cooking area and sees bags of rice. Thinking that he is not going to be given rice bag by the mentor, makes a plan. Finds a big flower-pot (*gamla*), empties it and prepares it for filling with soil. Takes it towards the cooking area and thinking that he is not being seen, puts a bag of rice in it and covers it with soil. Fastening it on the carrier of his bicycle he takes it outside the mentor’s abode on the pretext that he is going to bring a plant from the nursery. When he comes the next day with a plant in the *gamla*, the worthy disciple of the mentor gives him one bag of rice. Mr. ABC keeps on considering that he acquired 10 kg of rice by his own planning, whereas it had already been ordained that he would be given the same quantity.

Thus the antinomy is formulated on the wrong concept of the pre-ordaining of sustenance. According to Islamic religious teachings the concept of pre-ordained sustenance and human freedom never confront each other.

# **COMPARATIVE STUDIES**





## H. A. WOLFSON AND A. H. KAMALI ON THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN MUSLIM KALAM\*

*Abstract: The problems dealt with by the Muslim Kalam are at least of three types. Some of them are purely religious; some are purely philosophical; some are problems of religion treated in terms of philosophy.<sup>1</sup> It is our humble contention that not only the problems of purely philosophical nature, but also at least some of the problems of purely religious nature, along with almost all of the problems of religion treated in terms of philosophy, have their origin either in Plato or Aristotle. It is our contention that many of these problems even could not have arisen, had the Muslims not accepted Greek Philosophers views passed to them through Christianity or through Judaism. Since it is not possible to analyse all the problems in such a brief article, We have selected the problem of the nature of relationship of Divine Being with Divine Attributes, a problem apparently of essentially religious nature, to prove our contention. This study argues that the problem of Divine Attributes in Muslim Kalam, ultimately has its origin in one of the different interpretations of Plato's theory of Ideas as a further development mainly of the problem of "the relation of God, the world of Ideas, and the Logos" dealt with by Philo, and the reconstruction of Philo's ideas by the Church Fathers into Trinity. And as far as the semantic aspect of the same problem in Muslim Kalam is concerned, it is based on discussions on the "Unknowability of God and Divine Predicates" both in Philo and the Church Fathers.*

Before we embark upon this discussion let us make a very important point clear. It is usually thought among our scholars that the thought of the orientalist is mostly infected with general Western malady — of their views being far-fetched to the extent of absurdity. The author agrees with this view, but it cannot be made a rule. As for Wolfson's views concerning the different interpretations of Platonic Ideas is concerned, it is a fact of history that philosophers have disagreed as to the real nature of their relationship with God.<sup>2</sup> According to our understanding Wolfson has traced the development of Intradeical interpretation of Platonic Ideas with logical consistency. Wolfson's views on this specific problem of Divine Essence and Attributes are farfetched to the least. To our mind, there is a similar

malady found in the views of Muslim philosophers in general *i.e.*, to prove by farfetched explanations that the views of the Muslim theologians and for that matter, the Muslim philosophers, were somehow or the other originated from the spirit of Islamic teachings; and that if they were influenced by Greek or other alien thought, only to the extent of their being consistent with the spirit of Qura'nic teachings; hence it was a creative assimilation and not a blind acceptance of alien thought.<sup>3</sup> A. H. Kamali in a series of his three articles (referred to at footnote no. 26), has presented the views similar to Wolfson on the origin of the problem of Divine Attributes in Muslim Kalam. Kamali's articles are rather more comprehensive and enlightening than Wolfson as he not only traces the origin and development of this problem in Muslim theology and philosophy but also traces the development of this problem in '*sufism*'. Abdul Hameed Kamali also makes a more significant and positive contribution by presenting a quite new and genuine attempt in the right direction, *i.e.*, at the development of a logic of Divine Names. In this article, we have tried to make a critique of the Muslim Kalam on the problem of Divine attributes by presenting with approval the views of Wolfson on the origin of this problem; and have presented the views of A. H. Kamali to make a comparison and to show similarity and continuity in their thought. With this explanation, let us now specify the different aspects of this problem in Muslim Kalam to trace its origin.<sup>4</sup>

In the Qur'an, Allah is described by what the Qur'an refers to as 'the Most Beautiful Names of Allah' such for instance, 'as the Living', 'the All Powerful or the Omnipotent', 'the Beneficent, 'the Wise', 'the All Knowing or the Omniscient' and so forth up to ninety-nine. In the early centuries of Islam *i.e.*, as early as the first part of the eighth century, there arose in Islam a view, first with regard to only two of these Names and then with regard to all other Names by which Allah is designated, that each Name reflects some real being existing in Allah as something superadded and distinct from His Essence, but inseparable from It and coeternal with It.<sup>5</sup> In the history of Muslim Kalam, the belief that certain terms attributed to Allah in the Qur'an stand for real incorporeal beings which exist in Allah from eternity, is known as *Attributism*. This belief soon became the orthodox belief in Islam.<sup>6</sup> However, as soon as the belief in real attributes had been introduced, there arose opposition to it. This opposition declared the

terms predicated to Allah in the Qur'an, to be only Names of Allah, designating His actions, and hence the so-called attributes were not real beings other than the essence of Allah, they were identical with His essence. In the history of Muslim Kalam this view is known as 'anti-attributism' or as 'the denial of the reality of attributes.' This view arose during the first half of the eighth century and is generally ascribed to Wâsil b. Atâ of Baṣra, the founder of Mu'tazilism.<sup>7</sup> And with the gradual introduction of Greek Philosophy into Islam, the problem of attributes became identified with the problem of Platonic Ideas, or rather with the problem of 'universals', as the problem of Platonic Ideas was called by that time, and with that the controversy between the Attributists and the Anti-attributists in Islam became a controversy over 'universals' as to whether they were *extradeical* or *intradeical* (as will be discussed later).<sup>8</sup> It is during this new phase of the problem that the theory of Modes (*aḥwâl*) as a new conception of the relation of attributes to Allah, makes its appearance. Dissatisfied, as they were, with both the Attributism, and the Anti-attributism, the exponents of this new theory declared that attributes, now surnamed as 'modes', were "neither existent nor non-existent." Abû Hâshim is the main exponent of this theory.<sup>9</sup> Some others among the anti-attributists made an exception of certain terms predicated to Allah and treated them as things which were real and created. This is known as the Theory of Exceptional Nature of Terms. The terms treated by them in such manner were: (I) Knowledge (II) Will (III) Word (*Kalam*).<sup>10</sup> The theory of modes which arose among the Mu'tazilites as a moderate form of their denial of real attributes was, according to the testimony of Ibn-Hazm, adopted by some Ash'arites as a moderate form of their affirmation of attributes. Two of such Ash'arites, Bakillani and Juwaini, are mentioned by Shahrastani in his '*Nihayat*'.<sup>11</sup>

As far as the semantic aspect of the problem is concerned, it appears in the Kalam in two forms. The first form of the problem is how one is to take the Qur'anic terms which describe Allah in the likeness of created beings. The basis of this problem is the Qur'anic teaching that there is no likeness between Allah and other beings, expressed in such verses as "Not is there like Him" (42:9), and "There is none equal with Him" (112:4). Among the Attributists there were different opinions on this form of the problem. There were Likeners (*al-mushabbihah*) who disregarding the above mentioned verses took

the terms predicated of Allah in their extreme literalness. Then there were some who claimed that all terms predicated of Allah, while not establishing a likeness between Allah and other beings, should be taken literally to mean exactly what they say, however without asking "how" (*bila kayfa wa la tashbih*). Another group claimed that any term predicated of Allah was unlike the same term predicated of any other being, without however giving it a new unlike meaning. The Anti-attributists, however, all agreed that common terms predicated to Allah were, not only to be taken literally, but were also to be given new non-literal meanings. The second form of the semantic aspect, for both the Attributists and the Anti-attributists, was the search for the formula which would express their respective conceptions of attributes.

The formula that "attributes are neither Allah nor other than Allah" was first presented by Suleman b. Jarîr al-Zaidy flourished at about 785 a.d. The same formula is used by Hisham bin al-Hakam (d. 814 a.d.). The next to use the same formula is Ibn Kullab (d. 854), a Sunnite. Wolfson gives it the name of Kullabite Formula after him. About a century later, the Kullabite formula was adopted by Abu Hashim, however, replacing the term 'attribute' by the term 'mode'.<sup>12</sup> At about the same time Asha'ri adopted the Kullabite formula and another formula to construct a new formula. Hence he is reported to have said: Coexistent with Allah are things (*ashya*=attributes) other than Himself (*siwahu*).<sup>13</sup>

According to Wolfson, among the things which Plato somehow left un-explained about his Theory of Ideas is the question: How are these ideas related to God? Sometimes he uses language from which we get that the Ideas have an existence external to God, either ungenerated or coeternal with God or produced or made by God: they are thus *extradeical*. Sometimes Plato uses language from which we get that the Ideas are the thoughts of God. They are *intradeical*. This second interpretation identifies Plato's God with mind. According to Wolfson, more than two methods have been applied by the students of Platonic philosophy to solve these real or seeming contradictions in his thought:

Modern students of Plato try to solve the problem by assuming that these different views about ideas were held by Plato at different periods of his life, and so try to classify his dialogues

according to certain chronological schemes and speak of early dialogues, middle dialogues, and later dialogues.

The second method which is applied by the students of Platonic Philosophy is what Wolfson calls the method of selection and rejection. The followers of this method simply select one set of statements in Plato and accept them as representative of his true philosophy and reject all the other statements as of no account. This method is applied by the early students of Plato's philosophy in antiquity.<sup>14</sup>

While these two contrasting methods of interpreting Plato's Ideas were followed by pagan philosophers, the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria introduced a new method which though less convenient was more subtle. Wolfson describes this method, in its general form, as Method of Harmonization. According to this method, all the statements in Plato, however contradictory they may appear to be, are assumed to be true, and out of all of them a harmonious composite view is formed, in which all the apparently contradictory statements are made to cohere with each other.<sup>15</sup> Wolfson calls the method of Harmonization, in its specific form as introduced by Philo as Harmonization by Succession. Christian Fathers followed him in this method of integrating *Extradeical* and *Intradeical* interpretations of Platonic Ideas but with some difference. Wolfson calls this harmonization as Harmonization by Unification.

According to Philo's interpretation of Platonic Ideas, "when God by His own good will decided to create this world of ours, He first, out of the Ideas which had been in His Thought from eternity, constructed an '*intelligible world*', and this *intelligible world* He placed in the *Logos*, which had likewise existed previously from eternity in His Thought. Then in the likeness of this *intelligible world* of ideas, He created this "*visible world*" of ours."<sup>16</sup> Philo, thus integrated Platonic Ideas into an *intelligible world of Ideas* contained in a *Nous* called *Logos*<sup>17</sup> so that the original problem of the relation of Platonic Ideas to God becomes with him a problem of the relation of the *Logos* to God, and the problem is solved by him on the assumption of two successive stages of existence in the *Logos*, an *intradeical* one followed by an *extradeical* one. When we compare this account of creation with the story of creation as told by Plato in

his *Timaeus*, we see that in Plato, there is a God who is called the Demiurge, the Creator. Besides the Demiurge, there is a model which is coeternal with the Demiurge. Plato calls this model as 'the intelligible animal'. According to Plato this model contains in itself 'intelligible animals'. The Demiurge looked at the intelligible animal and he created this world of ours in its likeness, which Plato calls 'the visible animal'.<sup>18</sup>

We can readily see what Philo was trying to do was to interpret the story of creation of the Book of Genesis in terms of the story of creation in the *Timaeus*.<sup>19</sup> In fact, this was his purpose.

Philo and Jesus Christ were contemporaries. By the time Philo preached his philosophical sermons in the houses of worship of Alexandria, Jesus preached his sermons in the synagogues of Galilee. About half a century later there appeared one of the four standard biographies of Christ, the Fourth Gospel, the Gospel according to St. John. This biography of Christ is based upon the theory introduced by Paul, that before Christ was born there was a pre-existent Christ, an idea of Christ. This pre-existent idea of Christ, which in the letters of Paul is called *Wisdom* or perhaps also *Spirit* is described in this biography of Jesus by the term *Logos*, which is conventionally rendered into English by the term *Word*. "The Gospel according to St. John" opens with the verse:

*"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"*.

Then like the *Logos* of Philo, which became immanent in the created world, the *Logos* of John, which is the pre-existent Christ, became immanent, or as it is commonly said, incarnate in the born Christ. Wolfson gives reference from the same Gospel narrating a verse which reads:

*"And the Word was made flesh"* (1:14)<sup>20</sup>

In spite of some differences the similarities between the *Logos* of Philo and the *Logos* of John are quite striking. The two elements which were missing or at least which were not clearly stated regarding the *Logos* of John were supplied in the second century by Church Fathers known as Apologists, who having been born pagans, were before their conversion to Christianity students of philosophy. They identified the *Logos* of John with the Philonic *Logos* and thus, without the Johannine *Logos* ceasing to mean the pre-existent Christ, it

acquired the two main characteristics of the Philonic *Logos* so that it was no longer a single Idea, the idea of Christ, but it became the place of *intelligible world* consisting of all ideas; then again like the Philonic *Logos*, it was made to have two stages of existence prior to its incarnation: first from eternity it was within God and identical with Him; second, from about the time of the creation of the world it was a generated real being distinct from God.

Following Philo too, these early Fathers of the Church added to the *Logos* another pre-existent incorporeal being, the Holy Spirit. Thus, together with God and the *Logos* making three pre-existent real beings, subsequently to become known as Hypostasis or persons. Now the Holy Spirit is mentioned in the New Testament but it is not clear whether it is meant to be the same as the pre-existent Christ, or whether it is meant to be a pre-existent being different from the pre-existent Christ. The Apologists, under the influence of Philo, definitely declared the Holy Spirit to be distinct from the *Logos*.<sup>21</sup> Like the *Logos*, the Holy Spirit was held by them to have been at first *intraideical* which then became *extradeical*. These three persons of the Trinity, however, though each of them a real being and each of them God and each of them really distinct from the others, constituted one God, who was most simple and indivisible. Since they all constitute one God, whatever is said of any of the persons of the Trinity, with the exception of the terms which describe the one single distinction between them, applies to the one indivisible God which they all constitute. Wolfson calls this type of harmonization as 'harmonization by unification' which was added by the Apologists to the Philonic harmonization by succession.

Various attempts at explaining the unity of a triune God in the third century by Origen and others ultimately meant the reduction of the unity to a relative kind of unity. But this was not acceptable by many. There were two choices before them: either to deny that *Logos* was God, or to deny the reality of its existence. Those who followed the first alternative are Arians. Wolfson calls those who followed the second alternative, after one of its exponents, as Sabelians.

How the Doctrine of Attributes was introduced in Islam, Wolfson claims that it is traceable to the Christian doctrine of Trinity. He not only provides external evidence in the form of tracing the origin of basic terms used in these discussions to show how such transformation was effected, but also offers logical reasons and

psychological motives in favour of his claim about this transition from Trinity to Attributism.

From the very beginning of the history of the problem of Divine attributes in Islam two Arabic terms are used for what we call attribute, namely, (i) *ma'na* and (ii) *ṣiffah*.<sup>22</sup> Now if there is any truth in what Wolfson has claimed above, these two fundamental terms used in the doctrine of attributes should reflect similar fundamental terms in the doctrine of the Trinity. The Arabic term *ma'na*, among its various meanings, also has the general meaning of 'thing' and it is used as the equivalent of the term *shaiy*. Now it happens that in Christianity, the term 'things' is used, in addition to the terms 'hypostasis' and 'persons' as a description of the three persons of the Trinity in order to emphasize their reality.<sup>23</sup> Similarly regarding the term *ṣiffah* it can be shown that it also goes back to the Christian terminology of the Trinity. The term *ṣiffah* comes from the verb *waṣafa*, (to describe) which as a verb occurs in the Qur'an thirteen times and of which the substantive form *waṣf*, "description" only once; the term *ṣiffah* never occurs in the Qur'an. While in most cases in the Qur'an, the verb *waṣafa* is used with reference to what people say about God (Allah), in all these cases its usage is always with reference to something vile which impious people say about God (Allah).<sup>24</sup> The laudable terms by which God (Allah) is described in the Qur'an are never referred to in the Qur'an by any form of the verb *waṣafa*; they are referred to as the Most Beautiful Names (*al-Asma' al-Husnâ*).<sup>25</sup> When this term was coined and by whom, is not known but finally it put on the highly technical sense of the term "attribute", and took the place of the Qur'anic term *Ism* (Name). What has been said up till now is enough to make it clear that the use of the term *ṣiffah* in the sense of *attribute*, whatever be its origin, is not Qur'anic, rather is contrary to the Qur'anic concept. Wolfson, in his book *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (p.119-120) and in his article "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretation of Platonic Ideas" has attempted to show that the term *ṣiffah*, like the term *ma'nâ*, is also derived from the vocabulary of the Christian Trinity. There is essential difference in the logic of the Qur'anic term *Ism* (اسم, Name) and in the logic of the un-Qur'anic term *ṣiffah* (equivalent to the Greek term *attribute*) which the Muslims failed to comprehend.<sup>26</sup> We will discuss it later.

As far as the Orthodox Muslim concept of attributes is concerned, it can be shown that their position is like, though not exactly the same,



as orthodox Christian position. If one is to put the Muslim 'attributes' in place of the second and third persons of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Trinity is transformed into Muslim Attributism. However unlike the second and third persons of the Trinity, which are *intradeical* and *extradeical* by unification, that is, they were at once the same as God and other than He, these orthodox Muslim attributes were *intradeical* and *extradeical* by location, that is, they were in God but other than He. Whereas the unorthodox position of the Anti-attributists in Islam corresponds to Sabellianism in Christianity.

Against the Christian concept of Trinity Qur'an says: ... say not "Three" —Cease! (it is) better for you.... Allah is only One God" (4:171) They surely disbelieve who say: Lo! Allah is the third of three; when there is no God save the One God" (5:73).<sup>27</sup> Keeping in view these verses, it seems strange to believe that the view of the real attributes in Muslims is traceable to the doctrine of Trinity. With reference to *Disputatio Christiani et Sasaceni* by John of Damascus (d.ca.754) Wolfson states that after the conquest of Syria by Muslims in 7th century, there were debates between Christians and Muslims on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Wolfson sketches some such typical debate between a Muslim and a Christian to show that the view of the reality of attributes in Muslims could not have arisen spontaneously but it could have originated under Christian influence in the course of debates between Muslims and Christians. Nutshell of these debates is that when Muslims accused the Christians of associating partners with God, they found themselves in severe need of some defence. In their defence they tried to convince the Muslims that the second and the third persons of the Trinity were nothing but the terms 'Wisdom' and the 'Life' or 'Wisdom' and 'Power' which in the Qur'an are predicated to Allah. The Christians argued that by believing Trinity they simply believed these attributes to be real in their own right and superadded to the being of God. As a counter question they asked to the Muslims that didn't they believe Divine Attributes to be real. The answer of the Muslims was in affirmation. The Christian further asked the Muslims that whether they believed the Attributes to be real in their own right and superadded to the Being of God or they believed the Being of God and His Attributes to be identical. Those who affirmed the former, they had to prove that in spite of believing Divine Attributes much more in number than the Christians believed, as real and superadded to the Being of God they

were not idolaters. Those who declared the Being and Attributes of God to be identical they had to face the allegation of being deniers of Divine Attributes and were labelled as Anti-attributists.<sup>28</sup>

As further proof of the alien origin of the problem, according to Wolfson, is the fact that with the gradual introduction of Greek Philosophy into Islam, the problem of attributes became identified with the problem of Platonic ideas or rather with the problem of 'universals', as the problem of Platonic ideas was known by that time and with that the controversy between the Attributists and the Anti-attributists became a controversy over 'universals' as to whether they were *intradeical* or *extradeical*. There is no concept of such 'ideas' in the Qur'an. The Most Beautiful Names (*al-Asma-ul-Husna*) or attributes for that matter, are not 'ideas'. They lack the essential characteristic of the Platonic ideas, that of being pre-existent patterns of things that came into existence. Hence all these discussions regarding Divine attributes in terms of universals, were unwarranted and out of place in Qur'anic perspective.

According to Professor A. H. Kamali the logic of the Qur'anic term *Ism* (اسم, Name) is absolutely different from the logic of the term *siffah* (attribute) which was used to replace it. 'Name' is never a component of the being of the 'named'. The being of the 'named' is always prior and transcendent to the 'name'. 'Attribute' is always a component of the very being of the thing/person 'attributed'. It is, therefore, the principle of the priority of the being of the 'named' over the 'name' in the logic of 'naming' which essentially differentiates it from the 'attribute-logic'. This seems to be what the Muslim theologians could not attend to because of oversight, and because of their over indulgence in the un-Qur'anic terminology of Aristotelian metaphysic. One very important thing to be noted is that terms are never neutral; ideas thrive on terms and ride on their back; whenever there is a transmission of terminology from one ideological setting to another, there is always a transmission of belief or ideas with it.<sup>29</sup>

The Names are of two types: the personal (*dhati*), and the attributive (*sifâti*). A personal name stands in the consciousness of the knower, for a real or even fictitious person/thing, through which the knower affirms for himself the being/existence or non-being/non-existence of that person or thing. The first intuition in man of God is essentially to be the intuition of an Absolute Being. Name '*Allah*' as stated in the Qur'an is used as a Personal Name of this Deity. Another

way, the intuition of this Being formed in man, is through the consciousness of the activity of this Absolute Being as expressed in Its relations with respect to other beings. Qur'an witnesses in man, an intuition of the many kinds of the activity of this Deity. This is the only Qur'anic sense of the term *ṣifāh*, in which it can be used if it is to be used. Hence many Good Names of Allah (usually considered to be ninety-nine) are stated in the Qur'an. The term 'attribute' comes from Aristotle. It is immersed in the dualism of Aristotelian metaphysics. As Aristotelian metaphysics bifurcates reality into two principles of 'form' and 'matter', its logic bifurcates a thing into 'subject' and its predicates/attributes. 'Subject' is the logical substratum of 'attributes'. 'Attributes' cannot be imagined to exist without a logical substratum. But the 'subject' in its own turn cannot be conceived to exist if the attributes are withdrawn from it. But both are real in their own right. Qur'anic metaphysics is through and through monotheistic. Everything in it is based on the Oneness of God. Allah is the Personal Name of this Deity and He has other Good Names too which describe His activity or relations. There is no concept of any bifurcation of Allah into His Essence and Attributes in Qur'anic metaphysics. It was only when the Muslims mistakenly accepted from the Christians the Aristotelian concept of 'attribute'/*ṣifāh*, they got entangled into mistaken notions and formulated the problem of the relation of the Divine Essence and Attributes which genuinely could not arise had they stuck to the Qur'anic notion of *Ism* (اسم, Name). And the same problem when stretched further, multiplied itself into the problem of the createdness vs. un-createdness of the Qur'an. Another principle which the Muslims mostly seemed to ignore was the principle that: *Naught is as His likeness. (42:11)*<sup>30</sup> Had the Muslims not ignored this principle of absolute transcendence of God either, they should have been saved from bifurcating the being of Allah into His Essence and Attributes. But here they again followed the authority of Aristotle who had applied the concept of change for God in the likeness of things.<sup>31</sup> Thus Aristotle's logic<sup>32</sup> as well as *intradeical* interpretation of platonic ideas both supported each other in derailing Muslims from the right direction.<sup>33</sup>



## STATE AND STATECRAFT: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND WESTERN PARADIGMS\*

*Abstract: Islam is the Dîn (the way of life) near Allah from the beginning of humanity till it was revealed to the last Prophet (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). It is for whole mankind and is perfect (kâmil). The Qur'an admits the existence of dîn/s opposed to Islam and calls them disbelief but also says that He who wants or brings any religion other than Islam will not be accepted from him. The Qur'an enjoys the status of al-Haqq (the standard of truth) from the Lord. (02:41-42, 147) It is the advice for whole mankind. (6:90, 12:104) Whatever concept, teaching, ideology, way of life or whatever is in accordance with the Qur'an is truth (Haqq). What is against it is falsehood (al-bâtil) (02:42) or zann — unfounded conjecture (10:36) or ad-dalâl (wrong) or fisq (moulding truth according to one's desires). These are the various forms disbelief can take in any period. Allah decrees the Muslims 'not to mix falsehood with truth. (3:71) Zann (conjecture) cannot spare anyone from Haqq. (10:36) Ad-dalâl as deviation from Haqq has no reality of its own. (10:32.) Allah leads astray none but fasiqun. To give equal importance to anyone's saying as the Word of Allah is shirk (associating partners with Allah). 'Modernity' — a human endeavour — has assumed the role of Dîn (the way of life) in the present day world for a larger part of mankind. Democracy, capitalism, socialism, communism, nationalism, liberalism, secularism, humanism, pragmatism, Occidentalism and other countless isms are its various manifestations. Post-modernism and its allied movements are also its further development. Islam and Modernity are two opposing paradigms. They disagree with each other in all their postulates. They are so drastically different that no viable understanding between the two at any level seems possible. But Islam does not leave us to wander in darkness. The Qur'an opens the way of bid'at (innovation). Bid'at (innovation) can be of two types: lawful (bid'at-e ḥasana) and unlawful (bid'at-e sayyia'). The Qur'an qualifies ar-râsikhûn fil-ilm (the sound in knowledge) for working out the limits and scope of lawful/comely innovations which help people in coming towards righteousness. This is ijtihâd. The present study explores the possibilities of working out a relationship between Islam and modernity in line with the Divine Decree: la talbisul Haqqa bil baṭili (Do not cover truth with falsehood.)*

Let us study the essentials of both paradigms. The following are the postulates which comprise *modernity*:

- *Reason* and *sense experience*, the faculties owned by mankind, are the source of all knowledge required to mankind for regulating its affairs.
- *Rationality, freedom/autonomy, and natural goodness of man* are the basic values. 'Religion' is a personal and private affair. Everyone is free to embrace and live any ideology or religion he likes. No one is to be underestimated on the basis of religion.
- State is a set up to regulate the affairs of citizens to ensure their well-being according to their wishes. "Respect for civil and political liberties, governance by law with the consent of the governed, ... is one of the features of a modern state and ideology."
- Maximization of the possibilities for the fulfilment of desires and actualization of abilities, and minimization of pain and suffering from the life of citizens by eradication of poverty, illiteracy and disease is the function of State. State has nothing to do with anyone's religion for religion is private and personal. This is *Secularism*.
- No individual or group is to be allowed to enforce an ideology or religion as standard of determining values for society or mankind at large. Everyone is autonomous to decide what is 'good' for him and free to pursue it unless it harms equal freedom of others.
- Communities/identities are free to regulate their personal and private affairs in accordance with their religious teachings or cultural tradition unless these conflict with the social values evolved by liberal consensus of humanity in line with scientific and philosophical research.
- Statecraft will be designed to bring about all possible conveniences to the citizens for the maximum fulfilment of their desires and actualization of abilities. This is the spirit of *Secularism*. A secular society is a *liberal* society so far as it respects civil and political liberties of all citizens without discrimination on the basis of creed, race or religion.

● The socio-economic system developed in accordance with the postulates of modernity is known as *Capitalism*. It is this thought, practice and ideology that prevail in the world today. Organization of this ideology into social and political system is called *Democracy*. 'State' is the basic agency, a tool in the hand of democracy, to bring about dominance of capitalism. The two essential characteristics of the economic system evolved by capitalism are interest/usury and gambling/wager. The concept of 'Human Rights' has been devised to protect the interest of capitalism and is necessary to be observed in a democratic state. In a democratic state the Constitution becomes the most important document. Western civilization/modernity has made many experiments and has worked out the details of social, political, educational, administrative, economic and other aspects of this ideology to the minutest. Western civilization is constantly making experiments to make their systems still better. 'Globalization' is a movement in the present day world which aims at universalization of liberalism, secularism, and capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

As stated at the very opening of this paper Islam is *the religion* near Allah, prescribed for whole mankind and for all times to come. The Qur'an is revealed knowledge and standard of truth. The Prophet (pbuh) is the teacher of the Book and wisdom and absolute model to be followed in our lives.<sup>2</sup>

The Qur'an contains all guidance needed to mankind at individual, social, national and international level. It encompasses all spheres of human activity *i.e.*, economics, politics, administration, education, research in natural and social sciences etc. It covers all phases of life *i.e.*, peace, war and calamity. It is applicable in all modes of life *i.e.*, physical, rational and spiritual.<sup>3</sup> Reason, sense experience and intuition, are abilities granted by Allah to be used keeping them subservient to Divine knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Man is autonomous within Allah's prescribed limits.<sup>5</sup> *Taufiq* (ability to do) at man's disposal is a trust and it is being seen whether he uses it in accordance with Allah's pleasure or follows his likes and dislikes.<sup>6</sup> Qur'an very clearly states values the upholders of which Allah loves and disvalues the upholders of which Allah does not love.<sup>7</sup> Principles stated in these values and disvalues encompass all areas of individual and social life.

Organization of social life reaches its climax in the form of a State. Yet it is very strange when we see that the Qur'an addresses the individuals as Muslims or Non-Muslims; the *epithet Muslim* or a *Disbeliever* or *Islamic* or *Un-Islamic* nowhere applies to a State or country. So to call a state *Muslim/Islamic* or *Non-Muslim/Un-Islamic* is against Qur'anic teachings. Hazrat Yousaf, Hazrat Dawûd and Hazrat Sulemân (Peace be upon them all.) were prophets as well as kings. Does Allah anywhere in the Qur'an calls the kingdoms ruled by them *Islamic* or *Muslim*! The same is true about states ruled by Hazrat Zulqarnain and of Hazrat Talût (pbuh). The State of Madina, founded by the Prophet (pbuh), was an administrative set up brought about for the peaceful co-existence of various identities, then present at Holy Madina, in accordance with their respective religions or cultures.<sup>8</sup> Unification of State and Religion, has given nothing except immense pain and suffering to the mankind. How could Islam, the religion near Allah for whole mankind could propound such idea!

*The Qur'an declares the principle of non-coercion in matters of religion (Lâ 'Ikrâha Fi Ad-Dîni).*<sup>9</sup> Principle of non-Coercion and Principle of Social Justice (*Allah loves muqsitîn*)<sup>10</sup> provides basis for peaceful co-existence in a multi-cultural environment. It is a solution for religious pluralism and diversity of regional, cultural and sectarian identities.

Every religion/ideology has two aspects: Paradigm and Practice. This is equally true of Islam and Modernity. It is illogical to compare paradigm of one ideology with practice of the other, and vice versa. Seen as paradigms Islam and Modernity are opposed to each other. *Islam aims at emancipation from unrestricted following of desires*<sup>11</sup> and modernity at providing unrestricted maximum fulfilment of desires. Apparently no viable understanding between the two at this level seems possible. As for the practical aspect of utilizing the experiments of modernity is concerned Islam does not leave us to wander in darkness. The Qur'an opens the way of *bid'at* (innovation). *Bid'at* (innovation) can be of two types: lawful (*bid'at-e ḥasana*) and unlawful (*bid'at-e sayyia*).<sup>12</sup> *Rahbaniyyat (monastic asceticism) was an innovation (bid'at) of the Christians, Allah did not enjoin it on them. They had initiated it with the purpose of seeking Allah's pleasure. [Allah does not disapprove it.] They did not confine them within viable limits as they should.* (Al-Ḥadîd, 57:27)

'No *bid'at* (innovation) in respect of Prohibitions (*munkir*) is allowed' is the basic principle of *ijtihâd*. Not everyone is qualified for



carrying out this job.<sup>13</sup> The Qur'an qualifies 'the sound in knowledge' for working out the limits and scope of *lawful/comely innovations* to help people in coming towards righteousness.<sup>14</sup> 'The sound in knowledge' are the ones who are best qualified for working out an appropriate relationship between Islam and Modernity in line with the Divine decree: *la talbisul haqqa bil batili* ... 02:42. Examples help us in understanding matters on analogical grounds. Firmly believing that postulates of modernity are drastically against Islamic Paradigm, we cannot conceive of living without the products of modernity. Already acting upon the principle of *innovation* we are making use of western system of medicine, methods of physical and psychological treatment, education, administration, all kinds of technology, economic, commercial and social institutions. Why not to make use of experiments made by western civilization in the field of administration, politics, sociology and economic institutions etc. reconstructing them according to our ideology until we work out and develop institutions in accordance with our Islamic Paradigm. It is the superiority of a civilization or ideology that makes others to follow. A civilization can demonstrate its superiority only by practically proving on global scale that it can relieve humanity from fear and grief better than any other civilization. And it is a very sad reality that the Muslims/Islamic organizations, political parties, movements etc., have not been able to translate values and disvalues stated in the Qur'an into systems, institutions, approaches, technologies, models, sciences and disciplines covering all walks of life to demonstrate their worth on laboratory bench of a global society.

The idea of an Islamic / Muslim State is un-Qur'anic. Practical impossibility of bringing about any such state can be viewed from another angle. Muslims are divided into Shi'a and Sunnis, for the last fourteen centuries. Each sect is further subdivided into sub-sects and factions who are cutting each other's throat in the name of religion! It is not the end. Are we not further subdivided into linguistic, national, tribal, and regional identities and interests! Let us follow the constitution of Madina as our model.

Liberalism and secularism of the West is absorbing Muslim societies and states in the fold of its civilization. Consciously or unconsciously Muslim social scholars are heading towards mixing western paradigm into Islamic teachings and molding Islam according to modernity. The right approach would be to benefit from

experiments made by western civilization in various fields following the principle of *bid'at-e hasana*. *Bid'at-e Hasana* had always been part of Islam, and it will remain so for ever.<sup>15</sup> It is high time that we get out of un-Qur'anic Ideal and separating State from Religion concentrate on working out a socio-political set-up on the principles of equity and justice, well-being of the citizens, respect for civil and political liberties, governance by law with the consent of the governed, protection from arbitrary authority, maximization of the possibilities and opportunities for the actualization of abilities and minimization of pain and suffering from the life of citizens, eradication of poverty, illiteracy and disease, non-discrimination on the basis of caste, creed and religion — in accordance with Qur'anic values and disvalues — admitting modernity through the doctrine of *bid'at-e hasana*.

In the near future secularism in the garb of democracy seems to prevail all over the world. World is going to be organized under a single system. All outward religious activities are likely to be banned. What we have said may seem unbelievable, but could anyone imagine some thirty years back that the Muslims will say their regular everyday as well as ceremonial prayers in Pakistan, an absolute Muslim majority country, under so severe security arrangements! Was it ever believable for the Spanish Muslims in their golden days what happened to them in the ensuing centuries! Allah's Will prevails everywhere.

# **MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY**



## IBN SINA, AL-GAZALI AND IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ORIGINATION OF THE WORLD\*

*Abstract: Philosophical doctrines and scientific worldview of an epoch from which a scholar gets too much impressed, attain the status of the standard of rationality for him. He begins to comprehend that to believe these ideas as compared to the ones believed by past generations, is more rational and logical. On the contrary, iman bil-ghaib (faith in the unseen) is the foundation of religion. This is the prime quality of the muttaqin (the God-fearing ones) who qualify for attaining guidance from the Qur'an.<sup>1</sup> These are the people who after acknowledging the truthfulness and trustworthiness of Shahid (the messenger and those whom he certified), do not ask how and why on what the shahid says next. Volition has been ascribed in the Qur'an to God as His Dignity and Majesty. The God-fearing ones believe that Allah has created the universe at Will and has created it ex-nihilo. They find no contradiction in believing this view. They firmly believe that if any metaphysical notion, principle of logic, or scientific worldview is contrary to the teachings of the revealed truth, fault lies not with the assertions of faith but with the metaphysical notion, logic, or science. Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina are very close to each other in their views.<sup>2</sup> Ibn Sina (Avicenna) developed these ideas much more than al-Farabi did. In history of Muslim philosophy they both are referred to as Muslim philosophers. The Muslim philosophers got so much impressed by Plato and Aristotle that they accepted their philosophical views as the standard of rational truth. As Muslim they believed religion as the revealed truth. Philosophical system and the scientific worldview by which one gets impressed, as said above, assumes the status of a rational version of truth for him. If one already believes in a revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance. In the history of religious philosophy, this desire for reconciliation has emerged in the form of reconstruction of religious thought in terms of prevalent philosophical and scientific theories. This is undertaken with the purpose to make the rational face of religion more manifest. But in the end it is the religion that suffers. In their attempt at the reconciliation of religion and philosophy, Muslim philosophers had to deny all the major beliefs of Islam. Imam Ghazali, with great philosophical acumen, locates the presuppositions which made them deviate from standard Qur'anic beliefs and reconstructs them so as to prove Islamic*

*beliefs fully rational. Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, a great Muslim thinker also enters in the discussion, but is entangled in un-Qur'anic notions like 'absolute and fixed privation' and principles like 'Inconceivability of Inaction of Divine Attributes.' etc. Controversy between these thinkers is not merely an intellectual heritage of Muslim history, but also has intimate relevance with our own times. This provides us with a criterion to examine our own approach towards the relationship between religion and the philosophical and scientific world-views of our own times. Naturalism of Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, and sociological interpretation of Islam and especially presentation of Tauhid as World-view by Dr. Ali Shari'ati in the recent past and similar attempts of various contemporary scholars need to be seen and evaluated in this perspective. Initially an article on the same theme was written with the title "Takhliq, Sadûr, aur Ham-azliyat" in Urdu which was published in Iqbaliyat, Vol. 38, 39, no. 2, 1998. Present one is an updated version in English on the same theme.*

It has been a standard Islamic belief ever since its beginning that Allah has created the world at His Will; that He has created the universe *ex-nihilo*. Two things bear great importance in this view. (i) That Volition/Will (*Iradah*) is very much Allah's Attribute. (ii) That He is All Powerful to create the universe *ex-nihilo*. In the later periods some theologians proposed that the universe was created out of a pre-existent matter. They presented those verses of the Qur'an in their support which say that before the creation of the universe Allah's throne was on water. But they admitted that this matter (*i.e.* water), too, was Allah's creation. Thus they denied the existence of any primordial matter or something coeternal with God.

Contrary to the above, Muslim philosophers Al-Farabi (circa 873-950)<sup>3</sup> and Ibn Sina (known in the West as Avicenna, 980-1037)<sup>4</sup> proclaimed that Allah does not possess the attribute of Will. Under the influence of Aristotle they denied Allah to be having Will.<sup>5</sup> They argued that 'Thought' instead of 'Volition' was Allah's essential attribute. They define 'volition' as a capacity to attain something which one lacks or a capacity to remove deficiency which one suffers. According to them, having volition is contrary to the dignity of an absolutely perfect being for the following reason: "Volition implies change, and change implies imperfection. Since God is conceived to be an absolutely perfect being, the attribute of 'volition' cannot be

ascribed to him." They held 'Thought' to be the essential Attribute of God and said that in God 'Thought' and 'Will' are one and the same thing. As to what is the object of Divine Thought, for thought is always about something, the Muslim philosophers replied that the Being of God Himself is the object of His Thought! Since nothing except Him ever existed with Him therefore object of His Thought cannot be anything other than His Own Being. He is a Self-Thinking Thought, an eternally Self-Contemplating Being.<sup>6</sup> Finding that, 'volition' cannot be denied for Qur'anic God, Ibn-e-Sina makes an indirect move and says that since Allah lacks in nothing nor is there any deficiency in Him, so in Him 'Volition' is the same as 'Knowledge'. Again following Aristotle he said that the essential nature of God is 'Thought' and thought expresses it in knowledge; so there is no contradiction in identifying 'volition' with 'knowledge' in God. Since there is nothing outside God to have knowledge of it, therefore, God's knowledge consists of His eternal self-knowledge. The Muslim philosophers could not have denied Volition for God, had they not accepted definition of 'will' from Aristotle. Thus they denied that the universe was contingent, created by God *ex-nihilo* on Will. They argued that the universe has emanated from the absolute perfection of God the way light emanates from the sun.<sup>7</sup>

They said that self-thinking of God means His Self-Knowledge, and His Self-Knowledge consists of knowing that He is the Necessary Being and the Prime Cause of all possible existents. Thus His Self-Knowledge comes to encompass knowledge of everything universal and particular. Since, there was nothing deficient in God, all possible beings began to emanate from Him with His Self-Contemplation from all eternity. Therefore universe as eternally emanating from Him is eternal.<sup>8</sup> God has not created it by His Will. It has not come into being out of not-being. It is eternal. Neither the Being of God is temporally prior to the universe nor is the universe temporally posterior to God. Both are co-eternal as cause and effect. God as Cause is only logically prior and the universe as effect is only logically posterior; temporally they are simultaneous.<sup>9</sup>

Why did the Muslim philosophers adopt theory of emanation instead of theory of creation, which has been an established religious doctrine in Muslims? Moreover why did the Muslim philosophers adopt a cosmology consisting of nine heavens instead of a Qur'anic cosmology which very clearly consists of seven heavens?

Philosophical system and scientific worldview by which one gets impressed assumes the status of a rational version of truth for him. If one already believes in a revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance. Aristotle conceived perfection as immutability. Aristotelian concept of perfection as immutability was not in line with the Qur'an. Al-Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina, deeply impressed by Aristotle's philosophy as they were, accepted the notions of 'volition' and 'perfection' from him. The Qur'an very clearly states 'Volition/Will' (*Irada*) as a Divine attribute and a sign of His Majesty. Qur'anic God is not immutable: *Every day He is at work.* (al-Qur'an, 55:29) It also states Allah's Knowledge and Volition as two different attributes.<sup>10</sup> Finding that, 'volition' cannot be denied for Qur'anic God, Muslim Philosophers make an indirect move and argue that since Allah lacks in nothing nor is there any deficiency in Him, so in Him 'Volition' is the same as 'Knowledge'. Again following Aristotle they say that essential nature of God is 'Thought' and thought is expressed in knowledge so there is no contradiction in identifying 'volition' with 'knowledge' in God. Since there is nothing outside God to have knowledge of it, therefore, God's Knowledge consists of His eternal Self-Knowledge. Muslim Philosophers could not have denied Volition for God had they not accepted definition of 'will' from Aristotle.

Aristotle holds that reason is the ultimate source of knowledge; therefore, what is rationally intelligible is real.<sup>11</sup> Aristotle's metaphysics consists of two ultimate principles: Pure Form and Pure Matter. To pure form he considers what the religious people call god. He argued that everything in the universe is composed of form and matter. He also holds that the pure form and pure matter are absolutely real but they do not exist for existence presupposes space and time. Working out the attributes of his god, Aristotle as we have seen, considered the attribute of 'volition' against god's perfection and argued in favour of god's being a 'self-thinking thought'.<sup>12</sup>

The Muslim philosophers, as we see, accept this Aristotelian concept of god as absolutely rational and felt obliged to reconcile Islamic concept of God with it.

According to Aristotelian metaphysics, pure form (god) and pure matter both are eternal and parallel to each other. Everything in the



universe comes into being when matter takes up a form—this is becoming. Since pure form and pure matter are eternal, the process of becoming must also be eternal. Therefore the universe is eternal. Because of considering Aristotle's system of thought a rational version of truth, the Muslim philosophers, too, held the universe to be eternal. Plotinus was also a successor mystic-philosopher in the Platonic tradition. Plotinus believed that the universe has come into being from god the way the rays emanate from the sun.<sup>13</sup> Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, finding in it a good precedent, introducing certain amendments gave a theory of graded emanation as a possible explanation of the coming into being of the universe from God. They gave a model of emanation according to which the universe comes into being from God at tenth step.

Apparently this view shows great improvement upon the earlier theory of emanation, yet was no better than the Plotinus' view with respect to being nearer to the teachings of the Qur'an! It is as away from the Qur'anic doctrine of Creation as the other un-Islamic views are.

Ptolemy's model of the world which consisted of nine heavens with the earth in the center<sup>14</sup> presented the scientific worldview of Al-Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina's times (Circa 980-1037 A.D.). Qur'anic model of the universe consists of seven heavens and is irreconcilable with Ptolemaic model. Remaining true to the Qur'an, Ibn-e-Sina could not accept Ptolemaic model. But they did not prove their competence in locating flaws in Aristotelian metaphysics, logic, concept of 'will' and 'perfection' etc. They also could not locate flaws in Ptolemaic model of the universe. This marred al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's whole metaphysics with inconsistency and self-contradiction and they had to surrender their beliefs in the creation of the universe in favour of eternal emanation, in Allah's Knowledge of particulars in favour of His eternal knowledge of everything, in human freedom in favour of determinism,<sup>15</sup> in bodily resurrection in favour of spiritual resurrection, in miracles in favour of absolute causation and so on.

Under the influence of Greeks, preferring theory of emanation over theory of creation by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina entangled them into various intellectual problems. Theory of emanation conceives God as a 'Necessary Being' as compared to all other things which are 'possible beings'. God himself is 'Uncaused' but the 'first cause' of everything. Since they hold 'thought' to be the essential attribute of

God, and that thought unfolds itself according to the laws of logic in which the conclusion follows from its premises with logical necessity, so when God thinks upon Himself as Self-thinking Thought, the 'first intellect' is the first thing that emanates from Him as a consequence. The Muslim philosophers conceived Oneness of God as Absolute Simplicity of God according to which, they argued, the Knowledge of God must also be One and without any tinge of multiplicity.<sup>16</sup> They further argued that from something which is absolutely one, only one can emanate. Therefore, from God's Knowledge which is one and absolutely simple, only one thing could directly emanate. Conceiving Knowledge of God as the cause, the first intellect as its effect, they derived two characteristics of their theory of causation: i) that a cause is a unitary event; ii) and that only one effect follows from one cause.

The question is as to how the things of the universe start emanating by mere Self-Knowledge of God in the eternity? The Muslim philosophers' replied that in an absolutely perfect being 'knowledge' is identical with 'creation' and there cannot be any temporal distance in them. From this argument another principle of their theory of causation comes to the fore: That 'the cause' and its 'effect' are simultaneous. Cause is only logically prior to its effect and the effect is only logically posterior to its cause; temporally they are simultaneous.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, if it is admitted that the relationship between cause and effect is of logical necessity, then they should both belong to one and the same kind.

Since the Muslim philosophers held 'thought' to be the essential characteristic of God, they argued that whatever emanates from Him must be 'intellect' as to its essence. Their concept of cause as a 'unitary event' implies another principle of their theory of causation: That an effect will be issued forth necessarily from a single cause. According to this principle, only 'the first intellect' alone could directly follow from God. The first intellect will have two kinds of knowledge: Knowledge of its being a 'possible being' as depending upon God for its coming into being; and knowledge of its being a 'necessary being' as emanating from God as a logical necessity. From one knowledge of God only one thing followed, from two dimensional knowledge of the First Intellect two things—the second intellect and the first heaven—followed by logical necessity.<sup>18</sup>

The 'second intellect' will have more than two kinds of knowledge about itself, so more than two things *i.e.*, the third intellect, the second heaven, and some planets etc. will emanate from it according to the principle of 'one emanates from one'. The number of things emanating from successive Intellects in this theory of graded emanation goes on increasing at each step, with increase in references of their self-knowledge, till at last this terrestrial world of generation and corruption with all the genera, the species, the relations, their members and instances comes into being emanating from the 'tenth Intellect. The principle of causation based on logical necessity, under which the process of emanation starts from God, keeps on at each successive step and ultimately prevails in the whole universe through the Tenth Intellect.

The view of the world arising from this theory is necessarily of a world governed by logical necessity and universal determinism. The actions of human beings can be no exception to it. This nullifies freedom of will for man. There can be no moral freedom, no freedom of choice etc. Islam holds man free and accountable for his actions. If, whatever happens to man is bound to happen with logical necessity, prayer and entreating lose all their meaning. Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's concept of god creates an unfathomable gulf between man and God. Neither God nor man remains free. It leaves no scope for believing in miracles. It makes believing in bodily resurrection impossible. Denial of God's knowledge of particulars becomes unavoidable.

Imam Ghazali severely criticized Muslim philosophers for their ideas. He firmly believed their views to be contrary to Qur'anic teachings. He rightly felt that refutation of the philosophers through traditional theological methods will not produce desired results. He felt it necessary that the philosophical ideas which provide foundation to their views are refuted and that they are refuted on the basis of same logic which they employ in formulating their arguments. According to the philosophy of religion derivable from his writings, Imam Ghazali believed that no religious truth should be rejected unless believing it gives rise to a logical contradiction; and that no philosophical truth should be accepted unless rejecting it entails a logical contradiction.<sup>19</sup> It is evident from his teachings that Imam Ghazali firmly believed that the truth and the untruth can never be reconciled. He believed that any attempt at such thing would necessarily give rise to contradictions. He wrote *Tahafatul Falasifa*

(*Incoherence of the Philosophers*)<sup>20</sup> in which he critically examined twenty selected problems from Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's works and argued that

- (i) Either the very principles *i.e.*, premises on the basis of which they reached their conclusions were wrong; or
- (ii) In case the premises were correct, they had violated the principles of logic which they themselves proclaimed; so the conclusions were incorrect.
- (iii) If the conclusions stated by them were correct, these do not follow from their premises.

Imam Ghazali held that on sixteen out of these twenty problems the Muslim philosophers can be exonerated of deviation from established Islamic beliefs but they cannot be given this leave on the remaining four problems which are as follows:

- (1) The problem of the eternity of the world
- (2) The problem of the denial of God's Knowledge of particulars
- (3) The problem of the denial of miracles
- (4) The problem of the denial of bodily resurrection

Imam Ghazali rightly pointed out that Muslim philosophers' reason for preferring doctrine of emanation over the doctrine of creation lay on the fact that they could not reject Aristotle's definition of 'volition'. Imam Ghazali rejected this definition with sound argument and reconstructed its definition which showed that 'volition' is not a demerit for a perfect being, rather it is a great merit, a dignity of a perfect being that He should have the attribute of 'Will' (*Iradah*).

Imam Ghazali believes that the 'universe' and 'the time' both have been created in the past *ex-nihilo* at a moment which is at a limited temporal distance from the present moment.<sup>21</sup> Ghazali does not support his stand point with proofs; rather he considers the rejection of Muslim philosophers' stand point sufficient in this regard. Muslim philosophers have presented four arguments to prove the eternity of the world. Their first argument is based on Aristotle's concepts of 'cause' and of 'will'. Aristotle's theory of causation holds that: (i) Every effect has a cause; (ii) Cause and effect are two separate events. (iii) Cause and effect are simultaneous. (iv) Aristotle applies his theory of causation equally on physical and psychological changes. (v) He applies this theory equally to God and His attributes as he applies to human beings and other entities.<sup>22</sup> Ibn Sina argues that

suppose the universe is not eternal as a whole, rather it is contingent (*i.e.*, has come into being at a specific moment at a limited distance in the past), there must be some cause for its coming into being.

This cause cannot be a physical one, for as *per* our supposition the matter does not exist prior to the coming into being of the universe.

‘Volition’ of Allah can be the cause of bringing into being of the universe as the religious people believe, but in that case there must be some cause for the activation of Divine Will. This cause cannot be outside God. This will make one Divine action need another Divine action for its explanation, and there will be no limit to it. Ultimate regress of Divine causes will make the existence of the universe unintelligible. And if there is no eternal material which could be referred to as a possible cause of the universe, and if Will of Allah also cannot be held as its cause, and if there exists nothing else which can be referred to for coming into being of the universe, then we are left with only two possibilities—Either the universe does not exist; or the universe exists from ever. The first thing is contrary to the fact. Therefore, the Muslim philosophers argue, the universe is eternal; God has not created it from nothingness; it has always been with God as the rays are with the sun. They further argue that God is immaterial and things of the universe are material, therefore God cannot be the cause of the universe. Hence, matter is coeternal with God and exists parallel to Him. Though God and matter both are coeternal, God is logically prior to the universe as the cause is logically prior to its effect.<sup>23</sup>

According to the discussion made above God's Will alone can be the cause of the creation of the universe from nothingness. Muslim philosophers, arguing that the explanation of the activation of Divine Will is unintelligible, reject the view of creation but Ghazali criticizes them on the same point. He says that may be God eternally has ‘willed’ to create the universe at a specific moment! Ghazali says that no logical contradiction occurs in believing in this way. Ghazali asserts that philosophers may respond by saying:

That ‘volition’ is a complete explanation of an event.

If someone wills a thing, it must happen immediately if there is no hurdle in its way.

That no hurdle can be conceived if Allah wills a thing.

Responding to the philosophers, Ghazali takes support from an Asharite argument and says: May be God has eternally made the bringing into being of the universe conditional to something. Philosopher may say in response: That Will of God is eternal and as per our supposition the creation of the universe is a contingent event, how an eternal Will can be held to be a cause of a contingent event. Ghazali replies this objection by saying: What logical contradiction occurs in accepting delayed effect for a cause!<sup>24</sup> Ghazali asserts that no such contradiction occurs in it; and if the philosopher think that it does, on what principle their argument is based! If the philosophers think that they intuitively feel so, then why do others do not share such intuition!<sup>25</sup>

Another objection of the philosophers against Asharite delayed effect theory is that: According to it the Divine Will chose a moment for the creation of the universe. Choice is always based upon some principle of particularization. Choosing one out of two logically identical moments without a principle of particularization is impossible. A principle of particularization in this respect is inconceivable for God because He is absolutely perfect. So it is not acceptable that God made up His mind to create the universe in eternity, but postponed its coming into being to a later moment. Ghazali's reply is: That Will (*Iradah*) is a capacity which is free in its activity. It itself is its principle of particularization. Asking why and how about it is unnecessary. Ghazali explains the unconditional nature of 'will' or 'volition' by an example. He says that two logically identical dates are presented before a person who is extremely hungry. The condition is that he can take just one. Nothing except severe hunger is the principle of particularization in this case. Now taking one out of two things is possible—either he will take one out of the two pieces of date, or he will take none and remain hungry. Ghazali says that it is absolutely unnecessary for the Divine Will to have a principle of particularization for coming into action. Commenting on discussion between Ghazali and Ibn Rushd on this example, Van Den Berg objects on Ibn Rushd that the problem for that person is not that which one of the dates to take, the problem is that whether to take a

date or not to take one and remain hungry. And that there is clear cut reason for taking any one of the dates. Commenting on this Van Den Berg says that the person's 'volition' will necessarily choose one out of the two dates. But Ibn Rushd gives no answer as to what will be the principle of particularization for choosing that date or on what grounds he will choose that date.<sup>26</sup>

Dilating upon the nature of Divine Will, referring to some characteristics of the actual universe Imam Ghazali says that these characteristics could have been otherwise. For example: It can be conceived that God had so created the universe that the planets that move from east to west, moved in the opposite direction. God, by His Will, chose one out of the two possibilities as He liked. No question as to the principle of particularization could be raised in this concern about Divine Will. Responding to it Ibn Rushd says that present structure of the universe is the best of all possible structures. Rationally speaking, God made the best choice by creating the universe in its present form. Ibn Rushd further says that the question before God was that whether He creates the universe or He does not create the Universe; the question was not of choosing out of two identical possible universes in which planets move in opposite directions. F. H. Hourani says that Ibn Rushd could not properly prove his point, and that his argument is weak. He further says that if the Divine Will is considered to be like human will, Ibn Rushd gets some point, *i.e.*, that God has seen from eternity that the creation of the universe was better than not creating it, so God has created it from eternity and the universe is eternal. But if we admit that the Divine Will cannot be conceived on the analogy of human will, then whole of Ibn Rushd's argument collapses. God can Will to create the universe without any reason, in any form, and at any moment. He can choose a possibility without any reason or principle of particularization. Therefore the problem of the eternity of the universe cannot be solved by comparing Divine Will with human will because all our knowledge about Divine Will is no more than mere conjecture.<sup>27</sup>

The other arguments of the Muslim philosophers for the eternity of the world related to proving the existence of a primordial matter, and through it they wanted to prove the eternity of the universe. Ghazali refuted these arguments too. Ghazali also severely criticized their theory of emanation. He attempted to show that the theory of emanation was a mere myth created by Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina.

Ghazali argued that these philosophers violated the principles put forward by them as the governing principles in the process of emanation. For example: Ghazali says that the philosophers hold that only one emanates from one. But when they say that from one kind of First Intellect's knowledge the first heaven emanates, their own principle fails. Philosophers admit that everything is composed of matter and form; the first heaven is a celestial body which must be composed of matter and form. Ghazali asks: If one emanates from the one as the philosophers proclaim, how the above two things emanated from one knowledge of the First Intellect! Arguing against other principles of emanation Ghazali says that the philosophers claim a relationship of logical necessity between cause and its effect whereas this relationship is that of 'psychological necessity' rather than that of 'logical necessity'.<sup>28</sup>

Ghazali also argued that neither cause is a unitary event nor it is necessary that an effect always emerges from a single cause. Ghazali also rejects the doctrine of the logical priority of a cause over its effect and put forward the doctrine of the temporal priority of cause over its effect proclaiming that cause and effect are two separate events, and that delayed effect was possible. Thus Ghazali not only refuted Muslim philosophers' theory of the eternity of the world and theory of emanation but also rejected their arguments which had forced them for the denial of miracles and bodily resurrection. One of the implications of the philosophers' theory of emanation was that believing in God's knowledge of particulars had become impossible for them. The philosopher had argued that knowledge refers to a relation between the knower and the known. Therefore knowledge implies change in the knower, and change implies imperfection. Ghazali could never tolerate the denial of the knowledge of particulars for God, so he very severely criticized them on this problem.

The reason of why the Muslim philosophers adopted theory of emanation instead of theory of creation was that they were too much impressed by Greek philosophers and especially by Plato and Aristotle, and of Plotinus—a later representative of Greek philosophy. Though the Greek philosophers had not produced a cosmological model similar to Muslim philosopher's theory of graded emanation and the Muslim philosophers had not followed Greeks in this respect, yet the origin of theory of graded emanation did not lie in Islamic



teachings. Its origin lay in the Ptolemaic model of the universe. Ptolemy's worldview presented the scientific cosmology of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's times.<sup>29</sup> According to this cosmological model the universe consisted of nine heavenly spheres; sun, moon, mars, and other known planets of their times were placed in these heavenly spheres. Ptolemy (90 – 168) successfully located these planets.<sup>30</sup> The cosmological scheme and placement of planets in Muslim philosopher's cosmological model follow Ptolemaic model. At the beginning of seventeenth century Kepler (1571–1630) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) harmed Aristotle and Ptolemy's cosmology. Newton (1642–1727) presented a comprehensive model of the universe based on complex mathematical calculations in the seventeenth century. Newton's cosmology reigned almost for two centuries as a scientific worldview before its being replaced by Einstein's Theory of Relativity at the end of the nineteenth century. This view is still prevalent as most modern scientific cosmology having no concept of heavens. So the scientific theories on which al-Farabi and Ibn Sina founded their theory of emanation and because of which they had to deny creation of the universe, God's knowledge of particulars, miracles, and bodily resurrection has long been rejected and replaced by different and diverse theories.<sup>31</sup>

Al-Farabi denied knowledge of particulars for God. He held that God's Knowledge is eternal and one. God knows Himself from eternity and He knows everything through His Self-knowledge.<sup>32</sup> Though Ibn Sina does not differ from al-Farabi, yet he presents his views in such a way that it does not easily become clear that he denies God's knowledge of particulars. However, the arguments he puts forward to prove God's knowledge of particulars, ultimately end up in its denial.

Ibn Sina divides reality into two parts: celestial world (*i.e.*, the heavenly world) and terrestrial world. According to his cosmology, every entity or event relating to heavenly or celestial world is the only member of their respective species. For example, the First Intellect is the only entity or member of its species. Similarly the first heaven too is the only member of its species. Following Ptolemaic cosmology, Ibn Sina placed sun, moon, mars and other planets or known stars of their times at different heavens. So these are also celestial entities and a solar or lunar eclipse is a celestial event. Ibn Sina also argued that

like heavenly bodies and entities, heavenly events are also a sole member of their respective species.

Regarding God's Knowledge, Ibn Sina held that it can neither be sensational nor rational; rather God knows all particulars in a universal way.<sup>33</sup> Ibn Sina explained this by saying that God's Knowledge actually consists of the essence of things and events. Knowledge of essences consists of the knowledge of species and genera and this is a universal and general knowledge of the nature of all things. Now if a genus consists of more than one species or a species consists of more than one members, universal knowledge of that genus or species will not be equivalent to the particular knowledge of their individual members. But if a genus consists of only one species or a species consists of not more than one member, universal knowledge of that genus or species will be equivalent to the direct knowledge of that particular entity or event. Ibn Sina holds that in the celestial sphere each entity or event, from First Intellect to the Tenth Intellect, is the sole member of its species, and the respective species is a sole member of its genus, therefore God directly and completely knows each of these particular entities or events by a universal way. In Ibn Sina's theory of emanation, as we already know, Tenth Intellect is the origin of all terrestrial entities, individuals, events and of their species and genera. Since it is the only member of its species, it is known to God directly and completely by a universal knowledge. Therefore, by knowing Tenth Intellect directly and completely in a universal way God directly and completely knows all the particular entities, individuals and events belonging to this spatio-temporal world. So, Ibn Sina argues, God knows all the particulars, not a shred of anything remains outside His Knowledge, but God knows the particulars by a universal way.<sup>34</sup>

According to Ibn Sina's cosmological model, the celestial sphere consists of ten intellects, nine heavens, some planets placed on them. These are the entities each of which is the only member of its respective species, and their species the only member of their respective genus. The total number of these entities is not more than thirty. These are the particulars which can be known by God directly and completely. Though Ibn Sina argues that God knows all the particular entities and events emanating from the Tenth Intellect completely and directly by knowing their source which is the sole member of its species, but according to al-Ghazali he is not

successful. There is none among the particulars emanating from the Tenth Intellect which is the only member of its species. Every genus consists of many species and every species consists of innumerable members. Therefore, God's direct knowledge of the Tenth Intellect cannot be held equivalent to directly knowing these particulars. Ghazali is right when he asserts that the Muslim philosophers do not believe God's Knowledge of particulars.

Accepting Aristotle's theory of causation and adopting theory of emanation instead of theory of creation, the Muslim philosophers had to deny the miracles as well as bodily resurrection. If the nature of relationship between cause and effect is admitted to be of logical necessity, then the effect will be as natural and efficient an event as will be the cause. (It will bring God to the category of efficient entities.) Every event occurring in the universe will be held merely a natural event. If a miracle is a supernatural event, there will be no scope for their occurrence in such a universe. Denial of Volition for God also implies that God can never intervene in the universe with His free will. When God is conceived to be the Uncaused First Cause and it is held that an effect follows from its cause with logical necessity, absolute determinism prevails in the universe. Neither God nor man remains free. Prayers and solicitations lose their meaning; the intimate relationship between God and His servants which is the essence of religion, has to be denied. Another implication of accepting Aristotle's theory of causation was that the Muslim philosophers had to deny bodily resurrection. The relationship of logical necessity between cause and effect implies that an effect will always be entailed by one specific cause. If mankind is to resuscitate passing through the same series of causation as in this world, as much time will be needed in their bodily resurrection on the day of resurrection as it took in their coming into being in this world. Moreover, there is no sense in repeating the same process and creating the same world once again. Therefore bodily resurrection is impossible, resurrection will be spiritual in nature.

Ghazali rightly conceived that accepting Aristotle's theory was the basic cause of holding above ideas by Muslim philosophers. So he rightly felt that this theory should be rejected. Ghazali argued that the relationship between cause and effect was not of logical necessity but of psychological necessity. Observing two events always following each other we ascribe a relationship of logical necessity between

them.<sup>35</sup> For example, it is possible that water does not quench one's thirst, fire does not burn one's hand. Hume, (1711-1776) a modern British philosopher and historian who argued that human knowledge arises only from sense experience also presented the same view centuries after Ghazali. Modern philosophy and science do not admit the doctrine of logical necessity as nature of relationship between cause and effect. They simply admit it as a rule of the game.<sup>36</sup> Ghazali also falsified Muslim philosophers' principle of 'one effect generating from a single cause.' Ghazali argued that it is quite conceivable that the same effect comes about from more than one causes. Conceiving so does not give rise to any logical contradiction. For example, death is an effect, which can arise from many causes. Mill (1806-1873) a British philosopher and economist of the modern period known especially for his interpretations of empiricism and utilitarianism,<sup>37</sup> supported Ghazali's view by his doctrine of the plurality of causes. Ghazali also refuted Muslim philosopher's view of cause as a unitary event. Ghazali argued that cause is a composite event. In the modern period Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)<sup>38</sup> supported Ghazali in this aspect of his theory of causation. Ghazali argued that God is a Willing Being and Volition absolutely befits to His Majesty as a Perfect Being. He has created the universe on His Will. That there is no logical necessity between cause and effect. Therefore, occurrence of miracles is absolutely possible. Regarding bodily resurrection Ghazali argued that it is not necessary that resurrection will follow the system of causation known by us. May be there is a system of causation which is not known to us and will be activated on the day of resurrection or God brings into being a new system of causation on that Day. Thus Ghazali considers cause and effect to be subservient to Allah's Will, and not the otherwise. Imam Ghazali argued that resurrection was not a logical impossibility.

Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328)<sup>39</sup> an Islamic scholar, theologian and logician born in Harran located in what is now Turkey, close to the Syrian border, also enters into the discussion on the problem of the eternity/creation of the world and gives his views in the form of his doctrine of the continuity of effects.<sup>40</sup> Considers the inaction and suspension (*rakûd* and *t'attal* ركوذوتعطل) of the Divine Attributes logically impossible Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the Divine Attributes including His Attribute of Creation have been expressing them in some form from ever. So the effects of Divine Attributes have been

existed from all eternity. Though matter in itself is contingent, and this universe in itself is not eternal, yet Divine Attribute of Creation has been creating something from eternity and forever shall this continue without interruption.<sup>41</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah holds that though everything is contingent (*i.e.*, it was non-existent before its coming into being), yet there existed something before it such that no absolute privation existed prior to anything.<sup>42</sup> So a theory of creation which presupposes an absolute privation (or nothingness) before the coming into being of the universe, Ibn Taymiyyah argues, is a logical impossibility. Privation is only relative; it simply means the nonexistence of a thing before its coming into being. Though no inactivity or suspension in the expression of Divine Attributes is acceptable, and Attribute of Creation has continuously been creating its effects from eternity, no particular entity or event is coeternal with God. At most what we can say is that because of uninterrupted eternal activity of the Attribute of Creation, the continuity of effects as a whole becomes eternal and there is no harm in accepting this.<sup>43</sup>

Aristotle argued that pure form and pure matter are two ultimate principles which are parallel to each other from eternity. To pure form he calls god. Pure matter, according to him, is a logical substratum, a capacity of being molded into things. It is present from all eternity. According to Aristotle, god and primordial matter are coeternal to each other. Another form of coeternity is given by Plato before Aristotle. Plato conceives reality consisting of two worlds: celestial world, and terrestrial world. Celestial world of Plato consists of 'world of ideas', creator god (demiurge), and 'the world soul'. The world of ideas consists of innumerable abstract, rational, eternal, uncreated and absolutely perfect ideas organized in hierarchical form. The idea of matter is also included in this hierarchy of ideas. As to the relationship of these ideas and god, there is difference of opinion between interpreters of Platonic thought. Some consider these ideas to be separate from god as uncreated and eternally present with him; whereas according to others these ideas are eternally present in god's mind but are uncreated. Thus according to both interpretations the ideas are coeternal with god. Though, according to Platonic metaphysics, this universe is a dim copy of the world of ideas, but this copy too exists from eternity as god is eternally creating copies on the pattern of eternal ideas. Thus Platonic metaphysics, too, conceives universe coeternal with god. The thing to be noted is that both in

Aristotle and in Plato, each individual object is contingent but the process of becoming is eternal and there is no absolute privation before anything. Neither Plato's nor Aristotle's god is a 'willing' agent. An eternal becoming can never be an act of 'volition'. It must be some kind of a logically necessary process like emanation.

Let us make a comparison of the ideas discussed above.

- 1) A theory of creation must admit the absolute absence of determinations, including archetypes or ideas even, before the coming into being of the universe. Creation must take place from 'Volition' and on 'Command'.
- 2) The basic objection on this view was that Volition is contrary to the absolute perfection of God and we know that Imam Ghazali refuted this view with a strong argument and redefined the concept of 'Will'.
- 3) Plato and Aristotle do not admit of any absolute privation. Matter is coeternally present with god and the process of becoming starts from eternity. Aristotle's philosophy makes god, the matter and the universe eternally present with each other. One cannot have power over what is parallel to it.
- 4) According to the theory of emanation propounded by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina god is the Prime Cause. Because there is no temporal distance between cause and effect, therefore, emanation from god through first intellect to the tenth intellect is eternal. Tenth intellect includes genera, species, forms and matter, and universal properties from which all things come into being. In this way all these things will also become eternal. Particulars, individuals and states since are contingent therefore take privation before them but the universe as a whole does not proceed from absolute privation so it is also coeternal with god. Thus this view too is similar to that of Plato and Aristotle.
- 5) Apparently Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Sina's views look essentially different from each other because Ibn Sina's philosophy presupposes the existence of a primordial matter coeternal with god whereas there is no such thing in Ibn Taymiyyah. So in Ibn Taymiyyah, though the process of creation is eternal, however, everything is a unique creation and the universe as a whole is not coeternal with God. But as we shall see, this impression is not correct.

(i) If the process of creation is admitted to be eternally continuing, it will become coeternal with God. Those who are coeternal are parallel, and those who are parallel have no power over

each other. An eternal becoming, whether an emanation or creation of unique objects (as in Ibn Taymiyyah) can never be an act of 'volition'. It must be some kind of a logically necessary process. Volition is a capacity to freely choose between two logically identical possibilities without any principle of particularization. Choice of doing something or not doing something both are included in it. A being who has freedom of will has control over his activity. Doctrine of the continuity of effects negates this control of God over the effects and makes creation a logically necessary process like theory of emanation.

(ii) It is necessary for a 'Willing Agent' that what he wills comes into being on his Command (*amr*) but not with logical necessity as in al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's theory of emanation. Ibn Taymiyyah's theory also defies this principle.

(iii) The above theories apply same concept of serial time to God and His Attributes as to the contingent objects.

In Western thought the concept of eternity is conceived in following two ways: Everlastingness; and in the sense of Timelessness. Everlastingness in its essence is a serial time which we divide into past, present, and future. When it is seen without beginning with reference to past, it is eternity (*azliyat* ازلیت); when it is seen unending with reference to future, it is everlastingness (*abdiyat* ابدیت). The doctrine of the continuity of effects in its discussions conceives time as serial in nature like theory of emanation and applies to Divine Attributes, the process of creation, and their effects in the same sense. The concept of absolute and fixed privation and its logical impossibility before the coming into being of the universe etc., all support the contention that the time presupposed by Ibn Taymiyyah is serial in its essence. Eternal continuity of effects implies eternity of serial time as well as eternity of space. The concept of 'absolute and determined privation' and all discussions associated with it become meaningless when seen in the light of modern analytical philosophy.

God is transcendent and Absolutely Matchless. Conceiving Him on the analogy of things is against His Dignity. Having determinations or form is the essential feature of things. Nothing except the Absolute Creator of all determinations can be beyond determinations. The Absolute Creator of all determinations must be Absolutely Matchless and Unique.<sup>44</sup> The time and space are real. The

same present is going to transform into future.<sup>45</sup> On the Day of Resurrection though all adornment on earth will be eliminated, yet the time and space will still remain.<sup>46</sup> No word occurs in the Qur'an for *azliyat* (eternity). The word *abdiyat* (ابدیت) endlessness, everlastingness) is also used with reference to human beings, it is not used with reference to God.<sup>47</sup> The word '*ad-dahr*' (الدهر) occurs twice in the Qur'an yet does not refer to God. Identifying God with 'time' is absolutely against the Qur'an.<sup>48</sup> The Qur'an uses the words '*Aḥd*' and '*Wāḥid*' for God.<sup>49</sup> Keeping in view the above descriptions of *azliyat*, *abdiyat*, and of *ad-dahr*, it appears that '*Aḥdiyyat*' is a phase before the coming into being of the Universe. There are absolutely no determinations at '*Aḥdiyyat*'. Here the Divine Being is in His '*Ṣamdiyyat*' (صمدیت) i.e., beyond having any desire, want etc. No aspiration as to be known, nor of seeing His Own Beauty in the mirror of the universe; neither any Will to create the universe nor of not to create it; no archetypes nor anything like Platonic ideas etc. At this phase the Divine Being wills to create the universe. The determinations come into being in Divine Knowledge and these determinations are expressed, not with logical necessity, but with Allah's absolute Knowledge and on His Command (*amr*). This is the stage of Oneness (*Wahdat*). Divine Attributes are real attributes but dividing God into Essence and Attributes is to apply Aristotelian logic on God which is wrong. Similarly to say that 'delayed action and inaction of Divine Attributes is a logical impossibility' presupposes that the concept of God made on the basis of above faulty logic is in mind. The universe is a manifestation of the Being of God, and not of His Attributes. Attributes are real but not other than the essence of God as the Aristotelian logic conceives. Moreover, wherein the attributes (*ṣift*) are present the owner of the attributes (*maṣūof*) is present, is the principle. It appears from the principle presented by Ibn Taymiyyahh concerning the eternally continuous activity of Divine Attributes as if the Divine Attributes do not manifest under Divine discretion, but on their own; this is not a merit for a human being, not to talk of God. The Qur'an says that the universe is replete with Signs of God. Phase of Seclusion (*Aḥdiyyat*) comes before the phase of Divine Manifestation (*Wahdat*).<sup>50</sup> Ibn Taymiyyahh wrongly conceives *Aḥdiyyat* as inaction, suspension and delay in the manifestation of Divine Attributes. Night comes before the day; 'Being' follows 'Not-being'. At *Aḥdiyyat* the Divine Being is not manifest. Neither Allah is identical with 'Time' (*ad-dahr*) nor



'Time' is an essential feature of the Being of God. To assert any such thing is contrary to the Qur'an. At *Aḥdīyat* there are no determinations. Time and space refer to determinations and their coming into being by Allah's Will (*Iradah*) and Command (*Amr*) is called the phase of *Waḥdat*. Those who on the analogy of the world (being four dimensional reality) conceive God as infinitely dimensional Being, conceive God on the analogy of His creation which is wrong. They who conceive God infinite as compared to things, observe difference of degree not of kind, they conceive God on the analogy of mankind; which is again contrary to the teachings of the Qur'an. To differentiate '*Aḥdīyat*' and '*Waḥdat*' as phases and to state Will, Command, and Creation in a preferential order is right for it has been observed in the Qur'an.<sup>51</sup> Conceiving it on human experience is not correct, for God is Transcendent, Absolutely Matchless and Unique.

All discussion in this article is made in the perspective of Islam. There is a mention in the Qur'an of the creation of a universe which consists of seven heavens. Throne (*'Arsh*) and water were present before it. Allah is the Lord of the Throne and the Creator of water too. He created all living things from water. If someone conjectures that the present universe is not the only universe which has been created, the onus of proof lies on his shoulder alone for such an unfounded assertion. The universe is not eternal. The universe is manifestation of the Being of God; it is replete with the signs of His Majesty and Oneness. Everything other than God either belongs to the category of His 'creation' or of His 'command'. Every determination has a beginning, The One is there before every beginning, every determination has an end; The One is there after its end.<sup>52</sup> God with His Attributes transcends all determinations; none is a partner to Him in any manner.<sup>53</sup>



# **THE QUR'AN, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY**



## EVOLVING A QUR'ANIC PARADIGM OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY: IBN SINA, SIR SEYYED AHMED KHAN, DR. MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND DR. ISRAR AHMAD


*Abstract—The writer considers attempts in the history of Muslim civilization at the reconstruction of religious thought not to be on appropriate lines and proposes that the Muslim philosophers should be on their guard against such attempts and resist such irrationalities presented in the garb of rationality. By 'Reconstruction of religious thought' we mean taking a scientific theory and the worldview (i.e., philosophy) related to it, as the standard of rationality of one's own times and setting on to reinterpreting basic religious beliefs so as to prove them harmonious with these theories. History of Muslim philosophy is replete with attempts of making out reconciliation between revealed knowledge and manmade knowledge, but for the sake of precision we have chosen Ibn e Sina, Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal ultimately to examine Dr. Israr Ahmed's 'The process of Creation: A Qur'anic Perspective' as a latest instance of such attempt. Dr. Israr Ahmed is just a symbol of those present day scholars who idealize the above approach. Failing to find anything in the Qur'an that could support their contention either they try to search out a tradition in the corpus of traditions compiled in the name of the Prophet (pbuh) or the Companions of the Prophet on the basis of which they could insert their own suggestion in the Qur'an to bring out their desired meaning or they insert un-Qura'nic terminologies or identifications in the Qura'an for the same purpose. The contemporary school of scientific interpretation of the Qur'an, in one way or the other, is toeing the same lines. Though Ziauddin Sardar, Sayyed Hossein Nasr and the IIIT have taken lines different or opposed to each other, yet they do not escape the above criticism. However examining their method and content needs an independent study.*

**Keywords-** Qur'anic paradigm, theories, worldview, science, philosophy

“Philosophical system, and a scientific world view, by which one gets impressed, assumes the status of a rational version of truth for him. If one already believes in a revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance.”<sup>1</sup> Philo of Alexandria (also called Judaeus Philo c.20 BCE—40 CE) a Jewish scholar, got so much impressed by Plato that he referred to him as ‘the most holy Plato’. Believing Judaism as the revealed truth, and the Platonic philosophy as the standard of rationality, Philo set himself to developing a speculative justification for Judaism in terms of its harmonization with Greek philosophy. In the history of

philosophy this was the first attempt at the rational reconstruction of religious thought. This created the scope for Hellenistic interpretation of Hebrew thought. In this way Philo laid foundations for the philosophical and theological development of Christianity as we see it today.

Ptolemy's model of the world which consisted of nine heavens with the earth in the center presented the scientific worldview of Ibn-e-Sina's times (Circa 980–1037 A.D.). Ptolemy's cosmology prevailed for 1400 years. Qur'anic model of the universe consists of seven heavens and is irreconcilable with Ptolemaic model.<sup>2</sup> Remaining true to the Qur'an, Ibn-e-Sina could not accept Ptolemaic model. But then he had to reject the Ptolemaic model as false, or prove it doubtful, which he could not do. So he had to surrender his belief in Qur'anic cosmology consisting of seven heavens in favour of Ptolemaic cosmology consisting of nine heavens. Ibn Sina was as much impressed by Aristotelian metaphysics as Philo was by Platonic metaphysics. So he could not prove his competence in locating flaws in Aristotelian logic which was based on dualistic metaphysics, his concept of 'will' as implying imperfection, his concept of 'cause/effect relationship' as logical necessity, and his concept of 'perfection' as immutability etc. Accepting Ptolemaic cosmology and Aristotelian metaphysics as standard of rationality of his times, he set himself on the reconstruction of Islamic religious thought. This marred Ibn-e-Sina's whole metaphysics with inconsistency and self-contradiction. He had to surrender his belief in Qur'anic cosmology consisting of seven heavens in favour of Ptolemaic cosmology consisting of nine heavens, he had to surrender his belief in the creation of the universe in favor of eternal emanation, belief in Allah's Knowledge of particulars in favor of God's all-encompassing eternal knowledge, belief in human freedom in favor of determinism, belief in bodily resurrection in favor of spiritual resurrection, belief in miracles in favor of absoluteness of efficient causation and so on.



*Aristotle's Universe*

### ***Geocentric universe of Aristotle and Ptolemy<sup>3</sup>***

Ideas thrive upon terms and travel in history. If they are false they go on coloring the understanding and interpretation of other ideas. At times it may take centuries for someone to identify them and straighten them. It was around fourteen centuries after Aristotle when al-Ghazali (1058–1111) redefined the notion of Divine ‘Will’ to show that it was absolutely compatible with the perfection of Qur’anic God and a sign of His Dignity and Majesty. He also pointed out other inconsistencies in Ibn Sina’s philosophy which arose as implication of accepting Aristotle’s metaphysics, logic, concept of ‘causation’ and other ideas.<sup>4</sup>

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### ***Newtonian cosmology and naturalism***

Expanding on the ideas of Galileo, Copernicus and Johannes Kepler, in 1687 Sir Isaac Newton presented a comprehensive worldview of an infinite, closed, static, steady state, clockwork universe, in which the

total momentum of the Universe is conserved, interactions redistribute the momentum, but the total never changes. In this model, God was needed only to start the clock (initial cause), then it runs by itself for the rest of time. (cf. *The Physics of the Universe: Cosmological theories through history*, <http://physicsoftheuniverse.com/cosmological.html>) There could be no role for God in this universe Whose Goodly Names are mentioned in the Qur'an. Neither could there be any place in this universe for miracles, supernatural events, supernatural entities or divine intervention.<sup>5</sup> Prayer and supplication had no real meaning. Laws of nature are sufficient to account for everything relating matter, life, mind, soul, freewill, personal identity or whatever. "Prophecies and so-called miraculous events either are explicable by the known or hither to unknown laws of nature; if they are not thus explicable, their happening itself must be denied. Since, for religious and moral as well as for scientific truth, human reason is the only source of knowledge, the fact of a Divine Revelation is to be explained in natural terms if it is to be believed. The contents of such revelations can be accepted only in so far as they are rational according to the prevalent standards. "If man must have a religion at all, it is only that which his reason dictates." In short it can be said that Newtonian naturalism contradicts the most vital doctrines of Islam which rest essentially on the existence of a Person God, His so many Attributes, the Creator at Will of the universe and nature; and the idea of an organized system of Divinely administered universe,<sup>6</sup> angels, prophets, the soul and its spirituality and immortality, human freedom and responsibility, resurrection, judgment and reward and the life hereafter.

### ***Basic principle of Sir Seyyed's theology of modernity***

The philosophy of naturalism and Newtonian science, in line with each other, constituted the standard of rationality of Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan's times. The challenge he had in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in British occupied India was the following:

- (i) Either to prove naturalism to be wrong, or
- (ii) to show its assumptions to be doubtful, or
- (iii) to keep on believing what he believed as a traditional believer;
- or
- (iv) following Philo and Ibn Sina, to reconstruct his religious beliefs to demonstrate them as compatible with the standard of rationality of his own times.



Khan opts for the last and formulates a 15 point framework comprising, what he calls, his theology of modernity (*jadid ilm al-kalam*) to reinterpret the Scripture to harmonize it with the assumptions, implications and consequences of Newtonian naturalism.<sup>7</sup> Like Ibn Sina he justifies his belief in God on the basis of cosmological argument as First Cause, conceives this First Cause as Absolute Existence in the sense of *wahdat al wujud*, interprets His Attributes in Mutazilite sense. This comprises his rational supernaturalism. How can an Uncaused First Cause be a Creator at Will, how can a First Cause descend revelation, how can He be a Command Giver and Administrator of the world etc! Conceiving God as First Cause, how could you believe in angels, prophets, the soul, its spirituality and immortality, human freedom and responsibility, bodily resurrection, judgment and reward and the life hereafter! How can a First Cause claim to have created the earth in two days, and in two days to have created the provisions on earth, and in two days to have created the seven heavens!(al-Qur'an, 41:9-12)

The Qur'an is the basic source of teachings in Islam. It is believed by Muslims to be revealed *i.e.*, supernatural in its origin and the standard of truth/authority (*al-haqq*).<sup>8</sup> What conforms to it is true (*haqq*), what contradicts it is false (*bâtil*), what is said in violation to this is wrongful (*bi ghayr 'l haqq*), deviation from it is error (*al-dalâl*), to express views without reference to it is to follow conjecture (*zann*), saying anything about Allah, not supported by the Qur'an, is concoction (*iftirâ*). The Qur'an calls itself 'the Word of God' (*Kalâm Allah*).

Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan stipulates to call the created world *i.e.*, the phenomena of nature,) 'the Work of God' as compared to the Qur'an which calls itself 'the Word of God'. In order to reconstruct the Qur'anic teachings in accordance with Newtonian naturalism, elaborating the close relationship between 'the Work of God' and 'the Word of God' in his 'theology of modernity' he introduces a principle that in case of conflict between science and religion "the Work of God' overrides 'the Word of God.'" Developing this hermeneutics he makes the revealed Word of God (the 'Standard of Truth' in Islam) subservient to human knowledge based on the study of nature of which Newtonian scientific world-view being the best instance in Khan's own times. Look at the irony of fate that Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan passes away in 1998, and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity replaces Newtonian naturalism in 1905 and his General Theory of Relativity appears in 1915.

### ***Einstein's cosmology and naturalism***

Newtonian naturalism believed no connection between space and time. Physical space was held to be a flat, three-dimensional continuum (*i.e.*, an arrangement of all possible point locations—to which Euclidean postulates would apply.) Time was viewed as absolute (*i.e.*, independent of space, as a separate, one-dimensional continuum) completely homogeneous along its infinite extent.<sup>9</sup> So Newtonian universe was an infinite space existing in an absolute time. Albert Einstein in his Theory of Relativity suggested that “time wasn't separate from space but connected to it. Time and space are combined to form *space-time*, and everyone measures his or her own experience in it differently.” Einsteinian naturalism sees the fabric of space as four-dimensional. In it *time* is not absolute, it is relative to the experiencing subject. The basic elements of space-time are *events* as compared to Newtonian naturalism which believes in static and steady state universe with *things* as its elements. “In any given space-time, an event is a unique position at a unique time.” Einstein also suggested that space-time wasn't flat, but curved or “warped” by the existence of matter and energy. Einsteinian naturalism states “that objects with large masses can warp [bend/twist] *time* by speeding it up or slowing it down. How many dimensions are needed to describe the universe is still an open question. According to some modern theories, the universe can only be adequately described by using a system with many more dimensions than were originally proposed by Einstein.”<sup>10</sup>

### ***Basic principle of Iqbal's theology of modernity—Construction of a scientific form of religious knowledge***

Einstein's study of ‘the Work of God’ makes Sir Seyyed's reconstruction of Muslim theology outdated and incompatible with the newly arisen naturalism. As per his own principle “that Work of God overrides the Word of God”, a new Sir Seyyed was needed to reinterpret ‘the Word of God’ to show that it was still compatible with the naturalism of Einstein, Einstein who definitely did not believe in a Personal God and who was a determinist. Einstein argues that the natural scientists cannot legitimately believe in the reality of supernatural causes behind natural events.<sup>11</sup> Now Iqbal comes forward with a new interpretation of ‘the Word of God’ in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* in line with Einsteinian Naturalism and other modern sciences. Basit Bilal Koshul in his article “Muhammad Iqbal's

reconstruction of the philosophical arguments for the existence of God”<sup>12</sup> rightly sums up Iqbal’s understanding of the relationship between religion and science in the following words which could be termed as first point of Iqbal’s theology of modernity (*jadeed ilm al-kalam*):

[i] ‘If religion aspires to attract seekers whose religious faith is based on personal experience (rather than tradition, culture and dogma) religion will have to open itself to science. [ii] If science aspires to give a coherent and holistic account of experience (rather than partial and mutually irreconcilable accounts) science will have to open itself to religion.’<sup>13</sup>

According to Iqbal faith is ultimately based on a special type of inner experience. Sufism has been providing this facility by developing special spiritual and psychological techniques for directing the evolution of this inner experience in an individual believer but by becoming incapable of receiving fresh inspirations from the modern thought and experience, sufism has failed to fulfill this need. From here draws the second point of what Dr. Khalid Masud would rightly call, Iqbal’s theology of modernity. Keeping in view the unique characteristics of modern culture a scientific form of religious knowledge is but needed to make such inner experience possible.<sup>14</sup> By accomplishing a reconstruction of scientific thought in terms of, what Dr. Basit Bilal calls, Qur’anically-informed perspective and accomplishing a reconstruction of religious thought in terms of modern scientific understanding of experience, Iqbal believes, we will provide that scientific form of religious knowledge which is essential for that special type of inner experience on which the faith is ultimately based on. Thus Iqbal sees the “harmonization of religion and science as essential precondition for the possibility of such inner experience in the modern, scientific cultural setting.”<sup>15</sup>

Iqbal starts by examining religious experience to pave the way for opening religion towards science and science towards religion. “As is evident from the very title of his work, Iqbal undertakes a philosophical discussion of some of the basic ideas of Islam in order to attempt a reconstruction of Islamic religious thought in terms of modern science and philosophy considering them the standard of rationality. Iqbal considers that the essence of religion is faith, that faith is based on religious experience [revelation] or intuition, and that science is a

systematization of sense experience and philosophy an intellectual view of reality.<sup>16</sup> Developing an extended concept of thought, Iqbal persistently advocates his conviction that senses, reason and intuition are not independent sources of knowledge but only aspects of one wider source which he calls 'thought'. They seek visions of the same reality so they must be absolutely reconcilable. Intuition, however a higher form of thought, is more basic than intellect and sense experience and is not devoid of cognitive element. In the first lecture of *Reconstruction*, Iqbal examines the genuineness of intuition as a source of knowledge, and taking the Qur'an as the embodiment of religious experience, gives an account of reality revealed in it. In order to prove his contentions, he critically interprets and examines the accounts of reality discernible from scientists and philosophers with a view to discovering whether they ultimately lead us to the same character of reality as is revealed by religious experience. Thus in this chapter he analyzes religious experience as a source of knowledge and argues that intellectual thought and religious experience are not opposed to each other, they have common source and thus complementary to each other. The second chapter examines this experience philosophically and concludes that judgement based on religious experience fully satisfies the intellectual test. Through philosophical discussions of levels of human experience, and the meaning of creation, the primacy of life and thought, the teleological character of reality and the meaning of teleology with reference to God, by the end of this lecture he is able to reach the idea of God (or Ultimate Reality). He reaches this idea by identifying *Time* with God, and the spatial aspects of reality with God's manifestation in serial time. In this chapter Iqbal examines modern philosophical and scientific theories of space and time to find that philosophical theories in fact come to agree with the religious experience of reality; however conceding the limitations of the intellectual view of life, Iqbal asserts that it cannot take us beyond a pantheistic view of life whereas intuition of one's own self reveals that the ultimate nature of reality is spiritual (*i.e.*, a self) and must be conceived as an Ego. Further, the Qur'an emphasizes the individuality of the Ultimate Ego and gives Him the proper name of Allah.<sup>17</sup> The third chapter puts the religious experience of prayer to pragmatic test. Having reached and having identified the Ultimate Ego with the Qur'anic God citing Surat al-Ikhlās, which declares the incomparable uniqueness of God as Individual, in this chapter, Iqbal embarks upon drawing out either the characteristics of the

Absolute Ego and reinterpreting the attributes of the Qur'anic God to reconcile them or the other way round.”<sup>18</sup> “The fourth chapter relates religious experience with modern and Islamic ‘theories of self and its freedom’ from the perspectives of religion and philosophy. The fifth chapter explores prophesy as a fundamental of Islamic culture that demonstrates how religious experience transforms itself into a living world force. This particular perspective is possible only by disregarding the Greek classical metaphysical view of reason, matter and movement and by adopting the Qur'anic anticlassical approach to the universe. The sixth lecture on *Ijtihad* illustrates how the dynamism within the structure of Islamic thought was lost by the adoption of classical methods of reasoning that led to *taqlid* and stagnation. The concluding chapter comes back to the question “Is religion possible?” and argues that the religion and the scientific processes involve different methods but they are in a sense parallel to each other. In the scientific process self stands outside and in the religious experience the self develops an inclusive attitude. Both are descriptions of the same world but from different stand points.”<sup>19</sup>

For the sake of argument let us admit that Iqbal makes a very ingenious attempt in his lectures for the harmonization of science and religion, does this admission allows anyone to claim that it is on correct lines! Was not the attempt made by Ibn Sina an equally ingenious attempt for the same in his own times! Does not Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan make a very ingenious attempt in harmonizing Qur'an with Newtonian naturalism through his principle “The Work of God overrides the Word of God”? If the basic suppositions of these both are contrary to the Qur'anic teachings, so not on correct lines, then should we not examine whether presuppositions of Iqbal's project are based on the teachings of the Qur'an or not! This alone will decide the genuineness, originality and worth of his thought.

In the second chapter of his *Reconstruction* commenting on Newtonian scientific view of Nature as pure materiality associated with a view of space as an absolute void in which things are situated Iqbal observes that it creates an unbridgeable gulf between the knowing subject (mind) and the known object (matter) (Iqbal, 27-28). Looking at Nature as a structure of interrelated events possessing the character of continuous creative flow, as presented by Einstein, Iqbal conceives it as a systematic mode of behavior and as such organic to the Ultimate Self

(*i.e.*, God) as character is [organic] to human self. (Iqbal, 28, 45) (Koshul, 101)

Conceiving the relationship between Nature and God on the analogy of character to man, looking at Nature as habit of Allah, and considering Nature as organic to the Ultimate Self, as we shall see is one of the two fundamental presuppositions which enable Iqbal to bring about that scientific form of religious knowledge which he considers necessary for making special type of inner experience possible which according to him the faith is ultimately based on.

Any discussion on the negative or positive implications of the above idea drawn by Iqbal will be pointless unless the status of the basic idea is decided *i.e.*, whether it is correct or incorrect. Let us first examine the said basic idea presented by Iqbal.

Our point is that if Nature (as theo-philosophically interpreted by Iqbal) is to God as character is to human self, if it is organic to the Ultimate Self, if it is *habit of Allah* then Nature is must to be considered uncreated and eternal. And this is absolutely contrary to the Message of the Qur'an. Does God not say in the Qur'an: "Nothing is like Him." Hence Supremely Unique and Absolutely Transcendent of all analogies! Then how could you justify conceiving the Life of God on the analogy of man! The Qur'an says: "He is the Creator of heavens and the earth and whatever therein is!" Are not the domains of experience studied by physics, biology, and psychology *i.e.*, matter, life, and consciousness His creation! If so, then how can His creation be organic to Him! Should they be considered eternal with God!

The Qur'an says: "*If all the trees on the earth were pens and the sea, with seven seas behind it, were ink, still Allah's Words would not run out.*" (al-Qur'an, 31:27) As creation Nature is replete with the Signs of its Creator. A Qur'anically informed scientific study of Nature is must to keep it within Qur'anically prescribed limits; it will develop a worldview compatible with the features of the universe stated in the Qur'an; will discover the laws of nature and develop techniques, not for the maximum fulfillment of human desires but in the larger benefit of humanity. This study will add to the light of faith by verifying and highlighting Signs of God in the universe. Let us observe an example from al-Ghazali to understand what a Qur'anically informed scientific study of Nature could genuinely mean.

***What a Qur'anically informed scientific study of Nature could genuinely mean!— An instance from Al-Ghazali***

As stated above Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina under the impress of Aristotle conceived God as Uncaused First Cause and denying 'Will' as His Attribute asserted 'Knowledge' at its place. Now they needed a theory where the universe could originate from God devoid of the attribute of *Will*. Here Plotinus's theory of emanation in which universe overflows from the perfection of God without His Will and Command, comes to their help. Ibn Sina reformulates this as theory of graded emanation where universe emanates from God's Knowledge in ten steps. Ibn Sina is a philosopher as well as a physician/scientist whereas Al-Ghazali is a theologian, philosopher and a mystic but not a scientist. Concept of cause is one of the two pivotal concepts of Ibn Sina's philosophy as well as science. The essential attribute of Ibn Sina's God is 'knowledge' and as per his perception divine knowledge could not be conceived of violating principles of logic at any place. In logic the conclusion draws from its premises with logical certainty. Being the Uncaused First Cause whatever will emanate from Ibn Sina's God as its effect at the first step must emanate with logical necessity. This 'first effect' will turn into a 'cause' for further emanation. Whatever will emanate from this 'effect turned cause' will also come about as a logical necessity and so on. Ibn Sina's theory of causation conceives the relationship between 'cause' and 'effect' as of logical necessity. As implied by this view, determinism prevails in the whole universe including psycho-ethical spheres of human beings. Even God could not remain free. To deprive human beings of freedom of moral choice and action, is to deprive morality of its grounds and to deny accountability and reward in the Hereafter. Conceiving God as 'Cause' and relating Him to its immediate effect with logical necessity not only translates determinism in the whole universe, deprives man from moral freedom and creativity but also deprives God too of all Freedom and Creativity. Prayer and invoking God for help loses all meaning. Miracles and bodily resurrection become impossibility. Omnipotence of Ibn Sina's God becomes subservient to the principle of universal causation. Universe becomes coeternal with God. God as cause is only logically prior to the universe, temporally both are simultaneous as sun is only logically prior to the light emanating from it whereas temporally both are simultaneous. Thus Qur'anic concept of the creation of the universe from *non-being* to

*being* stands denied. The law of causation itself becomes an eternal fate eternally determining the destiny of everything including man as well as God. Ibn Sina translates the religious doctrine of the Oneness of God into the philosophical doctrine of the absolute simplicity of God. According to Aristotelian metaphysics which Ibn Sina inherits everything is composed of two principles *i.e.*, matter and form. There is dichotomy of essence and existence in everything. So nothing except God is absolutely simple. His attributes draw from Him as the theorem that 'the sum total of the internal angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles' draws as implication from the definition of a triangle. Thus there is no plurality of Being and Attributes or Essence and Existence in God. Now if God is absolutely simple, His Knowledge must also be one and without plurality. When there is nothing except God prior to Him then in what will His Knowledge consist of except that He alone is a Necessary Being and absolute source of whatever is possible. So His Self-Knowledge must also be one and absolutely simple. When in all eternity God had only Self-Knowledge, from this Self Knowledge only one thing emanates as 'effect'. This one thing he calls 'First Intellect'. Here Ibn Sina draws another principle of his cosmology: From 'one' only 'one' emanates. Keeping in view the first principle of his theory of causation that the relationship between 'cause' and 'effect' is of logical necessity, the other principle introduced by him is the relationship of one to one correspondence between 'cause' and 'effect'. One specific 'cause' will always generate one specific 'effect' and one specific 'effect' will ever come into being by one specific 'cause'. He rejects the concept of plurality of causes. This very principle bars him to believe in the Qur'anic doctrine of bodily resurrection. Ibn Sina sees *cause* as a unitary event instead of 'a set of conditions which when become sufficient the *effect* occurs.' Another principle of his cosmology is that 'cause' and 'effect' both must belong to the same nature. Ibn Sina's God is of the nature of 'Thought' so what comes about from Him at the first step must keep close to Him *i.e.*, First Intellect is also not a material entity. Coming down step by step the physical world with all its genus, species and individuals emanate from the Tenth Intellect. This principle brings the God down to the category of efficient causes except one thing that He alone is Uncaused. The relationship of 'cause' and effect is how much important for Ibn Sina can be seen from the fact that as physician prescribing remedies in every case he says: eliminate the cause first. Had it been in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an, how much



benefit it would have given to humanity, how much it would have contributed to the promotion of empirical sciences in Muslims centuries ago!

Now al-Ghazali, a renowned religious scholar of his times, who is neither a scientist nor a physician, does not accept this theory of causation on religious grounds. He is a firm believer in the Qur'an. He firmly believes that whatever has been stated in the Qur'an about the attributes of God or about the nature of the universe can never be untrue and that a theory, how ingeniously formulated may it be, if contradicts the Qur'an, is necessarily false. He could never believe anything manmade (Aristotelian philosophy) etc., at par with the Qur'an. He is in no doubt that Ibn Sina's definition of 'perfection' taken from Aristotle, which conceives perfection as immutability, and Ibn Sina's concept of 'volition' again taken from Aristotle, which force him to deny the attribute of 'Will' for God, his concept of 'Divine Knowledge' as Eternal Self-Knowledge which forces him to deny knowledge of particulars for God, his concept of God as Uncaused Cause and the theory of cause-effect relationship based on it with all its deterministic and other implications were certainly false. He was absolutely sure that a model of the universe consisting of nine heavens as opposite to the Qur'anic model of the universe consisting of seven heavens, could never be true. This strength of faith enables al-Ghazali to identify the flaws, faults and fallacies in Ibn Sina's thought and enlightens him to reformulate these concepts in accordance with teachings of the Qur'an. Al-Ghazali defines Divine Will' as a Dignity of God to take any one of the two absolutely possible but contrary options without any principle of particularization. This definition of 'Will' renders Volition a Dignity for God and rejects the view of perfection as immutability. So establishes the view of God as Creator at Will and Command. Rejecting Ibn Sina's concept of God as Uncaused First Cause on the grounds that the very cosmological argument itself is fallacious for the conclusion does not draw from the premises, al-Ghazali refutes his theory of causation with reference to Aristotle's definition of logical impossibility and falsifies each and every corollary mentioned above of Ibn Sina's theory of cause-effect relationship. Al-Ghazali had firm faith that the Qur'an is the standard of truth. He was so sure that what contradicts with the Qur'an is false. A false argument contains causes of its self-contradiction in itself, the point is only to locate it. Firmness of his faith in the truth of the Qur'an enables al-Ghazali to identify self-contradictions of Avicenna's

thought with little difficulty on the very grounds admitted by Muslim philosophers themselves. Out of this critical examination emerges al-Ghazali's own thought. He views God as Absolute Creator at Will and Command and beyond any resemblance to His creation. Rejecting Muslim philosopher's view which makes universe coeternal with God, Ghazali argues for a specific beginning of the universe in time in the past. He also denies the eternity of *time* and argues that *time* was created with the universe.<sup>20</sup> Rejecting concept of logical necessity in cause-effect relationship, he offers in place the concept of psychological necessity as cause-effect relationship. Originality, creativity and force of Ghazali's theory of cause-effect relationship can be seen from the fact that he presents this theory in the second half of the 11<sup>th</sup> century whereas Hume, a modern British philosopher presented the same theory in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Till today same is the case. Modern philosophy and science do not admit the doctrine of logical necessity as nature of relationship between cause and effect. They simply admit it as a rule of the game.<sup>21</sup> Ghazali also argued that neither cause is a unitary event nor it is necessary that an effect always emerges from a single cause. In place al-Ghazali argued that cause is a composite event. In the modern period Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)<sup>22</sup> supported Ghazali in this aspect of his theory of causation nine centuries later than him. Ghazali also falsified Muslim philosophers' principle of 'single effect generating from a single cause.' Ghazali argued that it is quite conceivable that the same effect comes about from more than one causes. Conceiving so does not give rise to any logical contradiction. For example, death is an effect, which can arise from many causes. Mill (1806-1873) a British philosopher and economist of the modern period known especially for his interpretations of empiricism and utilitarianism,<sup>23</sup> supported Ghazali's view by his doctrine of the plurality of causes.<sup>24</sup>

This is in real sense the best instance in the history of Muslim thought of what Iqbal perceives as reconstruction of scientific [and philosophical] thought in terms of Qur'anically-informed perspective and a reconstruction of religious thought in terms of scientific [and philosophical] understanding of experience, which as Iqbal believes, will provide us that scientific form of religious knowledge which is essential for that special type of inner experience on which the faith is ultimately based on. Let us examine Iqbal's own case in this perceptive.

Naturalism arising out of Einstein's theory of relativity which sees reality as a space-time continuum taking *time* as a fourth dimension of space, is a modern scientific understanding of experience of the physical world. This brings to the fore the concept of *time* with its implications with reference to *simultaneity*. Bergson, a renowned philosopher of Iqbal's period critically examines implications of Einstein's concept of *time* and refusing to accept it develops his own concept of *time* and of ultimate reality. Bergson conceives ultimate Reality as *Time*. Thus *time* acquires central place in both scientific and philosophical deliberations of Iqbal's period. Biology and psychology also develop in this period and problem of the nature of life, nature of self and its autonomy, and their relationship with *time* come to the fore as center of discussions in these fields. Modernity exposes itself to Iqbal through concepts of *time*, *life*, *self* and *autonomy of self*. Being a Muslim thinker Iqbal aspires to reconstruct these objectifications of modernity in Islamic perspective ultimately to relate this scientific form of religious knowledge to scientific and philosophical understanding of reality. Iqbal gets impressed by Bergsonian concept of *time* as essence of ultimate reality. In psychology introspection as a method for the study of *self*, impresses him and in it he sees the prospects of a philosophy of *self* and of the proof for the existence of God in place of traditional ones which he rejects. The question was how to relate *time* and *self* together. Iqbal conceives self as ego – a thing which conceives itself as 'I-am'. He argues that life and ego-hood cannot be conceived without *time*. *Time* is the essence of everything. When on the analogy of human ego he conceives God as Absolute Ego, he identifies *time*—as 'eternal now' or 'pure duration'—as the permanent factor in the Being of God. Now he needs something in the Qur'an which could substantiate his above contention. Not finding anything in the Qur'an to this purpose, he turns towards the *tradition (hadith)* where he finds one, on the basis of which rendering God and *Time* identical, he attempts to reconstruct what he calls scientific form of religious knowledge. Can a *tradition* not verified by the Qur'an be a saying of the Prophet (pbuh)! Should such thing bear any authority! Can such approach of harmonizing religion and science be termed a move in the correct direction!

If God is *time* or *time* is essential factor in the Being of God, as Iqbal puts it, then at least Iqbal and Bergson both have been able to discover at least one factor of God's Being! If God is *time* or *vice versa*, does the *time* not become uncreated and eternal! Does the eternity of *time* not

render universe or reality eternal and uncreated! (Without underestimating his intent and effort, it can be safely said that Iqbal's philosophy, how ingeniously may it be reconstructed, does not essentially differ from Ibn Sina or Sir Seyyed's attempts.) Thus the other principle, which the fate of this Iqbalian project of reconstruction of religious thought is ultimately based on, is his identification of God with *Time* (*al-dahr*). From this identification Dr. Basit Bilal Koshul draws what he calls Iqbal's Qur'anic-scientific conception of *time*.<sup>25</sup>

### ***Iqbal's conception of time and its identification with God***

According to Dr. Basit Koshul the intimacy of the relationship between 'time' and 'God' is summarily conveyed by a hadith that Iqbal quotes in which "the Prophet said: Do not vilify *time* for *time* is God."<sup>26</sup> In order to justify Iqbal's identification of God with *time*, Dr. Koshul, refers to "the dynamism, creativity, and freedom—to the degree that these are characteristics of *time*, they also are characteristics of God." Dr. Koshul terms it as the Qur'anic-scientific conception of *time*.<sup>27</sup> In order to support above contentions Dr. Koshul refers to eight passages from the Qur'an *i.e.* 3:190-1; 2:164; 24:44 and 10:6; 25:62; 31:29; 39:5; 23:80 as mentioned by Iqbal himself to point out that the Qur'an considers *time* to be one of the greatest symbols of God.<sup>28</sup> Iqbal conceives the real time as pure duration. He conceives God, his Absolute Ego, as the whole of Reality which exists in pure duration. Thus Iqbal asserts "*time* to be an essential element in the being of God."<sup>29</sup>

There is a difference between 'symbol' and 'sign'. "One thing, A, is a sign of another thing B, if A refers to B in some way or other. [And] there are different ways in which one thing can refer to another thing. But one thing A is a symbol of B if it is identical with B or some essential aspect of B. For example mathematical symbols are symbols not signs. In Islamic religious numerology the figure 786 is a symbol of the formula *Bismi-Allahi*. Basit Bilal is right in rendering Iqbal's assertion which sees "*time* to be an essential element in the being of God." as "Time is a greatest symbol of God." But in our view Iqbal's assertion and its rendering by Dr. Koshul both are absolutely un-Qur'anic. The correct thing would be to say that "*Time* is a sign of God." as mentioned in the following verses: "*Everything in the heavens and earth belongs to God. God is self-sufficient and worthy of all praise. If all the trees on earth were pens and all the seas, with seven more seas besides, [were ink,]*

*still God's words [kalimâtullah –signs] would not run out: God is almighty and all wise.” (al-Qur'an, 31:27)*

Since this study does not consist in an exclusive examination of Iqbal's *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* so it is not possible to give a fuller examination of his work. Suffice it is to say that if his identification of God with Time is verified from the Qur'an, implications—teleological or whatever—drawn by Iqbal on the basis of this principle are most likely to be accepted to be an ingenious attempt in the right direction. But if it is otherwise, shall anyone be unjustified if he considers this attempt too, like those made by Ibn Sina and then by Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, not rightly-directed, and the implications thereof as wrongful. Let us examine this Iqbalian principle and Dr. Koshul's attempt to justify it.

This tradition occurs in five versions, all narrated by Hazrat Abu Huraira (r.a.). First and fourth versions clearly deny any identification between God and time. The second and the third version can be interpreted in both ways. Whereas the last version very clearly identifies Allah with time. Leaving the first four versions aside Iqbal chooses the last version. Following are the various versions of the above mentioned tradition:

*“(i) The Prophet (pbuh) said: Allah says: Man vilifies time, whereas time is in My Hand. I control the day and night.”*

*“(ii) The Prophet (pbuh) said: Allah says: Man tortures Me when he vilifies time, whereas I Myself am Time; I alter the day and night.”*

*“(iii) The Prophet (pbuh) said: Allah says: Man tortures Me when he says: Woe to the Time! So none of you should say “Woe to the Time for I Myself am Time; I bring the day and night. I will suspend their coming if I would feel like.”*

*“(iv) The Prophet (pbuh) said: Allah says: None of you should say, “Woe to the time; for time is in My Hand.”*

*“(v) The Prophet (pbuh) said: Allah says: Do not vilify Time, for Allah is Time.”<sup>30</sup>*

The Qur'an consists of 6238 verses. The text of the Qur'an is historically intact and throughout centuries the one and the same text in one and the same arrangement of verses and *surahs* is prevalent all over the world. So it is not difficult to examine whether this alleged

'Qur'anic-scientific conception of time' derives anywhere from the Qur'an!

The word '*ad-dahr*' (meaning '*time*') is an Arabic word and occurs only at the following two places in the Qur'an:

- i) Those who have taken their own desires as their god, those whom God lets to stray in the face of knowledge, sealing their ears and hearts and covering their eyes, they say: "*There is only our life in this world: we die, we live, nothing but time [ad-dahr] destroys us. They have no knowledge of this; they only follow conjecture.*" (al-Qur'an, 45:24)
- ii) Inviting man towards pondering over his own self, it has been said in Surah *Al-Insân* of the Qur'an (which is also known as Surah Ad-Dahr) that: "*Was there not a period of time [ad-dahr] when man was nothing to speak of!*" (76:01)

Out of the five different versions of the same tradition Iqbal picks up one which explicitly contradicts with the Qur'anic teachings. Let us now examine the eight passages of the Qur'an pointed out by Iqbal himself on the basis of which Dr. Koshul justifies what he calls Iqbal's Qur'anic-scientific conception of time.

1. *In the creation of the heavens and earth; in the alternation of night and day; in the ships that sail the seas with goods for people; in the water which God sends down from the sky to give life to the earth when it has been barren, scattering all kinds of creatures over it; in the changing of the winds and clouds that run their appointed courses between the sky and earth: there are signs in all these for those who use their minds. (2:164)*
2. *Control of the heavens and earth belongs to God; God has power over everything. There truly are signs in the creation of the heavens and earth, and in the alternation of night and day, for those with understanding; who remember God standing, sitting, and lying down, who reflect on the creation of the heavens and earth: 'Our Lord! You have not created all this without purpose—You are far above that!— so protect us from the torment of the Fire. (3:189-91)*
3. *God alternates night and day— there truly is a lesson in [all] this for those who have eyes to see. (24:44)*

4. *In the succession of night and day, and in what God created in the heavens and earth, there truly are signs for those who are aware of Him. (10:6)*
5. *It is He who made the night and day follow each other— so anyone who wishes may be mindful or show gratitude. (25:62)*
6. *[Prophet], do you not see that God causes the night to merge into day and the day to merge into night; that He has subjected the sun and the moon, each to run its course for a stated term; that He is aware of everything you [people] do? (31:29)*
7. *He created the heavens and earth for a true purpose; He wraps the night around the day and the day around the night; He has subjected the sun and moon to run their courses for an appointed time; He is truly the Mighty, the Forgiving. (39:5)*
8. *It is He who gives life and death; the alternation of night and day depends on Him; will you not use your minds? (23:80)*

Is there even a slightest justification for taking *ad-dahr* to mean Allah at any of these places? Absolutely not. Can anybody else know the Being of God better than God Himself? Absolutely not. When Allah Almighty has not used the word '*ad-dahr*' for Himself, on what authority Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Dr. Basit Balal Koshul or anybody else can hold Allah and '*ad-dahr*' [time] identical? The Qur'an forbids the believers from ascribing anything not based on authority, to Allah. The Qur'an calls it concoction (*iftrâ*). The Qur'an says: "So who does more wrong than he who fabricates lies against Allah with no authority in knowledge in order to lead people astray? God does not guide the evildoers." (6:144) The status of authority lies with the Qur'an as the Qur'an says: *Those who do not judge according to Allah's revelation disbelieve Allah's revelations. (5:44) Those who do not judge according to what Allah has revealed are doing grave wrong. (5:45) Those who do not judge according to what Allah has revealed are lawbreakers. (5:47)*

It is absolutely clear from the above verses of the Qur'an that the Qur'an gives no support to the contention that God is *time* or that *time* is God. To consider *time* to be one of the greatest symbols of God is one thing and to consider "dynamism, creativity, and freedom—to the degree that these are characteristics of time, they also are characteristics

of God” is the same as to identify God and *time* which Qur'an does not endorse.

To translate *Sunnat Allah* as *habit* of Allah is also incorrect. Allah is not bound by anything like *habits*. He is Absolutely Free and Willing Person. He has placed patterns and harmonies in nature but laws of nature are subservient to His Will, His Will is not subservient to the laws of nature. How highly Iqbal evaluates this supposition can be seen from the fact that according to him this view has the potential of investing science with new meaning and significance.<sup>31</sup> He observes this when he says: “The knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God’s behavior. In our observation of Nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the Absolute Ego, and this is only another form of worship.”<sup>32</sup> Let us examine the verses 33:62, 35:43, 48:23 of the Qur'an which he claims to endorse the above idea.

*Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make their outer garments hang low over them so as to be recognized and not insulted: God is most forgiving, most merciful. If the hypocrites, the sick at heart, and those who spread lies in the city do not desist, We shall rouse you [Prophet] against them, and then they will only be your neighbours in this city for a short while. They will be rejected. Wherever they are found, they will be arrested and put to death. This has been God’s practice with those who went before. You will find no change in God’s practices. (33:59-62)*

*[The idolaters] swore their most solemn oath that, if someone came to warn them, they would be more rightly guided than any [other] community, but when someone did come they turned yet further away, became more arrogant in the land, and intensified their plotting of evil– the plotting of evil only rebounds on those who plot. Do they expect anything but what happened to earlier people? You will never find any change in God’s practice; you will never find any deviation there. (35:42-43)*

*If the disbelievers had fought against you, they would have taken flight and found no one to protect or support them: such was God’s practice in the past and you will find no change in God’s practices. (48:22-23)*

The whole Iqbalian project of reconciliation of science and religion is based on purging modern scientific thought from materialistic, mechanistic, and reductionist philosophical concepts by replacing them with so-called Qur'anic-scientific concepts of Nature and *Time* through



the above mentioned two presuppositions. We have placed all the references from the Qur'an for an intelligent reader to decide the worth of this attempt by himself.

### **Blending "Creation" and "Evolution" together——Dr. Israr Ahmed**

Following the same track Dr. Israr Ahmed writes a Booklet *Ijâd-o-Ibdâ' i 'Alam sey 'Almi Nizam-e-Khilazfat tak Tanazzal-w-Irtiqa' kay Marahil* rendered into English by his younger brother, the renowned philosopher and religious scholar, Dr. Absar Ahmed by the title *The Process of Creation: A Qur'anic Perspective*.<sup>33</sup> In Dr. Absar Ahmed's words "In this tract Dr. Israr Ahmed, by collecting and collating references primarily from Qur'an and Hadith, has endeavored to put forth a theory which in essence blends "Creation" and "Evolution" together into one harmonious thread." Dr. Absar Ahmed further says: "The thrust of the venture is on presenting the Qur'anic position on questions pertaining to the realms of existence as distinct yet overlapping phases of creation and evolution, all brought into effect by the Omnipotent God the Qur'an calls Allah."<sup>34</sup> He further observes: "Dr. Israr Ahmed puts in bold relief the ontological dualism of man by emphasizing the evolutionary process only in the physical part of man."<sup>35</sup>

Dr. Israr Ahmed states the problem in the following words: "According to Islamic theistic belief, only Allah is the 'Necessary Being' and the 'Eternal Being'."<sup>36</sup> In "stark contrast, the vast expanse of space and time and the sum total of creation and existence (including human beings) are only 'potentialities', 'possibilities', and 'contingencies'. While there can be no dispute regarding these two beliefs, the process by which 'probability' emerged from 'Necessity' and 'contingency' from 'Eternity' remains a topic of debate and contestation among the theologians."<sup>37</sup> In response to this issue Dr. Israr Ahmed says: "In this booklet, we will try to unravel the cosmogenesis unfolded by a deeper reflection on the highly subtle and profoundly significant Qur'anic verses and its convergence with certain points of modern cosmological, astrophysical and biological thought."<sup>38</sup>

The fault of Dr. Israr Ahmad's thinking is manifest in the above para in his use of terms like 'probability as opposite to necessity' and 'contingency [*haduth*] as opposite to eternity [*qidm*}'. The above mentioned terms used by Dr. Israr Ahmad are formulated in Greek metaphysics which is

absolutely different from the Qur'anic metaphysics. These are polar concepts and applicable to entities belonging to the same order of reality. Qur'anic ontology consists of three categories: God, the Creation (*khalq*), and Command (*amr*). God is Supremely Unique. He is beyond all determinations and beyond any likeness or analogy to the orders of *khalq* or *amr*. Whatever is other than God, belongs either to the category of *khalq* or to the category of His *amr*. Neither *khalq* nor *amr* partake in the Divinity of God. The point is that when you take an un-Qur'anic notion (*i.e.*, a mistaken notion) about God or His attributes, and try to read it in the Qur'an, you cannot avoid facing inconsistencies.<sup>39</sup> No Good-Name of God in Muslim tradition amounts to the concept of 'eternity', 'timelessness', 'immutability', 'perfection' and 'un-caused cause'. Muslims borrowed these un-Qur'anic notions from Greeks either directly or through Christians.<sup>40</sup> In Christian tradition the concept of eternity has been identified in two senses: everlastingness and timelessness; and neither of the two is applicable to the Qur'anic God. To make the point more clear let us see an example from the problem of the relation of Divine Essence and Attributes discussed in Muslim Kalam. There is no concept of any bifurcation of Allah into His Essence and Attributes in Qur'anic metaphysics. It was only when the Muslims mistakenly accepted from the Christians the Aristotelian concept of 'attribute'/*sifah*, they got entangled into mistaken notions and formulated the problem of the relation of the Divine Essence and Attributes which genuinely could not arise had they stuck to the Qur'anic notion of *Ism* (اسم, Name). And the same problem when stretched further, reproduced the problem of the createdness vs. eternity of the Qur'an.<sup>41</sup>

### ***Basic supposition of Dr. Israr Ahmed's thesis***

The nutshell of Dr. Israr Ahmed's attempt is that "the word '*Kun*' or '*Be*', the verbal imperative of Allah, is the basis and catalyst through which the process of Genesis or the event of Creation was initiated and that whenever Allah decides on a matter, it is sufficient for Him to utter this verbal imperative and the matter is done."<sup>42</sup>

By a quite unjustified move he translates the Word '*KUN*' or '*Be*' the verbal imperative of Allah into "*Kalimah tu Allah*". The translation of verses 2:117, 3:47, 19:35, 40:68, 16:40, 36:82 referred to by Dr. Israr Ahmed, themselves refer to the Word *KUN* as Command (*amr*) and not the *KALIMA*. We will quote just one of these here. "...*The (nature) of His amr is such that when He wills a thing to be, He but says to it, "Be" ... and it is.*" (*Yaseen*, 36:82) The right rendering of the Word "*KUN*" is

Command, and not the *KALIMA*. Allah Himself does not call the Word *KUN* as "*Kalimah tu Allah*" as He calls Hazrat Isa (pbuh) as "*Kalimatun minho*".<sup>43</sup>

Dr. Israr Ahmed further identifies the "*Kalimah tu Allah*" (with reference to verse nos. 17:109, and 31:27) with every single created being; hence every single being representing the manifestation of a Divine Imperative 'Be'. If each single created being would need the expression of the Divine Word 'Be' then there will be no species, no organization, classification or laws of nature etc. in the universe. So with reference to verse 87:1-3 Dr. Israr Ahmed identifies 'Laws of Nature' or the 'Physical Laws' as the manifestation of Allah's promise of 'apportioning' and 'guiding' in the realm of inanimate matter, 'biological laws' in the sphere of biology and the 'instincts' in the sphere of animal life, and rules of logic in the realm of human beings. And beyond this normal functioning of the created order there is nothing but 'Revelation'.<sup>44</sup> (p. 12) Thus 'normal functioning of the created order does not require any additional expression of the Divine Word "Be!" "But wherever there is a need to alter the normal functioning of the created order ---- to alter the normal chain of 'cause and effect' in order that a special Divine Decree is enacted .... then there is the need for a new Divine Word "Be!".<sup>45</sup> Thus identifying and translating the Word '*KUN*' into *Kalimah tu Allah* Dr. Israr Ahmed enters into an endless process of drawing implications from this apparently illegitimate move. Then he explains the creation of angels, human souls, jinni and whatever else in a manner reminiscent of mythological period in human civilization. Why is this illegitimate move, can be made clear by looking into the Ash'arite attempt to solve the problem of the "createdness vs. un-createdness of the Qur'an" as a parallel case.<sup>46</sup>

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"The Mu'tazilites believed that the Holy Qur'an is 'created' and 'contingent'. Some believed that the Holy Qur'an was initially created on the preserved tablet (*lohīm-mahfūz*) in non-verbal form which after its revelation took the form in which it is recited; some of them believed that it was created during its revelation. They argued that the belief in an uncreated and eternal Qur'an was opposed to the belief in the Oneness of God. They did not deny the Qur'an to be the 'Word of Allah', however they denied its uncreatedness and eternity."<sup>47</sup> Ash'arites believed the Qur'an to be 'Word of Allah'. (9:06) They argued that the

'Word of Allah' could not be created and contingent. Referring to verse 54 of surah al-A'râf which says that "... *all Creation and Command belong to Him.*"<sup>48</sup> 'Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari argued that 'Creation' and 'Command' are two different categories. From verse 25 of surah ar-Rûm which says that: "...*Among His signs, too, is the fact that the heavens and the earth stand firm by His Command.*"<sup>49</sup> he argued that Allah's Word belongs to the category of His Command (*amr*), and His Creation (*khalq*) stands firm by His Command. The Qur'an is Allah's Word, so it belongs to the category of 'Command'. He further argues that it is necessary that the 'Command' precedes 'Creation'; for if some other 'Command' is perceived to precede the 'Command', it will again be a 'Command'; and infinite regress makes everything unintelligible. Al-Ash'ari further argues: "That as inherent in Allah's Attribute of *Kalâm*, Allah's Word (*Kalam Ullah*) was with God from ever as Unarticulated Speech (*kalam-i nafsi*). So the Qur'an is uncreated and eternal (*qadîm*) in its essence. At the beginning of the creation this was placed on the Preserved Tablet as 'Pre-existent Qur'an' where it remained till its revelation in articulated form (*kalam-i lafzi*)." <sup>50</sup>

The ideas of the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites both did not correspond to the Qur'anic teachings. However the case of Ash'arites is more appropriate to refer here. Declaring *Kalamullah* inherent in Allah's Attribute of Speech and drawing the conclusion that Allah's Word (*Kalamullah*) was with God from ever as Unarticulated Speech (*kalam-i nafsi*), was like Dr. Israr Ahmad's an illegitimate move. It was equivalent to the incarnation of the Divine Attribute of Speech in the form of the Qur'an. This will make the Qur'an co-eternal with God partaking in His Divinity.

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Dr. Israr's relevance with the above instance is that referring to the four verses mentioned above and "numerous others addressing the same theme" he says that

"...and the conclusion to be derived from this is that, whenever Allah decides on a matter, it is sufficient for Him to utter the verbal imperative "*KUN*" (*i.e.*, Be!) and the matter is done."

He further says:

"...the "Word of Allah" [?] is all that is needed in order to bring a thing or event into being."

It is here that Dr. Israr Ahmed replaces what he calls 'the verbal imperative of Allah' by 'Word of Allah' or '*Kalima* of Allah'. He himself admits that "The relationship between the "*Kalima* of Allah" and bringing of a thing or event into being has a direct bearing on the issue of interpreting the meaning of '*kalimah*'." At the same time he further admits that "The Qur'an repeatedly refers to the legal injunctions, individual and social moral decrees, judicial decisions, and ordained laws set by Allah as the *Kalimaat* or "Words" of Allah, as all of these matters are indeed the outcome of the "Word of Allah"."<sup>51</sup> [This sentence can safely be translated into the following: "That the 'Words of Allah' are the outcome of the 'Word of Allah'." Does it say anything!] He goes further and with reference to verses 17:109 and 31:27 identifies every single thing and matter in the created order with "Words of my Lord" and then with the verbal imperative 'Be!' by holding it as manifestation of the verbal imperative 'Be!' This entire booklet is a meaningless quibble of such utterly confused talk.

Dr. Israr Ahmad's work relates to the interpretation of some verses of the Qur'an. Let us see what guidance the Qur'an gives concerning it. According to the verse: *It is He, Who has sent down this Book on you. Some verses thereof are Imperative [Muḥkamât]. These be the Mother of the Book [Umm ul Kitab i.e., foundation of the Book]. And others are Allegorical [Mutashabihât]. Then, those in whose hearts is perversity, follow the part of it which is allegorical, seeking to mislead and seeking to give it interpretation. And none knows its interpretation save Allah. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say: We believe in it, it is all from our Lord...*(03:07) The Qur'an consists of two kinds of verses: the imperative (*Muḥkamat*) and the allegorical (*Mutashabihat*). The imperatives (*Muḥkamat*) are those verses that are directly in the form of commandments. The allegorical (*Mutashabihat*) are the verses that, on reading or listening, render an obligation on the reader or the listener according to that statement. Only the imperatival verses (*Muḥkamat*) of the Qur'an are called the "Mother of the Book" (*Umm ul Kitab*). Some verses can clearly be categorized as imperatival and some others as allegorical, while the remaining others can be categorized on the basis of already established set of imperatival verses. The imperatival verses are the standard in any decision. These are the foundation of the Book. Whatever is to be inferred from the allegorical verses is necessarily to be verified by and be coherent with the imperatival verses. If otherwise, the

interpretation is false.<sup>52</sup> Does Dr. Israr Ahmad follows this commandment in this enterprise!

Let us see the implications of Dr. Israr Ahmad's enterprise for the development of science in Muslims. Does this theorizing adds any factual improvement in any present scientific theory of the origin of the world (*i.e.*, big-bang theory), or gives a new theory on the origin of the world parallel to the prevalent scientific theories! Or does it give a new and better approach to the scientific investigations! Does this effort introduce a scientifically verifiable kind of a new theory about the status of laws of nature or laws governing social changes? Does it contain any concrete suggestion for the development of science in accordance with Qur'anic teachings!

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### ***Critical Examination:***

Purpose of this study is not to underestimate the efforts of those who understand the significance of working out the principles of relationship between revealed knowledge and manmade knowledge in Islam. Rather the purpose is to take their work ahead on correct lines. In the case of Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan it is stressed that the very principle "The Work of God overrides the Word of God" is not correct. By 'Word of God' he means the knowledge based on the interpretation of the Qur'an. What he calls 'The Work of God' is actually nothing other than the theories of science and the world view based on the scientific study of nature along with philosophical investigation about nature in any period. This is what we have called manmade knowledge. If these two spheres of knowledge dispute on some matter, which one of the two will override? If it is maintained, as Khan does, that in case of apparent contradiction between the Word of God and the Work of God, the later will take precedence, while the former will be interpreted metaphorically to accord with it, it simply means making the Qur'an subservient to prevalent science. This study does not consider raising this question a right approach to the matter. The right approach to this matter should be: 'What is the appropriate theological principle for relating revealed knowledge with the manmade knowledge?'

This principle that "The Work of God overrides the Word of God." is not something new introduced the first time by Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan. Ptolemaic cosmology consisting of nine heavens was the scientific worldview of Ibn Sina's times as Newtonian cosmology

without any concept of heavens presented the scientific world view of Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan's time. Aristotelian philosophy with uncaused First Cause as its concept of God, denial of Will as Attribute of God, logical necessity as its concept of cause-effect relationship, dualistic metaphysics with its primordial concept of matter etc., was the philosophy of Ibn Sina's times as Newtonian naturalism with its infinite space, absolute time, closed, mechanically self-regulating universe (instead of an organised and Divinely administered universe) was the philosophy of Seyyed Ahmad Khan's times. Ibn Sina reinterpreted the Word of God to make it compatible with the dictates of Ptolemaic Science and Aristotelian philosophy as Seyyed Ahmad Khan did to harmonise it with Newtonian cosmology and naturalism. The same is true for Iqbal and his followers with the difference that Einsteinian cosmology and naturalism take the place of prevalent science and philosophy. Iqbal accepts Einsteinian concept of time as fourth dimension of space. Under the influence of Bergsonian criticism of Einsteinian concept of time, Iqbal gets impressed by Bergson's concept of time (as pure duration) as the ultimate nature of reality. For the reconstruction of science and philosophy in religious terms he needs to identify Pure Duration with Allah. Here he finds an alleged prophetic tradition, though overwhelmingly incompatible with the Qur'an, but suited to his purpose of bringing about what he calls 'a scientific form of religious knowledge'. He accepts it. Thus he prefers the Bergsonian philosophical reconstruction of Einstein's science over the Word of God.

The standards of rationality change as the science and philosophy change. The Qur'an, the embodiment of revealed knowledge, is the standard of truth for all times to come. The Muslims believe the Qur'an on the basis of faith. The question is why it is necessary for the Muslims to metaphorically or analogically interpret and reinterpret every now and then in each scientific epoch to prove that the Qur'an is compatible with the manmade knowledge! Ptolemaic science based on Aristotelian philosophical speculations, believed in nine heavens. There is no concept of heavens in Newton or in Einstein. Should we suspend our belief in the existence of seven heavens until science ever comes to prove it! While drowning, Pharaoh pronounces faith in the Lord of Hazrat Musâ and Hazrat Hâroon (Peace be upon them.). Allah says: "It is not accepted now. We shall preserve your dead body so that the coming generations take lesson." (al-Qur'an, 10:91-92) No one knew about the dead body of Pharaoh at the time of revelation till it was

discovered in the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Should the Muslims suspend their belief in the contents of this verse till that time! Should they suspend their beliefs in many other things relating scientific facts till they are ever confirmed by science or philosophy! Shall a Muslim be held answerable for believing or not believing the correctness of Darwin's or Lamarck's theory of evolution, or a big-bang theory of the creation of the universe in the Hereafter!

### **Conclusion**

This study argues that while discussing problem of the relationship of science (& philosophy) with Islam following points should be kept in mind:

1. It should be accepted that Word of Allah (al-haqq) alone is the standard of truth in all matters and for all times to come.
  - i) Allah has taken upon Him to ensure its protection.
  - ii) Allah pronounces it as a Book which is best of all narrations (*Ahsanul Biyan*). So it is consistent *par excellence*. Seeing contradiction in it proves one's own inability.
  - iii) All verses of it are to be categorised into two kinds only: The Imperative and the Allegorical. The Imperative verses are the foundation of the Book; only that interpretation of the Allegorical verses will be true which is consistent with the former ones.
2. The Qur'an is authority over *hadith* and not the *vice versa*.
  - i) Validity of a tradition will be judged on the touchstone of the Qur'an. It is necessary for a valid *hadith* to be compatible with the imperative verses.
  - ii) Only that interpretation of a valid *hadith* will be correct which is consistent with the imperative verses.
3. It should be kept in mind that the theories of science (natural, rational, biological, social or whatever) and the intellectual view of reality (philosophical theories) are closely interlinked. Either a scientific theory is embedded in a philosophical worldview or a worldview gives rise to a theory.
  - (i) 'Established facts of science' should be differentiated from 'the theories of science.' 'Established facts of science' are the one time theories of science which have



been scientifically verified and have become facts. A Muslim must also be absolutely sure that no established scientific fact can ever go against the explicit teachings of the Qur'an. Keeping this difference in mind a Muslim can go to any level of study or research in science.

- (ii) It should be made absolutely clear to a Muslim that until and unless anything establishes as a scientific fact, it will only be a conjecture even if it is a so-called well-accredited theory.
  - (iii) It should also be made absolutely clear on a Muslim that an established scientific fact can never contradict with the Qur'an (the Word of the Creator of Everything.) No instance from the past can be presented to refute this assertion. Let us see the instances:
    - (a) There was a time when the earth's being round was not an established fact. It was just a scientific theory. The invention of supersonic aircrafts and satellites irrevocably proved it to be an established fact. The earth's being round is no more a theory, but an established scientific fact.
    - (b) Whether the matter was only divisible into very small units of matter (*i.e.*, atoms) or it was infinitely divisible was a question, before the rise of modern science, to be answered by philosophical speculations and had given rise to many theories. Now matter's divisibility into atoms, breakable but not further divisible into smaller material particles, is an established scientific fact.
    - (c) There were various scientific theories regarding the nature of energy. The inter-convertibility of matter and energy is now an established scientific fact.
4. That scientific worldviews are only scientifically supported cosmological theories regarding the nature and structure of reality. Ptolemaic worldview prevailed for sixteen centuries, Newtonian worldview prevailed for two centuries. If the theories in the past were replaced by other theories, present ones may also be replaced. It should be made clear on a Muslim that holding an opinion about a scientific or philosophical worldview *e.g.*, Ptolemaic, Avicennian, Newtonian, Einsteinian, or

Bergsonian unless it contradicts with an explicit teaching of the Qur'an, has nothing to do with faith. The same applies to holding an opinion about a theory of the origin of species.

5. A scientific theory relates to some specific aspect of the universe for example: theory of causation, theory of gravitation, theory of quantum mechanics, theory of the origin of the world (*i.e.*, big-bang etc.), or theories of the origin of life or origin of species. The same is true regarding theories of social change, political administration or governance etc. These are all human attempts to understand and discover the laws of social change, political administration and better governance and have the status of intelligent conjectures. Theories may be considered well-accredited or not well-accredited, yet they are theories only. They give us a control on nature. There is nothing unlawful in using them in accordance with the principle of innovation for a better control on forces of nature and society for the best interest of humanity. The benefit of mankind is how much dear to Allah is evident from verse 13: 17 where developing a similitude of *al-ḥaqq* and *al-baṭil* Allah says: *Al-ḥaqq* is to remain on the earth for it benefits the mankind; *al-bâṭil* is to pass away like foam that scum on the bank.
6. According to the Qur'an laws of nature are subservient to Allah's Omnipotence and not the *vice versa*. The universe is not an absolutely mechanical system, it is a systematically organized but administered universe.
  - (i) The empirical facet of reality is not the only facet of reality. There are various facets of reality with laws of their own. (a) The Qur'an narrates a person who could bring a huge throne within the blinking of an eye. Allah says: *He had a knowledge of the Book.* (al-Qur'an, 27:40) This apparently miraculous event was based on a special knowledge. (b) The Qur'an narrates the creation of a self-conscious living, creature (Jinni) from fire. This creature also has moral-consciousness and will be held accountable for their deeds. Can anyone with any stretch of imagination conceive the creation from fire of such creature! Fire is a physical entity. It can be asked from Dr. Israr Ahmed: were the Jinni came into being through a kind of process of evolution or were

they created directly as Jinni! What were the necessary steps in the evolution of this specie in its final form and what are the laws governing this process if they came into being through a process of evolution! What specie is immediately prior to the Jinni! If they were created from fire as such why can't Allah create Adam from mud as such! Each sphere of knowledge has its own laws. All reality is an organized but administered system.

7. The Qur'an pronounces freedom of will for man and holds him accountable for his actions. All activity of science presupposes law of universal causation. Law of universal causation implies determinism in all spheres of the universe including human life. Yet practically man never has stopped considering others responsible for their actions and will never stop doing so. Is it not unscientific and irrational! If we as Muslim are never embarrassed in believing freedom of will and accountability at the face of psychological determinism, why should we feel embarrassed in believing creationism, seven heavens, judgment and reward, moral limits, in the face of a Ptolemaic, Newtonian, Einsteinian naturalism or Darwinism etc.!
- (a) Philosopher has not been able to devise a substantial proof for one's own existence, for one's own self-identity over the years. Phenomenalism, perspectivism, relativism and the like show that philosophers have not been able to prove the existence of the external world in which they live. All their views about the nature and structure of reality are mere conjectures. Why should a Muslim be embarrassed over believing God, prophets and the revelation if man with lofty claims of knowledge has not been able to prove his self-existence, self-identity, nature of time, nature of void, existence of the universe, freedom of will, nature of mind, nature of mind-body relationship, moral-consciousness etc.
8. Qur'anic ontology differs with the scientific ontology. Qur'anic ontology consists of three principles: God, the Creation (*khalq*), and the Command (*amr*). Whatever other than God is either 'creation' or 'the command'. Regarding 'command' it has been said that "*you have been given but little knowledge of it.*" (al-Qur'an, 17:85) So man's knowledge of certain things will always remain little. A Muslim researcher must realize this limit

to his knowledge. The sphere of empirical science relates only to the orbit of *khalq*. A Muslim will keep on believing things relating the orbit of *amr* and continue his research on *khalq*.

9. Three things emerge from scientific research: Worldview, theories, technology. What attitude should be taken by a Muslim about the scientific or philosophic worldviews as well as theories of science and facts of science have been discussed above. So for as scientific technology or institutions arising from social theories are concerned, Islam does not leave us to wander in darkness. The Qur'an gives us the principle of *innovation* (*bid'at*) to relate manmade knowledge with revealed knowledge. *Bid'at* (innovation) can be of two types: lawful (*bid'at-e hasana*) and unlawful (*bid'at-e sayyia*). Working out the limits of lawful innovation *i.e.*, working out appropriate limits for relating manmade knowledge with revealed knowledge is *ijtihad*. *Rahbaniyat* (monastic asceticism) was an innovation (*bida't*) of the Christians, Allah did not enjoin it on them. They had initiated it with the purpose of seeking Allah's pleasure. [Allah does not disapprove it.] They did not confine them within viable limits as they should. (Cf. Al-Qur'an, 57:27 ) Similarly Qur'an says: *And proclaim the Pilgrimage among men: they will come to thee on foot and (mounted) on every kind of camel, lean on account of journeys through deep and distant mountain highways.* (Al-Qur'an, 22:27) [Can the Muslims go on hajj as stated in this verse now? This is *bidat-e-hasana* that now we go by air for acting upon this injunction.]
10. 'No *bid'at* (innovation) in respect of prohibitions is allowed' is the basic principle of *ijtihad*. Not everyone is qualified for carrying out this job.<sup>53</sup> The Qur'an qualifies 'The sound in knowledge'<sup>54</sup> for working out the limits and scope of *lawful/comely innovations* to help people in coming towards righteousness. 'The sound in knowledge' are the ones who are best qualified for working out an appropriate relationship between revealed knowledge and manmade knowledge in line with the Divine decree: *la talbisul haqqa bil batili ...* 02:42<sup>55</sup>
  - (i) Examples help in understanding matters on analogical grounds. Firmly believing that postulates of manmade knowledge are against Islamic Paradigm, we cannot conceive of living without the products of science. Already acting

upon the principle of *innovation* we are making use of them. We are making use of western system of medicine, methods of physical and psychological treatment, all kind of technology, economic, financial, commercial, educational, administrative and social institutions but with a sense of guilt. Why not to make use of these products of modernity with open heart on the basis of religious sanction of *innovation* reconstructing them according to our Qur'anic paradigm.

- (ii) *Bid'at-e Hasana* had always been part of Islam, and it will remain so for ever. This is the Qur'anic principle for using knowledge generated by human experiment, experience and speculation. Muslims have disregarded this principle because of shortsightedness, rather they have rejected it ignorantly as they for centuries had been considering that the door of *ijtihad* was closed.
  - (iii) It is a very sad reality that the Muslims have not been able to translate commandments, insights, values and disvalues stated in the Qur'an into systems, institutions, approaches, technologies, models, methodologies, sciences and disciplines covering all walks of life to demonstrate their worth on laboratory bench of a global society. In the present global scenario making use of the principle of *bid'at-e hasana* is right way for the above purpose.
11. Purpose of exploration and research in science, philosophy or technology is not the implementation of our desires against truth; it is to seek the Pleasure of Allah by providing convenience to human beings in fulfillment of their obligations with reference to truth. The Qur'an says: "*So set your face towards religion as a man of pure faith. This is the natural disposition Allah instilled in mankind. There is no altering in Allah's creation, and this is the right religion. Most of the people do not realize it.*" (Ar-Rûm 30:30) Prohibition in this verse relates to altering the natural disposition of human being. Natural disposition of human being relates to piety. To keep our desires within Allah's prescribed limits is piety. Implementing our desires against truth will mean altering Allah's creation. That is absolutely forbidden. There is no scope for *innovation* regarding prohibitions. Theories regarding biomedical ethics, amputations, organ-donation, organ

transplantation, genetic engineering and geno-modification etc., are to be seen in the light of the principal of *innovation* by committees comprising of Muslim religious scholars and experts of related sciences.

12. The last but not least is that Man has been sent on earth as *khalifa*. Usually it is translated in the exegeses of the Qur'an as *vicegerent* of God. Being Omnipresent, Omnipotent and Omniscient Allah transcends any need for a kind of second-in-command to run the affairs on earth. Man is given mandate for using the provision placed on earth in accordance with Divine guidance in the face of freedom to follow desires. Everything in the universe is made subservient to man. Qur'anic science will entrust man with freedom to make research in any sphere of life as *khalifa*. It is obligation on a Muslim as *khalifa* to do his best to innovate ways and means to make use of earthly provisions in the best interest of humanity. Pleasure of Allah will be the ultimate motive behind all his activity. If he is given authority in the land, he will invent ways and means to judge between the people with truth and seal the ways leading towards injustice. (Aş-Şâd, 38:26) The knowledge to govern people is that matters between the people should be decided according to the truth and personal desires must not have any influence over the judgment. One's liking when mixed with the truth pushes the person away from the right path. Allah has appointed man as *khalifa* on earth to see how they behave. (al-Qur'an, 10:14) When Allah spoke to the angels about the appointment of Adam as vicegerent on the earth He told them that everything on the earth was meant for the use of mankind. The angels saw that the true purpose of vicegerency was to use resources of the world with great efficacy. They also saw that it will not be possible for mankind to live like angels. Having no social life they have nothing to share with each other. The inhabitants of the earth will fight and shed blood on the use of things needed for the fulfillment of their desires. There is apparent possibility of mischief and bloodshed when man has a vast capability of using things and these are to be shared by him. To make it clear on the angels that there will be no mischief and bloodshed if the knowledge of using things is perfect because then everything is kept at its proper place, Allah taught Adam the names of all the objects he had to use in his life.

The name of a thing does not mean just the word by which it is known or identified but it also denotes its proper use, right measure, place of use, benefits and remedy in case it harms. The aggregate of all this information constitutes knowledge of things. In Qur'anic perspective to evolve this knowledge of using things which nullifies any chance of mischief and bloodshed is the purpose of all research. (al-Qur'an, Surah al-Baqara:30-33)





# SUMMARY OF MAIN ISSUES

## PART——1 QUR'ANIC STUDY

*Al-Haqq* means the standard of truth. For centuries the Muslims have believed *al-haqq* to be the comely Name of God. First time in the history of Muslim Culture, the article “*Is al-haqq one of al-Asmâ al Husna*” differs with this belief and argues that *al-haqq* is the title used in the Qur'an for the Scripture, the Word of God, and not for God. God is the Descender of *the truth*. The belief, the idea, the ideology, the notion, the simile, the vision, imagination, the religious experience or whatever is in accordance with the truth is truth, what is against it is untruth.

All the articles of this book examine on their respective themes how this principle is overlooked and how it has created problems for Muslim Thought.

The article “**Qur'anic Ontology and Status of *al-Haqq***” replies various objections raised by critics with reference to the thesis propounded in the above mentioned article and argues that the controversy arises from incorrect understanding of Qur'anic Ontology by such scholars. The Qur'anic Ontology consists of three principles: God, Creation (*Khalq*) and Command (*Amar*). This article also points out the implications of following un-Qur'anic ontology by Muslim theologians.

The M'utazilites and the Asha'rites both believed that the Qur'anic Ontology consists of two principles: God and His Creation. Whatever is not God is His Creation. The M'utazilites believed that the Qur'an was created whereas the Asha'rites believed it to be uncreated and eternal. The article “**The Qur'an: Creation or Command**” arguing that the Qur'anic Ontology consists of three principles, God, Creation (*Khalq*) and Command (*Amar*), offers a solution for a perennial problem of Muslim Theology relating createdness vs. eternity of the Qur'an. First time in the history of Muslim Thought the article argues that the controversy is the outcome of accepting Un-Qur'anic ontology and offers a solution that the Qur'an is neither created nor eternal, it belongs to the category of Command (*Amar*).

It is considered that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6666. The article “**Number of Verses of the Qur'an (Index and Argument)**” declares that it is absolutely incorrect that the total number of verses of the Qur'an is 6666. There is no difference among Muslims as to the Text of the Qur'an, however some scholars divide the Qur'anic Text into 6236 verses whereas some other divide it into 6238 verses. This article argues that the Qur'anic Text consists of 6238 verses. Table of the verses is given to prove our contention.

### **PART——2 SPIRITUALITY**

The Qur'an is the fundamental religious document and basic source of Islamic faith. Sufism is a phenomenon which organized itself into a discipline in the early centuries of Islam. A great majority of Muslims have always believed it quite coherent with the spirit of their faith. But the question is: Where does lie its origin in the Qur'an! Muslim scholars have been searching for the answer since centuries. They have tried to explain the origin of Islamic spirituality in terms of words like '*saf*', '*sûf*', '*suffa*', '*wujûd*', '*Ihsân*', '*hubb*', '*tazkia*' etc. but could not explain its origin and its development into a discipline on Qur'anic grounds. The article “**The Way of *Shahidin*: The Construction of a Qur'anic Theology of Sufism in Tafseer e Fâzli**” argues that first time in fourteen hundred years long history of Muslim Culture *Tafseer-e-Fâzli* (an exegesis of the Qur'an, 7 vols, 1982-1998) traces the origin of this discipline in the Qur'anic word '*Shâhid*'. According to the *TF* the epithet used by the Qur'an for what is commonly called 'sufi mentor' is '*shahid*' (witness), '*Tariqat-i-Shahidîn*' (The Way of *Shahidîn*) is the right epithet to be used for sufism, which is a discipline for granting purification (*tazkia*) and then its verification (*taşdîq*). As compared to *wahdat al-wujud* and *wahdat ash-shahud*, Tafseer-e-Fâzli offers *wahdat-e-Shahideen* as a metaphysical doctrine which is a better alternative of *wahdat ash-shahud*.

### **PART——3 OMNISCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM**

Writers like Martin Schreiner, Ignacz Goldziher, R. Nicholson Franz Rosenthal, Harry Austrian Wolfson all argue that the Islamic teachings are predestinarian in nature. Religious scholars like Dr. Muhammad Fethullah Gûlen promote such views about Islam. Eight out of sixteen articles included in this book differ with this view and define the limits of human freedom in Qur'anic perspective. Examining antinomies relating Omniscience, Omnipotence,

Predestinarian verses of the Qur'an, Inexorability of the Appointed Term, Pre-ordained Sustenance, Divine Pleasure and Divine Will etc., it has been argued in these articles that not a single person ever born including Iblīs (Satan), Pharaoh, Abu Lahb was ever born such that he was predetermined in Allah's Knowledge to leave the world as sinner. The most significant thing about this book is that everything argued in this book is argued on the authority of the Qur'an; that nothing said in this book is without the authority of the Qur'an. Abdul Hameed Kamali

The article **“Qur'anic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom”** argues that the view of Omniscience prevalent among Muslims since centuries is contrary to Qur'anic teachings as it conceives God as an eternal Script Writer who eternally knows what is going to happen to a character or what is going to be performed by a character in any episode in this everlasting drama. The study argues that this view is not essentially different from the Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience formulated by Saint Thomas Aquinas. The article reconstructs the concept of Omniscience and allied concepts on Qur'anic basis and argues that though there are three types of persons that come in this world: some are sent in this world as role model of righteousness and are predestined in Allah's Knowledge to leave this world as righteous ones; all others come in this world such that it is not predestined in Allah's Knowledge whether they will leave the world as righteous or sinner; that no person ever comes in this world such that it is predestined in Allah Knowledge that he/she will leave the world as sinner. The article also examines the objection that such view will make Allah's Knowledge incremental, and argues that the objection does not apply to Qur'anic God.

Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), who is an eminent Muslim thinker of the modern era discusses the concept of Omniscience only with reference to its implications for Freedom of God and develops his own philosophical concept of Omniscience. He does not discuss the bearings of any concept of Omniscience for actions of human free will. The article **“Iqbal's View of Omniscience and Human Freedom”** examines Iqbal's concept of God and his concept of Omniscience in Qur'anic perspective. *“La tasubu addahr, fa innallaha howa addahr.”* (Do not vilify time for Allah is time.) is considered to be a saying of the Prophet (pbuh). It

contradicts with the Qur'an, therefore cannot be a saying of the Prophet. Nowhere in the Qur'an Allah identifies Himself with Time (*ad-dahr*). Iqbal conceives 'time' as an essential element of God's Being and offers the above mentioned tradition as a proof. The word *ad-dahr* (the time) occurs only at two places in the Qur'an. In *surah al-Jâthiya* the disbelievers are reported to be saying: "*There is naught but [only] our life of the world; we die and we live, and naught destroyeth us save time [al-dahr]; when they have no knowledge whatsoever of (all) that; they do but guess.*" (45:24) The disbelievers deny afterlife and requital and attribute what happens to them to *al-dahr* as if *al-dahr* (time) was but over and above everything like a superior fate. In *surah al-Dahr* the Qur'an says: "*Hath there come upon man (ever) any period of time [al-dahr] in which he was a thing unremembered?*" (76:1) There is no sense in drawing the identification of *al-dahr* with Allah or taking it as the Good-Name of Allah on the basis of these verses. The article argues on the authority of the Qur'an that the alleged tradition can never be a saying of the Prophet. The Qur'an does not endorse the view that 'Allah is time'.

It has been commonly understood that Divine Knowledge, even though eternal and inclusive of foreknowledge of free human actions, does not restrict human freedom. But the philosophers and theologians both in the Muslim and the Judaeo-Christian tradition have pointed out that apparently the doctrine of Omniscience of God does not cohere with the doctrine of freewill of man. The article "**Christian View of Omniscience and Human Freedom**" is an attempt to examine different formulations of the problem as well as solutions attempted by Christian theologians/philosophers for their similarity and bearings on the view of omniscience traditionally believed by Muslims. We observe that Saint Thomas Aquinas' formulation of the doctrine of omniscience in an absolutist manner makes it incoherent with the concept of human freedom. This formulation is known as Traditional Doctrine of Omniscience. History of Christian thought on this problem is basically formulation and reformulation of this doctrine in different ways. We agree with Swinburne that there is essential incompatibility between God's Omniscience and human free will, if the traditional doctrine of Omniscience is accepted. Swinburne asserts that it is contrary to Biblical teachings as well. On the basis of our understanding of

'Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom' we believe that the correct formulation of the concept of Omniscience must include an indeterminate aspect concerning free choice of a human action.

#### **PART——4 FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION**

Divine Power encompasses all things is a principle taught in the Qur'an. In presence of such a principle a school of Muslim theologians with predestinarian bent of mind—the Ash'arites, found it impossible to believe human free will without certain preconditions. Whereas the Mu'tazilites—a school of Muslim theologians with libertarian bent of mind—stressed human free will in an unconditional sense. This disagreement involved these groups in polemics. They not only formulated arguments to justify their point of view, but also devised arguments to falsify their opponents. Antinomy is a form of argument which is presented as a challenge to show that whatever approach the opponent adopts, he is bound to meet such results as are equally unacceptable to him. Abu al-Hasan Al-Ash'ari, the founder of Ash'arite school, formulated antinomies on different aspects of the problem of human free will, 'antinomy of Divine Power and Human free will' being one among them. The article "**Allah's Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man**" examines the theories of acquisition presented by Ash'arites and the Mut'atazilites with reference to this antinomy. Reconstructing the concept of Omnipotence as Allah's Power over the consequences, analyzing a moral action into 'intention', 'line of action' and 'consequences' the article argues that there is no incoherence between Allah's Power and human freedom.

There is a difference between 'Allah's Pleasure' (*raza*) and 'Allah's Will' (*mashiat*). Much confusion in Muslim Thought and especially in problems relating Divine Omnipotence and human freedom has arisen because of not keeping in view this difference. Divine revelation has always been the source of knowing Allah's Pleasure and the prophets, the messengers, have always been presenting the model of Allah's Pleasure in their lives. So the knowledge of Allah's Pleasure is always clearly stated, declared, determined and foreknown. Whereas consequences are subservient to Allah's Will. Allah's Absolute Power over the consequences is His Will (*mashiyat*). Allah's Will is not known, or foreknown (except to him whom He please), it is not declared. It may not be determined in Allah's Knowledge even as stated in verse 3:165-166. The article

**“Knowledge of Allah’s Pleasure (*Rada*) and Knowledge of Allah’s Will (*Mashiyat*)”** makes this difference clear narrating the event of Hazrat Mûsa and Hazrat Khizer as stated in the Qur’an.

There is a concept of an ‘appointed term of life’ in the Qur’an. It has been stated in the Qur’an that when the appointed term of life comes for the disbelievers, the realities they had been denying throughout their life become manifest on them. Now they beg for respite promising that they will follow the guidance sent by Allah and will live according to it. It is said to them that neither the ‘appointed term’ comes in advance nor can it be delayed. An antinomy argument has been formulated by the predestinarians to prove that the libertarians’ stand point was not correct. The article **“Free Will and the Appointed Term (*Ajl e Mussamma*)”** examines this dilemma and shows that it is based on un-Qur’anic concept of the inexorability of the appointed term (*ajl-e-musamma*) and does not pose a challenge to human freewill. Span of ‘life’ or the term of ‘death’ are not appointed inexorably. The Creator of life can extend life and the Creator of death can postpone death for as much time as He Wills. Actually it is the wrongdoers who entreat for respite when death reaches them, and it is they who are denied such respite.

The problem of free will and pre-ordained sustenance presents one of the various dimensions of the problem of free will and predestination identified by Muslims and orientalist both with respect to Islam. The study **“Antinomy of Free Will and Pre-Ordained Sustenance”** argues that the problem arises from un-Qur’anic concept of Allah’s Bounty, His Will and Pleasure. Allah approves at present the measure of sustenance for each individual according to His Absolute Knowledge and Wisdom. Qur’an says: *He straitens the provisions for some, He amplifies for some, and He gives provisions without measure for whom He please.* Therefore pre-ordaining of sustenance as wrongly supposed in the dilemma does not mean that it has been preordained as to its measure from the creation of the universe or from the birth of the individual.

On the problem of freewill, in the early centuries there arose sects known as the predestinarians, and the libertarians among Muslim. According to the former there is no distinction between the actions that occur in the world including the actions which occur to man, and the actions which are performed by man. According to the later, there

is a distinction between actions that occur in the world, including actions which occur to man — and actions performed by man. The former actions admitted by all (but two of the libertarians) to be directly created by Allah; the later actions are taken by them to be performed by man's free will. Conflicting sects formulated arguments, mostly in the form of antinomies, to confront each other with difficulties. H. A. Wolfson, presents five of these antinomies in his *The Philososophy of the Kalam* with reference to Ashari's *Ibana...*, and *Makalat*, Bagdadi's *Fark*, and Shahrastani's *Milal*, and other sources. The article "**Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an**" examines only the first of these antinomies. Taking clue from these polemics, the orientalist try to draw the conclusion that the Qur'an contains sets of libertarian as well as predestinarian verses which does not cohere with each other. The study examines in the vast perspective of Qur'anic teachings the concepts on which the dilemma is based to show that, among other things, it were the unwarranted formulations of certain key concepts which gave rise to these disagreements.

#### **PART——5 COMPARATIVE STUDIES**

'Attribute' means *siffah* which is a derivative of the Arabic root *ṣ-f-t*. The Qur'an nowhere positively ascribes the word *siffah* to God. The Qur'an ascribes attributive names (*i.e.*, the Most Beautiful Names) to Allah and not the Attributes. Aristotelian metaphysics conceives everything as composed of two principles *i.e.*, essence and attributes. It conceives 'attributes' to be real and superadded to the 'essence'. Had the Muslims kept in view this fact they could have saved from entangling into useless discussions on the problem of the relationship of Divine Essence and Attributes. The Ash'arites claimed that Attributes were real in their own right and superadded to the Being of God. The Mu'tazilites denied them to be so and declared the Being of God and His Attributes to be identical. None of the two theological schools realized that they have entangled into a useless discussion by inserting un-Qur'anic notion of 'attribute' into a discussion relating Islamic theology. The problem is part of Muslim theology since centuries with no solution. First time in the history of Muslim theology Abdul Hameed Kamali, a Karachite scholar, very aged now, has drawn the attention of the Muslim scholars that the problem should be reconstructed in Qur'anic terms *i.e.*, 'the Name

(*Ism*), and the Named (*Musammâ*)” and himself has tried to develop a logic of Divine Names. This is a very original and genuine attempt. The study “**H. A. Wolfson and A. H. Kamali on the Origin of the Problem of Divine Attributes in Muslim Kalam**” argues that whereas both Wolfson and Kamali agree that the problem of the Relationship of Divine Essence and Attributes in Muslim Kalam, ultimately has its origin in Greek philosophy, Abdul Hameed Kamali goes further and makes a more significant and positive contribution by presenting a quite new and genuine attempt in the right direction.

Qur'an addresses the individuals as Muslims or disbelievers; the epithet Muslim or a Disbeliever or Islamic or Un-Islamic nowhere applies to a state or country. The Qur'an does not call the states established by Hazrat Dawood, Hazrat Suleman, Hazrat Yusaf (Peace be upon them all.) as Islamic/Muslim. So to call a state Muslim /Islamic or a Non-Muslim/Un-Islamic State is against Qur'anic teachings. The article “**State and Statecraft: Relationship between Islamic and Western Paradigms**” argues that the State of Madina, founded by Allah's Messenger (pbuh), was an administrative set up brought about for the peaceful co-existence of various religious and cultural identities endowed with religious freedom, and further argues that unification of State and Religion has given nothing except immense pain and suffering to the mankind. This study also argues that *Bid'at* (Innovation) is a principle given in the Qur'an for relating revealed knowledge with knowledge evolved through human experiences and experimentation. The principle of *Bid'at* (Innovation) provides Qur'anic basis for *ijtihad*. Unluckily the Muslims have abandoned this Qur'anic principle because of their shortsightedness with reference to a *hadith* which is actually meant for condemning unlawful and vile innovation only. Since some eminent religious scholars in the past have condemned innovation (*bid'at*) so the Muslims do not realize the real significance of this principle. Islamic and Western paradigms essentially differ from each other but we can benefit from the experiments made in the western civilization in politics, economics, administration, education, medicine, warfare and various other fields consciously and deliberately on the basis of this principle. The principle of innovation demarcates the lines and limits for benefitting from manmade knowledge with religious approval.



## **PART—6 MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY**

Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina are very close to each other in their views. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) developed these ideas much more than al-Farabi did. In history of Muslim philosophy they both are referred to as Muslim philosophers. The Muslim philosophers got so much impressed by Plato and Aristotle that they accepted their philosophical views as the standard of rational truth. As Muslim they believed religion as the revealed truth. Philosophical system and the scientific worldview by which one gets impressed, as said above, assumes the status of a rational version of truth for him. If one already believes in a revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance. In the history of religious philosophy, this desire for reconciliation has emerged in the form of reconstruction of religious thought in terms of prevalent philosophical and scientific theories. This is undertaken with the purpose to make the rational face of religion more manifest. But in the end it is the religion that suffers. In their attempt at the reconciliation of religion and philosophy, Muslim philosophers had to deny all the major beliefs of Islam. The study "**Ibn Sina, Al-Gazali and Ibn Taymiyyah on the Origination of the World**" examines how Imam Ghazali, with great philosophical acumen, locates the presuppositions which made the Muslim philosophers deviate from standard Qur'anic beliefs and reconstructs them according to Islamic teachings. Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, a great Muslim thinker also enters in the discussion, but is entangled in un-Qur'anic notions like 'absolute and fixed privation' and principles like 'Inconceivability of Inaction of Divine Attributes etc. Controversy between these thinkers is not merely an intellectual heritage of Muslim history, but also has intimate relevance with our own times. This provides us with a criterion to examine our own approach towards the relationship between religion and the philosophical and scientific worldviews of our times. Naturalism of Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, and sociological interpretation of Islam and especially presentation of Tauhid as World-view by Dr. Ali Shari'ati in the recent past and similar attempts of various contemporary scholars need to be seen and evaluated in this perspective.

**PART——7 THE QUR'AN, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY**

The significance of defining the nature of relationship between religion and rational sciences of a time has been identified by scholars in all periods of known history. Muslim scholars in various periods of Muslim history too realized its significance and made efforts to formulate an appropriate theology to this purpose. Examining the merits and demerits of Ibn Sina, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal and Dr. Israr Ahmed's attempts, the study **“Evolving A Qur'anic Paradigm of Science and Philosophy: Ibn Sina, Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal And Dr. Israr Ahmad”** presents a humble attempt of the writer for "Evolving a Qur'anic Paradigm of Science and Philosophy" in line with his understanding of the Qur'an.

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## NOTES AND REFERENCES

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### Introduction

\* For references concerning what is said in the “Introduction” please see the respective articles in the book.

Note: *Transliteration of a few verses used* some places throughout the book has been taken from [http://transliteration.org/Qur'an/website\\_cd/mixpicthall/002.asp](http://transliteration.org/Qur'an/website_cd/mixpicthall/002.asp)

<sup>1</sup> Claudius Ptolemy c. AD 90 – c. AD 168, was a Greek-Roman citizen of Egypt. He was a renowned mathematician, astronomer, geographer, astrologer, and poet.

<sup>2</sup> For details and references, please see the article, “Creationism, Emanationism, and Co-Eternity”.

<sup>3</sup> Abdul Hafeez Fazli, “Evolving a Qur’anic Paradigm of Science and Philosophy: Ibn Sina, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal and Dr. Israr Ahmed” unpublished article included in this book.

<sup>4</sup> For in depth study of this point please see, Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, “Is Allah al-Dahr!” (Urdu), *al-Hikmat* vol.29 (2009), Lahore, Pakistan: Philosophy Dept, Punjab University.s

<sup>5</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious in Islam*, ed. and ann, M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, reprint 1986), 46

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 160. This tradition is narrated by Ahmad Hanbal in his Musnad, V, 299 and 311. Professor M. Saeed Sheikh who has annotated this book also quotes following other references: Cf. Bukhari, *Tafsir*; 45; *Tawhid*: 35; *Âdâb*:101; and Muslim, *Alfâz*2-4.

<sup>7</sup> For references and details please see the article “Iqbal’s View of Omniscience and Human Freedom”.

<sup>8</sup> Maturidiyyah is a Sunni theological school named after its founder Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d.944). The school came to be widely recognised as the second orthodox Sunni theological school beside Ash’ariyyah. <http://mb-soft.com/believe/txw/maturidi.htm>, last updated on 04/20/2012 20:53:46. Ash’ariyya - named after its founding thinker, al-Ash’ari (d. ah 324/ad 935)- was the foremost theological school in Sunni Islam. It had its origin in the reaction against the excessive rationalism of the Mu’tazila (originated in Basra at the beginning of the second century A.H./eighth century A.D.).

<sup>9</sup> Ozcan, Hanifi (1997), The Relationship between God’s Knowledge and Human Freedom: A New Approach to the Problem. *Hamdard Islamicus*, 3, 70.

<sup>10</sup> For details see the article “Christian View of Omniscience and Human Freedom.”

<sup>11</sup> M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, *ibid*, p.40

<sup>12</sup> The angels gave glad tidings of a son and a grandson (Hazrat Ishâq and Hazrat Yaqûb) to Hazrat Ibrahim (pbuh) at one and the same time, who both will be

prophet and righteous persons. Observing the nearness of Hazrat Maryam (pbuh) who was in the custody of Hazrat Zakariya (pbuh) prayer gushes forth from the holy heart of Hazrat Zakariya: O Lord! Grant me a son too! The prayer was granted the very same moment and it was stated: His name will be Yahya; none of this name is created before, he will be a prophet, a righteous person, god-fearing, and verifier of one of our signs. (For reference please see, al-Qur'an:3:39, 45-51, 11:71)

<sup>13</sup> M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, (tr), The Qur'an: A New Translation, USA: Oxford University Press, 2004-2005, p.86

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.281

<sup>15</sup> ibid, p.385

<sup>16</sup> Concerning the things man will be rewarded in the Paradise it is said: A Reward for the deeds of their past (life). (56:24) Then it is said: *He that works evil will not be requited but by the like thereof: and he that works a righteous deed - whether man or woman - and is a Believer- such will enter the Garden (of Bliss): Therein will they have abundance without measure. (Also see: 2:281, 3:25, 16:11.)*

<sup>17</sup>It is taking the righteous line of action that makes a deed righteous. *"But those who have faith and work righteousness, they are companions of the Garden: Therein shall they abide (forever)." (002.082)*

<sup>18</sup> Allah leads not astray save the transgressors.

<sup>19</sup> For details see the article "Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom".

<sup>20</sup> For references and details see the article "The Way of Shahidîn: The Construction of the Theology of Mysticism in *Tafseer-e Fazlî*".

<sup>21</sup>*Rahbaniyyat (monastic asceticism) was an innovation (bida't) of the Christians, Allah did not enjoin it on them. They had initiated it with the purpose of seeking Allah's pleasure. [Allah does not disapprove it.] They could not confine them within viable limits as they should. (22:27), And proclaim the Pilgrimage among men: they will come to thee on foot and (mounted) on every kind of camel, lean on account of journeys through deep and distant mountain highways. [Could the Muslims go on hajj as stated in this verse? This is bida't that now we go by air for acting upon this injunction.]*

Stoning of the images of devil (*rami jamâr*) is an essential component of *Hajj*. Since centuries people have been performing this ritual from sunshine till midday on 10th of Zilhajj, and from midday till sunset on 11th and 12th of Zilhajj. Though no Divine Injunction existed as to this effect yet it had been a practice since centuries. With too much increase in the number of pilgrims it did not remain possible for all to perform this ritual within these time limits. Since few years the time for the performance of this ritual has been extended to the whole day i.e., that from sunshine till sunset all the three days.

<sup>22</sup> For references and details of this topic please see "Allah's Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man".

<sup>23</sup> Dr. Devin Stewart suspects that “the number 6666 comes from Christian polemics against Islam. It would be important if someone tries to trace this claim and figure out who the first person to make it was.

### 1. Is ‘Al-Ḥaqq’ One of Al-Asmâ’ Al-Ḥusnâ!

\* Published in *Bâzyaft: A Research Journal*, vol. 9 (2006), pp.1-31, Department of Urdu, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

**Note:** Translation of verses has been taken from Marmaduke Pikhthal (tr.), *The Glorious Qur’an*, (Banglore: India, 1952) and shown in italicised format. Where the writer has given only the import of a verse/verses according to his understanding, it is not italicised and abbreviation ‘cf.’ precedes the reference.

<sup>1</sup> Al-Ghazali, *Majmu’a Rasail-e-Imam Ghazali*, vol. 1, Khalil Ashraf Usmani (edt.), Karachi: Dar al-Asha’at, 2004, p. 314. The above is a collection of various treatises of Imam Ghazali translated in Urdu by various scholars at various times. It consists of three volumes and makes 15 treatises of al-Ghazali available in one collection. The first volume contains the Urdu translation of *al-Maqṣad ‘l asna...*’ at pp. 207-363. It is translated by Mawlana Muhammad Nazir Martasi. No further information about the translator is given.

<sup>2</sup> According to William C. Chittick the first clear and detailed formulation of *wahdat al-wujūd* is usually ascribed to al-Shaykh al-Akbar, Muhyi al-Dîn Ibn al-Arabi (560/1165–638/1240). The term *wahdat al wujūd* itself is not found in any texts before the works of Ibn al-Arabi’s school. Ibn al-Arabi himself never employs the term *wahdat al-wujūd* in his enormous corpus of writings however he frequently discusses *wujūd* and often makes explicit statements that justify that he supported the idea of *wahdat al-wujūd* in the literal sense of the term., William C. Chittick, “Wahdat al-Wujud In Islamic Thought” *The Bulletin*, Jan.- Mar. 1999, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Qur’an and *Hadīth* as source and inspiration of Islamic Philosophy”, *Histoery of Islamic Philosophy* part-1, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), (London: Routledge) 1996, 29.

<sup>4</sup> Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, ed. Brill, 2002, vol.2, s. v. “God and His Attributes”; Vol. 5, ed. Brill 2006, s. v. “Sufism and the Qur’an ”.

<sup>5</sup> Ahmed Raza Khan Brailwi (tr.) and Muhammad Naeem al-Din (exegete), *Kanza al-Iman al-Qur’an ‘l Hakim*, Lahore and Karachi: Taj Company, year of publishing not given.

<sup>6</sup> J. W. Redhouse, (1811-1892 ) M.R.A.S., Hon. Mem. R.S.L., etc was a well-known British Orientalist of the 19th century. J. W. Redhouse, On “The Most Comely Names,” al-Asmâ’ al-Ḥusnâ i.e. The Laudatory Epithets, or The Titles of Praise, bestowed on God in the Qur’an or by Muslim Writers, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol.12, London: 1882, p. 23. In this article he refers to Johann Heinrich Hottinger (1620- 1667) a Swiss Philologist and Theologian who in his *Historia Orientalis* gives a list of Good Names of Allah. He also refers to Francis Meninski (1623-1671), a French Orientalist, the learned author of the thesaurus *Lingua-rum Orientalium*, a profound scholar in most of the ancient and modern

languages. He also refers to an article by E. T. Rogers, M.R.A.S. "On Arabic Amulets and Mottoes" published in J.R.A.S., vol. XI (New Series); also refers to Lord Stanley of Alderley, "Poetry of Mohamed Rabadan." Mohamed Rabadan composes Good Names of Allah in his poetry.

<sup>7</sup> Abdul Bâqî, Muhammad Fu'âd. *Concordance And Index of the Qur'an* (Lahore: Suhail Academy), 1983, 208. Meaning of these derivatives have been taken from the respective contexts in various English translations of the Qur'an.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 212

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Al-Qur'an, *And We shall take out from every nation a witness and We shall say: Bring your proof. Then they will know that Allah hath the truth, and all that they invented will have failed them*, 28:75.

<sup>21</sup> *And the True Promise draweth nigh; then behold them, staring wide in terror, the eyes of those who disbelieve! ... 21:97; Had the truth [Word of Allah] made to accord with their desires verily the heavens and the earth and whatsoever is therein had been corrupted*, 23:71.

<sup>22</sup> He it is Who sent His messenger with the guidance and the religion of truth (Dîn al haqq), that he may cause it to prevail over all religion ... 48:28, 61:09.

<sup>23</sup> For full reference of a verse on this subject see, Al-Qur'an, *Allah has created the heavens and the earth in truth, and that every soul may be repaid what it hath earned. And they will not be wronged*. 45:22

<sup>24</sup> Pickthall in *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an: Text and Explanatory Translation* has translated *Mawla humu l-haqq* as 'their Lord, the Just,' which does not seem to be right translation to the present writer. Al-Hâj Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar has translated it as 'their Master in truth' which seems better and correct. Al-Hâj Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar, *Translation of the Holy Qur'an* (reprint) (Pakistan: National Book Foundation, 1973), 77. M. A. S. Abdel Haleem translates as the following: ... *Then they will all be returned to God, their true Lord*. M. A. S. Abdel

Haleem, *The Qura'n, A new translation*, Oxford University Press: Oxford World's Classics, 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Pickthall translates it in following words: *In this case protection is only from Allah, the True. He is Best for reward and best for consequence, which does not seem fitting in the context of the example Allah has given in the preceding verses.*

<sup>26</sup> Pickthall translates it in this way: *That is because Allah, He is the truth, and because He quickens the dead, and because He is Able to do all things. (22:6), That is because Allah, He is the True, and that whereon they call instead of Him, it is the False, and because Allah, He is the High, the Great. (22:62) That (is so) because Allah, He is the True, and that which they invoke beside Him is the False, and because Allah, He is the Sublime, the Great. (31:30).* At one place he calls Allah, 'the truth' and at other place he calls Him 'the True'. 'Truth' is the property of a proposition whereas it is a person who can be true! At times Pickthall identifies Allah with His Word at other time he treats Him as Person!

<sup>27</sup> Pickthall translates it *That is because Allah, He is the True ...* but it does not seem to be right rendering in the context.

<sup>28</sup> Pickthall does not use the word 'God' in his translation. We have used it.

<sup>29</sup> Pickthall translates it in this way: *'On that day Allah will pay them their just due, and they will know that Allah, He is the Manifest Truth. (24:25)*

<sup>30</sup> If any contradiction is found it means that *al-ḥaqq* revealed in the past has been tampered with, and Allah has verified it. Cf. al-Qur'an, 4:46, 5:41.

<sup>31</sup> Pickthall translates it in this way: *That is because Allah, He is the truth, and because He quickens the dead, and because He is Able to do all things. (22:6), That is because Allah, He is the True, and that whereon they call instead of Him, it is the False, and because Allah, He is the High, the Great. (22:62) That (is so) because Allah, He is the True, and that which they invoke beside Him is the False, and because Allah, He is the Sublime, the Great. (31:30).* At one place he calls Allah, 'the truth' and at other place he calls Him 'the True'. 'Truth' is the property of a proposition whereas it is a person who can be true! At times Pickthall identifies Allah with His Word at other time he treats Him as person!

<sup>32</sup> Pickthall translates it *That is because Allah, He is the True ...* but it does not seem to be right rendering in the context.

<sup>33</sup> M. A. S. Abdel Haleem translates it as the following: *This scripture, free from all doubt, has been sent down from the Lord of the Worlds. Yet they say, 'Muhammad has made it up.' No indeed! It is the Truth from your Lord for you [Prophet], to warn a people who have had no one to warn them before, so that they may be guided. Ibid, p.264*

<sup>34</sup> Qâzi Muhammad Suleman Salman Mansoor-puri, *M'âraf al-Asmâ': Sharah al-Asmâ' al-Husnâ*, Lahore: Idara Islamiyat, reprint, year not given, 14. Mawlana Abu al A'la Maududi narrates three main traditions reported in these lines recognizing their differences but prefers one of them (taken by Tirmzi famous as *ṭarîq-e-Safwân bin Şâlih*) over others. He does not explain the rationale of giving this preference.

Maududi, Abual A'la, *Tafhîm 'l Ḥadîth*, (compiler. Abdul Wakeel Alvi), Lahore: Idara M'âraf-e-Islami, 1999, Cf. 195-200. Ghulam Ahmed Perviz gives a list of 89 Names, simple as well as compound, either given or derived from the Qur'an. However, he states that further descriptive Names can be added to this list drawing from verses in which Allah's Actions have been stated. Ghulam Ahmed Perviz, *Tabvîb-al-Qur'an* (vol.I) (Lahore: Idara Tulu-i-Islam, 1977), 209. Qâzi Suleman Salman Mansurpuri has been a Sessions Judge under British rule in India. He is a writer of very famous book on the life of the Prophet (pbuh) entitled *Rahmatu-lil-Âlamîn*.

<sup>35</sup> Al-Ghazali, *ibid*, p.353 al-Ghazali also does not show any originality while expounding *al-ḥaqq* as 'Good Name.' He even does not identify the contradiction which arises by considering *al-ḥaqq* (which occurs more than two hundred times in the Qur'an referring to the Qur'an), as one of *al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ*. cf. *Ibid*. p.314-16.

<sup>36</sup> Redhouse, *ibid.*, p.4

<sup>37</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Hazrat Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli, *Tafsîr-e-Fâzli*, vol. II, (Lahore: Fâzli Foundation, reprint 1996), 305. For the introduction of *Tafsîr-e-Fâzli* and their worthy authors please see article "The Way of Shahideen: The Construction of a Qur'anic Theology of Sufism in *Tafsîr-e-Fâzli*".

<sup>38</sup> Al-Qur'an, 39:23.

## 2. The Qur'anic Ontology and Status of *Al-Ḥaqq*

\* Edited and revised version of article "Qur'anic Ontology and Status of *al-ḥaqq*" published in *Bâzyaft: A Research Journal*, Dec. 2009, Department of Urdu, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

<sup>1</sup> al-Qur'an, 13:37

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 54:17 etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 39:23, 28.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 15:09

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 69:40-42, 81:19

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, (12:104)

<sup>7</sup> Abdul Hafeez Fazli, "Is '*al-ḥaqq*' one of *al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ*!", *Bazyaft*, Vol.9, Lahore: Urdu Department Punjab University, 2006, p.1

<sup>8</sup> Muhammad Fouâd 'Abdul Bâqi, *Concordance And Index of The Qur'an*, Lahore: Suhail Academy, 208-11

<sup>9</sup> "Is *al-ḥaqq* one of *al-Asmâ' al-Ḥusnâ*", p.1

<sup>10</sup> Pickthall in *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an: Text and Explanatory Translation* has translated *Mawla humu l- ḥaqq* as 'their Lord, the Just,' which does not seem to be right translation to the writer. Al-Hâj Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar has translated it as 'their Master in truth' which seems better and correct. Al-Hâj Hafiz

Ghulam Sarwar, *Translation of the Holy Qur'an* (reprint) (Pakistan: National Book Foundation, 1973), 77.

<sup>11</sup> Pickthall translates it in following words: *In this case protection is only from Allah, the True...*; Abdullah Yousaf Ali translates it in this way: "There, the (only) protection comes from God, the True One..." Both these translations do not fit in the context of the example Allah has given in the preceding verses.

<sup>12</sup> Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates it as following: "High above all is God, the King, the Truth! Be not in haste with the Qur'an before its revelation to thee is completed, but say, "O my Lord! advance me in knowledge."

<sup>13</sup> Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates it as following: Therefore exalted be God, the King, the Reality: there is no god but He, the Lord of the Throne of Honour! But this does not fit in the context.

<sup>14</sup> Pickthall translates it in this way: *That is because Allah, He is the truth, and because He quickens the dead, and because He is Able to do all things. (22:6), That is because Allah, He is the True, and that whereon they call instead of Him, it is the False, and because Allah, He is the High, the Great. (22:62) That (is so) because Allah, He is the True, and that which they invoke beside Him is the False, and because Allah, He is the Sublime, the Great. (31:30).* At one place he calls Allah, 'the truth' and at other place he calls Him 'the True'. 'Truth' is the property of a proposition whereas it is a person who can be true! At times Pickthall identifies Allah with His Word at other time he treats Him as person!

<sup>15</sup> Pickthall translates it *That is because Allah, He is the True ...* but it does not seem to be right rendering in the context.

<sup>16</sup> Pickthall does not use the word 'God' in his translation. We have used it.

<sup>17</sup> Al-Qur'ân, 39:23.

<sup>18</sup> Critical Appraisal, cf. p.7-8

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> ibid, 8, 10, 16.

<sup>21</sup> cf. ibid., 8-13

<sup>22</sup> Pickthall translates it *That is because Allah, He is the True ...* but it does not seem to be right rendering in the context.

<sup>23</sup> *...Surely His is the Creation (Khalq) and the Command (Amr).....* (al-Qur'an, 07:54) Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafseer-e-Fazli*, 7 vols. 2nd ed. (Lahore: Fazli Foundation, 1982-98), 2 (1996): 224. The translation given above in the text from *Tafsire-e-Fazli* is not substantially different from that of Pickthall. Pickthall's translation of this part of the verse is as follows: *His verily is all creation and commandment...* Marmaduke Pickthall (tr.), *The Glorious Qur'an: Explanatory Translation*, p. 593. For further references from the Qur'an on this ontology see the following:

i) "The heavens and the earth, and whatever therein is, belongs to the category of *Khalq* (Creation). Even the phenomenon of life and the phenomenon of death fall in

the same category. *Allah is He Who created the heavens and the earth and what is between them ... (32:04) He Who created death and life ... (67:2)*

ii) Allah has not created the heavens and the earth without a purpose. The purpose of what Allah creates, stands prior to His creating. .... *Allah created not the heavens and the earth and that which is between them save with the truth,...* (30:08)

iii) iv. It is Allah's *Amr* (Command) which makes what is to be created (*Khalq*) active in a well-defined course of action and subservient in its area of operation. *Surely your Lord is Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and He established on the throne of Power. He makes the night cover the day, which it pursues incessantly. And the Sun and the Moon and the Stars are made subservient by His Command (Amr). Surely His is the Creation (Khalq) and the Command (Amr)...* (7:54)

iv) Though *Amr* (Command) is determined or prescribed prior to creating yet it is expressed or issued in the present; for *Amr* (Command) is issued when the thing or the person (to be created or created) is capable of receiving it. *He said: Our Lord is He Who gave to everything its nature, then guided it aright. (20:50)*" Cf. Dr. Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, *The Qur'an: Creation or Command, International Journal of Humanities and Religion [IJHR] (On line access journal), 2(10) December 2012: 75 -83.*

<sup>24</sup> "(a) The Qur'an belongs to the category of *Amr* (Command) and not to the category of *Khalq* (Creation). *That [Qur'an] is the Commandment [Amr] of Allah, which He revealeth unto you...* (65:05) (b) It is the source of knowing *Shari'a* (Divine course); and *Shari'a* is Allah's *Amr* (Command) and not His creation. *And now We have set thee on a clear road [Shari'a] of (Our) Commandment [Amr], so follow it, and follow not the whims of those who know not. (45:18)* (c) *Amr* (Command) is always descended or revealed and not created. *Allah is He Who created seven heavens, and of the earth the like thereof. The Command (Amr) descends among them, that you may know that Allah is Possessor of Power over all things, and that Allah encompasses all things in (His) Knowledge. (65:12)*"

<sup>25</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, Lahore Pakistan: Suhail Academy, 1999, 15-16; also see p. 135 where Nasr says: *Wahdat al-wujud* asserts that "only God is absolutely Real; everything else is relative." See also: Ibn Arabi, *The Wisdom of the Prophets* (translation of *Fusus al-Hikam*) Titus Burckhardt (Ibrahim 'Izz Ud Din) has translated it from Arabic to French and from French to English by Angela Culme-Seymour, Lahore : Suhail Academy, 1981. Explaining the word '*al-ḥaqq*' in the Glossary at p. 139 the translator says "*al-ḥaqq*: The Truth or the Reality...". And in the first line of the first chapter the translator equates God to *al-ḥaqq* when the translator says: "God (*al-ḥaqq*) wanted to see the essences ..." p.8. With reference to Hazrat Bâyezîd, Frithjof Schuon writes "*Al-Haqq=God*", Footnotes at pp. 48, 50. *Dimensions of Islam*, (trans., Townsend) Lahore Pakistan: Suhail Academy, 1999. Schuon also belonged to *wahdat al-wujud* school as Nasr. He explains the word 'God' in footnote 2 as '*Al-Haqq*', '*the Truth*', or '*the Reality*'. Ibid, p. 33 Seyyed Hossein Nasr is considered to be the chief representative of *Wahdat al-Wujud* school in the present day academic world. In his book *Ideals and*



*Realities of Islam* which was first published in 1965 from Beirut he alleges to present Islam and its intellectual treasures in a contemporary academic language. The writer firmly believes that nothing in this book is stated on the authority of the Qur'an.

<sup>26</sup> M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, *ibid*, p.222

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p.381

<sup>28</sup> *Tafsir-e Fāzli* translates this verse as the following: "Vile discourse relates to the vile people, and vile people are for vile discourse; chaste discourse relates to the chaste people, and the chaste people are for the chaste discourse. These [the chaste people] are free of things they [the vile people] say. For them is forgiveness and provision honourable." (24:26)

<sup>29</sup> al-Qur'an, 62:2. See also: 2:129, 3:164.

### 3. The Qur'an: Creation or Command!

\* Published in *International Journal of Humanities and Religion [IJHR]*, 2(10) December 2012: 75 -83, India.

Note: An article entitled "Qur'ân: *Khalq ya Amr*", in Urdu by the same author was published in *T'alimi Zawiyay*, January 2003, Islamabad. This journal could publish hardly a few issues and was closed. Present one is a fully developed, annotated, fully revised and a new article on the same theme.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. al-Qur'an, cf., 5:03

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 109:06

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 5:03

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:147, 3:60, 32:2-3

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, cf. *نَرْفَعُ دَرَجَاتٍ مَّنْ نَّشَاءُ وَفَوْقَ كُلِّ ذِي عِلْمٍ عَلِيمٌ*... Cf. There is always one better knowing than a man of knowledge. (12:76)

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, His Word is the truth. 6:73

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 109:06

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, There is no coercion in *din*. (2:256)

<sup>9</sup> Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1976, p. 263-74.

<sup>10</sup> The Qur'an, cf. 07:54

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 30:25

<sup>12</sup> Abu 'L-Hasan 'Ali Ibn Isma'il Al-As'ari, *Al-Ibaanah an Usul Ad-Diyaanah* ( Eng. tr. *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation* by Walter C. Klein), American Oriental Society, New Haven, 1940, p. 66, 67, 76; also see translator's note at page 66. Klein in this note writes " In this section al-Ash'ari repeats himself frequently. He attempts to show, on the one hand, that the Qur'an is not created, because it has not the characteristics of a created thing and exists independently of creation, and, on the

other hand, that it is eternal and uncreated because, it is in a sense, a predicate of God's attributes like His Knowledge and His Will...".

<sup>13</sup>Wolfson, *ibid.*, p.238, 241, 243.

<sup>14</sup>Wolfson, *ibid.*, p.238.

<sup>15</sup> Al-Qur'an, *ibid.*, 85:22

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 43:03-4

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 56:78

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, You who believe, do not ask about matters which, if made known to you, might make things difficult for you– if you ask about them while the Qur'an is being revealed, they will be made known to you– for God has kept silent about them: God is most forgiving and forbearing. (5:101)

<sup>19</sup>Wolfson, *ibid.*, p.238.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. And cover not Truth with falsehood, nor conceal the Truth and ye know it.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, p.42.

<sup>22</sup> *"Whoso doth an ill-deed, he will be repaid the like thereof, while whoso does right, whether male or a female, and is a believer, all such will enter the Garden, where they will be nourished without stint."*(40:40) and also 2:281; 3:25; 16:11; 10:44; 16:118; 73:76; 11:101; 2:62; 5:69; 16:98; 41:46; 45:15 and many other.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. The Qur'an, 07:54

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* 30:25

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 32:04, 67:02

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 30:08

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 07:54

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 20:50

<sup>29</sup> *"And now have We set thee (O Muhammad) on a clear road [Shari'a] of (Our) commandment [Amr]; so follow it, and follow not the whims of those who know not."* (45:18)

<sup>30</sup> *"Allah it is who hath created seven heavens, and of the earth the like thereof. The commandment cometh down among them slowly, that ye may know that Allah is Able to do all things, and that Allah surroundeth all things in knowledge."* (65:12)

<sup>31</sup> Dr. Abdul Khaliq, "Problem of the Eternity / Createdness of the Qur'an in Early Islam", *JR(H)*, xvi(2), p. 10-11.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid* 3:77; 4:164; 7:143-44; 42:51

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:75; 9:06; 48:15

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, *"Praise be to God, Creator of the heavens and earth, who made angels messengers with two, three, four [pairs of] wings. He adds to creation as He will: God has power over everything."* (35:01)

<sup>35</sup> “To Hazrat Musâ God spoke directly.” (04:164)

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., cf. “It is He Who has sent this Scripture down to you [Prophet]. Some of its verses are definite in meaning—these are the cornerstone of the Scripture—and others are ambiguous. The perverse at heart eagerly pursue the ambiguities in their attempt to make trouble and to pin down a specific meaning of their own: only God knows the true meaning. Those firmly grounded in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it: it is all from our Lord’—only those with real perception will take heed.” (03:07)

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., cf. 2:191

<sup>38</sup> al-Qur’an, 13:37

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 85:21-22, 43:3-4.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 03:7

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Ibid. “God doth blot out or confirm what He pleaseth: with Him is the Mother of the Book.” (13:39)

<sup>42</sup> Cf. ibid., 13:39, 43:1-4

<sup>43</sup> Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, *Lughatul Qur’an* (Urdu) vols. 4 (in single binding), Lahore, Pakistan: Idara Tal’u e Islam, 1984, p. 1512.

<sup>44</sup> “Nothing is like Him; He is the Hearer the Seer.” (42:11)

<sup>45</sup> Dr. Qazi Abdul Qadir, *Kashhaf-e Iştilahât-e falsfa* (Urdu-English), Karachi University: *shu’ba talif o tarjama*, 1994, p.239

<sup>46</sup> Nelson Pike, *God and Timelessness*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, p. ix-x.

<sup>47</sup> Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, pp.217.

#### 4. Number of Verses of the Qur’an (Index and Argument)

\* Published in *IJHSS*, Vol. 2 No. 19, October 2012, pp.264-67, USA

<sup>1</sup> Al-Qur’an, 9:39 and 9:84 are the places where the statements do not conclude at phrase *عَذَاباً أَلِيماً*.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Zafar Iqbal, “Foreword”, *The Qur’an*, (published by Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam), reprint of the copy published in 1935.

<sup>3</sup> And We have bestowed upon thee the Seven Oft-repeated (verses) and the Grand Qur’an. (15:87)

<sup>4</sup> Over it are Nineteen. (74:30) And We have set none but angels as Guardians of the Fire; and We have fixed their number only as a trial for Unbelievers,- in order that the People of the Book may arrive at certainty, and the Believers may increase in Faith,... (74:31)

<sup>5</sup> Twenty-nine Surahs of the Qur’an start with separate-letters (*Hurūf-e-Muq’atiât*). Fourteen letters out of twenty-eight alphabets of Arabic Language occur as *Muq’atiât* in 14 different sets. Thus 29+14+14=57 which is a multiple of number 19. Total number of occurring of each one of these 14 sets of *Huruf-e-Muq’atiât*

(according to a chart worked out by one Lt. Colonel (ret.) Mahmood Ali Akhtar), independently or part of any word, in above mentioned twenty-nine surahs is a multiple of number 19.

<sup>6</sup>*The Qur'an*, (published by Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam), reprint of the copy published in 1935, p.7.

### 5. The Way of *Shâhidîn*: The Construction of a Qur'anic Theology of Sufism in Tafseer-e-Fâzli

\* The author is thankful to Dr. Devin Stewart, Winship Distinguished Scholar of Arabic and Islamic Studies Emory University Atlanta

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**Note:** Translation of verses in this article has been taken from Pkthall, *The Glorious Qur'an— Text and Explanatory Translation*, Lahore, Pakistan: Taj Company, 1984 and is given in *italics*.

<sup>1</sup> The Qur'an says: The (Qur'an) is the *qawl* of the illustrious messenger. (*'innahu laqawlu rasūlin karīmin.*') 69:40, also 81:19). In order to understand this verse it is necessary that we i) know the referent of *rasūlin karīmin* (the illustrious messenger), and ii) that we rightly determine the meaning of the word '*qawl*'. *Rasūlin karīmin* may not refer to the archangel Hazrat Jibrael for he has only brought down the revelation to the holy heart of the Prophet (pbuh) by Allah's Command (*Fa'innahu Nazzalahu 'Alā Qalbika Bi'idhni Allāhi*, ibid, 2:97) It may not refer to Allah, for the Qur'an is *كَلِمَاتُ اللَّهِ* (*Kalām Allāhi*—the Word of the Lord). (cf. ibid, 2:75, 09:06, 48:15); Allah is the Sender of revelation (ibid, 69:43) so He may not be the *rasūl* (the messenger). The Prophet (pbuh) can be the only referent of the phrase *rasūlin karīmin*. '*Qawl*' may not mean 'the inspired word' as Muhammad Asad translates it. (The Message of the Qur'an, 69:40, 81:1) He is a naturalist and may mean that Qur'an is a speech which the messenger (pbuh) articulated in his words under Divine inspiration. This is not correct for the Qur'an is *Kalām Allāh* and revealed as such. '*Qawl*' may not mean 'speech' or 'word' as Pkthall translates it. (cf. The Glorious Qur'an, 69:40 and 81:19, Abdullah Yousaf Ali also translates it as 'word'.) Allah warns a disbeliever of flinging into Hell-fire who says that this is nothing but the '*Qawl*—speech or word' of a *bashar* i.e., a human being. (cf. 74:25) The Qur'an verifies that the Messenger (pbuh) is a *Bashar*—human being (cf. 18:110). The (Qur'an) also asserts that 'it is the *Qawl* of the Illustrious Messenger.' How to reconcile this! '*Qawl*' means the 'precept', 'the guidance', the teachings. '*Qawl*' is a complimentary of the concept of '*amal*' (the human moral action). The auspicious person of the Prophet (pbuh) is the absolute model of acting upon this precept—'*qawl*'. The auspicious life of the Prophet (pbuh) is the best embodiment of this '*qawl*'. The Tafseer-e-Fâzli translates the verse in question as 'The (Qur'an) is the *qawl* of the illustrious messenger (69:40), and

rightly draws the conclusion that the Qur'an is *qawl*. *TF*, vol. 7, (Lahore: Fâzli Foundation, 1998) 69:40-43, 264-65.

<sup>2</sup>*ho wal-Haqqo mir-Rabbika*: The Qur'an is the truth from your Lord. *The revelation of the Scripture whereof there is no doubt is from the Lord of the Worlds. Or say they: He hath invented it? Nay, but it is the truth from thy Lord, that thou mayst warn a folk to whom no warner came before thee, that haply they may walk aright.* 32:02-3 ... *What is revealed unto thee from thy Lord is the truth (ho wal-Haqqo), ... 34:06, As for that which We inspire in thee of the Scripture, it is the truth (ho wal-Haqqo) 35:31, ... That which is revealed unto Muhammad – and it is the truth from their Lord (ho wal-Haqqo mir-Rabbihim) ... 47:02, al-Haqqo mir-Rabbihim: 47:03.*

From centuries onward the belief that *al-haqq* is one of *al-Asmâ al-Husnâ* (the Beautiful Names of Allah) is prevalent in Muslims. The *TF* does not agree with it. According to it '*al-haqq*' means the standard of truth and this epithet is to be used for the Qur'an. *TF*, vol. II, (Lahore: Fâzli Foundation, reprint 1996), 305.

<sup>3</sup> Assuredly conjecture (*ẓann*-ظن) can by no means take the place of truth. Cf. Al-Qur'an, 10:36; A guess can never take the place of truth. Cf. Ibid, 53:28. Commentary on this verse in the *TF* includes: The conjecture (*ẓann*) cannot spare anyone from the truth (*haqq*). *Zann* relates to one's desires whereas *haqq* is Allah's revealed Guidance. It is not possible to have knowledge if one follows one's conjecture. Cf. *TF* vol.7, 1998, 68.

<sup>4</sup> Say: *Al haqq* is from the Lord of you all. (cf. al-Qur'an, 18:29); al-Qur'an is the truth from your Lord (*ho wal-haqqo mir-Rabbika*—Ibid, 32:02-03) What Allah descends unto His messenger is the truth (cf. ibid,—5:83-84, 11:120, 13:01, 19; 21:55; More references will follow in the body of the article.

<sup>5</sup> Allah Almighty says: I swear by all that ye see. And all that ye see not. That it is indeed the *qawl* [teachings, precept] of an illustrious messenger [*rasool-e-karîm*). It is not the *qawl* of a poet, it is not the *qawl* of a diviner. It is a revelation from the Lord of the Worlds. (*TF* vol.7, 69:38-43, 264-65) also see, nor is it the *qawl* of an evil, accursed spirit. Ibid, 81:19, 383. Also see note 2 above.

<sup>6</sup>*Bâtil* is only the opinion of those who disbelieve. *TF* vol. 6, 1997, cf. 38:27; *What is opposite to al-haqq* is *al-bâtil*, *TF* vol. 1, 2 & 6, cf. 02:42, 109, 144, 146, 213; 07:118, 18:56, 40:78;

<sup>7</sup>*TF* vol., 5, 1996, cf. 33:70-71, 319-20.

<sup>8</sup>*O ye who believe! Why say ye that which ye do not? It is the most hateful in the sight of Allah that ye say that which ye do not.* (Ibid, 61:2-3) The *TF* apply this principle to all aspects of life. It doesn't agree with any preaching if what the preacher preaches is contrary to what he practices. Commenting on *bismalah* they say that a claim not supported by accordant actions does not prove to be true. Cf. *TF*, vol. 1, Eng. tr. p.1.

<sup>9</sup> Allah granted sustenance, facilities and honor to the Children of Israîl but "rather than keeping themselves on the right path in accordance with the Divine Message,

they begin to give the same importance to their speculations which was worthy of truth, and truth alone so they fell into schism after the knowledge had come to them. For knowledge is the capacity to draw a line of demarcation between right and wrong. *TF*, vol. 3 (Eng. tr.), 2008, cf. exegesis of verse "...*Famâ Akhtalafû Ĥattâ Jâ'ahumu Al-`Ilmu...*" 10:93, p.51.

<sup>10</sup> cf. *TF* vol. 2 (Eng. tr.) commentary on verse 5:15 which says: ...al-Qur'an is an enlightening Book., p.13 also cf. *Ibid*, commentary of verse 5:44 which says: who do not judge in accordance with the Qur'an are disbelievers. p.29

<sup>11</sup> Neither the word '*taṣawaf*' nor the word 'sufies' occur in the Qur'an. The words '*aṣ-ṣaf*', '*ṣaffann*' and '*aṣṣafoon*' the derivative of the root '*Ṣa Fa Fa*' does occur in the Qur'an but the above epithets which relates to *Ṣ-W-F* cannot be derived from them. Some people try to link the words *sufies* or *taṣawaf* with *aṣhâb as-ṣuffa* (people of the bench) who lived on a platform near the residence of the holy prophet (peace be upon him). But it again is just speculation, Qur'an does not refer to them by the epithet *sufies*. Hence, the *TF* nowhere uses these words in all its seven volumes notwithstanding of the fact that the worthy authors of this exegesis themselves are what is commonly known as practicing sufi saints of *Qâdiriyya* Order.

<sup>12</sup> "*Yâ 'Ayyuhâ An-Nabîyu 'Innâ 'Arsalnâka Shâhidâan Wa Mubashshirâan Wa Nadhîrâan. O prophet!*" "*Truly We have sent thee as a witness, a bearer of glad tidings, and warner*", al-Qur'an, 33:45, also cf. 48:8, 73:15

<sup>13</sup> al-Qur'an, 21:56, 73:15

<sup>14</sup> *وَشَاهِدٍ وَمَشْهُودٍ*, (*Wa shâhidin wa mash-hūd*) By the witness and by the witnessed. Cf. al-Qur'an, 85:03. 'To be witness' is one of the illustrious positions granted to the beloved servant-of-Allah. One who affirms the beloved servant-of-Allah as witness (*shâhid*), he becomes 'witnessed' (*mash-hūd*). He does not keep any reservations from his *shâhid*. It is not love if it is subject to any condition. The *mash-hūd* is a model of the glory of his *shâhid*. In this way lamps go on lit, have been lit, and will go on lit.' Allah sent the prophet (pbuh) as *shâhid*; whom he certified among the followers (*mash-hūdîn*) also became *shâhid*. Cf. *TF* vol. 7, 403.

<sup>15</sup> cf. al-Qur'an, "*Enroll us among those who witness (to the truth.)*" 3:53; "...*They say: Our Lord, we believe. Inscribe us as among the witnesses.*" 5:83

<sup>16</sup> "*Lo! We have sent thee (O Muhammad-pbuh) as a witness and a bearer of good tidings and a warner.*" Al-Qur'an, 33:45, 48:08, 73:15

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 73:15

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 6:48; 18:56

<sup>19</sup> Muhammad Asad translates it as "...and cause them grow in purity...". Muhammad Asad (tr.), *The Message of THE QUR'AN* (Jibralter: Dar Al-Andalus, 1980), 93. The worthy authors of *TF* translate this verse as: "*Indeed Allah has conferred a favour upon the believers by raising a messenger (pbuh) amongst them, who recites His verses to them and purifies them...*" Hazrat Fazal Shah &

Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli, *Tafseer-e-Fâzli*, (Eng. tr.) vol. 1 (Lahore: Fâzli Foundation, 2002), 241.

<sup>20</sup> For further reference see Al-Qur'an, 2:129, 62:2.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 02:248

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 03:42

<sup>23</sup> cf. al-Qur'an, 3:33; 3:42; 27:59 and commentary given in *TF*.

<sup>24</sup> cf. Commentary given in *TF* on the following verses: 3:33; 3:42; 27:59 In verse 03:42 it has been stated that the angels say to Hazrat Maryam (pbuh) that Allah has definitely chosen her and has exalted her above the women of the world.

<sup>25</sup> al-Qur'an, cf. 56:7-10, 09:100

<sup>26</sup> *TF*, (Eng. tr.) vol. 1, p. 187. For details see: Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom," *Al-Hikmat*, 2006, Pakistan: Philosophy Dept, Punjab University Lahore.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, commentary on verse 3:33

<sup>28</sup> Cf. al-Qur'an, 91:09

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 87:14

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 23:01

<sup>31</sup> *TF*, (Eng. tr.) vol. 1,x. also cf. 87:14, 81:09

<sup>32</sup> al-Qur'an., cf. 33:46

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 33:70

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 31:15

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *ibid*, 2:257

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, cf. 10:62

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 31:15, for a detailed discussion on the meaning of this verse see note 45; also cf., *TF*, (Eng. tr.) vol. 1, viii.

<sup>38</sup> Every prophet (pbuh) was a standard of servitude of Allah for his followers for he demanded the believers to follow him and to submit to him.

<sup>39</sup> Al-Qur'an, 25:01, 17:01

<sup>40</sup> *TF*, (Eng. tr.) vol. 1, Introduction, viii. Also, al-Qur'an, 14:1,5; 33:43; 57:9; 65:11

<sup>41</sup> Qur'an recites the story of a man who had such capacity. Qur'an says: And recite unto them the tale of him to whom We gave Our revelations [Signs is the proper word] but he sloughed them off, so Satan overtook him and he became of those who were led astray. And had We willed We could have raised him by their means, but he clung to the earth and followed his own lust. ...*Ibid*, 7:175-76

<sup>42</sup> Qur'an narrates the story of a pious man, a courtier of Hazrat Sulaimân (pbuh) who could make miraculous things. When Hazrat Sulaimân learned that the Queen of Sheba was coming he said to his council that which of them could bring her

throne before they come to him. A djin said that he could bring the throne before he adjourns the court. But a courtier whom Allah had given some knowledge of the Scripture said he could bring it before twinkling of his eye ceases. And the throne was there before him! Cf. Ibid, 27:38-40

<sup>43</sup> Al-Qur'an, 02:61.

<sup>44</sup> "And now We have set thee (O Muhammad) on a clear road [*Shari'a*] of (Our) commandment [*amar*]; so follow it, and follow not the whims of those who know not. Ibid, 45:18 The verse does not address to the prophet (pbuh) as Pickthall thinks, it addresses to the believers. Cf. *TF* vol. 6, 314.

<sup>45</sup> And follow the path of those who turn towards Me. Ibid, 31:15 The *TF* translates this verse as the following: "And follow the path of one who turns toward Me." (*TF*, Urdu, manzil 5, Lahore: Fâzli Foundation, 1996, 252-53.) This translation seems better and correct for one can follow only one person, one cannot follow many. The righteous and the evil-doers always have different *trîqat* (way). (cf. Ibid, 72:11) The *Trîqat* (way) of the righteous is that they follow their *shâhid* as one who turn towards Allah (Cf. *TF* vol. 5, commentary on 31;15, 253) and submit to Allah and His messenger (cf. 3:32,132). The *Trîqat* of the evil-doers is that they take their own likes and dislikes as standard (cf. *TF* vol. 1, Eng. tr., commentary on 2:145, p.75). They are the ones who follows the way of those who are oblivious of Allah's remembrance, follow their own desires and do not observe the limits prescribed by Allah.(18:28) Holy Qur'an is the Book that guides to the truth and guides to the straight road (*tariq-e-mustaqîm*) (46:30)

<sup>46</sup> O ye who believe! Why say ye that which ye do not? It is most hateful in the eyes of Allah that ye say that which ye do not. (al-Qur'an, 61:02) That which is most hateful in the eyes of Allah cannot be knowledge. Commenting on 2:08 and 61:02 the worthy authors of *TF* say: A claim of faith not witnessed by accordant actions does not prove to be true. A claim of faith in Allah and the Last Day proves true only by following the Beloved of Allah. (cf. *TF* vol. 1 (Eng. tr.), p. 07, and vol.7, p.190).

<sup>47</sup> According to the *TF*, to accept as true without asking how and why, the statement of one whose truthfulness and integrity has been acknowledged is *Imân-bil-ghaib*. The *muttaqîn* accept as true whatever is stated by their *shâhid* whether they understand it or they understand it not. *Qur'an* imparts its guidance only to *muttaqîn* (the pious). Qur'an also states the qualities of *muttaqîn* because of which they succeed in getting guidance from it. *Imân-bil-ghaib* (Faith in the unseen) being the first of those qualities. (*TF* vol.1 Eng. tr., p.5) commentary on, 02:02-3)

<sup>48</sup> Before acting upon Allah's injunctions having faith is only a claim or precept (*qawl*) but not knowledge. Hence *Imân-bil-ghaib* is *qawl*. Qur'an enjoins to join claim of faith with righteous deed. (cf. al-Qur'an, 02:82) A claim of faith not witnessed by accordant actions does not prove to be true. (cf. al-Qur'an, 2:08) *Imân-bil-ghaib* converts into knowledge when one acts upon it doing righteous deed for knowledge is always post-experience. The doings of the righteous are righteous-deeds. Following one's *shâhid*/Mentor raises faith from *Imân-bil-ghaib* to *Imân-*



*bish-shahâdat*. Mentor *vis-à-visshâhid* is at the level of *Imân-bish-shahâdat*. When one follows his *shâhid* in totality of his life the mentor purifies him and certifies him, the follower becomes *shâhid* and his faith becomes *witnessed faith*.

<sup>49</sup> Al-Qur'an, 05:83

<sup>50</sup> It is the way of the pious that they yearn and pray for togetherness with *shâhidîn*. Al-Qur'an says: Our Lord! We believe in that which Thou hast revealed and we follow him whom Thou hast sent. Enroll us among those who witness to the truth [*shâhidîn*]. (03:53, also 5:83)

<sup>51</sup> Javed Ahmed Al-Gamdi, "Nabi aur Rasûl" in *Mizân*, part-1, Lahore: Dâr al-Ishrâq, 1985, p. 15.

<sup>52</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1966. p.86.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *TF* vol. 7, p. 228. Also see, *TF* vol.1 (Eng tr.), viii. To use analogies to help people to come to light is Allah's way in the Qur'an. But only that analogy which conforms to Qur'an ic teachings is right. What this analogy explains is that neither of the higher grades of believing could be attained without believing and acting upon *shari'a* as neither the curd, nor the butter nor the butter oil could be attained without first having milk. They are analogical in other aspects also. The present Fâzli saint says that if one is physically healthy, milk suits him, but if one is physically unhealthy, milk aggravates his condition. Similarly if one is spiritually healthy (*i.e.*, rightly-directed) acting upon *shari'a* benefits him, but if one is not rightly-directed, he takes rituals as *Dîn* and boasts over it.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Ibid, p. 122. *IR* identifies *Haqiqah* with *Truth* when it says "Finally at the Center there is the *Haqiqah* or *Truth* which is the source of both the *Tariqah* and the *Shari'a*." Similarly it identifies *Haqiqah* with *Center* when it says: "...that *Haqiqah* or *Center* which is 'everywhere and nowhere, ...". It also identifies God with the *Truth* when it says: "...God who is the *Truth*." Ibid, p. 122. Thus in *IR*, *Haqiqah*, *Center*, *God* and *the Truth* refer to one and the same being. *IR* also identifies 'Reality' and 'Unity' with the above. For treating God as 'Reality' or 'Absolute Reality' or 'Real' see: *IR*, Pp. 15, 16, 17, 19, 137 etc.

<sup>55</sup> For an elaborate study on the meaning of al-ḥaqq, please see: Dr. Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "Is al-ḥaqq one of Al-Asmâ al-Husnâ!," *Bazyaft*, University of the Punjab Lahore: Oriental College, 2006

<sup>56</sup> Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Glorious Qur'an (Text and Explanatory Translation)*, Taj Company Ltd, 1984, 580-81; and Yousaf Ali, Abdullah, *An English Interpretation of the Holy Qur'an*, Lahore Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1934, p.927-28

<sup>57</sup> *M'arifat* is excellence in /ultimate hight of what Qur'an calls 'recognition of the truth'. The Qur'an says: When they listen to that which hath been revealed unto the messenger, thou seest their eyes overflow with tears because of their recognition of the truth. They say: our Lord, we believe. Inscribe us as among the witnesses. (05:83) *IR* mentions it but as a passing reference and without quoting authority from

the Qur'an when it says: "Imân, when transformed by *ihsân*, becomes that illuminative knowledge that unites, that gnosis ('*irfân* or *ma'rifâ*') which penetrates and transforms man." Ibid, p.134.

<sup>58</sup>IR, p. 137

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 137, Nasr also calls himself a representative of what he designates the *Traditionalist school*. See: Leif Stenberg, *The Islamization of Science: Four Muslim Positions Developing an Islamic Modernity*, Lund, 1996, p. 101 This is Nasr's interpretation of the doctrine of *wahdat al-wajūd* in present times.

<sup>60</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Qur'an and Hadîth as source and inspiration of Islamic Philosophy", *Histoery of Islamic Philosophy* part-1, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), (London: Routledge) 1996, 29.

<sup>61</sup> With reference to Hazrat Bâyezîd Frithjof Schuon writes "*Al-Ḥaqq=God*", Footnotes at pp. 48, 50. *Dimensions of Islam*, (trans., Townsend) Lahore Pakistan: Suhail Academy, 1999. Schuon also belonged to the same *wahdat al-wujud* school as Nasr. He explains the word 'God' in footnote 2 as '*Al-Ḥaqq*', '*the Truth*', or '*the Reality*'. Ibid, p. 33

<sup>62</sup> According to William C. Chittick the first clear and detailed formulation of *wahdat al-wujūd* is usually ascribed to al-Shaykh al-Akbar, Muhyi al-Dîn Ibn al-Arabi (560/1165–638/1240). The term *wahdat al wujūd* itself is not found in any texts before the works of Ibn al-Arabi's school. Ibn al-Arabi himself never employs the term *wahdat al-wujūd* in his enormous corpus of writings however he frequently discusses *wujūd* and often makes explicit statements that justify that he supported the idea of *wahdat al-wujūd* in the literal sense of the term., William C. Chittick, "Wahdat al-Wujud In Islamic Thought" *The Bulletin*, Jan.- Mar. 1999, p. 8. Also, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Qur'an and Hadîth as source and inspiration of Islamic Philosophy", *Histoery of Islamic Philosophy* part-1, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), (London: Routledge) 1996, 29.

<sup>63</sup> For detailed study of this thesis of *the TF* please see: Dr. Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "Is al-ḥaqq one of al-Asma al-Husnâ!"

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 20

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *TF*, vol.6, 45:18, p. 314

<sup>66</sup> Cf., *ibid.* cf. 46:30

<sup>67</sup> *Lo! Religion with Allah (is) the Surrender* [Al-Islam]...(03:19)Al-Islam is the Dîn which Allah has chosen for His servants, and which He absolutely perfected on prophet Muhammad (pbuh). (Cf. al-Qur'an, 05:03) The followers of prophet Muhammad (pbuh) are called Muslims. But the followers of the prophet s (pbut) of the past were also called Muslims. When Hazrat Ibrahîm and Hazrat Ismaîl (pbut) were raising the foundations of *Baitullah* (Ka'ba) they prayed to Allah Almighty to make them and a community from their seed as Muslim. (cf. 02:128,) Ibrahîm (pbuh) enjoins upon his sons, and also Y'aqoob [pbuh]not to die save as Muslimûn...(cf. 2:132) The disciples of prophet Īsa (pbuh) would call them Muslimoon. (cf. 03:52) Prophet Ibrahîm was neither a Jew nor a Christian but a

single-minded Muslim. (cf. 03:67) Allah sent revelation on Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as He did on Noah and the prophets (pbut) after him; and on Ibrahîm and Ismaîl and Ishâq and Yaqoob and the tribes; and on Īsa and Ayūb and Yūnus and Hârūn and Sulaimân (pbut). And to Mūsâ (pbuh) Allah spoke directly. So in principle all the prophets were sent with the same guidance. It is inconceivable that their teachings/revelations should contradict each other.

<sup>68</sup> *Guide us to the Straight Way. The way of those upon whom You have bestowed Your Blessings.* (al-Qur'an, 1:5-6)

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid. O prophet! Lo! We have sent thee as a witness [shâhid] and a bringer of good tidings and a warner. And as a summoner unto Allah and as a lamp that giveth light.* (33:45-46)

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* 5:52; 48:6.

<sup>71</sup> Nasr, *Ideals And Realities of Islam*, p. 63.

<sup>72</sup> Commentary on verse 33:21 which says that in the prophet (pbuh) you have excellent example to be followed. Cf. *TF*, vol. 5, 1996, 291-92.

<sup>73</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Ibid*, 63. Nasr also says: "a Sufi is one who has realized the end of the Path, the Supreme Union." *Ibid*, p.131

<sup>74</sup> *Al-Qur'an*, cf. 2:153, 194; 29:69

<sup>75</sup> *ibid*, 9:40.

<sup>76</sup> Pickthall translates it in following way: "...and follow the path of him who repenteth unto Me..." but to our understanding the phrase 'turns towards me' conveys the sense in a better way than "who repenteth unto Me". Marmaduke Pickthall, *ibid*, 763.

<sup>77</sup> *TF*, vol. 5, 1996, cf.verse 31:15.

<sup>78</sup> Cf., al-Qur'an, 4:49; 24:21

<sup>79</sup> Cf. al-Qur'an, 3:31. The *TF* holds that the status of Allah is that of a Lover: He loves the *mohsinîn*-2:195), *tawwâbîn* (2:222), *motatahhirîn* (2:222), *muttaqîn*. (3:76), (*sâbirîn*), (*mutawakkilîn*) (3:159) as stated earlier. Status of Allah is not that of a Beloved. *Shâhidîn* are Allah's beloved, they are also the beloved of the believers. The right translation of this verse according to the worthy authors of *TF* would be: 'Say: If you aspire Allah's love, then follow me, and Allah will love you ...' They write: "Whosoever holds Allah's beloved as his beloved, Allah makes him His loving friend." Some people and especially draw from—*Wa Mina An-Nâsi Man Yattakhidhu Min Dûni Allâhi 'Andâdâan Yuhîbbûnahum Kahubbi Allâhi; Wa Al-Ladhîna 'Âmanû 'Ashaddu Ĥubbâan Lillâhi* ...02:165 'that as for the believers, they love Allah ardently.' But the *TF* would translate it as the following: 'And there are people who choose others beside Allah, and aspire that they (*i.e.*, the others) love them as Allah loves. But as for the believers, they ardently aspire Allah's love.' (*TF*, Vol. 1, Urdu, reprint 1992, commentary on verse 3:31, p. 207 and commentary on verse 2:165, *Ibid*, p. 95.)

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *TF* vol. 1, Eng tr., 192, Cf. *TF* vol.2, Eng. tr., 50, Cf. *TF* , vol.3 (Urdu version), 1993, 274.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *ibid* vol.1, exegesis of 04:49.

<sup>82</sup> Hazrat Nūh's son did not believe in his father, he did not belong to Hazrat Nūh (pbuh). Similarly, Hazrat Lut's wife and Hazrat Ibrahim's father did not believe in them, so they did not belong to them.

<sup>83</sup> Dr. Israr Ahmad, "Khilafat kay Iqtisâdi Nizâm ki Usūli Asass" (Urdu), *Nida-E-Khilafat*, 1(4-5), 1992, 10.

<sup>84</sup> Al-Qur,ân, 07:157; 22:41; 31:17

<sup>85</sup> Commenting on this verse the worthy authors of *TF* say that Allah has done a great favour on the faithful by placing love for guidance in them and by having adorned their hearts with faith. And because of this they are always inclined to follow the shâhid and never incline to make him comply with their wishes. *Tafseer-e-Fâzli* vol. 7, p. 394.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid* vol. 2, cf. exegesis of 09:102-105

<sup>87</sup> *Say, (O Muhammad, to mankind): If ye love Allah, follow me; Allah will love you and forgive you your sins. Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. 3:31*

<sup>88</sup> Qurân says: *Whoso obeyeth Allah and the messenger, they are with those unto whom Allah hath shown favour, of the prophet s [nabiyîn] and the saints [siddiqîn] and the martyrs [shuhadâ] and the righteous [sâlihîn]. The best of company are they!* *Ibid*, 04:69

<sup>89</sup> al-Qur'an, 2:210; 8:44; 22:76; 35:4; 57:5

<sup>90</sup> The word 'amr' in Arabic has another meaning *i.e.* 'command' and it occurs in the Qur'an at many occasions. But it has 'awâmir' as its plural. Similarly the word 'Amr' also occurs in the Qur'an in ontological context: whatever has come into being out of Allah either belongs to the category of *khalq* or to the category of *amr*. But neither of them partakes in the Being of Allah. It is clear that word 'umūr' in the present context does not refer to any of these two senses of the word 'amr'.

<sup>91</sup> Text of the Hadith is as follows: 'Umar ibn Khattab said: One day when we were with God's Messenger, a man with very white clothing and very black hair came up to us. No mark of travel was visible on him, and none of us recognized him. Sitting down before the prophet, leaning his knees against his, and placing his hands on his thighs, he said, "Tell me Muhammad about submission [*Islâm*]." He replied, "Submission means that you should bear witness that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is God's Messenger, that you should perform the ritual prayer, pay the alms tax, fast during Ramadan, and make the pilgrimage to the House if you are able to go there." The man said, "You have spoken the truth." We were surprised at his questioning him and then declaring that he had spoken the truth. He said, "Now tell me about faith [*Imân*]." He replied, "Faith means that you have faith in God, His angels and His Books, His Messengers, and the Last Day, and that you have faith in the measuring out, both its good and its evil." Remarking that he has spoken the truth, he then said, "Now tell me about doing what is beautiful [*Ihsân*]." He replied,

“Doing beautiful means that you should worship God as if you see Him, for even if you do not see Him, He sees you.” Then the man said, “Tell me about the Hour.” The prophet replied, “About that he who is questioned know no more than the questioner.” The man said, “Then tell me about its marks.” He said, “The slave girl will give birth to her mistress, and you will see the bare foot, the naked, the destitute, and the shepherd vying with each other in building.” Then the man went away. After I had waited for a long time, the Prophet said to me, “Do you know who the questioner was, ‘Umar?’” I replied, “Allah and His Messenger know best.” He said, “He was Gabriel. He came to teach you your religion.” Schiko Murrata and William C. Chittick, *The Vision of Islam*, (Lahore, Pakistan: Suhail Academy, 1998), 25-26. They have quoted it from *Muslim*, Iman 1; *Bukhari*, Iman 37; MM 5-6.

<sup>92</sup> Dr. Ahmed Afzaal, “Rendezvous in Orlando,” *The Qur’anic Horizons*, 3 (1998), Quarterly Journal of the Qur’an Academy, Lahore, Pakistan, 6. Nasr, *IR*, p. 133-34

<sup>93</sup> Those who spend (of that which Allah has given them) in ease and in adversity, those who control their wrath and are forgiving toward mankind; Allah loveth the good [*Mohsinîn*]. (Al-Qur’an, 3:134) Is the reward of goodness (*Ihsân*)ought save goodness (*Ihsân*)! (55:60) Lo! Allah enjoineth justice and kindness (*Ihsân*),...

<sup>94</sup> al-Qur’an, 17:95

<sup>95</sup> Al-Qur’an, Say: I am only a mortal [*bashar*] like you. [With the difference that] My Lord inspireth in me that your God is only One God... (18:110; 41:06); Their messengers said unto them: We are but mortals [*bashar*] like you, but Allah giveth grace unto whom He will of His slaves... (14:11)

<sup>96</sup> The chieftains of his folk, who disbelieved, said: This is only a mortal like you... Al-Qur’an, 23:24. Also see, 11:27, 14:10, 33:34.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Maulana Amin Ahsan Islâhi, *Tazkia-e-Nafs*, (Faisalabad: Malik sons, 1989), 95-113.

<sup>98</sup> Al-Qur’an, 02:129; 02: 151

<sup>99</sup> *TF* vol. I (Eng. tr.), 78; also, *ibid*, 241.

<sup>100</sup> *TF* vol. 1, p. iv.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*. 15:40; 38:83

<sup>102</sup> al-Qur’an, 2:129, 151; 3:164; 62:2

<sup>103</sup> *Have they not travelled in the land, and have they hearts wherewith to feel [to reason—ya’qiloon] and ears wherewith to hear? For indeed it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts, which are within the bosoms, that grow blind.* Al-Qur’an, 22:46.

<sup>104</sup> Those who follow their desires go astray. (Al-Qur’an: 18:28; 25:43; 45:23;...)

<sup>105</sup> Cf. *Ibid*, 33:46. For detailed study of this parable see: Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, “Iqbal’s View of Omniscience and Human Freedom,” *The Muslim World*, 95/1, 134-35.

<sup>106</sup> Qudratullah Shahâb, *Shahâb Nama*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meal Publications, 1987). cf. p. 1114 Qudratullah Shahâb was a bureaucrat in Ayub Khan's regime in Pakistan, a novelist, and a sufi who died in 1987. *Shahâb Nama* is his memoir/autobiography which was published after his death.

<sup>107</sup> In fact there are many ways of imparting knowledge other than the normal. Al-Qur'an does not fail to mention these. For example, Allah imparted knowledge to Hazrat Musa's mother (a.s.) what to do when Hazrat Musâ (pbuh) is born. Similarly Allah guided and granted knowledge to Hazrat Maryyam. Similarly there are different kinds of knowledge which Allah grants to His servants. For example al-Qur'an mentions a servant of Allah whom the prophet Musâ met at river side. Allah states that: Then they found one of Our slaves, unto whom We had given mercy from Us, and had taught knowledge from Our presence. (18:66) But only Hazrat Musâ (pbuh) was at the status of *shâhid*. Similarly, al-Qur'an narrates the story of a pious man, a courtier of Hazrat Sulaimân (pbuh) whom Allah had given some special knowledge of the Scripture and could make miraculous things. (Ibid, 27:38-40) Ref. footnote nos. 21, 22. This special kind of knowledge is known as *Ilm-e-Ladunni*.

<sup>108</sup> Please see, foot note no. 62 above.

<sup>109</sup> *TF* vol. 6 (Urdu), 1997, p.251. See peroration of verse 43:15.

<sup>110</sup> Dr. Burhan Ahmed Faruqi, *The Mujjaddid's Concept of Tawhid*, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, first published 1940 reprint 1989). p.9

<sup>111</sup> Ibn al-'Arabi, and his followers present their view on the base of their own mystic experience which they call *kashf-o-shahood* (unveiling). Ibid., p. 35-6.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 42. Usually it is considered that pantheism and *wahdat al-wajud* are one and the same thing, and panatheism and *wahdat ash-shahud* ascribed to Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi are one and the same thing. Both these things are incorrect. Pantheism is a philosophical term which considers the universe and God identical; and panatheism is a philosophical term used to denote a view which considers that being of God has two aspects: immanent and transcendent. The universe is a manifestation of God; God is immanent in the universe or reality. So reality or manifestation is identical with God but God is also transcendent to His manifestation or reality. In Muslim *tasawuf* and especially in school of thought relating Ibn Arabi the term *wahdat al-wajud* is used in the sense close to panatheism.

<sup>113</sup> Commenting on verse 04:26 which says 'Allah wishes to make clear to you what is right and to show you the ways of those who preceded you...' the *TF* says: The present is proved true by the attestation of the past, and past is proved true by the verification of the present. It is in fact the greatest favor of Allah that one who has definite knowledge of relieving from fear and grief is *Shahid* in present time and a verifier of *Shahidîn* who preceded him in the past. *TF*, Eng. tr. Vol. 1, 274. In Surah Muzzammil it has been said that Allah has sent a Messenger (pbuh) who is *Shahid* (Witness) upon you as he sent a messenger towards Pharaoh. (73:15) Thus *Shahidîn* has been sent in the past. *TF* vol. 7, 301.

## 6. The Qur'anic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom

\* Revised version of "Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom", published in *Al-Hikmat*, a research journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab Lahore, Vol. 26 (2006).

**Note.** (i) The translation of verses has been quoted from Pickthall, Marmaduke (tr.) (1952), *The Glorious Qur'an* (Bangalore: The Islamic Literature Publishing House) and shown in *italicised* format. Wherever only the import of a verse is given, it is not italicised and abbreviation 'cf.' precedes the reference. (ii) We have preferred to use the word 'Allah' rather than 'God' where it has been used to depict specifically Qur'anic concept of God.

<sup>1</sup> The problem of the relation of Divine Essence and Attributes in Muslim Kalam, ultimately has its origin in one of the different interpretations of Plato's theory of Ideas. (See Abdul Hafeez, "H. A. Wolfson and A. H. Kamali on the Problem of the Origin of Divine Attributes". *Iqbal Review*, 1998, 3, pp. 81-96.) The same is the view of the writer concerning the Problem of the Createdness vs. Uncreatedness of the Qur'an. (Abdul Hafeez, Free will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an. *Hamdard Islamicus*, 1999, 4, pp. 97-105.) As far as the problems of purely philosophical nature for example creationism vs. emanationism and co-eternity; the problem of God's Knowledge of particulars; the problem of occasionalism vs. determinism etc., are concerned, the doctrine of emanation, the doctrine of absolute simplicity of God, the doctrine of causality etc., presented by Muslim philosophers al-Farabi (258/870-339/950) and Ibn Sina (370/980-428/1037)—and al-Ghazali's (450/1058-535/1143) analysis and criticism of these doctrines, is sufficient to show that the origin of these problems ultimately lies in Greeks. H. A. Wolfson, "Avicenna, Al-Ghazali and Averros on Divine Attributes", *Homenaje a Miltas Vallicrosa*, 1956, 2, pp. 545-46; and Michael E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars", *Journal of American Oriental Society*, 1962, 83(3), p. 304.

<sup>2</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, *Freewill and Predestination in Early Islam*, London: LUZAC, 1948; *Ibid*, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973, p. 103.

<sup>3</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson was the first and full time scholar of Judaica to the faculty completely devoted to Jewish Studies established in Harvard University America. He was the first Nathan Littauer Professor of Hebrew Literature and Philosophy, a wide read scholar, a prolific and creative writer in the history of philosophy. He retired from this post in 1958. Professor Wolfson's trail-blazing study of Jewish thinkers from Philo of Alexandria to Benedict Spinoza, and his systematic integration of the study of Jewish, Islamic, and Christian philosophy, attracted wide international attention. His many well-known and celebrated volumes are as follows: H. A. Wolfson, (a) *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle: Problems of Aristotle's Physics in Jewish and Arabic Philosophy*, 1929; (b) *The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning*, 2 volumes, 1934; (c) *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, 2 volumes, 1947; (d) *The Philosophy of Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*,

1956; (e) *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 1976; and (f) *Kalam Repercussions in Jewish Philosophy*, 1979. In addition to these, there are three book-length collections of papers and articles: (g) *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays*, 1961; and (h) *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, Volume 1 (1973) and Volume 2 (1977). Harvard University has established Wolfson Chair in his memory, in its Center for Jewish Studies.

<sup>4</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Harvard University Press), 1976, p. 660.

<sup>5</sup> Franz Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970, pp. 124-125.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, (reprint 1986), *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ed. and ann. M. Saeed Sheikh, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture, chapters 3-4; see also, Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, Iqbal's view of Omniscience and human freedom. *The Muslim World*, 2005, 95(1), pp. 125-145.

<sup>7</sup> Founder and *Amir* of Jama't-e-Islami India and then *Amir* of Jama't-e-Islami Pakistan after 1947.

<sup>8</sup>, Syed Abul A'la Moududi *Mas'la-e-Jabro Qadr*(Urdu) (Lahore: Islamic Publications), 20<sup>th</sup> edition, 111.

<sup>9</sup> Chairman retired of the Department of Philosophy University of the Punjab, Lahore (Pakistan) and renowned scholar of Muslim Philosophy.

<sup>10</sup> Abdul Khaliq, *Problems of Muslim Theology*, Lahore: Izharsons, 1991, pp. 69-70.

<sup>11</sup> Professor and Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore; retired as Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore (Pakistan); renowned scholar of Muslim Philosophy.

<sup>12</sup> M. Saeed Sheikh, "Freedom and fatalism in Islam", *The World of Philosophy*, ed. Dr. C. A. Qadir, Lahore: The Sharif Presentation Volume Committee, 1965.

<sup>13</sup> Hanifi Ozcan, "The Relationship between God's Knowledge and Human Freedom: A New Approach to the Problem", *Hamdard Islamicus*, 1997, 3, pp. 63-70.

<sup>14</sup> The view that God's Knowledge means knowledge of everything universal and particular including free human actions, that it is eternal and immutable, and that it is absolutely infallible.

<sup>15</sup> Cf., *Al-Qur'an*, 56:24; also cf. chapter 56; and 40:40, 2:281, 3:25, 16:11.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., *Ibid*, 2:25, 62, 82, 277; 5:69; 40:40 and many more.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*. O ye who believe! Why say ye that which ye do not? It is most hateful in the sight of Allah that ye say that ye do not (61:2-3).

<sup>18</sup> Cf., *Ibid*, 7:147; 16:93; 17:36; 20:15; 27:90; 29:4,7; 37:39; 52:16,19; 66:7; 83:36 etc.

<sup>19</sup> Cf., *Ibid*, 31:15; 18:28.

<sup>20</sup> Cf., Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, pp. 61, 603, 734.



- <sup>21</sup> Cf., *Ibid*, pp. 601-602. Verses mentioned here will be stated while examining and analysing the problem.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 605.
- <sup>23</sup> Cf. *Ibid*, 606-608.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid*. Wolfson uses this phrase, *i.e.early Muslims*, at p. 610, which is quite ambiguous.
- <sup>25</sup> Cf. *Ibid*, 611.
- <sup>26</sup> Cf. *Ibid*, 609. These orientalist see the following factors responsible for Muslims' preference of predestinarian passages of the Qur'an: (i) fatalistic belief of the pre-Islamic Arabs; (ii) influence of the Persian fatalism; (iii) pre-Islamic belief in an impersonal Fate which can be shown on the base of the personification of the time in pre-Islamic poetry. It is clear from the statement of the orientalist that predestinarian views were never the original teachings of Islam. It was only under un-Islamic influences that predestinarian views could enter into Muslims.
- <sup>27</sup> Abdul Khaliq, *Problems of Muslim Theology*, pp. 69-70.
- <sup>28</sup> The Qur'an says that Allah is Well-Pleased with 'the first and foremost of the *muhājirīn* and the *anṣār* (the fugitives from Madīna and those who welcomed and helped them in Mecca) and they are well-pleased with Him. The Qur'an also states that same is true for those who followed them in sincerity.
- <sup>29</sup> The Qur'an states that a multitude of 'the foremost in the race' will be from the first generations and a few of the followers of the Prophet (pbuh) in later times will also belong to this category (*al-Qur'an*, 56:13-14). In what lies their merit? Conversion is always of two types: individual or collective. Only individual conversion is a true conversion. Collective conversions are always due to social requirement. The foremost in race, were real converts. Having denounced pre-Islamic beliefs of their forefathers and having affirmed faith in the truthfulness and veracity of the Prophet (pbuh) they practically proved themselves upright and steadfast in severe most tests. Could they ever show even a slightest inclination towards anything un-Islamic whether Arabian or non-Arabian? Never!
- <sup>30</sup> This is not a verse of the Qur'an. Even the word *tataharraka* does not exist in the Holy Qur'an. This is only a statement commonly used and referred to among Muslim illiterate folk but which is contrary to the Qur'anic teachings.
- <sup>31</sup> For the view of the writer about Qur'anic concept of Allah's Power, see Abdul Hafeez, Allah's Omnipotence and freedom of will for man. *Hamdard Islamicus*, 2002, 1, pp. 31-40.
- <sup>32</sup> Cf. A. K. M. Ayyub Ali, "Tahawism" in M. M. Sharif ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 vol. (Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963; reprint ed., Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1983), 1:256..,
- <sup>33</sup> For further reference, see *al-Qur'an*, 10:44; 16:118; 73:76; 11:101; 2:62; 5:69; 16:98; 41:46; 45:15 and many other verses.
- <sup>34</sup> Hanifi Ozcan, *Ibid*, p. 70.

<sup>35</sup>The Qur'an calls them 'Sincere Slaves of Allah' (*Ibâd ullahil Mukhlashin*) to whom the devil cannot lead astray (cf. 15:40).

<sup>36</sup>Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup>Pickthall translates it in this way: .... *We raise by grades [of mercy] whom We will* .... The writer would prefer 'knowledge' to 'mercy' here.

<sup>38</sup>As implied in the verse: O ye who believe! Why say ye that which ye do not? It is most hateful in the sight of Allah that ye say that which ye do not. (*al-Qur'an*, 61:2-3).

<sup>39</sup>Allah says that it is He Who has revealed this Reminder (*i.e.*, the Qur'an) and it is He, Who is to protect it (cf. *Ibid*, 15:9). For historical authenticity of this belief, see M. Hameed Ullah, "Tarikh e Qur'an Majeed" in *Khutbat e Bahawalpur* (Urdu), Pakistan: Islamia University, Bahawalpur, 1401 Hijra, pp. 15-16. Dr. M. Hameed Ullah (1908-2002), who worked for years for the National Center of Scientific Research at France, and then devoted himself for research on topics relating to Islam, states that an institution 'Institution of Research for the Authenticity of Qur'an' had been created under the auspices of the University of Munich at Germany before World War II. Until 1933, when Dr. Perakshal, the third director of this institution, met Dr. M. Hameed Ullah at Paris, this institution had collected 42000 photocopies of the Qur'an from all around the world and was making a comparative examination of their text. In Second World War, an American bomb destroyed the library of this institution. However just before the advent of the world war, this institution had published an elementary report of its findings in which it established that it had been unable to find any discrepancy *vis-à-vis* the text of the Qur'an.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Al-Qur'an*, 39:23; 39:28.

<sup>41</sup>The Qur'an certifies that 'the Prophet (pbuh) does not speak of his own desire.' (cf. 53:3); The Qur'an further certifies that the whole life of the Prophet is exemplary role model for the believers to be followed in their own life. (cf. 33:21) Then it is certified by Allah that if anyone follows the Prophet, Allah will love him and will forgive his sins. (cf. 3: 31) So it stands as an article of faith of a Muslim that no saying of the Prophet can ever contradict with the Qur'an, even in the slightest degree. And if there is such a tradition that does not cohere with the Qur'an, it can never be a saying of the Prophet irrespective of the fact that in whose reference it has been stated and whatever methods of scrutiny it has stood through. However in practice, Muslims had followed the opposite. Every tradition which they came across in the 'books of tradition' at least some sect accepted it as true and then bent upon interpreting the Qur'an in the light of that tradition giving it priority over the Qur'an. This created many problems, which became one of the main causes of sectarianism in Islam. For details, see Abdul Hafeez, Free will and predestinarian verses in the Qur'an. *Hamdard Islamicus*, 4(1999), 97-105.

<sup>42</sup>Abdul Khaliq, *Problems of Muslim Theology*, p. 85; Cf. Allama Shibli Numani, , *Ilm ul Kalam Aor al-Kalm*(Urdu), Karachi: Nafees Academy, reprint 1979, pp. 25-

26. Cf., Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1983), pp. 37, 42.

<sup>43</sup> Mu'tazilah creed in Islam made its appearance nearly two centuries after migration (*Higrah*) of the Prophet (pbuh) to Madina. They were thorough going rationalists. They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality in religion. They accepted totally the theory of indeterminism and were true successors of the Qadarites (Libertarians). Ash'arism was a philosophico-religious school of thought in Islam that developed during the 4<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries. They would give revelation priority over reason and who allegedly tried to maintain an intermediary position between extremes. The same was their position on problem of free will.

<sup>44</sup>Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 734.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid*, 613. These two were Nazzâm (d. 231/845) and Mu'ammâr (d. 228/842) who believed in laws of nature and secondary causes. For details, see *Ibid*, 559.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid*, 734.

<sup>47</sup>Cf. *Ibid*, 655.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid*, 660, 663. For in depth study of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> of these please see the following articles in the corresponding issues of *Hamdard Islamicus*, Karachi, Pakistan: Abdul Hafeez, "Free will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an", 1999, 4, pp. 97-105; "The Antinomy of Free Will and the Appointed Term (*Ajal Mussamma*)", 2000, 4, 63-68; "Allah's Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man", 2002, 1, 31-40.

<sup>49</sup> Franz Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, pp. 124-125.

<sup>50</sup>Ozcan. *Ibid*, 68.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid*, 69. Dr. Hanifi Ozcan attributes the non-acceptance of this view to Sunnites, who wanted to save the characteristic of God's Knowledge 'being eternal' interpreted in a way to become compatible with freedom of man. But this is not a sound reason. The sound reason for not to accept this view is that it amounts to declaring 'the essence and nature of things (*i.e.*, universals)' as eternal/uncreated which is contrary to the Qur'anic teachings.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid*, 70.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid*, 70; quoted from W. M. Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, p. 103. Ozcan presents him as a quasi-predestinarian, but Majid Fakhri tells us with reference to Ibn Qutaybah's *Kitâb al-Ma'ârif* and Watt's *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* that some ancient authorities attribute to him belief in free will and in this respect a story is attributed to him. Majid Fakhary, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 42<sup>f</sup>.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid*, 70.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>56</sup> Allah is Glorious (*Al-Hamîd*). His Command (*Amr*) transcends and excels causation. Causes function and accommodate according to His Command ('*amr*).

The angels give glad tiding of a son Ishâq (Isaac) and after him his son Y'aqûb (Jacob) to the wife of Hazrat Ibrâhîm (Abraham – pbuh) when both the husband and wife were very old. When the woman (a.s.) expressed her reservations, the angels said “do yo deem it strange that God should decree what He Wills!” Al-Qur'an (11:73) Allah has Power (*Qudrah*) over all things (cf. 65:12). System of causation is under his Power, and not the *vice versa*. Similarly: Glory be to Him in Whose hand is the dominion over all things! .... (*Ibid*, 36:83).

<sup>57</sup>Ozcan. *Ibid*, 70.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid*, 72.

<sup>60</sup>There is only one Good Name of God, *i.e.* *Al-Qayyûm* (He is Self-Subsisting, and as Creator of all determinations, His Self-Subsistence is beyond all determinations.) Allah is Singularly Unique (*Aḥad*). The word eternity can be used to denote the time of the beginning of Creation of the Universe or it can be used to refer to ‘prior to the creation of the Universe’ but it will be beyond human understanding. If it is to be used for Allah then it should be used in the sense of ‘Beyond Determinations’ as a translation of Allah’s (*Aḥdiya*).

<sup>61</sup>Cf., Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, pp.559-662.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid*, 662.

<sup>63</sup>For details, see Hafeez, “The antinomy of free will and the appointed term (*Ajal-e Mussamma*)”, pp. 63-68.

<sup>64</sup>Hazrat Imran’s wife dedicated to the Lord what was in her womb and prayed for its acceptance. When she delivered, it was a female child. Allah says: “And Allah knew best what she brought forth, and that no wise is a male like that female.” Then she names her Maryam and prays Allah’s Protection for her and her offspring. Allah says: “Her Lord graciously accepted her and made her grow in goodness and purity, and entrusted her to the charge of Zakariya.” Al-Qur’an, Cf. 03:35-37 Allah declares Hazrat Maryam to be a truthful one (*Ṣiddiqa*). (5:75)

<sup>65</sup>*Al-Qur’an*, contains glad-tiding of Masih Isa ibn Maryum (pbuh) and Yahya (pbuh); and Ishâq and Y'aqûb (pbuh) before their birth at 3:45-51, 3:39, and 11:71; Al-Qur’an also contains glad-tiding of a righteous son to righteous parents who were not prophets at 18:81

<sup>66</sup> For only Allah knows when it is most appropriate to change anyone’s direction from darkness towards light or the *vice versa*. Cf. 2:213; 3:73; 16:93.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *Al-Qur’an* (26:52-66).

<sup>68</sup>Wolfson, *Ibid*, 661.

<sup>69</sup>For details, see Abdul Hafeez, “Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur’an”.

<sup>70</sup>Wolfson, *Ibid*, 656.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *al-Qur’an*, (07:54).

<sup>72</sup>The question of Pharaoh about the former generations was with reference to the destiny of these people (Cf. *al-Qur'an*, 20:51-52). For details, see Abdul Hafeez, "Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an", p. 102.

<sup>73</sup>For detailed study, see Abdul Hafeez, "Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qur'an", pp. 97-105.

<sup>74</sup>Cf. *Al-Qur'an* (2:26; 9:80).

<sup>75</sup> Norman Kretzmann, Omniscience and immutability, 1966. In Baruch A. Brody (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 366. (Norman Kretzmann is Susan Linn Sage Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Cornell University.)

<sup>76</sup>Eternity, as Immutability has been considered to be the necessary characteristic of the Omniscient being in Christianity.

<sup>77</sup> Baruch A. Brody, (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 335. Brody in his introduction to Part III states that one version of this problem is found in St. Augustine but is clearly fallacious. Aquinas reformulates this problem which is presented as 2<sup>nd</sup> version of his formulation in this article.

<sup>78</sup> Boethius (c. 480-524) wrote his *De Consolatione Philosophiae* when he was in the prison waiting for the execution of his death sentence. It consists of five books. It is in the fifth, *i.e.* last book that Boethius discusses the Problem of man's free will and God's foreknowledge and attempts to show that the doctrines are not inconsistent. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, ed. (1962) s. v., "Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus".

<sup>79</sup>Anthony Kenny, "Divine foreknowledge and human freedom", in Brody, (ed.), 405. (Article is actually a revised version of a paper read at Liverpool in 1960 and afterwards published in Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays*. New York: Double Day, 1969. Reference given in this para from *Suma Theologiae*, actually reads as "Ia, 14, 3, 3", which is not correct. The correct reference is *Suma Theologiae*, "Ia, 14, 13, 3". Cf. James F Anderson, tr., *Treatise on God* (translation of some selected parts of Part I from *Suma Theologiae* by St. Thomas Aquinas), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 93.

<sup>80</sup>*Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. (1908), s. v. "Molina".

<sup>81</sup> He published a doctrine on predestination, grace, free will etc. The basis of this doctrine is what is called his concept of scientia media. The general consensus is that "scientia media" was a phrase not simply used, but coined by Molina. Scientia media is the way by which God explores and knows with absolute certainty what the human 'free will' will infallibly do by its own innate liberty if it be placed in such or such circumstances.

<sup>82</sup>The argument purporting to show an incompatibility between divine Omniscience and human freedom runs as follows: If God is Omniscient then he foreknows all future human actions. If God foreknows anything, then it will necessarily come to pass. If a human action will necessarily come to pass, then it cannot be free.

<sup>83</sup>Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, p.175. The writer has made a detailed study of Christian philosophers' views on this problem in his article "Christian theologians/philosophers' Views on Omniscience and Human Freedom". This article is yet to be published.

<sup>84</sup>This doctrine asserts that: Omniscience means that God justifiably believes all true propositions. Saint Thomas Aquinas is the first to formulate this doctrine. James F Anderson, tr., *Treatise on God*, 1963, pp.93-94. St. Anselm (1033-1109) gave this traditional Christian doctrine a deep philosophical tinge by asserting that 'God is essentially omniscient'. But 'if God is essentially omniscient', He simply could not be mistaken about anything, *i.e.* He has infallible knowledge. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, England: Macmillan Press, 1986, p.33.

<sup>85</sup>On the other hand, Iqbal formulates the doctrine of Omniscience in such a way that absolutely denies divine foreknowledge of free human actions. Cf., Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "Iqbal's view of Omniscience and human freedom", *The Muslim World*, 2005, 95(1), pp. 125-145.

<sup>86</sup>So far as Christians are concerned it has been admitted even by them that there is no evidence of these concepts being Divine Attributes in Christianity before Augustine (354-430), nor is there any evidence in the Old Testament for it. Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, p. 217.

<sup>87</sup>Nelson Pike, *God and Timelessness* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, ix-x.

<sup>88</sup>Swinburne, Richard. *Ibid*, 217.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. *Al-Qur'an*, Allah, the eternally Besought of all! (112:02) ... Lo! Allah is Independent of all creatures (3:97); And Hazrat Musâ said: Though ye and all who are in the earth prove thankless, lo! Allah verily is Absolute Owner of Praise (14:8); And whosoever striveth, striveth only for himself, for lo! Allah is altogether Independent of (His) creatures (29:6).

<sup>90</sup> Al-Mubdi' and Al-Mu'îd do not occur in the Qur'an but the idea frequently, *e.g.*, See they not how Allah produced creation, then reproduced it? Lo! for Allah that is easy. Say (O Muhammad): Travel in the land and see how He originated creation.... (29:19-20); He began the creation of man from clay (32:07); The Day when We shall roll up the heavens as a recorder rolleth up a written scroll. As We began the first creation, We shall repeat it.... (21:104); Lo! He it is Who produceth, then reproduceth (85:13).

## 7. Christian Theologians and Philosophers' View of Omniscience and Human Freedom

\* Published in Iqbal Review, Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, vol.47 no. 4, October 2006, p. 33-68.

<sup>1</sup>Norman Kretzmann, "Omniscience and Immutability", in *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An analytic Approach*, ed. Baruch, A. Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 366. (Norman Kretzmann is *Susan Linn Sage Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Cornell University*. Brody has reprinted this

article from *The Journal of Philosophy* 63 (1966). The problem was formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas in the first part of his *Summa Theologia* but as Brody states in his Introduction to Part-III, Professor Kretzmann has re-emphasised and reformulated this problem in his own words. *Ibid.*, p.334. Professor Kretzmann states as a footnote that “the principle of Immutability is regularly supported by one of two arguments: (i) *From Supreme Excellence*: A perfect being is a supremely excellent being; thus any change in such a being would constitute corruption, deterioration, loss of perfection... (ii) *From Complete Actualisation*: A perfect being is a being whose capacities for development are all fully realised. A being subject to change, however, is in that respect and to that extent a being with an unrealised capacity for development, a being merely potential and not fully realised, a being in a state of process and not complete; hence not perfect... The principle of Immutability is a thesis of orthodox Christian theology, drawn from Greek philosophy...” *Ibid.*, p. 366.

<sup>2</sup> Baruch A. Brody, (ed.) *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An analytic Approach*, p. 335. Brody in his introduction to Part-III states that one version of this problem is found in St. Augustine but is clearly fallacious. Aquinas reformulates this problem which is presented as 2<sup>nd</sup> version of his formulation in this article.

<sup>3</sup> Boethius (c. 480-524) wrote his *De Consolatione Philosophiae* when he was in the prison waiting for the execution of his death sentence. It consists of five books. It is in the fifth *i.e.*, last book that Boethius discusses the Problem of man’s free will and God’s Foreknowledge and attempts to show that the doctrines are not inconsistent. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, ed. 1962, s. v. “Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus” by Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo.

<sup>4</sup> Anthony Kenny, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom”, in Brody, p. 405. (Article is actually a revised version of a paper read at Liverpool in 1960 and afterwards published in Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Double Day, 1969). Reference given in this para from *Suma Theologiae*, actually reads “Ia, 14, 3, 3” which is not correct. The correct reference is *Suma Theologiae*, “Ia, 14, 13, 3”. Cf., James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, (translation of some selected parts of Part-I from *Suma Theologiae* by St. Thomas Aquinas), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> Anthony Kenny, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human freedom”, in Brody, p. 405. Kenny almost reproduces this problem in Aquinas’s own words. Cf. James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, Objection 3 of 13<sup>th</sup> Article p. 93.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 405.

<sup>7</sup> James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, p. 93-4. William Ockham (c.1290-1349) thinks that the problem of God’s foreknowledge and future contingents arises for Christian theology as a result of its acceptance of the philosophical claim that some things are both future and contingent. Translators’ Introduction to William Ockham, *Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*, (Eng. Trans. with intro. and ann. by Marilyn McCord Adams & Norman Kretzmann), New York: Meredith, 1969, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, 1a, 14, 13, 2, p. 93

<sup>9</sup> Baruch A. Brody is the Leon Jaworski Professor of Biomedical Ethics and director of the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine. He is also a professor of philosophy at Rice University and director of the Ethics program at the Methodist Hospital.

<sup>10</sup> Brody, ed. *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An analytic Approach*, 335. Brody takes this formulation of the problem from the writings of Jonathen Edwards. But he gives no reference to any specific writing. This seems to be a restatement of the problem formulated by St. Aquinas at Objection 2 of 13<sup>th</sup> Article of his *Suma Theologiae* as mentioned above.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 405; Cf. James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, question XIV, art. 13, reply to objection 3, p. 95.

<sup>12</sup> Raymond Bradley/ Norman Swartz, *Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 237.

<sup>13</sup> Anthony Kenny, Ibid. p. 407; Cf. James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, question XIV, art. 13, objection 2, 93.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 407; James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, p. 93-4.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. 409.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 409.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 409. Numbering of premises is ours. Cf. James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, question XIV, art. 13, Objection. 1, 93.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> According to Aristotle, necessity applies only to true past and present propositions, not to future propositions of contingent facts. Ibid., p. 410.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 411.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 413.

<sup>22</sup> Jonathan Kvanvig Ph.D., **Professor and Chair**, University Of Notre Dame.

<sup>23</sup> Dr. Plantinga received his M.A. degree in 1955 from the University of Michigan and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1958. From 1963 to 1982 he taught at Calvin College and then at the University of Notre Dame He is author of the following books: *God and Other Minds*, 1967; *The Nature of Necessity*, 1974; *God, Freedom and Evil*, 1974; *Does God Have a Nature?*, 1980; *Warrant: the Current Debate*, 1992; *Warrant and Proper Function*, 1992.

<sup>24</sup> William Hasker, review of Jonathan L. Kvanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, 1986. in *The Philosophical Review*, January 1989, pp. 125-127.

<sup>25</sup> James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, (general answer to objections in Article 13), p. 94.

<sup>26</sup> Brody, ed. "Introduction to part-III", *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An analytic Approach*, 336.



<sup>27</sup> Arthur N. Prior (1914-1969) was one of the foremost logicians of the twentieth century. He made contributions both to the history of logic and to modern formal techniques. A significant achievement was the foundation of tense logic. He also made important contributions to intentional logic, particularly in the influential posthumous work

<sup>28</sup> Charles S. Pierce (1839-1914) An American Philosopher and Polymath.

<sup>29</sup> Brody, "Introduction to part-III, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 336.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 336.

<sup>31</sup> James F. Anderson, tr. *Treatise on God*, pp. 93-4. See note 6 above.

<sup>32</sup> Jonathan L. Kvanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, (England: Macmillan Press), 1986, 33. Kvanvig says that an interesting feature of this definition is that it allows an Omniscient Being to believe false propositions, so long as the Being also, and justifiably, believes their contradictories.

<sup>33</sup> Luis de Molina, Spanish Jesuit, one of the most accomplished and learned figures in the 16<sup>th</sup> century revivalist movement. He published a doctrine on predestination, grace, freewill etc. The basis of this doctrine is what is called his concept of *scientia media*. The general consensus is that "scientia media" was a phrase not simply used, but coined by Molina. *Scientia media* is the way by which God explores and knows with absolute certainty what the human 'free will' will infallibly do by its own innate liberty if it be placed in such or such circumstances. Molina presented this doctrine in an attempt to reconstruct Thomist doctrine. According to Aquinas a future free action is known by God by virtue of His decree for it cannot come into existence unless God decrees its existence. Molina considers this doctrine a subversion of human freewill and tries to find a means whereby God knows a future free act before and independent of Divine decree. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. ed., (1908), s.v. "Molina".

<sup>34</sup> Kvanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, p. xiv.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>36</sup> Cf., *ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>37</sup> Hasker, review of *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, in *The Philosophical Review*, January 1989, pp. 125-27.

<sup>38</sup> Kvanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, p. xiv.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 60-67. Kvanvig says that Chisholm (Roderick M. Chisholm, 1917-1999, late Professor of Brown University) dilating on the question that does a Propositional Theory imply Private Proposition, claims that each person knows directly and immediately certain propositions that imply his own individual essence. What he draws from this as a corollary is that no one knows any proposition that implies the individual essence of anyone else. Analysing the matter Chisholm presents a theory of *de se* awareness which involves two distinct features: i) it abandons the propositional view and, ii) it posits an order of awareness from self-

awareness to other-awareness. Kvanvig observes that by “accepting the distinction between *direct* and *indirect* grasping and by refusing to posit contingent first person propositions, we can avoid both the problem for Chisholm’s property theory and the purported problem of private propositions for the propositional view of the objects of intentional attitudes.” Kvanvig offers a new propositional theory which affirms the following principles concerning the nature of propositions that: i) propositions are necessary beings composed of properties which are bearers of truth-values; and, ii) that the contents of the intentional attitudes of believing and knowing are propositions. The attitudes of believing and knowing are directed towards propositions. Belief is a triadic relation between an intentional attitude, a proposition, and a particular manner of accessing the proposition. The particular feature of the theory that enables us to avoid the problem of private propositions is the distinction between direct and indirect grasping.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 1- 2.

<sup>45</sup> Concerning the second of these Kvanvig observes that “some philosophers argue that some sort of determinism follows from allowing that the future is real. Even so, at least this much is true: the claim that the future is real is not the same claim as that the future is determined; hence it must be shown that there is an entailment relation between the two...” Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>46</sup> **Peter Geach** is one of the foremost contemporary British philosophers. His areas of interest are the history of philosophy, philosophical logic, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of religion.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 13

<sup>51</sup> Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1977, pp. 167-68.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 175..

<sup>55</sup> Cf., Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Cf., Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>60</sup> Nelson Pike, *God and Timelessness*, (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul), 1970, pp. ix-x. "A corresponding set of problems and issues also arise as a further implication concerning the logical relations between 'eternal' and 'omnipotent' and the logical relations between 'eternal' and 'person'." Ibid., p. x. Nelson Pike is Professor UCI Department of Philosophy.

<sup>61</sup> Swinburne, Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>62</sup> Pike, Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>63</sup> Swinburne, Ibid., p. 217. Ockham thinks that "the problem arises for Christian theology as a result of its acceptance of the philosophical claim that some things are both future and contingent. Ockham takes it to be part of Christian doctrine that God has infallible knowledge of future contingents." Ockham attempts to develop a view regarding truth and future contingents to solve the problem. "Fatalism is a view whatever happens must happen of necessity and whatever does not happen of necessity does not happen at all... Thus fatalism denies that any events, actions or states of affairs are contingent... Many philosophers, including Aristotle, have thought that this highly implausible conclusion could be deduced from apparently impeccable principles of logic. In his *De interpretatione*, Chapter 9, Aristotle argues for this conclusion... The central point in Ockham's replies to these arguments is to preserve the Doctrine of God's universal foreknowledge in the face of apparent need to deny that every singular proposition is either determinately true or determinately false in the special case of singular future contingent propositions." Ibid., Translators' Introduction to William Ockham, *Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*, pp. 3-13. Marilyn M. Adams is Horace Tracy Pitkin Professor of Historical Theology and Norman Kretzmann is Susan Linn Sage Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Cornell University.

<sup>64</sup> Swinburne, Ibid., p. 219-20.

<sup>65</sup> Pike, Ibid., p. 54 -56.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 59 -60.

<sup>67</sup> Pike presents Augustine's analysis of the concept of 'necessity' in his support. Given God's foreknowledge of human actions, the actions are necessary. But according to Augustine, "the form of this conditional is 'P implies Q', and not 'P implies N(Q)'. 'Q' in the [later] consequent of this conditional is the claim that human actions are not voluntary..." Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 63. Pike states this argument with reference to Augustine's *the City of God*.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>72</sup> 'That human actions are products of certain order of causes' is the intermediate thesis in Cicero's case'. Ibid., 66. And according to Gale's interpretation of Prior's argument in order for God to know at  $T_1$  what Jones does A at  $T_2$  a sufficient

evidence or grounds is necessary upon which to base a well-reasoned prediction about what Jones does A at T<sub>2</sub>. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71. Reference here, as mentioned by Pike, is to Rogers Albritten, *Present Truth and Future Contingency*, written in reply to Richard Taylor, *The Problem of Future Contingency*, both articles in *The Philosophical Review*, 1957.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xii

<sup>77</sup> Brian Leftow, Review on Linda T. Zegzebski, *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge in Ethics*, October 1992, p. 163.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

## 8. Iqbal's View of Omniscience and Human Freedom

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<sup>1</sup>The Institute of Islamic Culture in Lahore, Pakistan has published an annotated and properly edited version of *Reconstruction* in 1986. All references to *Reconstruction* in this article are to this version.

<sup>2</sup>Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious in Islam*, ed. and ann, M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, reprint 1986), 1,49.

<sup>3</sup> cf., *ibid*, 48-50.

<sup>4</sup> The Qur'ân is the Truth (*al-Haqq*) from your Lord. Al-Qur'an: 2:147; 3:60; 18:29; etc., His Word is the Truth. (*Qawlu hul Haq*); 6:73 What Allah descends unto His Messenger is the Truth. 5:83,84; 11:120; 13:01,19; 21:55; etc.

<sup>5</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas also rejects Discursive Knowledge as being worthy of God. See *Great Books of the Western World*, vols. 55, (*Suma Theologia*, by Aquinas, First Part, Q. 14, Art. 7), ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago: *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1952), 19 : 82.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 62,75.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.* , 62.

<sup>8</sup>The definition is incomplete. 'Creation' must mean capacity for original action but at 'Will' and 'Command.'

<sup>9</sup> Iqbal attributes this view to Dawwânî, (Jalaluddin Muhammad b. As'ad, Mullâ, 830-908/1427-1502-3, *Risâlat al-Zaurâ'*, Cairo, 1326/1908), Iraqi and Royce (Josiah Royce 1855-1916). *Ibid.* 60, 62. Professor M. Saeed Sheikh ed. and ann., however, tells us that the Sufi poet named here as well as in Lectures V and VII as Fakhr al-

Dîn 'Irâqî is really 'Ain al-Qudât al-Hamadânî, 492-525/1098-1131, whose tract on space and time: *Ghâyat al-Imkân fi Dirâyat al-Makân*, 54, has been edited by Rahîm Farmanish, Tehran, 1338 S/1959; (Iqbal, *Ibid*, Notes and References, 169, and Index, 234.) Dr. M. Maruf, however, observes that Iqbal's objection is based on a confusion between foreknowledge and predestination. He distinguishes predestination and foreknowledge observing that it [*i.e.*, foreknowledge] is always based on the knowledge of prevalent conditions, and in no way determines future events. He further observes that "Iqbal denies foreknowledge to God in the zest for preserving freedom and originality in creation. He, however, forgets that God's knowledge does not divest future of its originality any more than the forecast of a meteorologist robs future weather changes of their originality." Dr. M. Maruf, "Iqbal's View of Divine Knowledge," Appendix to *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion: A Study in the Cognitive Value of Religious Experience* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), 224-25.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 86-7.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* 62.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>18</sup> H.A. Wolfson, "Avicenna, Al-Ghazali and Averros on Divine Attributes" in *Homenaje a Miltas Vallicrosa* Vol. II, 1956, 545-46; and Michael E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars" *Journal of American Oriental Society*, 83.3(1962), 304.

<sup>19</sup> Muhammad Hanif Nadvi, "*Ibn Taymiyyah Ka Tasawwar e Sifat*" (Urdu) in *The Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, Lahore vol. V (January 1962), 41-49.

<sup>20</sup> The Muslim philosophers al-Farabi and Ibn Sina argued that Divine Knowledge is essentially and primarily self-knowledge. Creation proceeds as a consequence of divine self-knowledge. Marmura, *ibid.*, 302.

<sup>21</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 12.

<sup>22</sup> Both these terms occur as interpretations of وحدت الوجود (*wahdat-ul-wujud*), or the Doctrine of the Unity of all Being.

<sup>23</sup> Iqbal uses the word "act" or "activity." An eternal, continuous act must be synonymous with an eternal 'process.' Iqbal seems to conceive creation as the process of self-revelation in God.

<sup>24</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 64.

<sup>25</sup> cf. Assumption 3 above.

<sup>26</sup> ...*He is the All-Wise Creator. But His Command when He intends a thing is only that He saith unto it: Be! and it is.* (Al-Qur'ân, 36:81-2)

<sup>27</sup> Iqbal, *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 108, Iqbal also approves Iraqi's (i.e., 'Ain al-Qudât al-Hamadânî's, ref. footnote no.6 above) similar view, 110.

<sup>29</sup> Qur'ân, 17:85.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, ... *Surely His is the Creation (Khalq) and the Command (Amr)...* (07:54).

<sup>31</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli, *Tafsir e Fâzli*, (Urdu) 7 vols., (Lahore: Fâzli Foundation, 1982-98), 2 (reprint ed. 1996): 224. Translation into English is mine. Marmaduke Pickthall translates this verse in following words: *Lo! your Lord is Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth in six Days, then mounted He the Throne. He coverth the night with the day, which is in haste to follow it, and has made the sun and the moon and the stars subservient by His Command. His verily is all creation and commandment. ...* (7:54) Hazrat Fazal Shah (d.1978 in Lahore, Pakistan) initiator of Fâzli Qâdrî branch in already existing Qâdrî order in Muslim Mysticism. Muhammad Ashraf Fâzli at present is his successor. The most prominent feature of this commentary is that it draws forth the practical application of each and every verse of the Qur'an for a believer. It asserts the absolute primacy and sufficiency of the Qur'an. It shows that the Qur'an is authoritative ; it is perspicuous and internally self-consistent.

<sup>32</sup> Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>35</sup> Cf *ibid.*, 44, 45, 61.

<sup>36</sup> Cf *ibid.*, 61.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>38</sup> Iqbal also tries to conceive of 'will' for God when he says 'rationally directed Divine will is good' (*Ibid.*, 64)

but he only conceives of it in the sense that Divine Omnipotence is intimately related to Divine wisdom and is not arbitrary and capricious. Iqbal does not prove 'Will' for God in the context of creation at Will and Command.

*Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 50-51.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 61. Iqbal writes: "If then we accept the guidance of our conscious experience, and conceive the life of the all-inclusive Ego on the analogy of the finite ego, ..."

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>47</sup> Professor M.M. Sharif also supports this observation. M. M. Sharif, "Iqbal's Conception of God" in *About Iqbal and His Thought: Collected Papers—1* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1964), 20.

<sup>48</sup> Iqbal, *ibid.*, 82. To assert that 'God created Adam upon His Own Form' is theomorphism. Among modern Muslim thinkers, Syed Hossein Nasr holds this view. Syed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), 18. *Theomorphism* is as un-Qur'anic as the *Anthropomorphism* because they demolish the absolute transcendence of the Creator from the created. Usually both views go together. If "There is something God-like in man..." (Nasr, *Ibid.*) then God is somewhat man-like. This is why they anthropomorphically interpreting the verse 15:29 of the Qur'an, try to support an alleged tradition from which they have drawn theomorphism.

<sup>49</sup> Iqbal, *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>51</sup> Light (*Nur*) is an attribute of Allah as there are other attributes, but it is not some kind of substance which comprises the essence or being of Allah. Physical light, in all its forms, is a kind of energy and inter-convertible into matter. No doubt speed of physical light has been found to be the last limit of speed in nature but even then it is not infinite nor any absoluteness be attributed to it. Then in what sense can it be a symbol for absolute. But let us first define the term 'absolute'. Absolute means what is not relative, what is ultimate. Ultimate Reality is absolute for it is not relative to anything. What is absolute or the ultimate can never be measured. Physical light is a form of energy; sound, electricity, magnetic force, heat being other forms. Energy and matter are inter-convertible and the relationship of both is measurable through the famous equation of Eienstein *i.e.*,  $E=MC^2$ . Qur'an says: Allah has created the heavens and the earth and whatever therein is in six days. Light, as a physical phenomenon belongs to these things. Then how can it be a symbol for the absolute?

<sup>52</sup> For details see: Abdul Hafeez, "Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qura'n" in *Hamdard Islamicus*, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (October-December, 1999) (Bait al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan), 97-105.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Have they not travelled in the land, and have they hearts wherewith to feel [to reason—ya'qiloon] and ears wherewith to hear? For indeed it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts, which are within the bosoms, that grow blind.* Al-Qur'an, 22:46.

<sup>55</sup> Those who follow their desires go astray. (Al-Qur'an: 18:28; 25:43; 45:23;...) There reason ('aql) go blind. (Al-Qur'an, 22:46)

<sup>56</sup> al-Qur'an, 42:11.

<sup>57</sup> M. M. Sharif, "Iqbal's Conception of God," 20.

<sup>58</sup> Al-Qur'an, 112:1.

<sup>59</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 46.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 8. Iqbal also refers to the same tradition in poetry in section captioned *Al-Waqtu Saif-un (Time is a Sword)* of his *Asrâr-i Khudî (Secrets of the Self)* as thus: Life is Time and Time is Life; 'Do not abuse Time!' was the command of the Prophet. (trans. Nicholson). *Ibid.*, (*Lecture I, Notes & References* no. 24), 160.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 160. Professor M. Saeed Sheikh who has annotated this book also quotes following other references: Cf. Bukhari, *Tafsir*; 45; *Tawhid*: 35; *Âdâb*:101; and Muslim, *Alfâz*2-4.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>63</sup> For detailed study of this point please see the article "Is God *ad-Dahr (Time)!*".

<sup>64</sup> M.S.Raschid, *Iqbal's Concept of God* (London: Kegan Paul, 1981), xiii-xiv.

<sup>65</sup> Throughout *The Reconstruction*, Iqbal uses the word 'Reality' with uppercase first letters both for God and the world. For example, comparing 'thought' and 'intuition,' Iqbal writes, "The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality." Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 2. "The one noteworthy feature of the Qur'an is the emphasis that it lays on this observable aspect of Reality." *Ibid.*, 11. "Reality lives in its own appearances." *Ibid.*,12. etc.

<sup>66</sup> Dr. M. Mauruf in Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion also states Iqbal's position as panentheistic. He rightly conceives that Iqbal denies Divine Foreknowledge to secure human freedom. But Dr. Maruf himself takes the traditional libertarian position that Divine foreknowledge is non-causative. This approach is not correct to the present writer. Dr. M. Maruf, "Iqbal's View of Divine Knowledge," Appendix to *Iqbal's Philosophy of Knowledge*, Ph.D dissertation submitted to Punjab University in 1968, 314.

<sup>67</sup> M.S. Raschid, *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, xiii, 95.

<sup>69</sup> The school of Ibn Arabi commonly expresses its most fundamental view of *wujud* in terms of the theological concepts of *tanzih* and *tashbih*. The first is often translated as 'transcendence,' the second as 'immanence' or 'anthropomorphism.' Chittick prefers translating these in more literal sense, as 'incomparability' and 'similarity.' This school declares that God in Himself is incomparable with every created thing. In other words, *wujud* in totality is beyond the reach of everything in the cosmos; It is absolutely Nonmanifest (*al-batin*). But the Qur'an teaches us that, He is also Manifest (*al-Zahir*). As such, He is similar to all things, since He bestows His own attributes on creation. As the One Being,



He is absolutely incomparable, so no created thing can share in His Being, but as the Creative Principle, He is similar to all things, since He bestows His own attributes on creation. *Wujud* is One in Itself at the level of Its nonmanifestation or Incomparability, and many through Its manifestation or similarity; God is One in His Essence (*dhat*), and many through His Names. He sometimes refers to God as the 'One/Many (*al-wahid al kathir*). Cf. William C. Chittick, "Wahdat Al-Wujud In Islamic Thought", in *The Bulletin*, Jan.-Mar. 1999, 11. It is un-Qur'an ic to say that 'Allah bestows His own attributes on creation'. Divine Attributes are un-created and unique, human attributes are originated. They are either creation or command of God.

<sup>70</sup> M.S.Raschid is right to observe "that Iqbal's pantheistic notion of God is very close to pantheistic Sufi concept of God" (M.S. Raschid, *Ibid.*, xiii-xiv) but his observation is right only concerning Sufis belonging to pantheistic tradition. Pantheistic tradition in *Tasawuf* is not the only approach in Muslim mysticism; there is a parallel tradition that believes in supremely Transcendent and Omnipresent God.

<sup>71</sup> Process or activity is never a willing and self-conscious agent which have names like Allah has. Process or activity does not govern itself but is governed. Allah is the Creator, initiator and controller of all processes. *Allah is He Who created seven heavens and of the earth the like thereof. The Command (Amr) descends among, that you may know that Allah is Possessor of Power over all things, and that Allah encompasses all things in (His) Knowledge. 65:12.*

<sup>72</sup> ...Allah created not the heavens and the earth and that which is in between them save with the truth... (al-Qur'an, 30:08)

<sup>73</sup> Al-Qur'an, 6:73, 10:5, 14:19, 15: 85, 16:3, 29:44, 30:8, 39:5, 45:22, 46:3, 64:3.

<sup>74</sup> M.M. Sharif (late) was the editor of *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 vol. published by Pakistan Philosophical Congress and first printed in Germany by Allgäuer Heimatverlag GmbH., Kempten, Germany in 1963. M.M. Sharif was also the founder president of Pakistan Philosophical Congress.

<sup>75</sup> M. M. Sharif, "Iqbal's Conception of God," 9-30.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* 27.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 27-28.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 28-29.

<sup>79</sup> To, M. M. Sharif, both Ward and Iqbal have fallen into this pitfall. *Ibid.*, 29-30.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>81</sup> M. S. Raschid has demonstrated this in the first part of his work.

<sup>82</sup> Al-Qur'an, ...Lo! Allah is Independent of all creatures. 3:97; And Hazrat Musã said: Though ye and all who are in the earth prove thankless, lo! Allah verily is Absolute Owner of Praise. 14:8; And whosoever striveth, striveth only for himself, for lo! Allah is altogether Independent of (His) creatures. 29:6.

<sup>83</sup> *Al-Mubdi'* and *Al-Mu'id* do not occur in the Qur'an but the idea frequently, e.g., *See they not how Allah produced creation, then reproduced it? Lo! for Allah that is easy. Say (O Muhammad): Travel in the land and see how He originated creation... 29:19-20; He began the creation of man from clay. 32:07; The Day when We shall roll up the heavens as a recorder rolleth up a written scroll. As We began the first creation, We shall repeat it...(21:104) Lo! He it is Who produceth, then reproduceth.(85:13)*

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Muhammad Suhail Umer, *Khutbat-e-Iqbal Naiay Tanazir Mein* (Urdu) [*Iqbal's Lectures in New Perspective*] (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1996), preface 7-19. Mr. Umer says that he has grown out of this position and now he believes that there is no essential contradiction between Iqbal's works, whether poetry or the *Reconstruction*.

### 9. Allah's Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man

\* Published in *Hamdard Islamicus* Vol. XXV, No. 1, (January-March 2002) Bait al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 31-40.

#### Notes

- 1) Translation of the verses quoted in the article has not been taken from any specific translation of the Qur'an. We have consulted several translations but quoted only that which was near to our understanding. We have given our arguments, wherever necessary, for adopting a specific translation.
- 2) Since the discussions in this article revolve around the Qur'anic concept of God, so we have preferred to use the word 'Allah' to stress this fact.

#### References

- <sup>1</sup> W. C. Klein, *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation*, Eng. trans. of Abu al Hasan Al-Ash'ari's, *Al-Ibâna 'An Uşul Ad-Diyânah*, New Heaven: American Oriental Society, 1940. Antinomy concerning inexorability of the Appointed Term, Antinomy concerning Provision of Sustenance, Antinomy with reference to the verses of the Qur'an etc. are some other antinomies formulated in this book.
- <sup>2</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 663-64. Wolfson states: "This antinomy is phrased by Al-Asha'ri in the form of a question raised by the Mu'tazilites as to 'whether God has power over that over which He has endowed men with power.'" Wolfson cites the above with reference to Al-Asha'ri, *Kitâb Maqâlât al-Islâmiyîn wa Ikhtilâf al-Musallîn*, ed. Hellmut Ritter, Constantinople, 1929-1930, p. 199. We have seen only Urdu translation of this book of al-Ash'ari but we have preferred to directly examine, in the perspective of Qur'anic teachings, the concepts involved in this dilemma, to show that among other things, it were the unwarranted formulations of certain key concepts which gave rise to polemics in such theological matters.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 663-719

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 735

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 736.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 736. "The Najjârite are the followers of Husain b. Muhammad al-Najjâr, whose views were adopted by most of the Mu'tazila in the district of al-Rayy....Najjar says that God is the creator of all man's deeds, good and bad, right and wrong: man on his part acquires these deeds. He further maintains that the created power has a certain effect on these deeds; this he calls acquisition, *kasb*, as Asha'ri does. He agrees, too, with Asha'ri that capacity exists with the act. The Dirârîya are the followers of Dirâr b. 'Amr and Hafis al-Fard. .... Both say that man's deed are in reality created by God and man in reality acquires them. Thus it is possible for an act to be produced by two agents. It is possible, too, for God to change accidents into bodies. Capacity and incapacity also are parts of the body, and therefore a body, which certainly continues to exist for two moments, *zamânain*. (p. 76); A. K. Kazi, and J. G. Flynn (trans.), *Muslim Sects and Divisions* (The Section on Muslim Sects in *Kitâb al-Milal wa 'l-Nihal*) by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karîm Shahrastâni, London: Kegan Paul International, 1994, p. 75-6.

<sup>7</sup> Wolfson, *Ibid.*, p. 736.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p.737.

<sup>9</sup> Erich W. Bethmann, *Bridge to Islam*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953, p. 67. Bethmann writes "... Al-Ash'ari (260-327 A.H.; A.D. 873-935) ...maintained the absolute, eternal, free will of God, including His power to will evil and to do evil. But he allowed man certain powers. This he called *kasb* or *iktisab*, which as a theological term has the meaning of acquisition. That means, if God wills a thing, He creates in man the power to acquire it. The acquiring of the thing willed by God is man's own act, and thereby his responsibility is established. So taught Al Asha'ri. That this is no real solution is very apparent. It is fatalism somewhat camouflaged..."

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Wolfson, , *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 693-5

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 738.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 694.

<sup>13</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, p.699.

Reference here is to Ghazali's *Ihyâ*, chapter 1 *Tauba (Repentance)* and chapter 5 *Kitab al-Tauhid wal-Tawakkal*) Ghazali's view is that man has got freedom of action. He also believes that everything is the creation of God. Ghazali thinks that in his opinion these views are not opposed to each other. Not only 'will' but also man's 'wishing' is created for him. When God creates will and makes it firm, He creates power needed for that action. The unification of will and power compulsorily leads to action. The will and power, both, are the creations of God. Then there is a well-arranged plan according to which each of these factors created by God follows the other. This plan does not change. For example, God creates movement of hand before He creates a well-arranged writing. He creates power before He creates the movement of hand. He gives it life and creates firm will before He creates power, and so on. Thus God is agent of actions. Only He is the Creator of everything and there is no master of action except Him. But how does man get freedom of action? Ghazali thinks that when nature is subject to some

condition, the condition is created to accept that nature. Then that nature can be acquired from the strength of fate and God-given gift. According to al-Ghazali God creates the conditions and man acquires the action. Al-Hâj Maulana Fazul-ul-Karim, *Imam Ghazali's Ihya Ulum-id-Din*, Eng. Trans. of *Ihya Ulum-id-Din*, Book. 4, by Al-Ghazali, Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1971. p. 05-07.

Ghazali also dilates upon the same problem at pages 240-253.

<sup>14</sup> Wolfson, *ibid.*, p.702.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p.702-11, also cf., p. 738.

<sup>16</sup> S.J. McCarthy, *The Theology of Al-Ash'ari*, (Eng. translation of the *Kitâb Al-Luma'* and *Risâlat Istihsân al-Khawd fi 'Ilm al-Kalâm*, of Abu'l-Hasan Alî b. Ismâ'il Al-Ash'ari), Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953. Reference here is to Discussion of *Qadar* at Chapter 5.

<sup>17</sup> E.E. Elder, *A commentary on the Creed of Islam*, Eng. trans. of al-Taftâzânî. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. p.82. In verse 5:110 Allah addresses Christ on the Day of Judgment:..and how thou didst shape(*takhluqo*) of clay as it were the likeness of a bird by My permission, and thou didst blow upon it and it was a bird by My permission... It is clear from the context that the verse narrates a miracle. Though a derivative of the root *Khâ Lâm Qâf* has occurred with reference to a human being *i.e.*, the Christ, the verse uses the formula 'by My permission'(*bi iznillah*) twice to emphasize that it was not an ordinary act of a human being. As a parallel we can ask: Was Hazrat Musâ the creator of Serpent by his staff! It fully sports our contention that nowhere in the Qur'an, any word of the root *Khâ Lâm Qâf* has been used either for any ordinary man-made thing or for human act of moral responsibility.

<sup>18</sup> Even the word *kasaba* has not been used in the Qur'an for man's assuming the trust which was offered to heavens and earth and hills and they shrank from bearing it. The word '*hamala*' (to bear, to assume) has been used here. (al-Qur'an 33:71) The reason is clear. The assuming of the trust was not a moral act; it is in the exercise of trust that man earns responsibility.

<sup>19</sup> McCarthy, *The Theology of Al-Ash'ari*, p.53.

<sup>20</sup> Asha'ri quotes some other references from the Qur'an to support the same conclusion. But the verse 37:96 provides basis to all these arguments. So it seems appropriate to examine the interpretation of verse 37:96 or also verse 46:14, if necessary, to determine the validity of his line of argument.

<sup>21</sup> Reference here is to 'Discussion of *Qadar*' in al-Ash'ari's *Kitab Al-Luma'*.

<sup>22</sup> Reference here is to English translation of the Qur'an by R. Bell. McCarthy has not quoted any further reference of this book.

<sup>23</sup> al-Ash'ari', *ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> The author has been inspired by *Tafsir-e-Fazli*, an Urdu exegesis of the Qur'an to formulate this opinion. Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafsir-e-Fazli*, vols. 7, Lahore Pakistan: Fazli Foundation, 6 (1997): 36.

<sup>25</sup> Cf., al-Qur'an.... *verily Allah decrees what He wills.* 5:1; 22:14;... *Surely your Lord is the Doer of what He will.* 11:107; ... *And Allah wills no injustice for His slaves.* 40:31;

<sup>26</sup> Cf., al-Qur'an, 6:101; 9:28; 24:21; 42:12; 42:50.

## 10. Allah's Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man

\* Published in *Hamdard Islamicus*, XXII (4), 1999, p. 97-105

• **Notes:** 1) The translation of the verses quoted in the article has mostly been taken from Marmaduke Pickthall's explanatory translation *Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an* but whenever we have quoted from some other translation finding it more near to our understanding we have given its reference.

2) Since the discussions in this article revolve around the Qur'anic concept of God, we have preferred to use the word 'Allah' to stress this fact.

3) Verses of chapter 111 of the Qur'an also contain condemnation of Abu Lahb's wife but only Abu Lahb is alluded to by name. Since in the dilemma reference is made only to Abu Lahb by name so we have also not made any reference to Abu Lahb's wife. It is evident, however, that whatever has been said of Abu Lahb stands true of his wife.

### •References

<sup>1</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 734

<sup>2</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 613. These two were Nazzâm and Mu'ammâr who believed in laws of nature and secondary causes. For details see *Ibid.*, p.559.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 660 and 663. Other four antinomies relate to the problem of free will and the appointed term (*Ajal Mussamma*), the problem of free will and Allah's Fore-Knowledge, the problem of free will and Allah's Power, and the problem of free will and preordained sustenance. Antinomies concerning the Appointed Term, and concerning the Provision of Sustenance have been stated by al-Ash'ari in his *Ibana*. Ref. Walter C. Klein, tr. and nn., *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation*, (trans. of *al-Ibana an Usula ad Diyanah*, by al-Ash'ari) New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1940, pp.115-119. Wolfson cites as footnote that he states the antinomy in question with reference to discussions in *Kitab Makâlât al-Islâmiyîn* of al-Ash'ari, *Fark bain al-Firak* of Baghdâdi, and *Milal* of Shahrastani.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 656

<sup>5</sup> It seems as if Wolfson translates the verses himself for he has not given reference of any standard English translation of the Qur'an. Marmaduke Pickthall translates this part of the verse in following words: *Thus Allah sendeth astray whom He will, and whom He will He guideth.* (74:31) Marmaduke Pickthall (tr.), *Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an: Text and Explanatory Translation*, Karachi: Taj Company, 1984, (reprint ed.), p. 593. Pickthall's translation is better than one made by Wolfson for Wolfson does not distinguish between 'pleasure of Allah' and 'the will of Allah'.

Allah does not please to lead anyone astray, rather it is in accordance with His Will that He let Him led astray who shows persistence in following his low desires.

<sup>6</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p.723

<sup>7</sup> Cf., *ibid.* p. 724

<sup>8</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafseer-e-Fazli*, (7 vols., Lahore: Fazli Foundation, 1982-98), 2 vol. (reprint 1996): 224. *Tafseer-e-Fazli* is Exegesis of the Qur'an written in Urdu; rendering into English is from author. The translation given above in the text from *Tafsire-e-Fazli* is not substantially different from that of Pickthall. Pickthall's translation of this part of the verse is as follows: *His verily is all creation and commandment...* Marmaduke Pickthall (tr.), *The Glorious Qur'an: Explanatory Translation*, p. 593.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, *Tafsir-e-Fazli*, 5 (1996) : 217.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 (1998) : 231. Pickthall when translating this verse changes the sequence of "death" and "life" (as stated in this verse) which is not correct. If Allah has mentioned "death" before He mentions "life", it is because of His absolute Knowledge. Pickthall (tr.), *Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an*, p. 574. For further reference to the matter under discussion in the body text see the following verses: *And Allah hath given you, of that which He hath created, shelter from the sun, and hath given you places of refuge in the mountains, and has given for you coats... (16:81); Who [i.e., Allah] created the heavens and earth and all that is between them... (25:59) Ibid.*, pp. 258, 353.

<sup>11</sup> Marmaduke Pickthall(tr.), *Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an*, p. 396. For further references see the following verses: *And We created not the heaven and the earth and what is between them in vain... (38:27); And We created not the heavens and the earth and all that is between them, in play.(44:38) Ibid.*, pp. 451, 497.

<sup>12</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafseer-e-Fazli*, 2 (1996): 224.

<sup>13</sup> Marmaduke Pickthall(tr.), *Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an*, p. 301.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 570.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 500.

<sup>16</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafseer-e-Fazli*, 7 (1998): 222.

<sup>17</sup> Dr. Abdul Khaliq, and Yousaf Shadai, *Muslim Falsfa*, (Urdu), Lahore Pakistan: Aziz Publishers, 1988, pp. 61-62.

<sup>18</sup> H. A. Wolfson, "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretation of Platonic Ideas", *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays*, Harvard University Press, 1961, p.49; and *Philosophy of the Kalam* chapter 2. Wolfson writes that among the things which Plato somehow left un-explained about his Theory of Ideas is the question: How are these ideas related to God? Sometimes he uses language which lends itself to the interpretation that the Ideas have an existence external to God, either ungenerated and coeternal with God or produced or made by God. They are thus *extradeical*. Sometimes, however, he uses language which lends itself to the interpretation that the Ideas are the thoughts of God. They are *intradeical*. This

interpretation identifies Plato's God with mind. Philo adopted the second interpretation. The Christians, following Philo adopted the same view in their theology and doctrine of trinity was its outcome. Muslims, being impressed with this view, conceived divine attributes in the same manner. Wolfson seems to have successfully shown that this view "could not have originated in Islam spontaneously but it could have originated under Christian influence in the course of debates between Muslims and Christians shortly after the conquest of Syria in the VII century." Majid Fakhri also seems to endorse the same point of view when he says "Scholastic theology... gave the Muslims, as it had given the Christians of Egypt and Syria centuries earlier, the incentive to pursue the study of Greek Philosophy.", or when he says, "The beginning of the Islamic Philosophical school coincides with the first translations of the works of the Greek masters into Arabic from Syriac or Greek." Majid Fakhry, "Introduction," to *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. xviii, xix.

<sup>19</sup> Abdul Hameed Kamali, "*Maqūla-e-Şifāt aur Haqiqat-e-Asmā*" (Urdu), *Iqbal Review*, 6: 2, (July 1965), Lahore Pakistan: Iqbal Academy: 1-32.

<sup>20</sup> al-Qur'an, 8:144; 42:51; 2:75; 9:6; 48:15. 65:5; 6:114.

<sup>21</sup> Marmaduke Pickthall (tr.), *Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an*, p. 97. For further reference see the following verses: *These be the messengers ... There are those among them to whom God [Allah] has spoken... (02:253); And when Hazrat Musā came according to Our appointed place and His Lord spoke to him... (07:143); He said: O Hazrat Musā, surely I have chosen thee above the people with My messages and with My Speech... (07:144)* Al-haj Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar, *Translation of The Holy Qur-an*, National Book Foundation Karachi, 1973, pp, 24, 95.

<sup>22</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafsir e Fazli*, 1 (2nd reprint, 1997): 175.

<sup>23</sup> *Hā Mīm. By the Book that makes manifest! Surely We have made [Jaalna] it an Arabic Qur'an that you may understand. And it is in the Mother of the Book [Umm-ul-Kitab] with Us, truly elevated, full of wisdom. (al-Qur'an 43:1-4) Ibid., 6 (1997) : 245-46.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid., 7 (1998) : 134, and 3 (1993) : 262*

<sup>25</sup> Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, *Lughat ul Qur'an (Urdu)* vols. 4 (in single binding), Lahore, Pakistan: Idara Talu'-e Islam, 1984, p. 1512.

<sup>26</sup> Wolfson mentions some traditions in the name of the Holy Prophet of Islam in this regard. He also tries to corroborate this concept of the Preserved Tablet with the Judaic concept for the same. But no tradition, which states a concept which contradicts to basic components of Islamic Faith can be a saying of the Holy Prophet (pbuh), nor can such interpretation of a tradition be valid.

<sup>27</sup> Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar, *Translation of the Holy Qur-an*, p. 180.

<sup>28</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafseer-e-Fazli*, 4 (1995) : 291.

<sup>29</sup> The question of Pharaoh about the former generations was with reference to the destiny of these people *i.e.*, whether they were condemned or blessed.

<sup>30</sup> Created if Preserved Tablet belonged to the category of Creation (*Khalq*), or brought into being if it belonged to the category of Command (*Amr*) as discussed above.

<sup>31</sup> Hazrat Fazal Shah and Muhammad Ashraf Fazli, *Tafseer-e-Fazli*, 7 (1998):407.

<sup>32</sup> Al-Qur'an, 2:26; 9:80.

### 11. Free Will and the Appointed Term (*Ajl-E Mussamma*)

\* Published in *Hamdard Islamicus*, XXIII (4), 2000. p. 63-68

<sup>1</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 734.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 613. These two were Nazzâm and Mu'ammâr who believed in laws of nature and secondary causes. For details see p.559 of the same book.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, p. 734.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 655

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 657. Wolfson cites with reference to Ash'ari's *Kitab al-Ibana*, p.76, ll, 4-5; and l, 6; and ll. 7-8, Hyderabad: 1321 A.H.[1903]. Cf. W. C. Klean, *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation*, Eng. trans. of *Al-Ibanah 'An Usul Ad-Diyanah*. by Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Ibn Ismail al-Ash'ari, New Heaven: American Oriental Society, 1940. p.

<sup>6</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, p.657-60

<sup>7</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 658. An apparently similar but actually quite different answer of the same question as presented by Wolfson with reference to Nasafi which he (Nasafi) ascribes to orthodox Islam but which Hilli ascribes to the "Compulsionists" and Iji ascribes to "the People of Truth" (*ahlal-haqq*) is as follows: (i) the *ajal* is inexorable; (ii) that God has a foreknowledge of the act as well as of the time of the killing, and that that foreknowledge is the cause of both the act of killing and the time of the killing; (iii) that God synchronizes the *ajal* with the killing caused by His foreknowledge.

<sup>8</sup> For further reference see: al-Qur'an, 2:38; 10:23.

<sup>9</sup> for further reference see: *We said: Descend all of you from here. And when there comes unto you Guidance from Me, then those who follow My Guidance shall have no fear, neither shall they grieve.*(02:38) *...O men, your rebellion is against yourselves----a provision only of this world's life, then to Us is your return, so We shall inform you of what you did.*( al-Qur'an, 10:23)

<sup>10</sup> For further reference: *Say, (O Muhammad, to mankind): If ye love Allah, follow me; Allah will love you and forgive you yours sins. And Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.*( al-Qur'an, 03:31)

<sup>11</sup> For further reference see: al-Qur'an, 3:30; also, *And there came from the utermost part of the city there came a man running. He cried: O my people, follow those who have been sent! Follow those who ask of you no fee, and who are rightly guided.*( al-Qur'an, 36:20-21)



<sup>12</sup> For further reference see, al-Qur'an: *So We sent them the flood and the locusts and the vermin and the frogs and the blood—a succession of clear signs. But they were arrogant and became guilty.*(7:133) *And when the terror fell on them they cried: O Hazrat Musâ! Pray for us unto thy Lord, because He hath a covenant with thee. If thou removest the terror from us we verily will trust thee and will let the Children of Israel go with thee.*(7:134) *But when We did remove from them the terror for a term(Ajal) which they must reach, behold! they broke their covenant.*(7:135)

<sup>13</sup> *...He (Allah) calls you that He may forgive you your sins and relieve you (yo akhiro kum) unto an appointed term(Ajal Mussamma)...*( al-Qur'an,14:10); *And ask forgiveness of your Lord, then turn to Him. He will provide you with a goodly provision to an appointed term (Ajal Mussamma)...* (al-Qur'an,11:3)

<sup>14</sup> For further reference see the following verses of al-Qur'an: *And spend of that wherewith We have provided you before death comes unto one of you and he says: My Lord! If only You would relieve me for a short term, then I would give alms and be among the righteous.* (63:10); *But Allah relieves no soul when its term (Ajaloha) comes, and Allah is Aware of what you do.*(63:11); *And if Allah were to take men to task on account of their wrongdoing, not a single creature (i.e., out of the wrongdoers) would he leave thereupon(i.e., on the earth), but He respites them to a fixed term (Ajal Mussamma). So when their appointed term comes they are not able to delay it an hour, nor can they advance it.*(16:61); *Surely We sent Noah to his people,... He said: surely I am a plain warner to you: That you should serve Allah and keep your duty to Him and obey me... He will forgive you of your sins and grant you respite to a.n appointed term (Ajal Mussama). Surely the term of Allah, when it comes, is not postponed...* (71:1-4); *And if Allah were to hasten for men the evil, as they would hasten on the good, their appointed term (Ajal) would certainly have been decreed for them...* (10:11); *And were Allah to punish men for what they earn, He would not leave on the back of it (i.e.,earth) any creature, but He respites them till an appointed term (Ajal Mussama); so when their term (Ajal) comes, then surely Allah is ever Seer of His servants.*(35:45); *Until when death overtakes one of them(i.e., the unjust), he says: My Lord, send me back. That I may do good in that which I have left. By no means! It is but a word that he speaks. And before them is a barrier, until the day they are raised.* (23:99-100) *For each decree, there is an appointment (Ajal-in Kitab) lit. writing, or a prescribed Divine Law.* (13:38) *It is because Allah is Seer of what the wrong-doers do* (35:45); *He is the Knower of what they do.*

## 12. Knowledge of Allah's Pleasure (Raḍa) and Knowledge of Allah's Will (Mashiyat)

\* Published in *IJHSS*, Vol. 2 No. 19 [Special Issue October 2012], pp.298-300, USA

<sup>1</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, 1976, 660, 663. Harry Austryn Wolfson (1887-1974) was the first and full time scholar of Judaica to the faculty completely devoted to Jewish Studies established in Harvard University America. He was the first Nathan Littauer Professor of Hebrew

Literature and Philosophy, a wide read scholar, a prolific and creative writer in the history of philosophy. He retired from this post in 1958. *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays*, 1961; *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 1976, are among his best books.

<sup>2</sup> There did Zakariya pray to his Lord, saying: "O my Lord! Grant unto me from Thee a progeny that is pure: for Thou art He that heareth prayer! *Al-Qur'an*", (al-Qur'an, 3:37) Also see (ibid, 19:1-6).

<sup>3</sup> "Those who say, "Our Lord, we believe, so forgive us our sins and protect us from suffering in the Fire," (ibid, 3:16)

<sup>4</sup> "And those who pray: Our Lord! Grant us from our wives and offspring the joy of our eyes; and cause us to be the foremost of the *Muttaqîn*." (ibid, 25:74)

<sup>5</sup> Al-Qur'an, "and know that your possessions and your children are a test,..."(8:28) "Among your wives and your children there are enemies for you." (ibid, 64:14-15)

<sup>6</sup>For details see, Abdul Hafeez, "Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom", *Al-Hikmat*, Lahore: Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Volume 26, 2006, pp. 11-47

<sup>7</sup> "Hazrat Khidr (a.s.) prayed to the Lord to give them in exchange a son better than he in innocence and nearer in mercy." (al-Qur'an, 18:80-81) This is a caption which he pronounces with God-given special knowledge.

<sup>8</sup> "Khidr's knowledge exceeds that of Hazrat Musâ because God has given diverse gifts to various prophets — not, as others have said, because Khidr was a saint and therefore superior to a prophet in esoteric knowledge (Tafsîr Muqâtil, ii, 592-9). *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ân*, vol. 3 ed., (2003), s. v. "Khadîr/Khidr".

<sup>9</sup> "Exegetes generally agree that Khidr's divinely infused knowledge was esoteric, whereas that of Hazrat Musâ was more exoteric." *Ibid.* p. 82

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.* vol. 5, ed., (2006), s. v. "Trust and Patience".

### 13. Antinomy of Free Will and Pre-Ordained Sustenance

\* Published in *IJHSS*, Vol. 2 No. 19 [Special Issue October 2012], pp.192-94, USA

<sup>1</sup>William Montgomery Watt (14 March 1909 – 24 October 2006) was a Scottish historian, an Emeritus Professor in Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Edinburgh. Watt was one of the foremost non-Muslim interpreters of Islam in the West, was an enormously influential scholar in the field of Islamic studies. He is largely known in Muslims for his comprehensive biography of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, *Muhammad at Mecca* (1953) and *Muhammad at Medina* (1956).

<sup>2</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, *Freewill and Predestination in Early Islam* London: LUZAC, 1948; *Ibid*, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973,103.

<sup>3</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson was the first and full time scholar of Judaica to the faculty completely devoted to Jewish Studies established in Harvard University America. He was the first Nathan Littauer Professor of Hebrew Literature and Philosophy, a

wide read scholar, a prolific and creative writer in the history of philosophy. He retired from this post in 1958. Professor Wolfson's trail-blazing study of Jewish thinkers from Philo of Alexandria to Benedict Spinoza, and his systematic integration of the study of Jewish, Islamic, and Christian philosophy, attracted wide international attention. His many well-known and celebrated volumes are as follows: Wolfson, H. A. (a) (1929) *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle: Problems of Aristotle's Physics in Jewish and Arabic Philosophy*; (b) (1934) *The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning*. 2 volumes; (c) (1947) *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*. 2 volumes; (d) (1956) *The Philosophy of Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*; (e) (1976) *The Philosophy of the Kalam*; and (f) (1979) *Kalam Repercussions in Jewish Philosophy*. In addition to these, there are three book-length collections of papers and articles: (g) (1961) *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays*; and (h) Volume 1 (1973) and Volume 2 (1977) *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*. Harvard University has established Wolfson Chair in his memory, in its Center for Jewish Studies.

<sup>4</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, 1976, 660.

<sup>5</sup> Franz Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970, 124-125.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Iqbal, Allama Muhammad, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ed. & ann. M. Saeed Sheikh, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture, reprint 1986, chapters 3-4; see also, Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "Iqbal's view of Omniscience and human freedom", *The Muslim World*, 2005, 95(1), 125-145.

<sup>7</sup> Founder and Amir of Jama't-e-Islami India and then Amir of Jama't-e-Islami Pakistan after 1947.

<sup>8</sup> Syed Abul Ala Moududi, *Mas'la-e-Jabro Qadr* (Urdu), Lahore: Islamic Publications, 20th edition, 111.

<sup>9</sup> Chairman retired of the Department of Philosophy University of the Punjab, Lahore (Pakistan) and renowned scholar of Muslim Philosophy.

<sup>10</sup> Abdul Khaliq, *Problems of Muslim Theology*, Lahore: Izhar sons, 199, 169-70.

<sup>11</sup> Professor and Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore; retired as Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore (Pakistan); renowned scholar of Muslim Philosophy.

<sup>12</sup> M. Saeed Sheikh, "Freedom and Fatalism in Islam", in Dr. C. A. Qadir ed., *The World of Philosophy* (Lahore: The Sharif Presentation Volume Committee), 1965.

<sup>13</sup> Ozcan, Hanifi, "The Relationship between God's Knowledge and Human Freedom: A New Approach to the Problem." *Hamdard Islamicus*, 1997, 3, 63-70.

<sup>14</sup> *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ân*, vol. 2, ed. 2002, cf., s. v. "Freedom and Predestination".

<sup>15</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 660.

<sup>16</sup> Al-Qur'an, 11:6

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 16:71

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 13:26; 17:30; 28:82; 29:62; 30:37; 34:36; 34:39; 39:52; 42:12.

<sup>19</sup> *But when the prayer is ended, disperse abroad in the land and seek of Allah's bounty (fadal)...* ibid., 62:10 *And when they see merchandise...they break away to it...And Allah is the Best of providers.* ibid., 62:11, also see ibid., 2:198.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 11:6

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 31:34

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 11:6

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 31:34

#### 14. H. A. Wolfson and A. H. Kamali on the Origin of the Problem of Divine Attributes in Muslim Kalam

\* Published in *Iqbal Review*, 40(3), 1998, p. 81-96.

<sup>1</sup> Problem of the createdness/ uncreatedness of the Qur'an, Beautific Vision, problem of the creation of the world as *ex-nihilo* or 'out of something', Atomism, Causality, Predestination and Free Will, Problem of the relation of Faith and Action, are some of the different problems dealt with by Muslim *mutakalimūn*. Mir Valliuddin, 'Mu'tazilism' and M. Abdul Hye, 'Ash'arism' in *History of Muslim Philosophy* Vol. 1, by M.M. Sharif (ed.), Royal Book Company, Karachi--3, 1983, pp. 202-214 and pp. 224-243. Also please see H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam* Harvard University Press, 1976, Contents, pp.xi-xxvi.

<sup>2</sup> "A part of that [Platonic] teaching is the much-disputed theory of Ideas. The theory is doubtless basic to all Plato's thought, but is presented in so many ways and attended by so many difficulties that scholar's have been for from certain about its meaning." Irene Samuel, *Plato And Milton*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1965, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> Reference here is to *Studies in Muslim Philosophy*, by M. Saeed Sheikh, and 'Ibn e Tamiyya ka Taṣawar e Şifât' article by Moulana M. Hanif Nadvi in *Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, V, January 1962, Pakistan Philosophical Congress Lahore. Professor M. Saeed Shaikh in his Book *Studies in Muslim Philosophy* tries to prove that the views of the Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn e Sina were a creative assimilation and not a blind following of the Greeks on the face of the fact that he himself pronounces Ibn Sina's theory of Emanation and Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars to be quite contrary to the spirit of Islamic teachings.

<sup>4</sup> "Philo Judaeus is one of the writers who first attempted to reconcile Plato with Holy Writ. Philo Judaeus initiated the system of Biblical exegesis which made the text a peg from which to suspend Plato's doctrines." Irene Samuel, *Plato And Milton*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1965, p.37-38.

<sup>5</sup> Wolfson, 'Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretation of Platonic Ideas' in *Religious Philosophy (A Group of Essays)* by H. A. Wolfson (ed.), Harvard University Press, 1961, p.49.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, and *The Philosophy of Kalam* Harvard University Press, 1976, chapter 2, Wolfson seems to have successfully shown that this view “could not have originated in Islam spontaneously but it could have originated under Christian influence in the course of debates between Muslims and Christians shortly after the conquest of Syria in the VII century. Majid Fakhry in his book *A History of Islamic Philosophy* also seems to endorse the same point of view when he says “Scholastic theology... gave the Muslims, as it had given the Christians of Egypt and Syria centuries earlier, the incentive to pursue the study of Greek Philosophy.”, or when he says, “The beginning of the Islamic Philosophical school coincides with the first translations of the works of the Greek masters into Arabic from Syriac or Greek.” (Introduction, p.xviii, xix)

<sup>7</sup>*The Philosophy of The Kalam, Ibid.*, p.132.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, ‘Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretation of Platonic Ideas’ (article) p.52.

<sup>9</sup> This theory introduced two innovations to the discussion of attributes. They replaced the old formula “neither God nor other than God” by “neither existent nor non-existent” as a description of modes in their contrast to attributes as conceived by the Orthodox and the Mu‘tazilites. Second, they introduced the view that modes are related to Allah as effects to their cause. The Orthodox had spoken regarding the attributes as being coeternal with Allah, or subsisting in His Essence as superadded to His Essence, without suggesting that they were proceeding from Him as from a cause.

<sup>10</sup> Jahm and Abu al Hudhail are the proponents of this view. Jahm though agrees with the Mu‘tazilites in denial of attributes he is reported to have said that “God’s knowledge is originated (*muḥdath*) or created (*makhluq*).. Abu al Hudhail is reported to have said that the “Will” of Allah is not mere a word nor an eternal attribute with Allah, it rather exists as an incorporeal real being created by Allah outside Himself. He is also reported to have regarded the attribute “Word” (*Kalam*) as of exceptional nature. He divided this term as attributed in the Qur’an in two kinds: one kind is the term “Be” (*Kun*) and the other is “Command” (*Amr*). While both these kinds of the attribute “Word” are created, according to him, the creative Word or Command is created but incorporeal whereas the obligative Word or Command is created in an *abode* where by *abode* is meant the Preserved Tablet in the Heaven. Cf. *The Philosophy of The Kalam, Ibid.*, p.140-41.

<sup>11</sup>*The Philosophy of The Kalam, Ibid.*, p.175.

<sup>12</sup> Abu Hasham says of modes that they are “neither Allah nor other than Allah”. Hence it no longer is meant to describe a belief in the reality of attributes.

<sup>13</sup>*The Philosophy of The Kalam, Ibid.*, p.212.

<sup>14</sup> Wolfson, *Ibid.*, article pp.28-29.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.30-31. Such a method of interpretation was used by Jewish rabbis in their effort to harmonise contradictory statements in Hebrew Scripture.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p.31.

<sup>17</sup> Wolfson tries to prove that Philo had identified *Logos* with *Nous*, however Dr. C.A. Qadir mentions the word 'Sophia' as used by Philo, instead of 'Nouse'. ('Alexandrio-Syriac Thought', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy* vol.1,1983, ed. M.M.Sharif, p.117.)

<sup>18</sup> Wolfson, *Ibid.*, article.

<sup>19</sup> However there are some differences too. The first difference is that Philo describes the contrast between the *pre-existent ideas* and the *created world* as a contrast between *the intelligible animal* and *the visible animal*. As for the significance of this difference is concerned, it involves two problems: i) the problem of the existence of a world soul. To Plato there is a World-Soul, a Soul, which exists in the body of the world, just as there is a soul which exists in the body of any living being. To Philo, however, there is no World-Soul. The function of the Platonic as well as the Stoic *World Soul* which is a soul immanent in the world, is performed in Philo's philosophy partly by *Logos*, which with the creation of the world becomes immanent in it, and partly by what he calls the *Divine Spirit*, which is incorporeal being not immanent in the world. Without a soul, the world to Philo is not an animal being. ii) then it involves the problem of the existence of ideas as segregate beings. To Plato, all the ideas, with the exception of those of living creatures exist in segregation from each other. Whereas to Philo all the ideas are integrated into a whole, namely, the *intelligible world*; and their relation to the *intelligible world* is conceived by him as that of parts of indivisible whole, which as such has no real existence of their own apart from that of the whole. The second difference between them is that in the *Timaeus* there is no mention of a place where the ideas exist, whereas in Philo the ideas are said to have their place in the *Logos*. Now, while the term *Logos* occurs in Greek Philosophy, having been used ever since Heraclitus in various senses, it was never used as the place of the Platonic ideas. (See *Ibid*, article, p. 32)

<sup>20</sup> Wolfson finds justification for such type of controversy in religions in the fact that in the history of religions, many a hotly debated problem was not so much over actual beliefs as over the manner in which to formulate actual beliefs. And behind it there was always the fear that a wrong formulation might lead the unwary astray. But we think that Wolfson has not given proper recognition to political interests of the ruling elite. According to our view mostly it is due to the political interests of the ruling class that one way or the other stirs controversies in religious factions and it is after this that it becomes a problem of the sanctity of the real beliefs to some.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.41.

<sup>22</sup> *The Philosophy of the Kalam, Ibid.*, p.114, It is said that Wassail maintained, in opposition to those who believed in the reality of attributes, that "he who posits a *ma'na* and *siffah* as eternal, posits two gods."

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p.115.

<sup>24</sup> *Al-Qur'an*, 2:18,112; 6:100,140; 21:22; 23:93; 37:159,180; 43:82. The instances where the term is used with reference to evil things; 12:18,77; 16:64,117; 23:98.

<sup>25</sup> *Al-Qur'an*, 7:179; 17:110; 20:7; also *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, *Ibid.*, pp.117-8 and the footnote no.30 at p.118.

<sup>26</sup> Professor Abdul Hameed Kamali's article "*Maqūla e Sifāt aur Haqiqat e Asmā*" (Urdu) in *Iqbal Review*, 1986, pp. 1-32, presents a very ingenious attempt to develop this 'Logic of Good Names'. This article is the last of a series of three articles. The first two articles, 'Mahiyat e Khudi aur Khud Aagahi ki Tashkeel" and "Martba e Zat e Haq"(Urdu) were published in the issues of *Iqbal Review* in July 1963, and January 1964 respectively.

<sup>27</sup> MarmadukePikthhall, translation of *The Glorious Qur'an*, Taj Company Ltd., Karachi, Pakistan,1984. pp. 97 and 110.

<sup>28</sup> "The Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretation of Platonic Ideas", *Ibid.*,p.50.

<sup>29</sup> *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, *Ibid.*, cf. p. 71.

<sup>30</sup> MarmadukePikthhall, translation *The Glorious Qur'an*, Taj Company Ltd., Karachi, Pakistan,1984. p. 483.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle says that volition implies change, and change implies imperfection. He applies the same principle on things of this world, as well as on God in the same sense. Cf. H.A.Wolfson, 'Avicenna, Al-Ghazali and Averroes on Divine Attributes', in *Homenaje a Millas- Vallicrosa* vol. ii, 1956.

<sup>32</sup> It were the Muslim philosophers specially Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina who solely followed Aristotle on this problem. Their approach to the problem is based on their rigid conception of the Absolute Simplicity of God as a conception of the unity (*Tauhid*) of God, and on Aristotlian 'doctrine of the kinds of predicables'. They tried to prove that Divine Attribute are properties; since the definition of property is that it is not part of definition however logically derivable from the definition of an object, so no question of multiplicity in the being of God. For details please see H.A.Wolfson, 'Avicenna, Al-Ghazali and Averroes on Divine Attributes', in *Homenaje a Millas- Vallicrosa* vol. ii, 1956. *ad-dalāl*

<sup>33</sup> Now the question is, had the Muslims followed the logic of 'ism' (اسم) instead of the logic of *şiffah* (attribute) how should they explain the Divine Names and how would they differentiate in their meaning when the same words were to be used for human beings. This point needs an independent treatment.

## 15. State and Statecraft: Relationship between Islamic and Western Paradigms

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<sup>1</sup> cf. Javed Akbar Ansari 2004. "Sarmāya awr Sarmayadāri Nizām kiya hai?" (Urdu) in *Sāhil*, Volume 15, No. 7, pp. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 02:151 Kamā 'Arsalnā Fikum Rasūlāan Minkum Yatlū 'Alaykum 'Āyâtinā Wa Yuzakkikum Wa Yu'allimukumu Al-Kitāba WaAl-Ĥikmata.Wa Yu'allimukum Mā Lam Takūnū Ta'lamūna. *Ibid*, (33:21)

<sup>3</sup> A detailed exposition of all things, and guidance and a mercy to any such who believe. (12:111)

<sup>4</sup> And pursue not that of which thou hast no knowledge; for every act of hearing, or of seeing or of (feeling in) the heart will be enquired into (on the Day of Reckoning). (17:36)

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, al-Fatiha: 03 (Mâliki Yawmi Ad-Dîni – He is the Master of the day of requital.)

<sup>6</sup> *Lâ Yukallifu Allâhu Nafsâan 'Illâ Wus`ahâ Lahâ Mâ Kasabat Wa `Alayhâ Mâ Aktasabat ... Ibid*, 02:286 Allah does not burden anyone beyond his capacity. One gets reward for that which one has earned, and one is punished for that which one has earned ...

<sup>7</sup> All other values or disvalues expressly stated or derivable anywhere from the Qur'an are subsumable under these broader categories. The values are as follows: ***Ihsân***: Allah loves *mohsinîn* (02:195), *i.e.* those who provide convenience to others in the fulfillment of obligation/s devolved on them with reference to truth. ***Taubâ***: Allah loves *tawabîn* (02:222), *i.e.* those who seek forgiveness from Allah on the errors committed from them with the resolution to be upright in future. ***Taharat***: Allah loves *mutataahirîn* (02:222), *i.e.* those who remain chaste in seclusion as well as in public and have the honour to grant chastity. ***Taqwa***: Allah loves *mutaqîn* (03:76), *i.e.* those who act righteously. The characteristics of the god-fearing are given at the very beginning of the Qur'an at 02:02-05. It is they who has the eligibility to get guidance from the Qur'an. They keep themselves free of contradiction, establish prayer and keep the commitment they make in it, and spend in the way of Allah, believe the Qur'an as well as prior scriptures as revealed. ***Sabar***: Allah loves *sâbirîn* (03:146), *i.e.* those who are firm and steadfast with reference to the truth. ***Tawakkal***: Allah loves *motawakkilîn* (03:159), *i.e.* those who put their trust in Him. ***Qist***: Allah loves *muqsitîn* (05:42), *i.e.* those who judge in equity. ***Taharat***: Allah loves *mutahirîn* (09:108), *i.e.* those who remain chaste in seclusion as well as in public.

The disvalues stated in the Qur'an are as follows:

***Transgression***: Allah loves not *m'utadîn*, *i.e.* the transgressors. (02:190) To cross the limits prescribed by Allah is transgression. ***Wickedness***: Allah loves not the ungrateful and wicked (*kaffar-in-aseem*). (02:276) ***Kufer***: Allah loves not *kafirîn*, *i.e.* those who reject faith. (03:32) ***Zulam***: Allah loves not *zalimîn*, *i.e.* the wrongdoers. (03:57) ***Khatal wa Fakhar***: Allah loves not *mukhtâlan-fakhûra*, *i.e.* vainglorious and the boastful. (4:36) ***Betrayal and Crime***: Allah loves not *khawwanan-aseema*, *i.e.* the betrayer of His trust and the criminal. (04:107) ***Fasâd***: Allah loves not *mufsidîn*, *i.e.* the mischief makers. (05:64) ***Isrâf***: Allah loves not *musrifîn*, *i.e.* the wasters. (06:141) ***Khianat***: Allah loves not *khâinîn*, *i.e.* the treacherous/dishonest. (08:58) ***Takabbar***: Allah loves not *mutakabbirîn*, *i.e.* the arrogant. (16:23) ***Treachery and Ingratitude***: Allah loves not *khawwanin-kafûr*, *i.e.* treacherous and the ingrate. (22:38) ***Farhat***: Allah loves not *farihîn*, *i.e.* who exult. (28:76)



<sup>8</sup> Cf. Dr. Naeem Ahmed 2004. "Misâq-i-Madina" in *Ayyam-i-Habib*, Lahore: Ch. Muhammad Ayyub, pp. 415-426. Dr. Naeem writes: "The Pact of Madina provided that non-Muslim tribes were free to live according to their culture and traditions while remaining part of this pact for the defence of State." *Ibid*, p. 426. Also see, Dr. Hamidullah Haiderabadi 2005. *Siyasi Vasiqa-jaat*, Urdu tr. by Maulana Abu Yahya Imam Khan Noshehravi. Lahore: Majlas-e-Taraqi-e-Adab, 2nd reprint, pp. 35-40.

<sup>9</sup> Al-Qur'an, Lâ 'Ikrahâ Fî Ad-Dîni Qad Tabayyana Ar-Rushdu Mina Al-Ghayyi Faman Yakfur Biṭ-Ṭaghūti Wa Yu'umin Billâhi Faqadi Astamsaka Bil-'Urwati Al-Wuthqâ Lâ Anfiṣâma Lahâ Wa Allâhu Samî'un `Alîmun (02.256). Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error.

<sup>10</sup> Ref. Qist: Allah loves *muqsitîn* (05:42), i.e. those who judge in equity.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, 18:28.

<sup>12</sup> *Rahbaniyyat* (monastic asceticism) was an innovation (*bida't*) of the Christians, Allah did not enjoin it on them. They had initiated it with the purpose of seeking Allah's pleasure. [Allah does not disapprove it.] They did not confine then within viable limits as they should. (Al-Hadîd, 57:27 ), And proclaim the Pilgrimage among men: they will come to thee on foot and (mounted) on every kind of camel, lean on account of journeys through deep and distant mountain highways. (22:27) [Can the Muslims go on hajj as stated in this verse now? This is *Bidat-e-hasana* that now we go by air for acting upon this injunction.]

<sup>13</sup> Not everyone is qualified for the demarcation of limits for the relationship between truth and untruth. Those who know and those who do not know are not equal. (Az-Zumar, 39:09) Only those who are endowed with understanding grasp the Message. (... *Wa Mâ Yadhakkaru 'Illâ 'Ūlū Al-'Albâbi. Âl-i-Imrân*, 03:07).

<sup>14</sup> (al-Qur'an, 3:7)

<sup>15</sup> Reference to note 12 above. Also consider the following: Fine flour, which is very harmful for health, was never used by the Prophet (pbuh) in his life time. But now it is used by Muslims all over the world. The products of fine flour are used in Makka and Madina in highly abundant quantity. Is it not *bid'at-i-sayia*? To have photographs was once considered *bid'at-i-sayia* but is it not the case that performance of *Hajj* or *Umra* is not possible without it? Has it not become *bid'at-i-hasana*! Many more examples from everyday life can be given.

## 16. Ibn Sina, Al-Gazali and Ibn Taymiyyah on the Origination of the World

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<sup>1</sup> Al-Qur'an, (02:2-3)

<sup>2</sup> "These two philosophers were Aristotelian. They were also Neoplatonists who had formulated two closely related but quite distinct emanative schemes. There are, moreover, differences between these two thinkers, not only in their emanative schemes, but also in their theories of the soul, epistemologies, and eschatologies. At the same time, however, there is overlap in their ideas, so that many of al-Ghazali's

criticisms apply to both.” Michael E. Marmura (tr.), “Translator’s Introduction” in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, (Eng. tr. of Ghazali’s *Tahafut al-Falasfa*), Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Pmsi, 2000, p.xix

<sup>3</sup> The first Islamic philosopher to uphold philosophical truth over revelation. He was born in Fârâb, Transoxiana (now Uzbekistan), under the name Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzalagh al-Farabi. He became one of the earliest Islamic thinkers to transmit to the Arab world the doctrines of Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>4</sup> Celebrated Islamic physician, philosopher, and scientist whose best known work is the Canon of Medicine, born in Bukhara, Persia.

<sup>5</sup> G.F. Hourani, “The dialogue between Al-Ghazali and the philosophers on the origin of the world”, part-I, the Muslim World, vol.48 Issue 4(1958), p.183.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Simon Van Den Berg (tr.), “Introduction” in *Averoes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, Vol. I, London Lozac & Co, 1954, p. xix.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina had upheld the Aristotelian position that the world as a whole was eternal in the past. The Muslim philosophers see God, as Aristotle did, as the First Mover. They did not deny God as the Creator, but they regard Him, under the influence of the Plotinian theory of emanation, as the Creator of the universe from whom the world emanates eternally. Hourani, Ibid, part I, p.184.

Michael E. Marmura says: “Their entire philosophical system rested on affirming the existence of God, from whom all other existents emanated. But, according to the Islamic philosophers, these existents emanated as the necessary consequence of the divine essence. As al-Ghazali saw it, this meant that God produces the world by necessity in the same way that an inanimate object like the sun was said to produce its light by its very nature—by its essence, necessarily. It meant for him the denial of the divine attributes of life, will, power, and knowledge. Denuded of these attributes, he maintained, the God of the philosophers was not the God of the Qur’an. At issue was not the question of God’s existence, but the nature of the godhead.” Michael E. Marmura (tr.), “Translator’s Introduction” p.xv.

Van Den Berg (tr.), Ibid, p. xvi. Al-Ghazali’s answers to the Muslim Philosophers are contained in his *Tahâfut al-Falâsifa* completed in 1095. The debate in its final form is contained in Ibn Rushd’s *Tahafut al-Tahafut* which was written sometime after 1180.

<sup>8</sup> Hourani, Ibid, part-II, p,308.

<sup>9</sup> Michael E, Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicena’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 83.3(1962), p.302-03

<sup>10</sup> Cf. al-Qur’an, 65:12, 16:40

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Dr. Naeem Ahmed, *Tarikh e Falsfa-e Yunaan*, Lahore: Ilmi Kitab Khana, 2005, p. 145

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 158

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 204.

<sup>14</sup> Claudius Ptolemy c. AD 90 – c. AD 168, was a Greek-Roman citizen of Egypt. He was a renowned mathematician, astronomer, geographer, astrologer, and poet.

<sup>15</sup> Van Den Berg writes that “In the Qur’an there is no definite theory about free will.” Van Den Berg, *Ibid*, p. xi. Simon Van Den Berg is absolutely mistaken on this point. There is a definite theory of free will in the Qur’an. For verification please see the following articles of Dr. Abdul Hafeez Fâzli:

Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qura’n,

Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXII, No. 4 (October-December, 1999) Bait al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 97-105.

The Antinomy of Free Will and the Appointed Term (Ajal Mussamma)

Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXIII No. 4, (October-December 2000) Bait al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 63-68.

Qudrat e Mutliq our Insaani Aazadi,(Urdu) in al-Hikmat, Vol. 20 (2000), The Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab Lahore Pakistan.

Allah’s Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man

Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXV, No. 1, (January-March 2002) Bait al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 31-40.

Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom

Al-Hikmat, vol. 26 (2006), pp.11-46, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

<sup>16</sup> H.A.Wolfson, Avicena, Al-Ghazali and Averros on divine attributes, *Homenaje a Miltas vallicrosa vol-II*, 1956, p.545-46

<sup>17</sup> Van Den Berg, *Ibid*, p. xxi.

<sup>18</sup> Marmura, *Ibid* article, p.304

<sup>19</sup> Cf. M.Saeed Shaikh, *Studies in Muslim Philosophy*, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. 1974, p.154; also Cf. Hourani, *Ibid*, part-II, p.311-13.

<sup>20</sup> A magnum opus of Ghazali in which he refutes the Muslim philosophers’ views as incoherent.

<sup>21</sup> Hourani, *ibid*, part-I, *the Muslim World*, vol.48(1958), p.183

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Dr. Naeem Ahmed, *Ibid*, p. 158-59

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Marmura, *Ibid* article, p.303

<sup>24</sup> As per Aristotle’s definition ‘something is a logical contradiction if it is impossible to be conceived.’

<sup>25</sup> Hourani, *ibid*, part-I, p.184-91

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p.184-85

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p.186

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, part-II, p.312-13

<sup>29</sup> “The earliest thoroughly-established system is that of Ptolemy... We obtain an excellent view of the general nature of this system from Cicero. He writes:— “The Universe is composed of nine heavens, or rather of nine moving globes. The outermost sphere is that of the heavens which surrounds all the others, and on which are fixed stars. Beneath this revolve seven other globes, carried round by a motion in a direction contrary to that of the heavens. (John F. Blake, *Astronomical Myths Based on Flammarion’s History of the Heavens*, chap viii *Astronomical Systems*, 1877, p. 179-80, Google Books )

<sup>30</sup> Steven Hocking, *A Brief History of Time*, 14.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid p. 23

<sup>32</sup> Dr. Abdul Khaliq and Prof. Yousaf Shadai, *Muslim Falsfa (Urdu)*, Aziz Publishers, Urdu Bazar, Lahore, 1988, p.189

<sup>33</sup> Micheal E.Marmura, Ibid, p.302

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 305

<sup>35</sup> According to Ash’arites and al-Ghazali there is no causation in this world at all. There is only one extra-mundane cause which is God. Van Den Berg, Ibid, p. xxvi

“al-Ghazali was an Ash'arite in Kalam. Ash’arism ... subscribed to a metaphysics of transient atoms and accidents, from which material bodies are composed. It regarded all temporal existents as the direct creation of God, decreed by His eternal attribute of will and enacted by His attribute of power. What humans habitually regard as sequences of natural causes and effects are in reality concomitant events whose constant association is arbitrarily decreed by the divine will. Between created things, there is no necessary causal connection— indeed, no causal interaction at all. God is the sole cause: all events are His direct creation. There is no inherent necessity in the uniformity of nature. Hence, when at certain times in history God interrupts this uniformity by creating a miracle on behalf of a prophet or holy man, no contradiction ensues. In his works of Kalam, al-Ghazali ardently defended this atomist-occasionalist doctrine on logical and epistemological grounds.” Marmura, “Translator’s Introduction” p.xvi-vii.

<sup>36</sup> Hospers, John, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, Reprint 1978, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 317

<sup>37</sup> Ibid p.

<sup>38</sup> Bertrand Arthur William. Third Earl Russell, British philosopher, mathematician, social critic, and writer who had profound influence on the development of symbolic logic, logical positivism, and the set theory of mathematics. His written works include *Principia Mathematica* (1910-1913), written with Alfred North Whitehead, and *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945). He won the 1950 Nobel Prize for literature.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, in full Taqî al-Dîn Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Salâm ibn ‘Abd Allâh ibn Muḥammad ibn Taymiyyah (born 1263, Ḥarran, Mesopotamia— died Sept. 26, 1328, Cairo), one of Islam’s most forceful theologians who, as a member of the Pietist school founded by Ibn Ḥanbal, sought the return of the

Islamic religion to its sources: the Qur'ân and the *sunnah*, revealed writing and the prophetic tradition. He is also the source of the Wahhâbiyah, a mid-18th-century traditionalist movement of Islam. *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Ibn Taymiyyah", accessed June 06, 2012, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/280847/Ibn-Taymiyyah>.

<sup>40</sup> Muhammad Hanif Nadvi, *Aqliyât-e Ibn Tamiya*, Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, Second reprint 2001, p. 196. Muhammad Hanif Nadvi develops Ibn-e Tamiyah's doctrine of the continuity of effects with reference to pages 71, 72, 188, 189, 190, 201, 209 of Ibn Tamiyah's *Ar-Rasala tut Tadmiryah* published by Husainiya of Egypt. Year of publishing is not given.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, "Ibn Tamiya ka Tasawar-e Sifaat", (Urdu) in *Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, Vol. January 1962, Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Club Road Lahore, pp. 45-46

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p.48

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p.20

<sup>44</sup> Al-Qur'an... *Laysa Kamithlihi Shay'un...*(Nothing is like Him) (42:11)

<sup>45</sup> The concept of reward in the Qur'an of human actions depends upon this belief. Reference to few verses is as follows: Ibid, 17:63,98, 41:28.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 18:47

<sup>47</sup> Ibid 64:09; 65:11; 72:23; 98:08

<sup>48</sup> Al-Qur'an, "*Wa Qalu Ma Hiya 'Illa Hayatuna Ad-Dunya Namutu Wa Nahya Wa Ma Yuhlikuna 'Illa Ad-Dahru Wa Ma Lahum Bidhalika Min 'Ilmin 'In Hum 'Illa Yažunnuna.*" (45:24); "*Hal 'Atá `Alá Al-'Insani Hinun Mina Ad-Dahri Lam Yakun Shay'aan Madhkuraan.*" (76:01). For detailed criticism please see: Abdul Hafeez Fazli, "Iqbal's view of Omniscience and human freedom", *The Muslim World*, (95), 2005, p.136

<sup>49</sup> Al-Qur'an, "*Inna 'Ilahakum Lawahidun.*" (37:4), "*Quli Allahu Khaliq Kulli Shay'in Wa Huwa Al-Wahidu Al-Qahharu.*" (13:16), "*Inna 'mallahu ilahun Wahidu.*" (4:171), Wa 'Ilahukum 'Ilahun Wahidun La 'Ilaha 'Illa Huwa Ar-Rahmanu Ar-Rahimu. (2:163)

<sup>50</sup> Night comes before the day.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 'Innama 'Amruhu 'Idha 'Arada Shay'aan 'An YaquLa LahuKun Fayakunu. (36:82)

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, Huwa Al-'Awwalu Wa Al-'Akhiru Wa Až-Žahiru Wa Al-Batinu Wa Huwa Bikulli Shay'in `Alimun. (57:3)

<sup>53</sup> "*Qul Huwa Allahu 'Ahadun. Allahu As-Samadu. Lam Yalid Wa Lam Yulad. Walam Yakun Lahu Kufuan 'Ahadun.*" (112:1-4)

**17. Evolving a Qur'anic Paradigm of Science and Philosophy: Ibn Sina, Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal and Dr. Israr Ahmad**

<sup>1</sup> Abdul Hafeez Fazli, "Ibn Sina, Al-Gazali And Ibn Taymiyyah On The Origination Of The World" IJHR, 2(1), February, 2013, 19

<sup>2</sup> Claudius Ptolemy c. AD 90 – c. AD 168, was a Greek-Roman citizen of Egypt. He was a renowned mathematician, astronomer, geographer, astrologer, and poet.

<sup>3</sup>Source:Cartage.org: <http://www.cartage.org.lb/en/themes/sciences/mainpage.htm>)

<sup>4</sup> For details and references, please see the article, "Creationism, Emanationism, and Co-Eternity".

<sup>5</sup> "While naturalism has often been equated with materialism, it is much broader in scope. ...Strictly speaking, naturalism has no ontological preference; *i.e.*, no bias toward any particular set of categories of reality: dualism and monism, atheism and theism, idealism and materialism are all *per se* compatible with it. So long as all of reality is natural, no other limitations are imposed.' 'Naturalists point out that even when one scientific theory is abandoned in favour of another, man does not despair of knowing nature, nor does he repudiate the "natural method" in his search for truth. Theories change; methodology does not.'" (<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/406468/naturalism>, last updated 9.11.2013)

<sup>6</sup> Verily Allah keeps the heavens and the earth in place lest they leave their places. If they move from their places, no one can grasp them. Allah is Ever Most Forbearing, Oft-Forgiving. (35:41)

<sup>7</sup> Naturalism did not exist as a philosophy before the nineteenth century, but only as an occasionally adopted and non-rigorous method among natural philosophers. It is a unique philosophy in that it is not ancient or prior to science, and that it developed largely due to the influence of science. Naturalism begins with Galileo and Isaac Newton, who began to explain nature by theoretical and experimental descriptions of matter and their motions. The outstanding success of this method led others to emulate them, and a comprehensive understanding of the universe was initiated. Galileo and Newton were not naturalists; they did not hesitate to attribute supernatural causes to things that they thought could not be explained by natural causes. Until the late eighteenth century, most scientists agreed with them, but the influence of the Enlightenment led scientists, such as Antoine Laurent Lavoisier, Pierre Simon de Laplace, and James Hutton to abandon all supernatural explanations in favor of natural ones. Biology was the last science to be so treated, by Jean Baptiste Lamarck and Charles Darwin. I am convinced that each of these men intentionally tried to be the Newton of his day--and science--by finding purely natural laws to explain natural processes and objects. Naturalism is Today An Essential Part of Science, by Prof. Steven D. Schafersman, at [http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/schafersman\\_nat.html](http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/schafersman_nat.html)

<sup>8</sup> Allah's Word is *al-Haqq*. (Al-Qur'an, 6:73, 2:42 etc.) *Al-Haqq* means 'the standard of truth'. Whenever Allah reveals *al-Haqq*, it comes to humankind as the certain truth. (*ibid*, 32:2-3; 34:6 etc.) And *al-bâtil* (falsehood, untruth), *al-dalâl* (error) or *ẓann* (conjecture or opinion) have no reality of their own. *Al-bâtil* is but

the attempted rejection of *al-Haqq*. To say anything in violation to *al-Haqq* is without justification and wrongful (*bi ghayr 'l haqq*). (*ibid*,02:61; 03:21 etc.)

To prefer suspicions, conjectures or opinions in the face of *al-Haqq* is to follow *ẓann*. Whatever the Qur'an upholds is truth (*haqq*), whatever it disapproves is untruth (*bâtil*). To express views without reference to it is to express opinion or conjecture and 'Assuredly conjecture can by no means take the place of truth.'*(ibid*,10:36)

*Al-dalâl* (error) is nothing except deviation from truth. (*ibid*,10:32) It results in the generation of erroneous ideas, and ideological systems. It is the outcome of giving equal importance as *al-Haqq* to man-made ideas and ideologies, human experiments, opinions, suggestions, insights, imaginations, visions (*ro'yâ*), unveiling (*kashf*), direct witnessing (*shahûd*) and traditions (*riwayât*) and confounding them to *al-Haqq* (the Word of Allah). But it is the Way of Allah that He wipes out *the falsehood* and establishes *the truth* with His Words. (08:7-8)

Allah commands the believers 'not to utter aught concerning Allah save the truth' (4:171) for saying anything about Allah, not supported by the Qur'an, is *iftirâ* (concoction). (3:94)

*Al-Haqq* is the epithet used for Allah's Word revealed to His messengers (peace be upon them). Allah is the Descender of *al-Haqq*. (cf. *ibid.*, 5:83, 84; 11:120 etc.) Qur'an verifies that the People of the Book have tampered *al-Haqq* revealed in the past (cf. *ibid.*, 4:46; 5:13,41 etc.) and that Allah has taken on Him to protect the Qur'an against any such attempt, (cf. *ibid.*,15:9) so virtually epithet *al-Haqq* (*the truth*) rightfully applies to the Qur'an alone and the status of *authority* lies with it only.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Space-time in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/557482/space-time> Last updated 19.2.13)

<sup>10</sup> Cf. ([http://www.skwirk.com/p-c\\_s-4\\_u-138\\_t-400\\_c-1407/einstein-s-theory-of-relativity-/nsw/einstein-s-theory-of-relativity-/the-big-bang-and-our-universe/the-origin-of-the-universe](http://www.skwirk.com/p-c_s-4_u-138_t-400_c-1407/einstein-s-theory-of-relativity-/nsw/einstein-s-theory-of-relativity-/the-big-bang-and-our-universe/the-origin-of-the-universe))

<sup>11</sup> "The more a man is imbued with the ordered regularity of all events the firmer becomes his conviction that there is no room left by the side of this ordered regularity for causes of a different nature. For him neither the rule of human nor the rule of divine will exist as an independent cause of natural events. To be sure, the doctrine of a personal God interfering with the natural events could never be refuted, in the real sense, by science, for this doctrine can always take refuge in those domains in which scientific knowledge has not yet been able to set foot. But I am persuaded that such behaviour on the part of the representatives of religion would not only be unworthy but also fatal. For a doctrine which is able to maintain itself not in clear light but only in the dark, will of necessity lose its effect on mankind, with incalculable harm to human progress. It's probably not surprising that religious leaders have refused to heed Einstein's advice not to take refuge in the "dark" of what science has yet to illuminate. On the one hand, religion is indeed

forced to constantly retreat and narrow its claims on behalf of its god, but on the other religion would have to explicitly abandon all of its traditional doctrines. Both are arguably fatal: the former will mean that religion is continually squeezed and forced to make excuses for its errors; the latter will eliminate much of what encourages religious passion and commitment.

Unfortunately, there are far too many religious believers in the world who would prefer a retreating religion that still tries to defend traditional doctrines than a religion which admits that the doctrines wrong to begin with [?]. Conservatism requires that the alleged "truths" of the past be held to tightly because otherwise, there won't be anything to conserve. Holding on to the superstitions and falsehoods of the past does, however, accomplish exactly what Albert Einstein feared: incalculable harm to human progress." *Science and Religion* (1941), <http://atheism.about.com/od/einsteingodreligion/a/GodNature.htm>

<sup>12</sup> Basit Bilal Koshul, "Muhammad Iqbal's reconstruction of the philosophical arguments for the existence of God" in *Muhammad Iqbal: A Contemporary*, (edt.) Muhammad Suhail Umar and Basit Bilal Koshul, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2010, p. 127

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.96

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious in Islam*, ed. & annotation, M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, reprint 1986), 1,49.

<sup>17</sup> cf., *ibid*, 48-50.

<sup>18</sup> Abdul Hafeez, *The Muslim World*, vol. 95, Number 1, January 2005, pp. 125-45, Hartford Seminary 77 Sherman Street Hartford CT 06105 USA

<sup>19</sup> Muhammad Khalid Masud, "Iqbâl's Approach to Islamic Theology of Modernity", *Al-Hikmat*, 27(2007), p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> For detailed study on these points please see the following: Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taimiyyah on the problem of the origination of the world",

<sup>21</sup> Hospers, John, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, Reprint 1978, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 317

<sup>22</sup> "Bertrand Arthur William. Third Earl Russell, British philosopher, mathematician, social critic, and writer who had profound influence on the development of symbolic logic, logical positivism, and the set theory of mathematics." His written works include *Principia Mathematica* (1910-1913), written with Alfred North Whitehead, and *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945). He won the 1950 Nobel Prize for literature.

<sup>23</sup> British Literature by Credo Reference: Victorian Era, <http://libguides.iun.edu/c.php?g=10054&p=50552>



<sup>24</sup> Cf., Abdul Hafeez, "Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taimiyyah on the Origination of the World", *International Journal of Humanities and Religion*, Vol 2, No 1 (2013), p.27

<sup>25</sup> Koshul, *ibid*, p.110

<sup>26</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction ...*, p.8

<sup>27</sup> *Muhammad Iqbal: A Contemporary*, p.110

<sup>28</sup> Koshul, *ibid*, p.110

<sup>29</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction...*, p.46-7

<sup>30</sup> Şahih Muslim Sharif, (Urdu version) trans. Allama Waheed uz Zamân, Urdu Bazar Lahore: Mushtaq Book Corner, 1995, p.421-22.

<sup>31</sup> Koshul, p.126.

<sup>32</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction...*, 45

<sup>33</sup> Dr. Israr Ahmad, *The Process of Creation: A Qur'anic Perspective*, tr. Dr. Absar Ahmad, Markazi Anjuman Khuddam ul Qur'an Lahore, 2013

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p.5

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, This is not the first ever attempt solely made by Dr. Israr Ahmed for blending the 'Creation' and 'Evolution' together in one thread. "In his encyclical *Humani Generis* (1950), [Pope] Pius XII had already stated that there was no opposition between evolution and the doctrine of the faith about man and his vocation, on condition that one did not lose sight of several indisputable points." Pope John Paul II in his address entitled *Truth Cannot Contradict Truth* to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (October 22, 1996) admits that "Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis. It is indeed remarkable that this theory has been progressively accepted by researchers, following a series of discoveries in various fields of knowledge. The convergence, neither sought nor fabricated, of the results of work that was conducted independently is in itself a significant argument in favor of this theory." But neither the author of this tract nor the translator considers mentioning it and attempt to show as if it is an original attempt of Dr. Israr Ahmad.

<sup>36</sup> For my comments on the concept of eternity in western tradition please see: Abdul Hafeez Fazli, "Christian View of Omniscience and Human Freedom", *Iqbal Review* 47:4 (2006), Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p.7

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p.9

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>40</sup> So far as Christians are concerned it has been admitted even by them that there is no evidence of these concepts being Divine Attributes in Christianity before Augustine (354-430), nor is there any evidence in the Old Testament for it. Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, p. 217.

<sup>41</sup> Abdul Hafeez, "H. A. Wolfson and A. H. Kamali on the Origin of the Problem of Divine Attributes in Muslim Kalam", *Iqbal Review*, 40(3), 1998, p. 81-96

<sup>42</sup> Conf. *ibid*, p. 9-10

<sup>43</sup> Conf., *Ibid*

<sup>44</sup> Dr. Israr Ahmed, *ibid*, p.12

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12

<sup>46</sup> Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, "The Qur'an: Creation or Command" *International Journal of Humanities and Religion [IJHR]*, 2(10) December 2012: 75 -83, India.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1976, p. 263-74.

<sup>48</sup> The Qur'an, cf. 07:54

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 30:25

<sup>50</sup> Abu 'L-Hasan 'Ali Ibn Isma'il Al-Ash'ari, *Al-Ibaanah an Usul Ad-Diyaanah* (Eng. tr. *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation* by Walter C. Klein), American Oriental Society, New Haven, 1940, p. 66, 67, 76; also see translator's note at page 66. Klein in this note writes "In this section al-Ash'ari repeats himself frequently. He attempts to show, on the one hand, that the Qur'an is not created, because it has not the characteristics of a created thing and exists independently of creation, and, on the other hand, that it is eternal and uncreated because, it is in a sense, a predicate of God's attributes, like His Knowledge and His Will..." For details see: Abdul Hafeez Fâzli, *ibid*

<sup>51</sup> Dr. Israr Ahmad, *ibid*, p.11

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Not everyone is qualified for the demarcation of limits for the relationship between truth and untruth. *Those who know and those who do not know are not equal.* (Az-Zumar, 39:09) Only those who are endowed with understanding grasp the Message. (... *Wa Mâ Yadhakkaru 'Illâ 'Ūlū Al-'Albâbi.* Āl-i-Imrân, 03:07).

<sup>54</sup> Al-Qur'an, 3:7

<sup>55</sup> Also consider the following: Fine flour, which is very harmful for health, was never used by the Prophet (pbuh) in his life time. But now it is used by Muslims all over the world. The products of fine flour are used in Makka and Madina in highly abundant quantity. Is it not *bid'at-i-sayia*? To have photographs was once considered *bid'at-i-sayia* but is it not the case that performance of *Hajj* or *Umra* is not possible without it? Has it not become *bid'at-i-hasana*! Many more examples from everyday life can be given.